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I 
 
ABSTRACT 
Rational choice theory, which has a prominent position in the study of politics, generally 
focusses on developed Western countries, former African colonies and Latin American 
countries but neglects countries with an imperial background. This research aims to fill this 
gap paying attention to Turkey’s political economy and more specifically to the Kurdish 
Question and agricultural development of the South-eastern Anatolia Region. Rational choice 
theory pays attention to intra-elite relationships in state formation but tends to overlook the 
role of the peripheral movements in shaping intra-elite relationships. Following the founding 
of modern Turkey, over time, a series of peripheral movements emerged. The highly 
centralised formation of the Turkish state, the conflicting relationship between the centre and 
the periphery, and its effects on intra-elite relationships in the dominant coalition will be 
discussed in this research, particularly within the context of the Kurdish Question. The 
Question is relevant to the relatively less development of the South-eastern Anatolia Region. 
The development narrative is used to both gain insights in the development problems of the 
region and in the Question. Since 2001, both neoliberal policies at national level and 
development interventions at regional level were concurrently employed to deal with the 
region’s problems. The effects of these policies will be under investigation to then critically 
assess the use of the rational choice theory for countries with an imperial history. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The Context and the Contribution of the Study 
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, it left neither secure nor prosperous people in a 
disintegrated and war-affected Anatolia and Thrace. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a representative 
of the military class, became involved in shaping the country’s path under challenging 
circumstances. He managed to gather a group of people from within the army and set out to 
save the last pieces of territory of the Empire. When he founded modern Turkey in 1923, he 
had to deal with a returning question: how will the country achieve both security and 
prosperity? The discussion on modernisation among Ottoman elites dated back to the early-
period of the 18th century, and focussed on how the Ottoman army could catch up with the 
strong armies in Europe (Aytekin, 2013). The widening developmental disparity between the 
Ottomans and its European counterparts intensified this discussion. After the Ottoman 
modernisation was extended to reform the state and the society in the following centuries, 
Ataturk found himself among reformist army officials. Therefore, when he came to power, he 
did not hesitate to shape Turkey as a modern, secular, republican and nationalist country. 
This formation of the state incited reactions from two main groups, something which is 
present till this day: the conservatives and the Kurds. Their reactions were dominated by two 
topics: state formation and development. The conservatives opposed the removal of the 
caliphate, the introduction of secularism, the disengagement of modern Turkey from the 
country’s past and traditional values for westernisation (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 46-48), and the 
creation of a secular, westernised bourgeoisie at the expense of the peasantry with 
conservative values. In addition, the Kurds opposed the recognition of Turkishness as the 
only national identity and the removal of their autonomous rights with republicanism 
referring to high centralisation (Yavuz, 2001). 
When Turkey transitioned to a multi-party system at the end of World War II, the state 
relaxed its political grip over civil political involvement. In the late 1960s, Kurds were 
ideologically divided into two main categories: Islamist Kurds, and secular Kurds including 
Marxists and nationalists. Islamist Kurds have owned similar complaints as the conservatives 
towards state formation and development whereas secular Kurds have focussed on issues 
such as democratic rights, decentralisation, national identity and developmental problems of 
eastern Turkey (Yavuz, 2001). Overall, the discussions about state formation and 
development have never lost its relevance since Turkey was founded. 
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After safeguarding itself by suppressing the above mentioned responses in the 1920s-30s, the 
modern state showed determination in achieving development. During the early-period of the 
Republic, it first attempted to leave development to market actors, refraining from state 
interventions, using a classical liberal recipe. But this failed, as its economy had no mature 
capitalist class. Lacking such a class that could carry out developmental efforts on their own, 
the state attempted to create such a class dependent, applying economic protection and 
government interventions for a sustained period. Intentional development arrangements and 
efforts have, nationally or regionally, been part of economic policy design and 
implementations since then. 
The first massive flow of the masses from rural to urban areas in developing western Turkey 
took place in the 1950s. Urbanisation has constantly risen after that time, compounding the 
existing political and socio-economic problems. Democratic and economic demands have 
remained on the agenda of ordinary people, though security problems and military coups 
occasionally have blocked these. 
Turkey’s socio-economic transformation has created strong peripheral movements among the 
before mentioned groups, which dramatically intensified in the 1960 and 70s. While capitalist 
development was progressing, different classes and factions of classes continued to emerge, 
making the political setting more complicated along cultural and economic dimensions. 
Political conflicts started to depend on urban-based groups characterised by emerging 
developmental and cultural problems. While most secular Turks from different classes were 
championing the existing Kemalist modern transformation, two distinct groups were 
opposing them, criticising the state formation and the development pathway. One of those 
groups included leftist Turkish and Kurdish youth, part of the working class and secular 
Alevis and Kurds; the other involved conservative Turkish and Kurdish workers, and 
conservative small and medium-scale capital owners, some of which later became large-scale 
capitalists.  
All these groups have become highly politicised, competing with each other and putting 
pressure on the state to gain what they want. While the developmental disparity between 
western Turkey and other regions has widened and created complaints and demands, military 
coups have mounted to shape the political terrain. All of these disagreements and competition 
resulted in the rise of the Kurdish political movement and the Islamic movement in the 1990s, 
despite all the military interventions, and peaked after 2002 when the conservative Islamist 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power. 
3 
 
Because of the memories of the historical rivalry between the Ottomans and European big 
powers, and of modern Turkey’s choice to adopt westernisation as a way of modern 
development, the ordinary Turkish citizen occasionally makes the comparison between 
Turkey and developed Western countries to understand to what extent and why Turkey has 
succeeded or failed. Focusing on this question, this thesis discusses how developed countries 
achieved development in their history (see chapter 2). In doing so, it uses rational choice 
theory (RCT) in a critical manner. RCT is a dominant theoretical approach in politics for 
many years now. Prosperity and Violence and Development Dilemma written by Bates 
(2017), and Violence and Social Orders written by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) are 
seminal works in RCT and our main focus here. While critically assessing these studies, the 
research underlines that they comprehend state formation and development as a result of 
interaction and rivalries within a dominant coalition. They do not however examine how any 
reaction that comes from outside the dominant coalition influences the political-economic 
development and shapes the dominant coalition itself. The research also argues that regional 
diversities do not cause regionalism, shaping a political terrain hampering development. If a 
highly centralised state blocks political access and participation through suppressing the 
people, this may led those people to revert to regionalism. 
RCT scholars generally take the cases of African former colonies and occasionally Latin 
American countries to make comparisons with developed countries in order to grasp the 
dynamics that are responsible for developmental failures in developing countries. The gap in 
RCT is that it does not recognise the unique circumstances of developing countries with an 
imperial background (e.g. Turkey, China, Thailand and Iran etc.). These constitute a different 
type of category for examining how state formation and development take place. This 
research therefore focusses on Turkey’s state formation and development starting from the 
political, economic and institutional heritage of the Ottoman Empire to present day, in order 
to critically appraise RCT. 
Since its foundation, the character of the Turkish state, and its formation and transformation 
have become focus of interest among scholars. In general, the alliance between the military 
and capitalist classes is accepted as shaping and keeping power along the trajectory of 
capitalist development. However, some argue that the military is the main actor determining 
Turkey’s political trajectory (see Başkaya, 1991; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997; Feroz, 1993/1995; 
Kucukaydin, 2013b; Mardin, 1973), indicating that the military bureaucracy itself has class-
like interests to maximize politically. Others maintain that political-economic needs of the 
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bourgeoisie dominate politics by interacting with international/global capitalism, and that the 
military forcibly shapes the political terrain when it is required by the bourgeoisie (see 
Boratav, 2005; Yasli, 2014). In this sense, Turkey’s swing from semi-democratic to anti-
democratic orders or vice versa results from the problems of capital accumulation of the 
bourgeoisie in the context of centre-periphery relationships in the international system. 
This research accepts the significant role of the bourgeoisie in the dominant coalition but 
argues that the military has a key role in it. This role is a historical institutional fact spanning 
from the Ottomans to modern Turkey. 
Turkey’s political economic problems manifest themselves most clearly in the Kurdish 
Question and agricultural development of the South-eastern Anatolia Region (SAR). As a 
peripheral movement, the Kurdish Question fits in an ethno-political problem, covering 
several sub-problems with regard to national identity, democratic rights and development. As 
long as these problems cannot be solved successfully, the modern Kurdish political 
movement remains one of the greatest domestic challenges to the Turkish state. The effect of 
the armed conflict between the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê in 
Kurdish, PKK henceforth) and Turkey was one of the factors crippling Turkey’s development 
in the 1990s. 
The research critically approaches Olson’s argument in Logic of Collective Action that 
political collective action in large groups can be explained by psychological factors (see 
Chapter 3). Relying on the studies of Ahn and Ostrom (2008), E. Ostrom and Ahn (2009) and 
Miedema (2010), this research argues that social capital plays a key role in political collective 
action, and that despite all the measures taken by the state, the never-ending strength of the 
Kurdish political movement stems from the strong intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic social capital 
formed by Kurds. The measures proposed by the state to solve the Question are devised in 
two narratives: the military narrative and the development narrative. The former aims to 
eliminate the PKK, whereas the latter to transform Kurds via the South-eastern Anatolia 
Project (GAP in Turkish, Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi): an integrated, multi-sectorial socio-
economic development project. But the social capital of Kurds has frustrated the disguised 
aims of the state so far. 
When the JDP government came to power nearly two years after the deeply shocking 2001 
economic crisis, the centre-periphery relations became tense because of national-level 
disputes exacerbated by changes in international political settings. Searching for support from 
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the West, the government also directed its attention to the Kurdish Question to get support of 
Kurds. Meanwhile, the PKK, overcoming the arrest of its leader in 1999, revitalised itself in 
North Iraq where the Iraqi state lost its authority after the United States’ (US) invasion.  
In this political terrain, the ruling government took action to prevent the military bureaucracy 
from engaging in the Question via military measures, which may otherwise have caused their 
removal from power, similar to what happened to the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) in the 
1990s. While they fostered the relationship with the US in relation to this country’s interests 
in the Middle East and with the European Union (EU) to start Turkey’s accession 
negotiations, they promoted democratic openings and commenced peace talks with the 
political elites of the Kurdish pro-party and even with the arrested leader of the PKK. 
Furthermore, they have remained loyal to pre-determined commitments to neoliberal policies 
that were given by the previous government to the bourgeoisie and international economic 
organisations. Finally, the JDP attempted to contribute to the development of the SAR 
through government interventions. The last two policies mentioned above may look 
contradictorily, but the political conditions the government has faced and the course of the 
Kurdish Question were determinant in pursuing them. The commitments to neoliberalism 
have provided the government with the support of international organisations and the 
bourgeoisie. Public investments in the region’s agricultural development, without departing 
from market-based approaches, were aimed at getting the support of ordinary Kurds and 
enchanting the Kurdish bourgeoisie for a resolution to the Question. 
The research aims to understand the political economic factors behind and the effects on the 
regional agricultural development of the simultaneous implementation of neoliberal 
agricultural policies at the national-level and government interventions at the regional-level 
since 2001. In doing so, it shows that the conflicting relations between the centre and the 
periphery have shaped the dominant coalition in Turkey, so contributing to what Violence 
and Social Orders discusses (see chapter 5). 
By providing empirical findings, it, furthermore, critically assesses the arguments made by 
Robert Bates in Markets and States in Tropical Africa, which defies government 
interventions in agriculture and suggests that agricultural development must be left to free-
market dynamics. Our research finds that free market dynamics secured with neoliberal 
agricultural policies have created unfavourable results for especially smallholders since 2001 
but favourable ones for merchants, brokers, exporters, supermarkets and agro-processors. It 
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also shows that if government interventions are designed in accordance with the poly-centric 
governance approach, positive results can be obtained. 
1.2 Key Concepts 
As our main objective is to contribute to RCT from the point of state formation and 
development, we will introduce the key concepts of RCT and development. 
Rational Choice Theory 
RCT owns a dominant position in the social sciences as a theory which has nearly no area of 
politics untouched. True, rational choice scholars have enriched our understanding and 
knowledge of specific social phenomena in almost every subfield of social sciences; yet, all 
the theoretical arguments and inferences developed in those subfields have remained 
fragmented in a manner that has prevented the construction of a singular theory covering all 
the subfields (Wittek, Snijders, & Nee, 2014, p. 2). 
Displaying and critically assessing the methodological aspects of and variations in RCT 
require an effort beyond the aim of this section (see D. P. Green and Shapiro (1994); Boudon 
(2009); Wittek et al. (2014)). However, explaining its main assumptions may help to 
appreciate the nature of RCT.  
Methodological individualism plays an essential role in constructing the methodological 
foundations of RCT. As Boudon (2009, p. 180) states, ‘any social phenomenon is the effect 
of individual decisions, actions, attitudes and so forth’, where individuals are ‘concerned 
mainly with the consequences for themselves of their action. From this point, individual 
actions are supposed to be based on ‘understandable motivations and/or reasons’ (p. 180), 
referring to acting rationally. Rationality characterises the reason of individuals calculating 
costs and benefits of each in the set of possible actions, formulated as expected utility 
maximisation. For utility maximisation ‘when confronted with an array of options, she picks 
the one she believes best serves her objectives’ (D. P. Green & Shapiro, 1994, p. 14). 
Rationality conceptually varies among RCT scholars (see Wittek et al. (2014, pp. 5-6) for 
different types of rationality), but the most preferred model of rationality in RCT is bounded 
rationality. It was constituted to tackle the unrealistic assumptions of models of full 
rationality, which are that ‘individuals are fully informed about all their decision alternatives, 
the probabilities of their outcomes, and their consequences’ (Wittek et al., 2014, pp. 6-7), and 
that ‘[i]ndividual decision-makers do not face any cognitive limitations or biases in 
perceiving or processing this information’ (Wittek et al., 2014, p. 7) to calculate cost and 
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benefits of alternative options to reach utility maximisation. In this context, models of 
bounded rationality make two important assumptions: 
First, decision-makers are usually not fully informed about all available options: their 
perception of information is biased through selective attention (framing processes). 
Second, humans have limited cognitive capacities for processing the information that is 
available to them: rather than maximizing, boundedly rational actors satisfice—that is, 
once they detect a course of action that in their eyes is good enough to reach a goal, they 
won’t go on searching for a better one, even if they know that a better solution would be 
available (Wittek et al., 2014, p. 7). 
In Understanding the Process of Economic Change, North (2005, p. 24) accepts these 
assumptions of bounded rationality but points out that choices are also bounded within a set 
of beliefs in a world that evolves or changes continuously. This implies rationality shaped by 
a set of beliefs, which are necessarily creating path dependency in development in terms of 
crafting institutions. As he highlights, “choices in the present are constrained by the heritage 
of institutions accumulated from the past” (North, 2005, p. 51), and options out of the path 
would therefore not be chosen by rational individuals. 
RCT is successful in explaining not only individual actions but also collective actions. It 
elucidates within bounded rationality that individuals seeking utility maximisation may get 
involved in coordination and cooperation to reach common or group interests or benefits. In 
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, M. Olson (2002, pp. 
133-134) proves that in order to attain a collective good, large groups or organisations can act 
collectively if they provide positive inducements to encourage individuals to incur costs and 
if they have the authority and capacity to coerce or punish free-riders. In Governing the 
Commons, E. Ostrom (2011) shows that even in the absence of an authority to coerce or 
punish free-riders, individuals are capable of acting collectively to appropriate a collective 
good from common pool resources and to set rules for how to do so and for how to set or 
modify those rules.  
As for political collective actions such as those based on nationalism or ethnicity, bounded 
rationality remains inadequate to grasp reality. RCT scholars, for a long time, approached 
nationalism and ethnicity as instruments by which elites may exploit their group members to 
further their individual interests. This standpoint is a contradictory one: nationalist or ethnic 
group members have individual rationalism but they also stupidly follow their manipulative 
leaders without taking account of their own interests. However, nationalist or ethnic 
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collective action may require to take risks of resisting or fighting against another group or a 
dominant political power despite high costs (Varshney, 2003). For such political collective 
actions, according to Varshney (2003), the concept of rationality combines two different 
types: instrumental rationality and value rationality. Instrumental rationality is similar to 
bounded rationality in that individuals in the group use ethnicity or nationalism to reach their 
self-interested ends. This type of rationality especially predominates when a nationalist or 
ethnic movement ‘has reached a critical mass, raising prospects of success’ (Varshney, 2003). 
Value rationality explains the origins of an ethnic movement, and its pure form drives 
individuals to incur the highest costs for their group such as death.1 The combination of these 
two types of rationality shows itself in a struggle among group members how to decide to 
attain group objectives. It is no wonder that a group member has her own stance about what is 
valuable, what group objectives are to be and what is to be done to reach them. As for rival 
intra-group leaders, ‘selective retrieval of tradition’ is adopted as standard to get support from 
group members or foster group cohesion and consciousness (Varshney, 2003).  
Development 
Pointing to the fact that there are too many but highly contested definitions of development in 
the literature, M. P. Cowen and Shenton (1996/2005, pp. 2-3) argue that a major source of 
confusion comes from understanding development ‘as an imminent and objective process’ 
(e.g. capitalism develops) and understanding development as what can be achieved by 
intentional actions of ‘a subjective source of action’. 
When addressing the development of the West from a historical perspective, it is taken as a 
natural process or transformation. For example, the transformation from agricultural economy 
to industrial or urban-based economy, called as the great transformation, is proceeded by two 
laws pertaining to agricultural production: the law of diminishing return and Engel’s law. 
The law of diminishing returns holds that if the total size of land remains fixed as populations 
grow, then increases in returns from farming diminish. Average incomes would consequently 
decrease, and agrarian societies would fall into poverty. Regional specialisation in 
agricultural products, the expansion of trade of agricultural surplus on markets, and migration 
to not-yet-under cultivation lands are responses of agrarian families to counter the effect of 
the law of diminishing returns (Bates, 2017, pp. 7-8). Agrarian families interact with 
                                                          
1 Varshney (2003) states that the pure form of value rationality is exemplified in suicide bombings and seeking 
martyrdom. The individuals who get involved in them accept the high costs of their actions such as death and 
seek to contribute to their common goals. 
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merchants in towns to sell their agricultural surplus; merchants sell agricultural commodities 
to urban dwellers. In response to the law of diminishing returns, surplus labour is directed to 
developing urban areas for employment while families transition to intensive agriculture. The 
capital accumulation mechanism set up between town and rural areas in this way reflects the 
historical development of north-western Europe.  
According to Engel’s law, as incomes rise, food expenditures proportionally decrease in 
family budgets. The remaining part of the disposable income is spent to purchase non-
subsistence or urban commodities and services, and on a macro-level, the rural sector loses its 
weight in a country’s total gross domestic product (GDP). That is, urban economies 
characterised by industry and service sectors replace the rural sector (Bates, 2017, p. 8). Here, 
development implies a natural course of structural changes. 
The intentional development actions and approaches increased in importance after World 
War II and were especially aimed at dealing with developmental problems of the Third-
World (Escobar, 1997). The general approach to development was based on western-oriented 
assumptions, that is, the creation of ‘the conditions that were supposed to characterise the 
more economically advanced nations of the world’ were attempted for development (Escobar, 
1997).  
In the development literature, another source of confusion about development has, since then, 
arisen out of the ‘distinction between the state policy of development and the attempt to 
empower people, independently of the state’ (M. P. Cowen & Shenton, 1996/2005, p. 2). 
Particularly, the former has provided states of the Third World with legitimisation and means 
to achieve disguised political aims, such as aims relevant to nation-building and the removal 
of what is traditional.  
The development as an attempt to empower people goes beyond the concept of economic 
growth that indicates material welfare. As Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, p. 1) put it, it 
includes: 
the eradication of poverty with its correlates of illiteracy, disease, and early death; 
changes in the composition of inputs and outputs that generally include shifts in the 
underlying structure of production away from agricultural toward industrial activities; the 
organization of the economy in such a way that productive employment is general among 
the working-age population rather than the situation of a privileged minority; and the 
correspondingly greater participation of broadly based groups in making decisions about 
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the directions, economic and otherwise, in which they should move to improve their 
welfare. 
The developmental efforts in the Third World significantly created adverse results because 
their design was ‘sociologically ill-informed and ill-conceived’ (Cernea, 1994). The general 
approach to development has evolved since then. The disadvantaged groups were selected as 
the target group to benefit from developmental programmes and investments, undergirded by 
technical advice of social scientists, which were directed to social structures instead of 
physical infrastructure; approaches were adopted taking into consideration the diversity and 
locality rather than taking an ethno-centralism perspective (Cernea, 1994). In recent years, an 
important development has occurred with the emergence of the multi-stakeholder approach,  
creating cooperation and coordination across different modes of organisations and facilitating 
the participation of non-governmental bodies and private actors in decision-making processes 
and monitoring (Fransen & Kolk, 2007). 
1.3 Research Questions 
This study focuses on the political economy of development as an intentional attempt made 
by governments, development agencies, private actors, and non-governmental organisations. 
The main aim of the study is to critically assess RCT taking into consideration state 
formation and development in Turkey as a country with an imperial background. The 
transition from Empire to a modern republic did not go smoothly. The Kurdish Question, 
emerged as a result of this transition, has politically evolved over the years and considerably 
affected security and prosperity of the country. It still remains unsolvable as an ethno-
political problem. One of the characteristics of this problem is that it has always been 
interlocked with the less developed SAR which has a high Kurdish density. After the armed 
conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, market-oriented relationships and the use of 
modern agricultural methods started to spread across the region. This period coincided with 
the neoliberal agricultural transformation of Turkey’s agriculture, underscored by the 
introduction of the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) and the acceleration 
in government interventions in regional development, mostly within the scope of the SAR. In 
light of these developments, the research seeks to answer two questions: 
Why has Turkey, since 2001, simultaneously implemented both neoliberal 
agricultural policies and government interventions for agricultural development in 
the South-eastern Anatolia Region?   
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The response mainly lies in changes in Turkey’s political economy but specifically in the 
conflicting relationship between the centre and the periphery and international dealings of the 
government. After answering this question, we will answer a second question: 
How has the simultaneous implementation of neoliberal agricultural 
transformation and government interventions affected agricultural development 
of the South-eastern Anatolia Region since 2001? 
1.4 Research Design and Methodology 
This section discusses the methodological aspects of the research. The focus and limitations 
of the research are discussed. Furthermore, the details of data collection and the sampling 
method for quantities interviews will be shown. 
1.4.1 Focus and Limitations 
In this section the focus and limitations of the research are discussed. Note that the main 
observation – namely that the SAR is among the least developed regions in Turkey – is 
discussed in the background chapter.  
This research does not offer an analysis of the sustainability of agricultural development. 
Sustainability, in general, refers to increasing material welfare without leading to 
depreciation of the environment at the expense of the wellbeing of future generations. In this 
regard, Turkey has been improving, albeit slowly, its institutional framework and capability 
in line with the EU acquis (Oskam et al., 2004, pp. 146-150, 195-196) and cooperating with 
the affiliated organisation of United Nations to reach sustainable development goals (UNDP, 
2018). We therefore assume that agricultural authorities in Turkey, agricultural enterprises 
(AEs), and other related organisations are gradually improving their activities with regard to 
sustainable concepts. Our analysis does not cover most aspects of the agricultural relationship 
between Turkey and the EU or/and other international organisations.  As a matter of fact, the 
direct influence of international organisations over the regional development is limited to 
financial aid and technical assistance, which will be referred to within the evaluation of 
project- or programme-based interventions via the poly-centric governance approach in the 
next chapters. 
We focus on agricultural development rather than rural development, taking into account the 
fact that their conceptual equivalence is no longer accepted in the literature. Rural 
development requires to develop an understanding about rural milieus and the rural poor. In 
this sense, the general topics addressed in rural development are to develop rural households, 
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various rural non-farm sectors and employment types in rural spatial areas and to offset social 
inequalities in rural life. Agricultural development however focuses on the development of 
agricultural sector, so on agricultural policies and institutions and on interactions between 
different stakeholders such as producers, input providers, intermediaries, buyers, processors, 
and employment types in an agricultural space (Schejtman, 2008, pp. 141-142). Agriculture 
and agro-industry have an important role in the SAR’s economy. So when the government 
formulates and carries out economic policies for the region’s development, it therefore 
inevitably needs to take account of the two sectors.  
Our research concerns agricultural enterprises in the SAR that engage in modern, market-
based relations, so excluding small agricultural enterprises (SAE) doing subsistence farming. 
The temporal scope of our analysis chapters spans the period of 2001 to 2017, which 
witnessed a stark variation in terms of marketisation of agricultural enterprises. Subsistence 
or semi-subsistence farming had prevailed until the late-1990s, especially in Kurdish-
populated high-elevated areas (P. J. White, 1998, 1999). That is, farmers had mostly or 
completely cultivated their lands for their own consumption. But unfavourable physical and 
economic conditions exacerbated by the armed conflict (Jongerden, 2015, pp. 313-351) and 
diminishing returns as a result of an increasing population2 greatly changed the agricultural 
structure based on traditional farming (Keyder & Yenal, 2014, pp. 51-53). Traditional 
farming here refers to subsistence or semi-subsistence farming activities, which are often 
done within the limits of indigenous knowledge and cultural norms.  
This research ignores intra-tribal and inter-tribal relations, which strongly structured the 
traditional agricultural system of the region in the past but now have a limited impact on 
agricultural practices. Tribal leaders demonstrated their willingness, already from the 1950s 
onwards, to become big landholders exercising modern farming practices to generate more 
surplus. Sharecroppers, who before worked at a tribal leader’s service, almost disappeared 
many years ago as a result of mechanisation (Gürel, 2011), the diminishing returns of dry 
farming (Uluc, 2007, p. 151), the armed conflict, and the displacements related to dam 
constructions (Akça, Sasaki, & Fujikura, 2017; P. J. White, 1998). Consequently, the tribal 
system has been disintegrating for a long time, and tribal leaders are not able to perform their 
tradition roles in agricultural production anymore (Uluc, 2007, p. 149). Today tribal leaders 
                                                          
2 Even in the 1970s, Bruinessen (1992, p. 32) ascertained that limited size of land plots and the Islamic 
inheritance law leading to equal division of land among sons resulted in insufficient plot sizes for families to 
earn their livelihood and sustain their lives through farming. This phenomenon has induced migration to urban 
areas from rural ones, which is still ongoing to this day (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). 
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are largely wealthy, modern big landowners, who reside in urban areas involved in 
commerce, service and industrial sectors. They are able to keep their power and network as 
long as they provide their members with economic benefits, employment and social status 
(Gultekin, 2013).  
The research also does not pay attention to gender issues in the agricultural sector. The labour 
force participation rate of women in the SAR is the lowest in Turkey (Asik, 2012). 
Furthermore, cultural norms and values associated with patriarchy make communication with 
women very difficult for a male outsider. Whenever I was invited by a farmer to his house, 
female members of his family immediately left the living room until my departure. Men, 
given the strong patriarchal values prevalent, are still key decision-makers for most 
agricultural activities. 
The problem of insecurity in the SAR was a major limitation for the fieldwork. Southern 
boundaries of the region have long been susceptible to the threat of violence from the 
battlefields in Syria. Moreover, visiting high-conflict areas became more dangerous when 
Turkey and the PKK ended the ceasefire after the June 2015 general election. Following 
advice and warnings by local people, I cancelled or shortened potential dangerous visits.  
Another major limitation relates to incomplete, insufficient, and somewhat unreliable or 
outdated statistics that are released by the Turkish Statistical Institute, especially those that 
supposedly capture data at a regional, provincial or town level and during the period of the 
armed conflict. The recent literature about the SAR’s economy does also not offer us 
econometric studies to make inferences for our analysis. All impel us to conduct qualitative 
data collection and analysis. 
1.4.2 Data Collection and Methodology  
This study is predominately based on qualitative research methods using the inductive 
approach. Basic calculations on data provided by different sources of statistics further 
contribute to the analysis. In terms of epistemology, the research rests on interpretivism, 
seeking to capture the social world through the interpretations made by its members. With 
regard to the ontological position, the research can be defined as constructionist. According 
to Bryman (2012, p. 380), constructionism “implies that social properties are outcomes of the 
interactions between individuals, rather than phenomena ‘out there’ and separate from those 
involved in its construction.” The research recognises ‘the role of individuals in the 
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construction of social reality’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 30) and seeks to understand experiences, 
perceptions, viewpoints and values of local actors via qualitative research. 
Several data sources were used, including statistics and relevant documents from public 
organisations, i.e. reports of past policies and experiences, policy and strategy papers, plans 
and projections. These allowed an evaluation of national, regional and provincial 
organisations and their policies through a qualitative content analysis. I combined this 
primary data produced by organisations with the secondary sources produced in relevant 
areas by researches. 
Another data source was semi-structured qualitative interviews with authorities in various 
organisations. The selection criteria for the content of these interviews were as follows: I 
chose specific discussion topics for interviews, and then, several key questions were 
formulated to create an interview guide as a basis. During the interviews, the interviewer had 
the possibility to change the order of the questions, ask follow-up questions, promptly create 
additional questions and encourage the interviewee to clarify and expand on his or her 
statements or arguments (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 7; Robson, 2011, p. 280). When 
unanticipated relevant themes emerged from these interviews, those were added to the 
questionnaire and asked to the next interviewees. The interviews enabled a deeper 
understanding of the issues discussed but came with their challenges as well. Arranging 
interviews with an interviewee and conducting, transcribing and analysing them were all time 
consuming. Interviewees holding back their responses somewhat restricted the amount of 
data collected (Robson, 2011, p. 281).  
Different interview questions to different interviewees were asked according to their locale, 
the role of their organisation in agriculture, differing themes and types of agricultural crops 
cultivated. The interview questions are presented in Appendix 1a in relation to the second 
main research question.  
I occasionally met persons in a restaurant or a minibus, who were willing to get into 
conversation. After I became acquainted, I asked questions relevant to my research topic and 
took notes. This more informal and conversational type of qualitative data collection was also 
applied whenever farmers had negative attitudes about interviewing. Some farmers 
questioned my position, thinking of me as being linked to the state. To illustrate, when I went 
to villages in the central district and Hasankeyf of Batman, they were experiencing a 
disagreement with the state about the expropriation of their lands to be flooded as a result of 
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Ilisu Dam and its reservoir. This problem had been compounded by an antagonism that the 
farmers felt against the destruction of Kurdish heritage and the resumed warfare in urban 
areas of the region after the 7th June general election. It was difficult to persuade them that I 
had no ties with the state; the conversation was brief and tense. Added to the acquired data 
from the interviews were notes from conversation with the people (i.e. farmers) who reside in 
the region, statistics from different organisations, and primary and secondary sources.  
To reply the second research question, another data collection method employed was the 
focus group discussion with farmers. This technique is important for encouraging discussions 
and challenges between the participants and helps a researcher to understand what 
participants think about a certain case or topic, and how they interpret a certain phenomenon 
and construct meaning around it. The researcher can therefore understand the social world in 
a more naturalistic and practical way (Bryman, 2012, pp. 503-504). The main difficulties are 
that the focus group technique is more time consuming than individual interviews because of 
the longer transcription process; that the formation of focus groups is more arduous; and that 
the management of a focus group is a demanding task because of the possible existence of 
dominant or reserved people in a group (Bryman, 2012, p. 504). The questions that were 
asked to the focus groups are presented in Appendix 1b. 
In the next section, we will display detailed information about sampling for data collection 
and conducting of the fieldwork. 
1.4.3 Sampling for the Data Collection and Conduct of the Fieldwork 
The primary aim of this section is to describe how the fieldwork was designed and 
implemented. The fieldwork lasting over 4 months was performed in six separate periods as 
seen in Table 1.1. 
Locale  
The SAR was chosen as the main locale to be examined because it is a relatively less 
developed region in an urbanised country, in which market relations in agriculture have 
considerably bourgeoned for two decades. The political economic circumstances the region 
has faced in that period allow us to evaluate the effects of agricultural liberalisation in 
conjuncture with government interventions under a development programme, thus allowing 
for a critical assessment of the key arguments made by RCT scholars.  
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Table 1.1The Brief Timeline of the Fieldwork 
Agricultural wise, the SAR is far from a homogenous region. It includes different methods of 
agriculture (i.e. rain-fed and dry-land farming), different micro-climates, different crop types, 
various scales of agricultural enterprises in plains and mountainous areas, etc. With such 
characteristics, specific locales had to be selected in order to represent agricultural 
development of the region as complete as possible. Incidentally, it is worth noting that we 
focus on agricultural crop production (81.8%) far more than animal products (18.20%), 
taking into account of their shares in the total value of the regional agricultural GDP in 2017 
(Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). 
Prior to my fieldwork, provinces and towns were selected to be visited, on the basis of the 
2012 statistics of agricultural crop production3 ensuring a normal season not affected by 
drought or economic recession. Therefore, visits were made to the places where agricultural 
production is relatively high. For example, Kahta and Central District of Adiyaman were 
important fieldwork destinations with cereal and legume production accounting for over 60 
per cent of the total production of those crops at the provincial level (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 2018a). Nizip of Gaziantep was also visited since that town was ranked first in the 
production of olive and pistachio in the region (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a).  
                                                          
3 I used the Vegetative Production Statistics published by Turkish Statistical Institute (2017a). 
Time Period The Purpose of the Fieldwork
August 2014
Two weeks were spent to contact, arrange and conduct 
interviews with authorities at the Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Livestock and the General Directorate of the Chamber of 
Agriculture 
September 2014
Nearly a month was spent to arrange and conduct interviews 
with authorities in agricultural directorates and other 
organisations in Adiyaman, Gaziantep and Diyarbakir. Several 
farmers were interviewed as well
December 2014
One week was spent to contact, arrange and conduct 
interviews with firms that operate in agricultural information, 
technology and marketing system
April-May 2015
Over a month was spent to contact, arrange and conduct 
interviews with agricultural directorates and other agriculture-
related organisations in Mardin, Sanliurfa, Kilis, Gaziantep and 
Diyarbakir
July 2015
Nearly a month was spent to conduct interviews with farmers 
in various cities and authorities in regional administrative bodies
August 2015
Around ten days were spent to conduct interviews with farmers 
in various cities
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As many questions regarding the various crop types as possible were asked during these 
visits. Wheat, barley, maize and cotton are the prevalent crops cultivated in the region, 
however some provinces or towns produce crops such as olive, pistachio, red grape, 
pomegranate. These areas were also visited. For instance, Nizip of Gaziantep was visited to 
better understand agricultural production of pistachio and olive, Kilis for red grape, towns in 
Sanliurfa for red pepper and Adiyaman for tobacco and pomegranate. Farmers were 
interviewed exercising different methods such as rain-fed and irrigated farming methods and 
farming in different geographical spaces such as plains (i.e. Harran of Sanliurfa) and 
mountainous areas (i.e. Lice of Diyarbakir). The entire list of the towns visited can be seen in 
Appendix 2a. 
In our fieldwork, I furthermore sought to visit towns deeply affected by the Kurdish 
Question. Identifying towns with high conflict rates was necessary and therefore I used ‘the 
Global Terrorism Database’ - created by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism.4 I cross-checked all the violent incidents listed in the database with 
national newspapers and Serxwebun, a monthly magazine published by the PKK, in order to 
find out in which town which incident took place. As the data of 1993 is missing in the 
database, Serxwebun was used to compensate for this gap in the data. The reliability of data 
from Serxwebun in turn is cross-tested by comparing it with national newspapers published 
in Turkey and the data derived from the Global Terrorism Data. Hence, I ended up putting 
together a list of the names of towns and the number of violent incidents occurred in each 
town. 
In Appendix 2b lists all the areas with the highest level of conflict in the region between 1984 
and 2014 in terms of incident frequency. The towns marked in yellow in the list were visited 
for this fieldwork. The most important limitation for travelling was security issues that arose 
during the fieldwork. Whilst attacks made by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham prevented 
me from seeing towns along the Turkey-Syria border, warnings of local people also deterred 
us from travelling to pre-determined destinations in high-conflict areas of Siirt and Sirnak 
because of rising violence between the state and the PKK after the general election on 7th 
June, 2015.  
 
 
                                                          
4 For information, look at the website of the database, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/  
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Population and the Selection of Participants for Interviews and Focus Groups 
There is an obvious link between sampling and population because a sample is chosen from 
population. The main reason for sampling is the impossibility of scrutinising the entire 
population for the purpose of the research conducted (Robson, 2011, p. 270).  
The population of our research consists of farmers in the SAR who sell their crops to 
agricultural commodity markets; bureaucrats, officials and experts in central and regional 
agriculture-related governmental organisations; experts and farmers in regional farmer 
associations or cooperatives; people working for extension and advisory bodies and industry 
and trade associations; academics in regional research organisations and universities who are 
interested in agriculture-related sciences; and persons in the administration of agro-industrial 
companies.  
In our study, persons in agriculture-related organizations were interviewed through the 
snowball sampling method. These organizations were divided into three groups: high, 
medium and low-level organizations. For this research, the high-level category includes the 
Ministry of Agricultural and Forest (MOAF) in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey. 
Unfortunately, some of the lower-level officials within these high-level categories who were 
available for interviewing were constrained in the amount of knowledge they had (and were 
willing to provide). Officials with higher positions were approached but were not available 
for communication and interviews. Only one expert of the MOAF in Ankara accepted the 
request for an interview. Some of the high level category officials rejected interviews for fear 
of possible political-natured accusations. The same problem was faced as I interacted with 
most of the medium-level organisations in the region. Most local agricultural directorates, 
public research bodies and other public organisations made me to follow a long process 
obtaining permissions from various authorities in order to conduct interviews. Authorities in 
chambers of agriculture, commerce and industry too were reluctant in allowing interviews for 
political reasons.  
Low-level organisations, including farmer unions, cooperatives, and agricultural enterprises 
were also interviewed. Friends who lived in the region helped me to find and visit farmers 
and talk with Kurdish-speaking interviewees. I also followed up suggestions made by 
regional public agricultural organisations and farmer associations or cooperatives for 
potential farmers to interview. To mitigate potential bias, I also got recommendations from 
local ordinary people in friendly conversations to find proper farmers. Finally, social media 
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was used to contact the interviewees with whom I later conducted interviews via phone or e-
mail. 
Information about all the interviewees can be found in three tables in Appendix 3, such as the 
names of organisations interviewed, the locales of the farmers interviewed, the types of 
interviews made with the farmers and the dates of interviews. Nearly all of the interviewees 
asked for anonymity for political reasons, especially with regard to the Kurdish Question. 
Given the escalating political relation between the Turkish state and the Kurdish political 
movement after June, 2015, anonymity was deemed necessary, even where interviewees did 
not ask for it.  
I also kept the names of officials anonymous for (different) political reasons. A corruption 
scandal revealed in 2013 was portrayed by the government as an attempt to remove them 
from power. They consequently targeted the Gulen movement- now considered a terrorist 
organisation by the Turkish state - and started to purge police officers and judicial officials 
who were allegedly linked with the movement, and changed legal frameworks to enhance the 
state’s position. This incident caused stress for state officials, irrespectively of whether they 
had links with the Gulen organisation. At the start of the fieldwork, some of the officials 
clearly articulated their concern; obviously, many officials seriously questioned my political 
position and/or motivation. However, a number of them were willing to response to my 
questions in a frank manner, paving the way for highly informative interviews. Ten months 
after I had finished the fieldwork, a (failed) coup attempt took place on the night of 15th July, 
2016. The government again initially targeted members of the Gulen movement but then 
expanded their net to include all their opponents, purging a vast number of officials from 
their positions. Avoiding putting the lives of the interviewees in jeopardy, we conducted the 
interviews on an anonymous basis, and I kept information about their departments or 
positions as vague as possible. 
The Sampling Method for Individual and Focus Group Interviews with Farmers and 
the Categorisation of Agricultural Enterprises in the SAR 
The necessary data from farmers was gathered through interview and focus group techniques 
by following the stratified purposeful sampling method. By referring to Patton (2002, p. 240), 
Cohen and Crabtree (2006) explain: 
[Stratified samples] are samples within samples and […] purposeful samples can be 
stratified or nested by selecting particular units or cases that vary according to a key 
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dimension. For example, one may purposefully sample primary care practices and 
stratify this purposeful sample by practice size (small, medium and large) and practice 
setting (urban, suburban and rural). Stratified purposeful sampling is different from 
stratified random sampling in that the sample sizes are likely to be too small for 
generalization. 
With the stratified purposeful sampling method, the main aim is ‘[to] capture major variations 
rather than to identify a common core, although the latter may emerge in the analysis’ 
(Palinkas et al., 2015). I determined agricultural production as the main activity and stratified 
agricultural enterprises according to both crop types and location at first and then their scales 
(small, medium and large). In terms of location, agriculture-dense areas in each province and 
high-conflict areas were chosen and visited as mentioned before. 
An important criterion for determining the scale of an agricultural enterprise is the income 
level. As agricultural enterprises in Turkey tend not to keep accounting records, it is the size 
of land it has that is a fairly good indicator of the enterprise’s scale. The minimum and the 
maximum sizes of a SAE used for our analysis were taken from existing definitions and a list 
relying on a piece of legislation- the Law on Soil Preservation and Land Utilization, and its 
amendments. The law prohibits the division of any agricultural land as a result of inheritance 
in a manner that would make it smaller than a certain size. This relates to the minimum size 
of agricultural enterprises to sustain it economically, and it, typically, is more  than 20 decare 
(da) for farming lands and 5 decare for orchards and vineyards in Turkey ("The Law on 
Amendments on the Law No.5403," 2014). The maximum size of a SAE is also defined by 
law on a provincial and township level in respect of land utilisation ("The Law on 
Amendments on the Law No.5403," 2014). Table 1.2 shows the reference size for SAEs. 
There is no consensus in the literature about reference size of medium (MAEs) and large-
scale agricultural enterprises (LAEs), and generally no categorisation of these in relation to 
land utilisation.5 Based on our consultations with officials during the fieldwork, I defined 
MAEs and LAEs as can be seen in Table 1.2. However, there was no general consensus about 
the sizes of orchards and vineyards determined by the MOAF. Note that those in the table 
may be attributed to AEs that solely cultivate pistachio as this crop generally provides AEs 
                                                          
5 Large AEs are considered as those with total land size above 1000 decares in the study of  M. Öztürk (2012, p. 
82). Medium-scale AEs are defined between 200 decares and 999.99 decares and large farms are above 999.99 
decares according to Eurostat (Eurostat, 2017). According to Unal (2012), small AEs own land between 1 
decare to 20 decares, medium AEs 20 to 199.99 decares, large AEs 200 to 499.99 decares, very large AEs above 
500 decares. In fact, large AEs can be taken as those with land size above 500 decares in this study if we 
exclude the category of “very large AEs”. 
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very high prices that may not be seen in another crop type. For example, owning a vineyard 
of 15 da for grape cultivation is not enough to be a MAE as the income it offers is very low 
as I was told during the fieldwork. Nevertheless, a number of the farmers that were 
interviewed owned small sized orchards and vineyards along with farming lands. In such 
cases, I asked them questions to assess their agricultural income levels and compare them 
with the others in order to place their AEs in the correct category. Appendix 4 gives 
information about farmers and their AE size, and how focus groups were constituted. 
 
Table 1.2 The Reference Sizes of Different Types of Agricultural Enterprises 
1.4.4 Data Analysis 
A thematic analysis was used for the qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews and 
focus group interviews. Prior to conducting the fieldwork, the main themes and sub-themes 
were selected through knowledge gained through the literature review and from document 
analysis. The fieldwork was done in three steps. After conducting the interviews, these were 
transcribed and then read several times to check for gaps in data and subsequently establish 
an index of themes. Gaps detected sometimes gave rise to new interview questions during the 
next round of fieldwork. Through this, saturation was ultimately reached, and confidence 
about the index of themes improved. After the fieldwork was completed, the Nvivo 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software was used for coding and classifying the 
data under sub-themes and themes. It must be noted that the Nvivo cannot make decisions 
about how to derive codes from the data and categorise them and how to interpret data. In 
other words, all these tasks are to be fulfilled by researchers (Bryman, 2016, p. 602). 
Our data analysis was mainly based on qualitative data but some quantitative analysis also 
took place. The statistics published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (and to a lesser extent 
by other statistical data institutions) were tapped for simple calculations such as proportional 
changes and average growth rates. The main aim was to contextualize and triangulate 
evidence derived from the qualitative data analysis.   
Type of AE Reference Value
Rain-fed 
Farming
Irrigated
 Farming
Orchards 
& Vineyards
Minimum Size 5 da
Maximum Size 152.32 da 66.1 da 10 da
MAE Size Range 152.33-500 da 66.2-216.97 da 10.1-32.82 da
LAE Size Range >500 da >216.97 >32.82 da
20 da
SAE
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1.4.5 Ethical Considerations 
Given that the political disagreements and rivalries have become fierce in Turkey especially 
after 2013, and that the Peace Talks collapsed after the general election on 7th June 2015, 
though interviewees completed a consent form (as seen in Appendix 5) to waive anonymity, 
their identities or names are not stated in this research. In line with the university’s ethical 
standards, every interviewee was fully informed of the various aspects of the research 
through the research information document as seen in Appendix 6. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The thesis has two main parts. In order to critically assess RCT, the first part is concerned 
with state formation and development and the second part focuses on neoliberal agricultural 
policies and agricultural development, taking into consideration the dichotomy between 
simultaneously pursued market-based policies and government interventions.  
The first chapter introduces the context of the study, the knowledge gaps identified in the 
literature, the key concepts and research questions, and explains methodological issues and 
how the fieldwork was conducted. 
The second chapter discusses how RCT deals with the matter of state formation and 
development by taking different cases from developed countries and less developed former 
colonies. After introducing the key concepts, the chapter will compare the Ottoman Empire 
with England and France to better understand and appreciate the institutional differences 
shaping their development and state formation processes. This discussion enables us to 
understand how Turkey’s state formation is different than those of less developed countries 
and how the institutional heritage obtained from the Ottomans has affected state formation 
and development. Conflicting relationships between the centre and the periphery will be 
discussed to critically assess and test RCT. 
The third chapter deals with the Kurdish Question and the Kurdish political movement as 
political collective action. After the key concepts of social capital are introduced, the chapter 
focusses on how Kurdish ethnic social capital has created a long-standing political collective 
action, which has frustrated nation-building of the Turkish state. The military narrative and 
the development narrative as efforts of the Turkish state to frame the Question are also 
examined. 
The fourth chapter is concerned with Turkey’s political economy and agricultural policies, as 
shaped between 1980 and 2001, a period involving efforts to apply neoliberal policies with 
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the occasional diversion. Furthermore, information about the GAP, its changing content in 
line with changes in approaches to development at the global level and information about the 
SAR’s agriculture will be displayed. Our argument that the SAR is a relatively less developed 
region in Turkey will be presented in this chapter. 
The fifth chapter answers the first research question. It deals with Turkey’s political economy 
since 2001 and evaluates how the conflicting relationship between the centre and the 
periphery has affected the intra-elite and class-based relationships within the dominant 
coalition and how international dealings have been employed to foster political power. The 
effect of these relationships has been increasing government interventions in the SAR’s 
agricultural development. The implementation of neoliberal agricultural policies and 
development interventions seems contradictory, but the chapter shows that the combination 
of these policies comes from the political conflicts discussed. 
The second part of the thesis involves the sixth chapter and the seventh chapter. The sixth 
chapter is concerned with neoliberal agricultural transformation in less developed countries. 
It engages in discussions about neoliberalism, neoliberal economic policies and the 
relationship between RCT and neoliberalism. After presenting how RCT approaches 
agricultural policies, it provides a critical discussion of RCT and neoliberal agricultural 
policies.  
The seventh chapter responds to the second research question and displays the findings of the 
fieldwork to critically assess how neoliberal agricultural policies have affected the SAR’s 
agriculture since 2001. Thereafter, it argues that development interventions in the form of 
projects and programmes can produce good results if they are based on the poly-centric 
governance approach, and takes successful and unsuccessful examples to prove the assertion. 
The eighth chapter summarises the content and the findings of the study. All research 
questions are revisited in this chapter. In light of the findings, it gives suggestions for those 
who study in state formation and development. 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
PART 1: STATE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
Chapter 2: State Formation and Development from the Aspect of the 
Conflicting Relationship between the Centre and the Periphery 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter critically assesses RCT, mainly addressing theoretical arguments about state 
formation and development in Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for 
Interpreting Recorded Human History (Violence and Social Orders henceforth), written by 
North et al. (2009), and in Prosperity and Violence (2001) and the Development Dilemma 
(2017) written by Bates. These RCT scholars deeply examine developed Western countries 
and/or colonial countries to prove their theoretical arguments. The chapter however points to 
that an elaborate investigation into the countries that own imperial political economic 
background is neglected.  
To begin with, we will address how RCT deals with the matter of state formation and 
development by taking different cases from developed countries and less developed countries 
as former colonies. In further sections, we will take the case of Turkey to discuss how she 
matches with and differs from other countries, emphasizing institutions that were inherited 
from the Ottoman Empire. In a sense, the case of Turkey will also offer us an insight to carry 
on further discussions on the Kurdish Question and development in the next chapter. 
2.2 State Formation and Development in Rational Choice Theory and Its Critical 
Appraisal  
This section is primarily concerned with comparing development pathways of different types 
of countries to introduce the main concepts used in our research and critically assess 
arguments made by Robert Bates, which fall into RCT. Bates mainly compared north-west 
European countries with mostly African and Latin American countries to – generally 
successfully - explain why less developed countries have failed in achieving development. 
However, not all developing countries are former colonies; rather, some have a deep imperial 
background, which is still affecting their society and political terrain today. Turkey is a 
perfect example of such a non-colonised developing/transitional country, inheriting an 
institutional legacy from the Ottoman Empire. We shall expand on this point throughout this 
chapter and use it to critically approach Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual 
Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Violence and Social Orders 
henceforth), written by North et al. (2009), who examine development and state formation in 
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north-western countries in detail but neglect non-Western less developed countries with 
imperial backgrounds. 
We will show that the Ottoman Empire was one of the strongest powers in Europe/near-East 
during the late Middle Age and most of the early Modern period but could not shift its 
economy from agriculture to an urban industry, as a result of her institutional characteristics. 
If we compare France, England and the Ottoman Empire, we can understand how different 
political economy characteristics have affected Turkey’s development pathway. 
Assuming that actors act rationally, Bates (2017, p. 117) argues that regional diversities 
relying on economic, political, ethnic and cultural differences create different regional 
rationalities and shape political terrains and the use of power. Elites at the centre, who strive 
to hold power under conditions created by strong regionalism, generally find cooperating 
with regional actors a less effective strategy than practising coercion to suppress or 
discourage them. The use of coercion, however, can cause political instability and can lead to 
development failures. 
In response to Bates, we shall assert that a high degree of centralisation – characterised by an 
excessively powerful, narrow circle of elites - amalgamated with the use of coercion (or 
threat of violence) restricts the political access and participation of those who fall out of the 
central power. Experiencing intimidation and calculating risks, costs and payoffs of an 
uprising and social disorder, they are forced to opt for regionalism to increase their benefits. 
Local actors and groups, despite intimidation, sometimes fight to gain political access to the 
central power or to acquire more power. This mostly incites elites at the central power to 
exercise even more coercive acts to dissuade them from doing this. Alternatively, members of 
the central power face requests from regional elites or groups for participating in the central 
hierarchy when they are to extend their political base to the people in the periphery. Political 
instability and lack of development could consequently occur when this struggle is repeated 
or prolonged. 
What we have told above, too, holds for peripheral movements against the political centre. In 
fact, there is a nuance between the concepts of regionalism and periphery. Regionalism 
involves political approaches that are shaped by political-economic and institutional 
characteristics peculiar to a region as a specific geographic area. The concept of the political 
periphery includes regionalism but also the other approaches (and positions) that promote 
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resistance or attack to the political-economic centre by cutting across the entire population 
and territory of the political unit. 
 
Figure 2.1The Centre and the Periphery 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the tense relationship between the centre and the periphery. The red 
circle represents the elites with the strongest position who restrict access to valuable 
resources (i.e. land, labour, capital) and activities (i.e. trade, education, military) to create and 
appropriate rents. The blue circle encompasses the dominant coalition. The area between the 
blue and the red circle covers the elites who have (some) access to the centre; they can obtain 
privileges and rights in return for their support and resources. Another part of their political 
importance stems from their ability to influence over the people in the periphery. Some of 
those elites (e.g. the aristocracy in France) revert to regionalism; others (e.g. the bourgeoisie 
prior to the French Revolution) struggle for more or complete access to the centre (kept by 
the monarch of France). The area between the blue and the black circle represents the people 
oppressed in the periphery (e.g. the peasantry, craftsmen, petty traders, wage-earners, 
journeymen, etc. before the French Revolution who later politically supported the bourgeoisie 
against the monarch and the aristocracy), who can fight against the dominant coalition, 
sometimes allying with a specific group of elites in it.  
This diagram is a simplification; in reality the boundaries are blurry, and the characteristics of 
interactions and ties between the three groups are more complex, varied and stratified. This 
interpretation differs from that of North et al. (2009), who find transformation from “limited 
access orders” to “open access orders” in intra-elite interactions, giving no role for the people 
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in the periphery.6 In their opinion, in limited access orders powerful individuals coming 
together for common interests have established “a dominant coalition in such a way that 
limits violence and makes sustained social interaction possible on a larger scale” (North et al., 
2009, p. 13). According to North et al. (2009, p. 17), systematic rent-creation through limited 
access is a useful means for elites not only to be generating wealth but also to control 
violence. Their approach however ignores the reaction of the people in the periphery against 
the negative effects of rent creation among elites. More so, the periphery could also be used 
by elites to challenge the dominant coalition or central power, reflecting ongoing changes in 
intra-elite power balance. 
If the result of the competition between different groups of elites is to create “impersonal 
relationships”, “perpetually lived organisations in the public and private domains” and “the 
consolidated control of the military” by the government accountable to the elites, then “the 
door-step conditions” to an open access order are met (North et al., 2009, pp. 151-152).7 The 
open access order will be later attained when the elites believe that the only way to protect 
their impersonal rights is “allowing citizens the right to participate […] to ensure the civil and 
economic rights all citizens enjoyed” (North et al., 2009, p. 192). This order is one where rent 
is created and absorbed quickly to reap benefits under political and economic competition, 
leading to creative destruction resulting (possibly) in secure stable political economic 
development. Turkey can be deemed as a limited access order that has not satisfied the 
conditions of the door conditions to proceed to an open-access order. The competition 
between elites has been affected by the reactions from different groups in the periphery but in 
turn not led to an open access order. 
North et al. (2009, p. 194) state, “the threat to stability and order in a natural state usually 
came from elite factions within the dominant coalition that sought to use violence or coercion 
to gain control of the political system”. There is a missing part here: the threat from a group 
of people in the periphery. We will see that political and economic pressure that separately 
                                                          
6 According to North et al. (2009, p. 2), “the limited access order or natural state emerged in the first social 
revolution. Personal relationships, who one is and who one knows, form the basis for social organization and 
constitute the arena for individual interaction, particularly personal relationships among powerful individuals. 
Natural states limit the ability of individuals to form organizations. In the open access orders that emerged in the 
second social revolution, personal relations still matter, but impersonal categories of individuals, often called 
citizens, interact over wide areas of social behaviour with no need to be cognizant of the individual identity of 
their partners […]. Although elements of the second revolution have spread everywhere, especially technology, 
most contemporary societies remain natural states.” 
7 The importance of meeting the door-step conditions is related to turning “individual elite rights” into 
“impersonal elite rights”, more secure than the former because they “are defined as commonly shared rights 
rather than personal prerogatives” (North et al., 2009, p. 191). 
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comes from Kurds and the conservative people has helped the corresponding elite groups to 
reap more benefits, or to increase their power in the dominant coalition (or even the centre) to 
re-structure it. We shall discuss in the case of Turkey how intra-elite relationships have 
developed and transformed within the dominant coalition, and how the periphery has 
influenced those relationships.  
In Violence and Social Orders, North et al. (2009) generally focus on western European 
countries and the US but pay no attention to countries in the Third World with imperial or 
colonial background. These countries are mainly deeply divided along identity lines, which 
allows the development of intra-elite trust as far as maintaining the dominant coalition but 
low levels of generalised trust among people (Diamond, 2010). This prevailing phenomenon 
obviously obstructs the transition to open access orders by denying the development of 
impersonal social relations and perpetually lived organisations. 
In the next section, we shall compare development pathways of France and England at first 
and those of colonial countries later. Finally, we expand on what we have said by addressing 
development and state formation in Turkey. 
2.2.1 The Cases of England and France as Developed Countries 
Our primary purpose is to discuss RCT by critically assessing arguments made by Robert 
Bates in Prosperity and Violence (2001) and Development Dilemma (2017) and to underpin 
the theoretical concepts introduced in the previous section with examples and explanations. 
We shall briefly present how Bates explains, within the context of political economy, the 
differences between France and England.  
Both the countries had started the great transformation in the same period, which would pave 
the way for the emergence of the central states, but only England succeeded in entering the 
industrial revolution at the end of 18th century. Regionalism and its effect on politics and 
development are seen by Bates as explanatory for the implementation of different 
development policies in France and England, and resultant disparities in their developmental 
outcomes. Our critical discussion is focusing on the relationship between the degree of 
centralisation (the dominance of elites and classes at the centre and the dominant coalition) 
and regionalism or peripheral movements, and the effects of this relationship on the use of 
power and development. This discussion provides us with a theoretical understanding to be 
used for interpreting the political economy of Turkey. 
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The aforementioned responses to the law of diminishing returns increased prosperity but 
simultaneously insecurity through the private militarisation of rural households, which sought 
to seize the properties of others (Bates, 2001, pp. 53-56; 2017, pp. 16-18). Some kin groups 
surpassed others over time and established ruling lineages (Bates, 2001, p. 56), which would 
satisfy increasing demand from rural elites for peace due to unbearable cost of violence 
(Bates, 2001, p. 63; 2017, pp. 18-22). As a result, the need for justice among kin groups to 
increase wealth by rent-creation outweighed the use of violence and helped ruling lineages to 
found the central states of France and England in the Middle Ages, with a centralised justice 
system. Their increased central power allowed them to end the provision of private security 
and militarisation by repressing and seducing rural elites (Bates, 2001, pp. 65-68; 2017, pp. 
14-24).  
Though they both had successfully started the great transformation in the same period, France 
later dropped behind England in development over centuries. One of the main arguments 
proposed by Bates (2017, pp. 27-32, 46-48) is that the relatively homogeneity of England as 
compared to regionalism in France - based on cultural, political and economic differences - 
divergently shaped their political terrains and their ways of using power and framing policies 
and consequently led to different developmental outcomes.  
In terms of shaping political terrain and the way of using power, after conquering England in 
one attempt, the Normans took control of a unified polity, greatly replaced the Anglo-Saxon 
landed elites with Norman nobles and allowed them to participate in decision-making 
processes (Bates, 2017, pp. 27, 30; Perry, Chase, Jacob, Jacob, & Laue, 2013, pp. 235-236). 
In contrast, the French monarch conquered part of France and undermined or negotiated with 
others owning different cultures to secure his control over the country, in which regional 
economic differences also considerably prevailed (Bates, 2017, pp. 28-30). As a result, 
England owned a relatively homogenous political terrain that considerably allowed a broad 
consensus between different interest groups in shaping policies and determining outcomes. 
France, however, possessed a contrasting political terrain characterised by cultural, political 
and economic diversity, in which the monarch negotiated with regional elites and their 
assemblies one by one (Bates, 2017, pp. 35-36; Mann, 2005, pp. 479-480) or blocked their 
participation in decision-making via assemblies as considering himself more powerful 
(Mann, 2005, p. 476).  
England and France differed from each other in framing policies, so pursued different 
development pathways. When the kings in England confronted the financial imperative of 
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conducting wars, they were to cooperate with urban interest groups, as city centres were 
highly protected and offered them exiguous profits from usurping urban assets and properties. 
This “alliance” enabled merchants and manufacturers to participate in decision-making 
processes and obtain empowerment to regulate markets in return of supplying financial 
resources to the monarchs for campaigns (Bates, 2001, pp. 58, 60-62). The “alliance” 
between the monarch, large landholders and urban interest groups was established to perform 
collective actions at the national level for deriving collective rents from military victories, 
and helped the introduction of policies creating incentives for healthy development (Bates, 
2017, pp. 32-48).8 In a nutshell, the English monarch exchanged with different interest 
groups the political participation in state affairs for financial support (Bates, 2017, p. 37), by 
which political incentives were created, conducive to high level of political and economic 
development. 
As for France, landed elites at times gathered their forces to curb the power of the French 
monarch, thus to protect their assets, fiscal authority and regional power (Bates, 2017, p. 31; 
Rosenthal, 1998, p. 65); yet, their political quiescence was exchanged for privileges to access 
productive resources and exemption from taxes (Bates, 2017, pp. 37,42).9 Given that taxation 
was a vital issue in the birth of representative assemblies, when tax exemptions granted to the 
landed elites, the king did not feel committed  to base his decisions on the General Estate 
(Mann, 2005, p. 479). The monarch then focused on urban consumers in Paris, the political 
heart of the country, to avoid urban uprisings by keeping food prices low. Rural producers, 
however, were confronted with the disincentives created by low-priced food. They, therefore, 
had an aversion to expanding their production with new methods, led to low increases in 
agricultural productivity and agricultural income, and in turn hampered urban economic 
development (Bates, 2017, pp. 38-43).  
In essence, Bates’s argument is that regional diversity caused less development outcome and 
state failure in France, but relative homogeneity paved the way for economic and political 
development in England. However, not regional diversity but highly centralised power, 
inherently incorporating restrictions on political access to decision-making, leads to 
                                                          
8 For example, the monarch, in return of political support, created incentives for producers and merchants, by 
supporting export, banning import, avoiding policies to keep food prices low and improving land rights in 
favour of large landholders (Bates, 2017, pp. 32-48). 
9 To finance his wars, when the French king focussed on regions, he encountered regional resistance guided by 
assemblies and bureaucracy, and thus applied to borrowing money from public organisations and to selling the 
right to collect taxes to financial capital owners (Bates, 2017, pp. 43-46). Where the monarch could not repay 
debts, the national economy faced a downward spiral of crisis due to rising costs of borrowing and worsening 
financial positions of the public organisations that had owed money to the monarch (Bates, 2017, pp. 43-46).  
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regionalism that hampers development. Given that federalism is a system of government 
based on regionalism, developed countries with a federalist polity characterised by relatively 
high diversity10, such as the US, Canada, Switzerland and Belgium, are clearly contrasting 
examples to his argument. Bates clearly makes no attempt in understanding development to 
discuss the relationship between regionalism and the degree of centralisation that represents 
the political strength of the centre. He only touches upon the issue with few words (Bates, 
2017, p. 117):  
Long conditioned to think of Absolutism as absolute and France as “statist” and therefore 
unitary, I was surprised by the degree to which the nation’s politics was shaped by its 
regions. In France, regions were powerful; indeed, they were so powerful that they shaped 
the manner in which those at the center employed their power. 
A conceptual relationship can be regarded between absolutism as the highest degree of 
centralisation and unitary from a static perspective. Indeed, France had absolutism; regional 
elites could shape the manner in which those at the centre employed their power by both 
protecting their own interests and resisting merely in their own region against political 
economic demands from the centre. Obviously, absolutism was reached in France by 
restricting the access of various actors and groups to the central power and decision-making 
processes (Perry et al., 2013, p. 238) as happened elsewhere.11 It was seen from a dynamic 
perspective that regional (or peripheral in a broader term) forces could however challenge the 
centre or even occasionally unitary when they found chance,12 where their political access 
and participation had already been restricted. This in fact reflects the ongoing interplay 
between the centre and the periphery. For example, in the French revolution, peripheral 
forces gained a decisive victory, adeptly exploiting ‘the incapacitation of the central 
                                                          
10 It is noteworthy that ethnic and cultural fractionalisation is higher in the United States, Canada, Switzerland 
and Belgium than France and the United Kingdom (Fearon, 2003). 
11 According to (Perry et al., 2013), the General Estate had never executed a check and balance system over the 
king. Free from controls, the French monarchs succeeded in creating a unified state, but regional loyalties and 
politics remained powerful for centuries. In contrast, when the English monarchs sought to monopolise their 
power, barons resisted, re-captured and raised their power in the centre. The English parliament consequently 
curbed the English monarchy, thus paved the way of liberal democracy. 
12 For example, when Charles V intended to save the French King from captivity, the regions that had militarily 
vulnerability gave consent to cover the cost of setting up an army, but the regions that were militarily secure did 
not admit it. Later, Charles VII was threatened by attacks from England and the Duke of Burgundy, all the 
regions accepted to cover the cost of a war since all felt threatened and insecure (Bates, 2017, pp. 35-36). The 
accord of Troyes had provided for a legal base for the English king to sit in the throne of France through the 
alliance with Burgundy, which clearly undermined France’s unitary. Charles VII eventually managed to break 
the alliance, conferring concessions on Burgundy’s elites (Warner, 1997). As a result of such challenges from 
regional powerful elites to the kings, unitary in taxation had not been reached until reforms of the French 
Revolution (Rosenthal, 1998, p. 70), the mass uprising that involved urban wage earners, petty traders and 
peasants as peripheral political forces. 
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[absolutist] state’ apparatus of the Old Regime (Skocpol, 1988, p. 41), but then the following 
breakdowns of the centre in later decades brought other absolutist regimes (Goldstone, 1991, 
p. 479).  
As such, peripheral forces can be based on class, ethnicity, race, religion, different forms of 
culture, etc. If the excessive central power succeeds in banning or restricting the political 
participation of others outside the centre or the dominant coalition through coercion or threat 
of violence, peripheral groups (and their leading actors) may despondently revert to strong 
regionalism, employing discourse based on different forms of culture or other differences. 
Repeated challenges against the central power, often witnessed in the history, suggest a 
dynamic confronting relationship between the central power and peripheral movements, 
between “nation builders” or unitarists and “localists” or regionalists, and “between owners 
and non-owners of the means of production” (Mardin, 1973). “Each time a compromise –or 
even a one-sided victory- was obtained” from this confronting relationship, “some integration 
of the peripheral force into the center was achieved” in the West over time, “obtaining some 
recognition of their autonomous status” (Mardin, 1973). According to Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2005, p. 4), “the threat of social disorder was the driving force behind the creation 
of democracy in Britain”. Indeed, peripheral forces and elites with relatively weak positions 
in the dominant coalition valiantly struggled with the English monarch, and in turn liberal 
democratic institutions were gradually formed as the cumulative outcome of this struggle and 
of each reconciliation achieved.13  
Democratic values and norms did not appear out of the blue in England.  In his book, The 
First Transition from Primitive Socialism to Capitalism: England, Kivilcimli (1965b, pp. 13-
17) shows that technical and geographical productive forces are not underlying factors in 
explaining the emergence of capitalism in England. Formal and informal institutions such as 
traditions and customs, coined as “history productive forces”, and collective action, coined as 
“human productive forces” (Kivilcimli, 1965a, pp. 17-18) essentially initiated economic and 
political development in a stage of history where the expansion of global trade offered 
favourable circumstances (Kivilcimli, 1965b, p. 18).14 Likewise, in Understanding the 
                                                          
13 For example, unlike the French Parliament, the House of Commons, governed by the social capital of English 
people, did not let the monarch act arbitrarily, as seen in the struggle between Charles I and the Commons and 
in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 that limited the King’s power indelibly in favour of the Parliament. 
14 According to Kivilcimli (1965b, pp. 81-82, 42-43), ancient civilisations, which lasted for thousand of years, 
ruined the character of the people under their sovereignty and in degeneration caused by usury-merchants. Being 
at the beck and call of the most debased person in power became a principle over centuries. However, norms 
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Process of Economic Change, North maintains that ‘choices in the present are constrained by 
the heritage of institutions’ (p.51), which ‘structure human interaction by providing an 
incentive structure to guide human behavior’ (p.66). Now that development is path-
dependence, we need to highlight that RCT scholars generally examine the path-
dependencies of Western developed countries and colonial countries but not less developed 
countries with imperial backgrounds. In the next sections, we shall have the same discussion 
for Turkey as a less developed country that inherited institutional heritage from the Ottoman 
Empire. 
2.2.2 The Case of Less Developed Countries in Africa as Former Colonies 
In the Development Dilemma, Bates (2017, pp. 52-61) argues that former colonial countries 
share similar political-economic characteristics associated with early modern France, such as 
“high levels of cultural diversity”, “ethnic polarisation” and, “regional inequality”. To him, 
the colonial powers created cultural, political and economic diversities in developing 
countries, as they brought forth territories that covered culturally diverse populations to 
decrease their costs of governance (Bates, 2017, pp. 52-53). Moreover, “the European 
occupiers helped perpetuate subnational polities and empower local elites at the local level” 
as well as “vested local elites with control over land”, thereby ensuring the security of their 
order (Bates, 2017, pp. 54-56). From an economic aspect, the colonial powers invested in 
certain geo-economical areas that bestowed abundant natural resources and profitable 
agricultural products (Bates, 2017, p. 56). Divided across political, economic and ethnic fault 
lines, the former colonial countries had the political terrains that resemble what we described 
for early modern France. 
Probing post-colonial Zambia and Kenya for his analysis, Bates does good service by 
showing that diverse regional contexts brought regionalism and shaped the political terrain in 
which Zambian and Kenyan politicians exerted their power (Bates, 2017, pp. 62-86). Having 
to expand their political bases in such a political terrain to consolidate their power or survive 
politically, the political elites who were threatened by oppositions opted for establishing 
authoritarian regimes, and employed their power in a manner that harmed the development of 
their nations, as did the French monarchs before (Bates, 2017, pp. 87-113). Who were 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and values of the English people that originated from barbarism could be preserved from the rule of ancient 
civilisations. So loyal were barons to their kin members that they melted their interests with the interests of the 
people and did not let the English monarch arbitrarily. The monarch in France, however, allied with the 
aristocracy and the ecclesiastical- the institution of usury-merchants of the Roman Empire -, by providing them 
with exemptions and privileges, in return of acquiring a status of a dictator authorised by the God, as did its their 
Eastern counterparts. 
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politically those oppositions? As Bates (2017, p. 105) underlines that ‘[i]n the language that 
was fashionable at the time, they stated that while Kenya’s economy may be prospering 
under Kenyatta, the “center” was diverging from the “periphery” and prosperity was 
unevenly distributed’. The centre was represented affluent regions, of which economy the 
rural bourgeoisie controlled, whereas the periphery was poor regions even lacking of sanitary 
conditions.  
With the end of the Cold War, the Western countries pressured the African governments for 
democratic openings such as competitive elections. We know that the central states of many 
African countries collapsed or greatly weakened in this period when faced with peripheral 
violent actions, though regionalism drove them to establish a highly centralised state. 
Apart from this, many countries that transitioned from an empire to a modern state have not 
experienced any collapse since the Cold War, except for those which were collapsed by 
external interventions. These countries clearly comprise a sample that their common points 
have not been revealed sufficiently. At least, we can display how Turkey differs from former 
colonies, so can critically assess Bates’s argument. 
2.3 The Case of Turkey: State Formation and Development from the Aspect of the 
Conflicting Relationship between the Centre and the Periphery 
In this section, our main purpose is to show that Turkey’s failure in achieving political 
economic development is rooted in the institutional heritage from the Ottoman Empire. 
Particularly, we will focus on the military bureaucratic class and its extractive policies in the 
Ottoman era. Then, we will show that this class has continued to dominate the political centre 
in modern Turkey, allying with large-scale capitalist classes. Indeed, their use of power has 
shaped the political and economic terrains of the country and led to intense political struggle 
between the centre and peripheral groups. To maintain their position in those struggles, the 
military-bureaucratic class allied with various social groups and classes or factions within 
classes, all with their own vested interests. The formation of a highly centralised state has 
been the apparatus of this class to have a constant grip over the country. This class has 
succeeded in creating a homogenous population through nation-building, so greatly prevented 
regionalism. However, their efforts to thwart the political participation of those who are 
disturbed by political-economic policies have induced the formation of peripheral groups.  
It is difficult to talk about any political, economic and cultural diversities in Turkey that were 
artificially created by any colonial power. As the Ottoman Empire was gradually 
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disintegrating because of internal conflicts induced by growing nationalist movements, the 
Muslim population who had lived in the Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle East immigrated 
to what is contemporary Turkey. The fact that non-Muslim groups, such as Greeks and 
Armenians, were forced to leave Anatolia as a result of nation-building policies (Yeğen, 
2006) resulted in a relatively more homogenous population to establish itself in Anatolia. In 
modern Turkey, cultural, political and economic differentiated groups - bar the Kurds - have 
significantly remained dispersed across the territory. True, Turkey has far less ethnic and 
cultural diversity than almost all of the Sub-Saharan African countries (Fearon, 2003). In fear 
of facing a political conflict similar to what the Ottomans faced in the Balkans and the 
Middle East, the state officials have pushed the population to assimilate into the identity the 
state approves. In this sense, regionalism are always considered by the state officials a 
harmful thing against the sublime interest of the state in the era of nationalism: devletin 
bekasını korumak - to ensure the survival of the state - in its well-known Turkish formulation. 
The implementation of displacement and compulsory settlement of the Kurdish population 
(Yegen, 2009) and the authoritative nationalisation of education and culture (Aksan, 2006) 
are just a few examples of the policies applied to avoid regionalism and ensure the integrity 
of the state with its territory. 
Some institutional arrangements within the state formation also help to curb regionalism. At 
the local level, provinces and towns are managed by two groups of administrators. Valis in 
provinces and kaymakams in towns are assigned and controlled by the central government. 
Although mayors with limited mandates are democratically chosen by the people, they are 
highly controlled by the central and local bureaucracy.15  
Another factor that curbs regionalism is the law of diminishing returns. Many families who 
live on agriculture started to migrate to and group together in big cities and industrial coastal 
cities to start a new life in the 1950s (Robinson, 1952, 1958). This process has allowed 
individuals from different backgrounds to compose of nearly half of the population in those 
                                                          
15 Despite the conditions of EU membership, the Turkish state objects to the adoption of the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government15, which gives a (high) degree of authorisation and financial powers to local 
authorities (Akçadağ Alagöz, 2011, 24 Haziran). 
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cities today.16 The influx of the people to urban areas has prevented regionalism, except for 
part of Eastern Anatolia in which the Kurds are densely populated.17 
From all these facts, we argue that there has been no regionalism as strong as that in France 
or former colonies, shaping the political economic terrain of the Ottomans and Turkey. In the 
next two sections, we will delineate the fact that the bureaucratic class has not allowed 
regionalism but created strong peripheral movements by blocking the political participation 
of the people outside the dominant coalition, so limiting the establishment of liberal 
democratic institutions. Furthermore, the institutional heritage inherited from the Ottomans 
shaped political economic development pathway of modern Turkey. 
2.3.1 Turkey’s Path Dependency: The Political Economic Heritage from the Ottomans 
The Ottoman Empire was at least as strong as England and France in the Late Middle Ages, 
but could not accomplish the great transformation successfully because of its institutional 
characteristics. The Empire had managed to survive for over 600 years since its foundations, 
and collapsed at the end of the First World War as other land empires such as the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire. After its collapse, the institutional characteristics 
of the Ottoman Empire passed to Turkey and played a key role in establishing modern 
Turkey’s political economy. The most important is the excessive dominance of the military-
bureaucratic class as the central political power. As Sugar (1977/1993, p. 273 cited in Kumar, 
2017, p. 96) argues that ‘[u]nlike the European nobility, the Ottoman ruling class enjoyed no 
hereditary rights. It was a purely functional class, defined not by ethnicity, language, or 
religion, but by its role in the running of the state’. The definite outcome of such a ruling 
class formation was an excessively central state apparatus that undermined the development 
of economy and of democratic institutions. 
Anatolia and Europe showed considerable similarities in the Late Middle Ages. The House of 
Osman, known as the Ottomans, emerged from a political setting related to feudalism 
characterised by “the atomisation of politics and economy”, which had gradually formed in 
Anatolia of the Seljuk Interregnum, and in the unrestful Balkans of the Byzantium Empire 
(Kilicbay, 2000, p. 24). It subdued other houses, and took the qualities of a central state in the 
                                                          
16 The total population of the three most populated cities in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, is equal to 
nearly 30 per cent of the total country population. With some industrial cities that attract migration, this 
proportion increases to nearly 50 per cent of the total population (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017g). 
17 The conglomeration of the population in urban areas has brought individual strategies relying on community-
level solidarity. Seeking and forging relations with fellow-townsmen or fellow-villagers in urban areas has been 
such a strategy to survive or increase social and material welfare (Aktas, Aka, & Demir, 2008). Again, the rise 
of Islamic organisations based on religious communities is the result of migration to urban areas. 
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mid-15th century after capturing Istanbul from Byzantium (Kilicbay, 2000, p. 26; Kivilcimli, 
2010a, pp. 63, 66). Though they politically and economically peaked in the mid-16th century 
when having expanded its territories to Europe, Asia and North Africa and controlling a great 
part of traditional global trade routes, as Kivilcimli (2010a, p. 33) argues, the Ottoman 
Empire, which shared considerable political economic similarities with France, could not 
bring itself to modernisation. 
After Mehmet the Conqueror captured Istanbul, he reformed the state by inheriting 
institutional qualities from the Byzantium Empire, including setting up a strong political core 
that was supported with a standing army, and took a superior status to any individual and the 
entire society similar to the French counterpart (Kivilcimli, 2010a, pp. 66-70, 78). Until his 
period, all ghazis had owned the right to speak and to be heard, but they lost such a right with 
the establishment of the excessively central state (Kivilcimli, 2010a, pp. 79-83). While the 
English acting collectively were threatening the English monarch with rebellion and 
gradually creating liberal democratic institutions to limit his power, the central power with a 
strong salaried standing army18 easily precluded any collective action or threat of the 
common people19. 
The Ottomans applied various policies to set up and maintain the central power but created 
disincentives through extractive institutions to economic development this way (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012, p. 120). For example, a class of “slave administrators” was formed to rule 
the Empire, who were conscripted in their childhood and brought up as Muslims, with a view 
to limiting the military and political power of local Muslim elites (Mardin, 1969; Şevket 
Pamuk, 2007, pp. 22-23). To this end, the management of lands (timars), of which revenues 
were used for military services, was given to the military officials of this class (timariots) 
instead of to local Muslim elites (Şevket Pamuk, 2007, p. 23), and timariots were replaced at 
certain intervals to avoid any formation of local powers (Quartet, 2004, p. 61).  
The definition of property rights was not clear that small producers only had usufructuary 
rights on the lands with public property rights, which were controlled and managed by 
                                                          
18 The Janissary corps under the direct command of the sultan was the first standing army in Europe (Ágoston, 
1999, p. 122). This shows well the extent of centralisation in the Ottoman Empire. As the sultan was such 
powerful, it was not likely to limit his power. 
19 The subjects of the sultan are called as reaya in the Ottomans, which etymologically means animal, sheep or 
cattle that is herded or shepherded (Reaya, n.d.). This explains well the position of the common people in the 
mindset of the Ottoman elites. 
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timariots (Kivilcimli, 2010b, p. 137; 2010c, p. 69).20 Inherently, small-scale producers and 
timariots strived for holding lands as private property and bequeathing them to their own next 
generations (Kivilcimli, 2010c, pp. 72-74). Whilst the former was squeezed greatly in this 
struggle, the latter strengthened their economic bases with the expansion of the lands under 
their control (Şevket Pamuk, 2007, pp. 23-24) under the unclearly defined property regime. 
When the Ottoman sultan was forced by economic imperatives after the 17th century, he 
rented public lands to local families together with the right to collect tax (Genc, 2014, p. 96; 
Kivilcimli, 2010c, pp. 138-142) similar to what the French monarchs did. The main purpose 
was to create incentives for the military bureaucratic officials to boost agricultural 
production. The local officials and tax collectors (multezims) as their subcontractors 
endeavoured to transfer the lands to their ownership exploiting this policy, abused the power 
for taxation to unfairly appropriate agricultural surplus generated by the peasantry, and 
eventually compelled the central administration to gradually accept their right to hold lands 
as private property through the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 (Önal, 2012).  
According to Kivilcimli (2010c, p. 205), the unclearly defined property regime21 long 
prevented the local officials and multezims to become capitalists in a way that took place in 
England; rather, they became “a coterie of revenue earners’, enjoying extractive policies of 
the state. Multezims, accumulating wealth by exploiting the peasantry, turned into ayans in 
later centuries and then somewhat politically challenged the state, but desperate small 
producers flowed into cities as a result of this exploitative process (Kivilcimli, 2010c, p. 219). 
Obviously, capitalist farmers could not emerge in the setting where there were no private land 
rights (Kivilcimli, 2010c, pp. 153-155). 
                                                          
20 Kivilcimli (2010b, pp. 39, 102) objects to those who define the prevailing property type of lands in the 
Ottoman order as state property, and he argues that it, instead, was public because “Miri” (public property) lands 
are supposed to be allocated to the people with usufructuary rights for some purposes, such as earning 
livelihood, covering expenses of training soldiers, and paying taxes to the state. Whenever the Ottomans 
conquered any place, they terminated private property of lands to turn them into “Miri” lands, which were not 
accepted property of any individual but the public. As Kivilcimli (2010b, p. 115) puts, in the early period of the 
Ottomans, the sultan could event not seize both property rights on Miri lands and the benefits derived from them 
to augment his own wealth. 
21 The risk of losing land at the end of a renting term due to public land rights created disincentives for those 
large landholders. In fact, they lived in Istanbul and subcontracted multezims to collect taxes, thus assuming the 
characteristics of a “rentier” class (Genc, 2014, p. 107). Multezims unscrupulously squeezed small producers 
through taxation and usury to raise their revenue but so creating disincentives to increase productivity 
(Kivilcimli, 2010c, pp. 142, 197). Usury-merchant capital owners lent money in return of interest income to 
multezims or bureaucrats. Overall, small producers on land with public property rights served for the interests of 
officials, multezims and usury-merchants in the dominant coalition (Kivilcimli, 2010c, p. 166).  
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As a result, certain limitations to the power held by the sultan, (not dissimilar to the Magna 
Carta), were just introduced in the first decade of the 19th century as a result of an agreement 
signed between strengthened local rulers (ayans) and the sultan (Kiziltan, 2006). And 
contrary to the regional actors in France, who could curb policies imposed by the monarch 
through regional assemblies and bureaucracies, local actors had almost no such institutions to 
do so in the Ottoman Empire. All show that regionalism was remained politically weak in 
Anatolia. 
The sultan gave high importance to controlling not only rural but also urban areas, especially 
in the capital city, to pre-empt a political disturbance that would threaten his power (Quartet, 
2004, p. 80). A “provisionist policy” was followed to satisfy domestic demand for food. 
Import of food was thus encouraged through taxation, but its export was discouraged despite  
the existing control over global trade routes (Genc, 2014, pp. 41-44). The merchant capital 
owners could not play an important role in cementing ties between the rural and urban 
industry (Kivilcimli, 2010c, pp. 153-155) as their counterparts did in Western Europe (Şevket 
Pamuk, 2007, p. 57). More importantly, ‘it was highly difficult to make investment [in the 
urban sector] by diffusing into the strict and cohesive structure of communitarian and 
egalitarian guilds, which obtained strong support from the state’, as Genc (2014, p. 87) states, 
‘profit restrictions had their appeal lost’ this way. In such a setting, the usury-merchants, who 
had strong ties with high-level bureaucrats, were granted privileges for importing food and 
transporting them from towns to cities for urban and military consumption (Kivilcimli, 
2010c, p. 225). They also purchased food from domestic producers at lower prices through 
their monopolistic power and sold them to the army at higher prices (Kivilcimli, 2010c, p. 
227). This again inevitably undermined incentives for rural producers to increase agricultural 
production and made the great transformation impossible. 
What we have emphasised in this section is important to understand what made modern 
Turkey. The sultan was the paramount representative of interests of the military-bureaucratic 
class and set up a more centralised, absolutist state than its counterpart in Europe. He strictly 
controlled both politics and economy from the centre and did not allow the rise of any 
threatening local power to his political position. The military bureaucracy officials, 
multezims, usury-merchants were all in the dominant coalition but politically inferior to the 
sultan, who could easily confiscate their wealth if they politically objected to him. During the 
political stagnation period the sultan, however, was able to be forcibly replaced by the 
military bureaucracy class with another member of the Ottoman dynasty, as seen in the case 
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of Selim III (Inalcik, 2013, pp. 53-54). This shows that the sultan was not superior to interests 
of the class itself. In study of North et al. (2009), there is no argument about the class-based 
character of the military.  
In such a political-economic setting, open access institutions could not be established. Where 
the property rights were not clearly defined, this dominant coalition seized the agricultural 
surplus generated by the peasantry in the periphery, prevented capitalist relationships that 
would induce the great transformation and shared the systemic rents created to among those 
in the dominant coalition. 
2.3.2 Modern Turkey until 1980 
In this section, we emphasize two main points about the period until 1980. The military-
bureaucratic class sought to keep their political position at the centre, allying with different 
classes and groups, and adjusted their policies to changes in international power structures. In 
doing so, they were challenged by different groups and classes from the periphery such as 
Kurds, Alevis22, and students and urban workers adhere to Marxism. As Turkey was 
gradually undergoing the great transformation, large-scale capitalist classes over time 
predominated large landholders and small and medium-scale capitalists in the dominant 
coalition. The policies defined by the military-bureaucratic class, and civil governments that 
represented various economic and socio-cultural groups, intensified peripheral movements 
and occasioned frictions in capitalist classes throughout the period. 
After the Ottomans admitted defeat at the end of the First World War, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 
representing interests of the Ottoman military and bureaucratic classes (Karaosmanoglu, 
2000), managed to align national interests with economic interests of local Muslim notables, 
including large landholders and Muslim merchants23 (Başkaya, 1991, pp. 43-50), in order to 
wage a (successful) war of liberation against victorious European states. The new modern 
state, founded in 1923, was based on three main principles: secularism; Turkishness - 
referring to adherence to the Turkish nation-state -; republicanism that may be deemed as 
                                                          
22 The Alevis are the members of a heterodox sect of Islam. 
23 The capitalist land relations during the Ottoman reign became possible through the introduction of the 1858 
Land Code, legalising private property rights on lands. Rapid urbanisation and industrialisation in European 
countries increased demand for agricultural raw materials and goods produced in the Ottoman Empire in the 
19th century, and linked large landholders with European markets (Kasaba, 1993, p. 76). In particular, large 
landholders (multezims) in the West Anatolia region therefore assumed the character of merchant-agricultural 
producers, selling agricultural crops to Europe and imported goods to domestic people, as well as continued to 
derive profits through usury (Önal, 2012). As for Muslim merchants, they replaced non-Muslim ones through 
coercion and economic policies applied by the military bureaucratic class (Başkaya, 1991, pp. 37-39; Keyder, 
1979). 
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centralisation (Ergil, 2000), and the new state followed the path of capitalist development 
with some level of Westernisation (Başkaya, 1991, pp. 33-36).   
These principles immediately sparked political reactions from the periphery, i.e. Kurdish 
tribal elites and conservative anti-modernist Muslim elites. The military, in turn, responded 
with coercion (Narli, 1997; Orhan, 2012) and succeeded in firmly securing their power at the 
centre. Afterwards, they adroitly intervened in politics through military coups and the 
constitutional institutions that were established in interim regimes (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997; 
Karaosmanoglu, 2000). As Jung (2008, p. 130) articulates clearly, ‘[t]he particular character 
of Turkey’s civilian-military relationship was that the armed forces were not accountable to 
civilian rule, but that the civilian state institutions were accountable to the generals.’ 
The political centre generally shaped the use of power and development ways of the country 
under the restrictions imposed by the international power structure. During the inter-war 
period, liberal democracy was not popular in the world (Hayek, 2005, pp. 42-44); foreign 
capital flow to Turkey was seriously limited due to  the adverse impact of the Great 
Depression (Owen & Pamuk, 2002, p. 29). Civil representatives of the military-bureaucratic 
class adopted a single party system along with the Republican People’s Party (CHP in 
Turkish acronym) and economic statism to get the national economy integrated and 
industrialised through public investments (Owen & Pamuk, 2002, pp. 30-33). Facilitating 
private capital accumulation in every manner, the state invested in economic areas, in which 
private enterprises averted to invest (Aydin, 2005). Smallholders were squeezed through the 
low-priced crop policy whereas large landholders were supported with subsidies (Başkaya, 
1991, pp. 147-148). Large landholders still had a far more powerful political position than the 
newly emerging industrial bourgeoisie at the end of this period (Aydin, 2005, p. 27), and the 
merchants strengthened their position greatly through international trade and speculations, 
and profiteering in domestic markets during the Second World War (Başkaya, 1991, p. 152).  
The international system was based on a bipolar power structure after World War II. Whilst 
the use of force abroad remained limited in this period, superpowers used financial assistance 
to keep any country close to their sides (Bates, 2001, p. 75). The result of this international 
political environment was the foundation or maintenance of (excessively central) non-
democratic states in most of the developing world (Bates, 2001, p. 82; Huntington, 1984),24 
                                                          
24 We can make this inference from words stated by Bates (2001) that “[d]uring the Cold War, the United States 
was often criticized supporting regimes in power that violated its democratic principles. As illustrated by the 
case of Mobutu [of Congo], the government did indeed often ally itself with dictators and authoritarians.” 
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using coercion arbitrarily to halt opponents (any peripheral movement against the centre) 
(Bates, 2017, pp. 106, 108-109).  
When the Cold War started, the Turkish state, however, found sufficient incentives to set up 
part of liberal political institutions. In fear of being invaded by the Soviet Union, the CHP 
opted for allying with the West, thus countenanced a transition to a multi-party political 
system as a basic step for democratisation (Karaosmanoglu, 2000). They eventually lost their 
power in 1950 to the Democrat Party (DP) and handed power over. According to Aydin 
(2005, p. 27), “[t]he different class interests represented within the state were a significant 
factor, among others, in the abandonment of a single party system in favour of a pluralistic 
democratic system in 1950.” 
That the DP came to power was a silent but strong reaction of a wide group of the people in 
the periphery, such as Islamic groups and Kurdish tribes, and landholders in the dominant 
coalition, which had been squeezed to finance the army during World War II (Mardin, 1973; 
Owen & Pamuk, 2002, pp. 141-142). The DP government integrated Turkey in the world 
economy and Western organisations25 and obtained economic and military support in return 
(Aydin, 2005, p. 28). They satisfied smallholders and large landholders by introducing 
policies to give subsidies and higher prices for crops and diffusing intensification methods for 
increasing agricultural productivity (Aydemir, 2000, pp. 207-208, 218-219; Başkaya, 1991, 
pp. 172-173). Liberal trade policies of the DP also helped the merchants grow their wealth. 
However, dissatisfaction started to grew after the mid-1950s, because of increasing inflation, 
recession and financial incapability of importing inputs for agriculture and the industry, 
especially among smallholders, the working class, the manufacturing bourgeoisie, the 
bureaucracy, and a group of intellectuals who criticised the government due to their 
reactionary, anti-democratic political practices (Yerasimos, 1992, pp. 230-232). Their 
discontentment and protests were not enough to remove the DP government from power, and 
ultimately, the Turkish army staged a military coup in 1960 to restore its power and order 
(Yerasimos, 1992, pp. 232-233). This initiative nevertheless widened the distrust of 
conservative grassroots towards the CHP (Mardin, 1973), which was brought to power by the 
Army and governed Turkey until the Justice Party took over in 1965 with the support of the 
constituency of the DP. 
                                                          
25 Such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the International Finance Organisation, and the International 
Development Association. 
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Through the 1960 coup d’état, as Daldal (2004) contends, a new middle class composed of 
the military-bureaucratic class, a group of intellectuals and the manufacturing bourgeoisie 
took action and formulated development policies concerning import substitution 
industrialisation. Where economic planning “relegate[d] all control over one’s fate to the 
limbo of bureaucratic decision” (Mardin, 1973), the large-scale trade and industrial 
bourgeoisie, which mainly agglomerated in western Turkey and coastal areas, particularly in 
Istanbul, greatly developed in the 1960s through rents created under protectionist policies 
(Ataay, 2001; Başkaya, 1991, p. 182; Keyder, 1979) as well as through partnerships with the 
Western merchant and industrial capitalists (Daldal, 2004). Military and economic aid from 
Western countries continued in this period, and thus Turkey largely acted in accordance with 
western international policies (Sander, 1979). 
The military-bureaucratic class, the development bureaucracy and the large-scale capitalist 
classes formed the dominant coalition at the centre. As the capitalisation of agriculture was 
being accelerated in this period, villagers who were migrating to urban areas inherently 
swelled working class numbers (Yerasimos, 1992, p. 247). This period also marked a 
widening of the developmental disparity between western and eastern Anatolia (Yerasimos, 
1992, pp. 382-383), fuelling sentiments of Kurdish regionalism. The left-wing young people, 
the working class and Kurds started to actively oppose the dominant coalition as a wing of 
the peripheral movement after the-mid 1960s. 
The distribution of privileges to the large-scale urban bourgeoisie and the agglomeration of 
capital in west Turkey continued to provoke reactions from different interest groups and in 
relatively less developed regions in the 1970s. Holding conservative Turkish-Islamic views 
(Keyder, 1979), the petty capitalists26, who had burgeoned in urban areas all across Turkey, 
passively defied the superiority of the large-scale bourgeoisie (Ataay, 2001; Keyder, 1979) 
without initiating actual conflict. They continued to mobilise under various centre-right, far-
right and Islamic right-wing parties, which would govern Turkey through a coalition 
government during a large part of the 1970s.  
In the 1970s, the political centre got stuck in political and economic problems. As a global 
crisis of capitalism hit Turkey’s economy severely, the military bureaucratic class followed a 
                                                          
26 The small and medium-size capitalists had an intermediary position between the large-scale trade bourgeoisie 
and the industry bourgeoisie, and between local raw materials and commodity markets (Ataay, 2001). This 
group acquired rapid capital accumulation by exploiting the non-qualified labour force, thus strongly objecting 
to wage rises, supporting the immediate transformation of rural areas in a way that would create a labour surplus 
in agriculture (Keyder, 1979).  
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strategy to halt the pressure coming from the periphery: they crushed leftists and Kurds with 
the help of right-wing fascists and Islamists (Keyder, 1987, pp. 217-222). When they restored 
their power during the 1980 military coup, they initiated “Islamisation”, in line with 
“religionisation” or new conservatism, as seen in many cases in the capitalist world, to 
facilitate the implementation of neoliberal economic policies (Kucuk, 2010, pp. 59-74; Yasli, 
2014, pp. 22-23, 64-68). Apparently, international dealings, and efforts to find a proper 
position in international power structures impelled the military bureaucracy did so (Fuller, 31 
October 2004).27 
After all, the political Islam disintegrated not only the working class by dividing the urban 
poor via religious identities (Kucukaydin, 2012, pp. 49-52) but also the Kurdish political 
movement in the same way. This political strategy would render the position of the military-
bureaucratic class gradually vulnerable to Islamists after 1980 and paved the way for the 
conservative Islamist JDP. 
2.3.3 Modern Turkey between 1980 and 2000 
Turkey and many other less developed countries carried out the same strategy for 
development during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, - import substitution industrialisation - but ended 
this due to the late-century shocks to the global system, which led to dramatic changes in 
development policies and security conditions of developing countries.  
Following the end of the Cold War autocratic regimes were faced with not only democratic 
demands from both inside and outside (Bates, 2001, pp. 93-97) but also economic pressures 
where public budget deficits had mounted because of surges in petroleum prices and 
exorbitant costs of protectionist policies and patronage (Bates, 2001, p. 90). The policies 
recommended by a wide group of people, including creditors, businessmen and intellectuals 
were to lower public budget deficits, lift international trade barriers and avoid protectionism 
(Bates, 2001, pp. 90-94). In Prosperity and Violence Bates describes this: 
Changes in the international economy placed new fiscal limits on developing regimes; no 
longer presiding over fountains of privileges, their political leaders found it more 
difficult to seduce local warlords, enticing them to disband armed retainers and to 
affiliate with the center [emphasis added]. The end of the century was therefore marked 
                                                          
27 Graham Fuller (31 October 2004), a former operations officer having served for the Central Intelligence 
Agency in Turkey, expresses the international relations between the United States and Turkey required to use 
Islamisation to halt the leftist movement. They formed the Green Belt of Islam to stop the Soviet Union. Acting 
contradictorily with their ideology, they supported anti democracy in Turkey to eliminate the possible threat of 
communism. 
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not only by the spread of democracy in the developing world but also by the spread of 
violence (p.97). 
Late-century shocks changed the set of incentives that had helped the sustenance of 
excessively centralised states, and paved the way for peripheral movements and violent 
collapses of some countries in Africa and Balkans. But Turkey did not experience any serious 
political pressure from the West involving democratic demands28, and violence remained 
regional. 
Turkey had already experienced some of economic problems attributed to the 1990s in the 
1970s, such as foreign trade deficits, public budget deficits, swelling debts and increasing 
inflation rates (Buğra, 2008, p. 197). However, she did not face any state collapse similar to 
some African countries, and continued to receive political, military and financial support 
from the West because of its highly important geopolitical position in the Middle East. How 
did Turkey differ from African countries?  
According to North et al. (2009, p. 73), some natural states are fragile as their dominant 
coalitions depend on individual interactions and trust between powerful elites, and therefore 
they cannot create sophisticated and durable institutions in the private and public domain. 
Naturally, the distributional mechanism of rents among elites was foiled by late-century 
shocks, resulting in the collapse of some African countries.  
When it comes to Turkey, the state formation was being secured by the long-existing military 
bureaucratic class29. Despite all vagueness in his categories30, we can say that Turkey has 
been a mature natural state except for last few years. According to North et al. (2009, p. 73),  
[i]n mature natural states, credible institutions evolve that provide organizations a 
measure of rule of law. As more complex organizations develop, both inside and 
outside of the formal government, the distinction between public and private 
organizations begins to appear. The first steps toward Weberian states or 
governments with consolidated, monopoly control over the military occur in 
mature natural states. Sustaining some amount of rule of law for elite 
                                                          
28 For example, the European Union had not demanded democratic changes in Turkey’s constitution until they 
accepted its candidateship to the Union in December 1999. 
29 Its members are not powerful individuals. They are bound to the legal framework to be replaced or removed 
except for the case of a crise threatening them, and whey they retire from the military service, they become 
ordinary people. So, the class itself is powerful. 
30 North et al. (2009, pp. 55-76) classify limited access orders or natural states in three categories: fragile nature 
state, basic natural state and mature natural state. Although there are important differences between these 
categories, they use only “natural states” in their book to make arguments and explanations, which causes 
confusion and unclearness. 
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organizations appears to be incredibly complicated to pull off and is the 
beginning of the doorstep conditions. 
Relying on “the asymmetric power structures that the Turkish Republic inherited from 
Ottoman times” (Jung, 2008), the military-bureaucratic class has created a distinction 
between the government and the state. Its members have kept the survival of the state as a 
sublime interest and tightly controlled it so that they can materialise their interests and secure 
the creation of systemic rents in the dominant coalition. As North et al. (2009) do not delve 
into mature natural states taking into account of non-western countries with an imperial 
background, they do recognise that the (military) bureaucratic class in those countries is a 
major barrier to transition to open-access orders, with its monopoly over violence.  
Furthermore, it has always been capable of acting flexibly, continuing to cooperate with the 
West on economic and political levels, so increased legitimacy. At that time, they willingly 
espoused neoliberal policies under the supervision of the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) between 1980 and 1984 to integrate the national 
economy to the world capitalism (Buğra, 2008, pp. 197-200). 
They also framed their foreign policies to help the West to deal with the recently founded 
mullah regime in Iran, threatening Western interests, and removed their veto against the 
return of Greece to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 183-184). And 
when the US-led multinational forces intervened in Iraq in 1991, the state allowed them to 
use a military base for airstrikes, notwithstanding the substantial loss of revenues that would 
have derived from export to Iraq and oil pipelines as well as any possible retaliation from 
Saddam Hussein (Brown, 2007). The geo-strategical position were used by the military to 
increase bargaining power in international dealings and keep the power at the centre of the 
dominant coalition. 
The Turkish state received a significant degree of support from the West, unlike many 
developing countries, despite their anti-democratic practices. For example, while it was 
fighting with the PKK through a counter-insurgency strategy, human rights of ordinary 
citizens were seriously violated.31 Furthermore, it seems that the counter-insurgency strategy 
was taught by military officials of the US to their Turkish counterparts (Jongerden, 2015, p. 
95). And the West sold Turkey arms and equipment for the counter-insurgency (Jongerden, 
2015, pp. 90-91). 
                                                          
31 For details, look at the reports of TGNA Human Rights Inquiry Committee (2013) and Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki (1993). 
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Though Turkey had been shaken with economic recessions and crises at short intervals 
between 1988 and 2001, loans and capital inflow from the West revived the economy, thus 
reinforcing the power of the political centre, and helping to surmount the high costs of 
military operations to fight the PKK.  
The support given by the West was not gratuitous; Turkey was required to implement 
neoliberal economic policies, which were detrimental to the agricultural sector and impelled 
sharecroppers and smallholders to migrate to urban areas, undermining the position of 
labourers in the market (Buğra, 2008, pp. 200-201). Neoliberal economic policies were 
important to satisfy international economic actors and the large-scale bourgeoisie in the 
dominant coalition. Capital-friendly public policies, and the  measures that were taken in the 
labour market to repress wages and suppress trade unions played a decisive role in gaining 
their support (Boratav, 1999, pp. 89-92). To alleviate strong reactions, within three years after 
the coup in 1980, the military regime disorganized and crushed the working class, leftists and 
Kurdish activists and showed its political flexibility to transition to civil democracy.  
Turgut Ozal32 - elected mainly by conservative and centre-right constituencies - set up the 
Motherland Party government in 1983. The Populist Party, representing those who were 
discontent with the military coup and its results, obtained around 30.5% of the votes. This 
proved that military-bureaucratic class could render their policies and actions justifiable in 
the eyes of most people. When Kenan Evren, the leader of the coup, was replaced by Ozal, 
the military-bureaucratic class retreated from being directly involved in politics. Politicians 
who had been banned by the military regime returned to politics in 1987. Weak and mostly 
short-lived coalition governments were established during the 1990s. Constitutional 
institutions that had been legalised during the military regime facilitated the military-
bureaucratic class to pull the strings of incumbent governments during this period (Cizre-
Sakallioglu, 1997).  
In the meantime, all the policies deepened urban-rural, secular-Islamist and Turkish-Kurdish 
divisions in the society in the 1990s (Cizre-Sakallioglu & Erinç, 2000). The only violent 
challenge against the political centre came from Kurds, which re-organised themselves into 
the PKK. The armed conflict escalated in the early 1990s but remained geographically 
                                                          
32 Turgut Ozal was specifically chosen by the military to apply those policies in the post-coup period, who had 
been employed by the World Bank in 1971-73, and who had a strong relationship with national and international 
capital groups and organisations (Boratav, 1999, pp. 73-76, 82-86). During his prime-ministership, he gained a 
chance to introduce himself to the conservative people, promoting his status of saving the country from the 
economic disturbance. 
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limited. Meanwhile, the military-bureaucratic class reached the zenith of its political power 
and further consolidated their popular support by promoting nationalism/patriotism 
(Karaosmanoglu, 2000). 
The societal divisions were also gradually undermining the political base of the military and 
the western Anatolian large-scale capitalists and frustrated their mutual relationships, but 
strengthened those of the large-scale and petite capitalists with Islamic or conservative values 
(Kucukaydin, 2013b, p. 48). Similar to other Muslim-populated countries, Islamic social 
organisations and networks filled ‘the vacuum left by the government’ by offering a variety 
of social services including education, health and childcare (Huntington, 2002, pp. 111-113). 
By doing so, these organisations extended their political influence over the poor affected by 
modernisation. Traditional middle-class groups, such as merchants, traders, owners of small 
businesses, further strengthened the Islamisation process (Huntington, 2002, p. 113). 
The rise of political Islam challenged the power of the political centre during the elections in 
the mid-1990s. But the military-bureaucratic class eventually harnessed their power and 
removed the coalition government of the Islamist WP and the True Path Party in 1997, 
alleging that they had violated secular principles of Turkey. Relying on networks with 
religious communities and their affiliated religious organisations, the Islamic bourgeoisie, 
which had thrived under neoliberal policies, was also curbed and criminalised by the military-
bureaucratic class by means of financial investigations and measures (Hosgör, 2011). All 
these attempts did not stop the rise of the conservative Islamist bourgeoisie. 
The WP, meanwhile, was divided by internal disagreements. The JDP, which was set up 
under Erdogan’s leadership, adopted moderate Islamism more adaptive to neoliberal policies 
and the Western political tendencies in order to gain the international support. This was a 
critical strategic move for the conservative periphery. The JDP came to power in late 2002 as 
a result of the 2001 economic crisis. The Erdogan Administration politically representing the 
Islamist bourgeoisie succeeded in gaining support of the large-scale bourgeoisie in west 
Turkey (Yasli, 2014, p. 23) and also managed to get votes from traditional middle-class 
groups as well as the conservative poor. This change marked the rise of the conservative 
Islamist bourgeoisie in the dominant coalition, having skilfully leveraged the political 
reaction of the conservative poor and middle-class groups. 
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2.4 Conclusion  
We have showed that the central power is overwhelmingly dominated by the military-
bureaucratic class, traditionally executing high centralisation in Turkey. The secular, 
westernised bourgeoisie was created by this class and added to the dominant coalition to 
catch up developed economies with their economic power and investments. The conservative 
Islamic bourgeoisie and the conservative periphery showed a reaction to these two dominant 
actors, but the former only sought to strengthen their position in the dominant coalition, as we 
will see in the next chapters.  
This was a stark difference from England, in which the bourgeoisie developed by itself from 
capitalist relationships in the market and induced the establishment of liberal democratic 
institutions by rising its power in the dominant coalition. Kucukaydin (2013b, p. 42) explains 
well the positions of the bourgeoisie and the military class in Turkey’s politics: 
The bourgeoisie has a real dilemma here. On the one hand, they seek [to have] the actual 
political power; on the other hand, they do not seek to touch [or disturb] the powerful 
state apparatus and the army. By keeping that power [close to themselves], they desire to 
use it as a tool of their own political power. This is because if they did not have such 
power, they know that they could no longer sustain their own hegemony. Yet, as long as 
they do not touch their power, there exists no chance to take the political power from 
their [the military-bureaucracy’s] hands. And eventually, they turn into a mere pawn of 
them. 
According to North et al. (2009, p. 153), ‘in most natural states access to the means of 
violence is dispersed throughout the elite. […] Nothing precludes a faction within a natural 
state from taking control of military resources.’ North et al. (2009, p. 153) add:  
Moreover, societies where a single faction dominates the military are unlikely to sustain 
consolidated control for long, because the factions and groups in the dominant coalition 
without the means to protect themselves have no reason to believe that the commitments 
made to them will be honored.  
The logic of natural states explained by North does not match with the reality of Turkey. The 
elites in the dominant coalition have no military power to change the composition of the 
dominant coalition, and the military bureaucratic class itself possesses consolidated military 
power.33 There is however a symbiotic relationship between economic elites and the military, 
                                                          
33 One can question whether understanding the military-bureaucratic class as a single unit is correct. This class 
surely had political fractions in the course of history. But we can observe at least that they have kept their 
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and therefore the coalition has existed for long. More importantly, the bourgeoisie is afraid of 
losing the state apparatus to the periphery, namely the working class and the poor, so giving 
consent to the military to have a dominant position in Turkey’s politics. The military 
bureaucratic class is in fact an old-fashioned class, coming from the Ottoman Empire. It 
keeps power by ensuring a political-economic order that provides privileges to the 
bourgeoisie and by adapting to international power structure. 
This structure of the dominant coalition has definitely not conferred peace and prosperity on 
the people. Particularly, it influenced the development of the country geographically in 
favour of the western Turkey, thus created a reaction in other regions. However, this reaction 
did not take place in the form of regionalism but country-wide peripheral movements formed 
by ideology intertwined with cultural and economic differences. As long as the dominant 
coalition has blocked their participation, peripheral movements have grown. 
Given these facts, the question of how natural state countries similar to Turkey can pass to 
the door-step conditions to set up democracy remains unanswered in Violence and Social 
Orders. In the next chapters, we will address that the JDP government, mainly representing 
the interests of conservative bourgeoisie, challenged with the military bureaucracy, attempted 
to get rid of a wing of it but did not institutionalise checks and balances over it to cut their 
direct or indirect interventions in civil politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
political flexibility without falling apart over violent disagreements and mostly managed to accommodate 
changing relations and positions among different classes and social groups to hold their power at the centre 
(Kucukaydin, 2013a, pp. 49-50). 
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Chapter 3: The Kurdish Question as a Peripheral Movement: Political 
Collective Action and Ethnic Social Capital  
3.1 Introduction 
The Kurdish Question, starting from the foundation of modern Turkey, transformed Kurds 
into a peripheral movement. The Kurdish political movement first cut across tribes, and later 
modernisation shaped and changed the movement. We will use the concept of social capital 
and collective action to understand the Kurdish Question from a critical perspective, so 
contribute to RCT. 
This chapter seeks to understand the Kurdish Question with regard to social capital, or more 
specifically, to ethnic social capital. This understanding will help us to appreciate the policies 
of the Turkish state in its dealings with the Kurdish Question, ranging from military 
interventions to the implementation of development policies. The importance of the question 
stems from its adverse effect on Turkey’s political economic development. The resolution of 
the problem lies in democratisation and development together. However, the state is not able 
to approach the Kurdish Question accepting this reality because of the structure of the power 
in the dominant coalition. The democratisation requires democratic civil control over the 
military bureaucracy, so leaving the position at the centre. Neither the bourgeoisie nor the 
military bureaucratic class can desire such a thing. As a result, the Kurdish Question is 
interpreted in two ways: the military narrative and the development narrative. We will 
examine why the policies based on these narratives have not yielded the expected results for 
the state. In this sense, the social capital of and collective action among Kurds will be under 
scrutiny. 
3.2 Social Capital and Collective Action 
The concept of social capital has been theorized in the social sciences for nearly four decades. 
As Lan (2008, p. 50) points out, “since the notion of social capital has generated multiple 
definitions, conceptualizations, and empirical measurements, the continued diversity in such 
usages without integration may undermine and ultimately bring its downfall as a rigorous 
scientific concept and theory of social analysis.” To avoid confusion, we will be based on the 
concept of social capital introduced by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues who attempt to 
formulate a theory of social capital based on second-generation theories of collective action34. 
                                                          
34 The first-generation collective action theories did good service in challenging that people act voluntarily for 
the attainment of common interests as we see in Olson’s analysis of collective action that refers to universal 
selfishness of the human being in collective action problems. The second-generation collective action theories 
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In the Logic of Collective Action, Olson argued, “[…] unless the number of individuals in a 
group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or other some special device to make 
individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests” (M. Olson, 2002, pp. 2, emphasis in original). In 
large groups, an individual will calculate his/her benefit and cost of getting some amount of 
the collective good. If the benefit remains lower than the cost, (s)he will find little incentive 
and refrain from engaging in collective action with other group members to produce the 
collective good (M. Olson, 2002, pp. 33-35). Indeed, an individual action of a member in a 
large group (i.e. farmers) will carry little weight in producing the collective good and whether 
(s)he acts or not will not be noticeable to the other group members. As the members can get 
some amount of benefit without any cost, no member will choose to act collectively. From 
this point, M. Olson (2002, pp. 69-76, 153-159) suggests that large groups such as trade 
unions and farm bureaus must create economic incentives (i.e. non-collective benefits) 
together with coercion (e.g. compulsory membership through closed shop mechanisms) to 
convince potential members of joining or supporting collective actions. 
When we read Olson’s arguments, a question comes to our mind: can political collective 
action be taken by a large group? His response is that the ordinary followers of a political 
party are free-riders, so not engaging in political collective actions such as donating money to 
the party’s coffers, promoting party policies in streets, etc. They are aware that their 
contribution would not be effective and noticeable, but they could obtain benefits if their 
party came to power (M. Olson, 2002, pp. 163-164). But what if political collective action 
came from the people in the political periphery without even a chance to come to power in 
the foreseeable period, and moreover, the adherents were susceptible to regular coercion by 
the state? M. Olson (2002, pp. 161-162) (inconvincibly) argues that “mass movements” can 
be explained in psychological reference to the various qualities of the social structure. Such 
an explanation is vague, and here we argue that the collective action of mass movements may 
be better explained by referring to their social capital. 
Social capital can be defined as follows (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008, p. 73): 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rely on behavioural and evolutionary game models, and point out that in some cases the assumption of the 
universal selfishness is valid (Ahn & Ostrom, 2002, August-September). In other cases a large group of 
individuals are subject to bounded rationality, that is, “the decision making process was heavily influenced by 
institutions” such as norms and values, and thus they are “morally constrained” as “norm followers” (Volacu & 
Golopenta, 2015, p. 42). All those assumptions point to a high level of cooperation through institutional 
learning, thus of trust and trustworthiness (Ahn & Ostrom, 2002, August-September). 
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[…] social capital is a set of prescriptions, values, and relationships created by 
individuals in the past that can be drawn on in the present and future to facilitate 
overcoming social dilemmas [or collective-action problems]. Those who directly benefit 
from their own or others’ past efforts in building these patterns may be a small or large 
group. The externalities from the use of social capital may be positive (when a group of 
neighbours clean up a neighbourhood) or negative to the outsiders (when a gang of youth 
protect their turf). Social capital reflects a way of conceptualizing how cultural, 
structural, and institutional aspects of small to large groups in a society interact and 
affect individual incentives and behaviour and resultant economic and political change. It 
is a core concept […] whenever joint endeavours of individuals are critical in achieving a 
collective goal.  
Second-generation theories of collective action have been developed from dynamic or 
repeated game theory models by which heterogeneous individual preferences take 
evolutionary forms through interaction. Understanding those theories, “[w]e identify 
trustworthiness, networks, and institutions as three basic forms of social capital. […] 
Trustworthiness, networks, and institutions are capital in the broad sense that they serve as 
independent inputs to economic and political processes and outcomes” (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008, 
p. 72).  These are crucial to foster trust between individuals, thereby helping successful 
collective action for common purposes (E. Ostrom & Ahn, 2009, p. 22). 
‘Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’ by moulding incentives and reducing uncertainty 
(North, 1990, p. 3). ‘Individuals use [them] to organize their activities within and across all 
forms of organizational and interorganizational arrangements’ (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008, p. 74). 
Well-functioning institutions are of  vital importance to enable cooperation between 
individuals (instead of exploitation), furnishing information and act as deterrents to level up 
the likelihood of their reciprocation regardless of high material temptations (Ahn & Ostrom, 
2008). 
‘Trustworthiness as a characteristic of preferences [emphasis in original] […] is embedded in 
a person’s intrinsic norms by which one reciprocates others’ trust even when material self-
interest does not compel one to do so’ (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008, p. 72). Trust is a ‘rational belief 
about the other’s likelihood of reciprocation’; it is not ‘a form of social capital’ but ‘the key 
link between forms of social capital and outcomes’, especially given that individuals could 
choose to cooperate with others in social dilemmas if they have the belief that others would 
also cooperate (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008, p. 80).  
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Modern political economic orders require individuals to engage in relationships with people 
outside their close circle of friends and relatives in one-shot or less repetitive situations. 
Given the number of altruists in a society is limited, networks are to be established to forge 
trustworthiness between individuals, disseminating information of their reputation across the 
network they joined, through repeated actions facilitating cooperation (E. Ostrom & Ahn, 
2009, pp. 26-28). The importance of networks is about their creation of mutual obligations 
between their members, transformed into mutual trust through reciprocity (Putnam, 2000, p. 
18). 
E. Ostrom (2001) highlights that, ‘social capital is formed over time and is embedded in 
common understanding rather than in physically obvious structures’, and adds that, ‘[i]t is not 
easy to see and measure’.35 Furthermore, the limited number of studies undertaken constraints 
our efforts to explain the Kurdish Question in terms of social capital. 
3.3 Intra-Ethnic and Inter-Ethnic Social Capital 
Social capital can naturally take different shapes and entail different norms of reciprocity. Its 
most important categories are bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Putnam 
(2000) defines bonding and bridging social capital as follows: 
[…] [Bonding social capital is] by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to 
reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. […] Other networks are outward 
looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of bridging 
social capital include the civil rights movement, many youth service groups, and 
ecumenical religious organizations. Bonding social capital is good for undergirding 
specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity. Bridging networks, by contrast, are better 
for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion. […] Moreover, bridging 
social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social 
capital bolsters our narrower selves. […] Bonding social capital, by creating strong in-
group loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism. […] Nevertheless, under 
many circumstances both bridging and bonding social capital can have powerfully 
positive social effects. Many groups simultaneously bond along some social dimensions 
and bridge across others. (pp.20-21).  
Linking social capital can be defined “as norms of respect and networks of trusting 
relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized 
power or authority gradients in society” (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Cross-cutting ties 
                                                          
35 Social capital is more difficult to see and measure in less developed countries than developed countries, and in 
rural areas than urban areas, because of the weight of informal relations and institutions. 
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relying on trust and respect between persons such as specialists, officers, service providers, 
lawyers, etc., can be deemed as an important property of linking social capital, which may 
foster social harmony, welfare and well-being especially in disadvantaged groups and 
communities (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). As understood, linking social capital helps vertical 
integration or networking to reach sources and power outside the group (Onyx, Edwards, & 
Bullen, 2007). 
These forms of social capital should not be considered inherently good. They have a different 
relationship with power, so involving risks. Bonding social capital cements group-based 
identity and belonging, which can easily produce intolerance, oppressive acts and unfair 
advantages. Bridging social capital can give excessive power to reach external assets and 
networks of skills. When there is a hole between two networks, the mediator who links those 
networks may gain unfair advantages. The risk that linking social capital poses is to have an 
overpowering control over society, thus creating inequality among people (Onyx et al., 2007). 
For ethnic groups, Miedema (2010) introduces a new category of social capital , depending 
on the concepts of bonding, bridging and linking social capital: intra-ethnic social capital and 
inter-ethnic social capital.  
Intra-ethnic social capital is formed as a result of the connections between members of the 
same ethnic group. However, intra-ethnic social capital not only intertwines with “the sum of 
commonalities such as religion, culture, and language”, but also embeds in a network of 
connections that interact with kinship ties, traditions and norms associated with a common 
history, namely, “a belief in the distinctiveness of the group”, intra-group preferences and 
emotional attachments, and a shared sense of responsibility that facilitates reciprocity 
(Miedema, 2010, pp. 67-68). In this manner, intra-ethnic social capital embraces bonding, 
bridging and linking social capital, and thus more strong, durable and unified connections are 
vertically and horizontally formed among even remote members through kinship or ethnicity 
(Miedema, 2010, pp. 65-66, 68-69). 
If trustworthiness as a characteristic of preferences is embedded in a person’s intrinsic norms 
that enable or impel her to reciprocate to other’s trust (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008, p. 72), ethnicity 
must be an important factor imposing itself on a person’s preferences and placing itself in it 
as a strong layer. As mentioned before, Varshney (2003) defines this as value rationality of a 
member of an ethnic group. In her ethnographic study, Kizilkaya (2014, p. 114) contends that 
negative discourses or views of political parties can easily influence the decision made by a 
56 
 
member of an ethnic group: a Kurdish businessman cancels his agreement, thus desisting 
reciprocity to a company whose owner is a Turkish nationalist. It proves that ethnicity is an 
important factor that structures a person’s intrinsic norms associated with his trustworthiness. 
This is why a peaceful solution to ethnic problems in a highly ethnically polarised society is 
difficult to attain. 
Individual preferences are layered and structured by ethnicity at various levels, and breaking 
the layer of ethnicity could be difficult for any state that seeks to assimilate or disintegrate the 
targeted ethnic identity and its political formation. For example, while the Turkish state 
authorities could easily convince Kurds to become village guards, strongly associated with 
tribal social capital rather than ethnicity, they had great difficulty to do this with other Kurds 
who had a strong ethnic identity. Again, Islamist Kurds have an ideological layer of Islamism 
in their structure of individual preferences, and thus may politically act in a way compatible 
with the Islamic brotherhood rather than along Kurdish ethnic identity lines. 
Inter-ethnic social capital is formed from bonding, bridging and linking social capital that 
exist between different ethnic groups, to facilitate the coordination and cooperation between 
them. The networks of informal and formal relations between individuals and organisations 
from different ethnic groups are important components of inter-ethnic social capital. The 
other components are ‘norms, understandings, and expectations about rights and obligations’ 
that sustain relationships or end disagreements between ethnic groups (Miedema, 2010, p. 
70). The existence of such social capital does not guarantee that tension or hostilities between 
ethnic groups have vanished but serves the creation of or the improvement in informal and 
formal institutions that help them coexist without instability and violent vicious circles. This 
implies a difference between inter-ethnic social capital from bonding and bridging social 
capital: ‘the norms of inter-ethnic social capital largely govern the relationship between 
ethnic groups at the collective level in the polity’ (Miedema, 2010, p. 74).  
3.4 The Ethnic Social Capital of Kurds in Turkey 
The Kurdish population in Turkey, between 12 to 15 million or roughly 18 to 23% of the total 
population (F. O'Connor, 2017) are overwhelmingly concentrated in a specific area in eastern 
Turkey, called North Kurdistan by the Kurds. Others live in central Anatolia and 
metropolises such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. Such a distribution of the Kurdish 
population has thus compelled them to interact with various ethnic and religious 
communities, such as Turks, Turkomans, Arabs, Iranians, Yazidis, Christians, and Jewish 
(McDowall, 1996, p. 6). Today, Kurds can reside in Turkish-populated areas, speak Turkish, 
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access education and employment, run business and marry Turks, though the armed conflict 
occasionally increases tension between these two ethnic groups.36 The inter-ethnic social 
capital, having strongly formed between Turks and Kurds, is an important factor in 
explaining why no Turkey-wide civil war has broken out despite the armed conflict that has 
lasted over three decades. However, their intra-ethnic social capital also explains why no 
enduring peaceful society has been created. As we indicated earlier, the Turkish state has 
played an effective role in creating a conservative, nationalist – even chauvinistic - Turkish 
identity, which hampers the establishment of completely peaceful relationships between 
Kurds and Turks. 
The Kurdish ethnic identity has remained fragmented because of the existence of various 
tribal identities, ideologies and differences in cultural characteristics such as language, beliefs 
and religion (McDowall, 1997). Nevertheless, the increasing intimacy among Kurds from 
different countries as a result of globalisation and wars in Syria and Iraq, assimilation policies 
and the ban on the use of the Kurdish language have created a common identity among Kurds 
and strengthened the intra-ethnic social capital, despite a lagging economic and institutional 
integration (Kurubas, 2008). 
Even among young Kurds whose families have often integrated with Turks outside Kurdish-
populated areas, there is still a strong Kurdish identity. Kizilkaya (2014, p. 124) reports from 
an interview with a Kurdish young:  
I thought that the [ethnic] identity was not important among us; our material 
circumstances were good. We lived an isolated life [from the Kurds in the SAR]. The 
case of Ahmet Kaya became a turning point in my life. My family got deeply shocked 
over what he faced and his death. My consciousness about Kurdishness started [with this 
incident]. I wanted to learn Kurdish. […] Then, I got into learning the Kurdish history 
[…]. 
Weak governance structures, lack of public investments and state failures in providing basic 
economic and social services cement intra-ethnic capital in developing countries as ethnic 
group members step into this services vacuum (Miedema, 2010, p. 77). In Turkey, 
developmental problems induced the revival of Kurdish nationalism, especially among the 
Kurds that had migrated to urban areas. Nevertheless, widespread poverty and a low level of 
                                                          
36 The study of Kizilkaya (2014) scrutinises lives of ordinary Kurds who migrated to Konya centuries ago, one 
of the most conservative nationalist cities in Turkey. The study is important to show that Kurds have been able 
to develop robust inter-ethnic social capital with Turks, and strong intra-ethnic social capital even when they 
have been remote from mostly Kurdish-populated areas for centuries.  
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capital have not allowed networks of ordinary Kurds to provide a wide range of services to 
each other. And since the capacity of Kurdish tribal elites to provide economic insurance has 
also eroded over time (Gultekin, 2013), Kurds are impelled to call for state support. Still, 
there is a widely shared acceptance that solving the economic problems is not sufficient to 
address the Kurdish question, if the Kurdish identity is not recognized (Kizilkaya, 2014, pp. 
154-157). 
Nevertheless, kinship ties and ethnic identity can function as an interface for socio-economic 
security such as finding shelter and a job, ensuring security, settling permanently and 
assisting those who reside in rural areas (Kurban & Yegen, 2012; The IPS at Hacettepe 
University, 2006, p. 73). This has resulted in a concentration of the Kurdish population in 
some neighbourhoods in predominantly Turkish-populated urban areas, creating strong social 
but informal networks.  
In the SAR, rural life has been transformed into a hybrid rural-urban life. The old have 
returned to their villages after the end of the armed conflict in 1998 whereas the young still 
dwell in urban areas. In the rural-urban life, the old and the young in a family are exchanging 
agricultural goods and urban-based goods to support each other’s lives (Jongerden, 2015, pp. 
336-337). As a result, intra-ethnic social capital is increased in the network of family, relative 
and neighbours among Kurds. 
3.5 The Formation of Kurdish Ethnic Social Capital in the Kurdish Question 
This section explains how Kurds have formed ethnic social capital after the foundation of the 
Republic of Turkey in 1923 and turned this subsequently into political collective action. It 
also discusses what policies the Turkish state has adopted in response to this form of social 
capital. 
When the republic was founded, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk - representing the interests of the 
military-bureaucratic class - established a new constitutional regime based on three 
principles: republicanism (centralisation), secularism, and a nation-building project based on 
Turkishness. These principles, however, contradicted the nascent Kurdish nationalist 
collective identity, which was mainly based on tribal kinship, Islam and Kurdishness (A. V. 
Koçal, 2014).  
The exclusion of Kurdish tribal elites from the dominant coalition further provoked an angry 
response. In the 16th century, Kurdish tribes had obtained considerable autonomy from the 
Ottoman central administration in exchange for protecting the territory against Iran 
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(Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 157-161). However, they gradually lost their autonomy due to  
coercive policies of the Ottomans in the 19th century who advanced their centralisation 
project. When the new republic completely terminated the Kurdish autonomy and the 
caliphate, prohibited the Kurdish language in public areas and implemented forced exile and 
resettlement, a Kurdish nationalist rebellion erupted, tapping into the social capital of the 
Kurdish tribal networks (Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 281-299). 
Employing landless people on their lands, the exiled tribal leaders had been providing their 
members, by hook or by crook, with physical, economic and financial security via an 
informal credit mechanism (Besikci, 1970, pp. 106-107). But no modern credit mechanisms 
nor any social and economic security institutions were established by the government to help 
people to sustain their agricultural activities during the absence of the tribal leaders (Besikci, 
1970, pp. 30-31). The tribal leaders, in the end, came back to their hometowns, restored their 
legitimacy and established political relationships with local and national authorities to protect 
their positions (Besikci, 1970, pp. 310-311). Yet, the war destruction and disruptions in the 
feudal system had a significant economic impact on Kurdish society, contributing to the 
widening regional development disparity between eastern and western Turkey. 
In 1950 when the DP government came to power under a multi-party political system, they 
sought to satisfy the interests of large landholders in exchange for political support, providing 
imported agricultural inputs and machinery, favourable agricultural prices and subsidies 
(Aydemir, 2000, pp. 218-219; Başkaya, 1991, p. 173; Keyder, 1979, p. 57; Robinson, 1952). 
The mechanisation of the agricultural sector, however, tilted the agricultural structure away 
from sharecroppers and smallholders across Turkey (Robinson, 1952) but arguably mostly in 
the SAR - mostly populated by Kurds and Arabs and with a highly unfair land distribution 
(Besikci, 1970, pp. 60-61). Many sharecroppers were forced out of agriculture during the 
diffusion of mechanisation. Some resisted the tribal leaders and resettled on marginal land. 
Others, living in border towns, started smuggling various agricultural and agro-industrial 
goods. Finally, some migrated to regional urban areas, but with limited investments and 
industrial activity many faced hardship (Besikci, 1970, pp. 127-130, 199-202, 383).37 Tribal 
leaders with large plots abandoned the sharecropping system for capitalist agricultural 
production in order to generate more surplus (Besikci, 1970, pp. 122-123). Increased 
                                                          
37 Given that the urbanisation level is taken as an indicator of development, the average urbanisation level for 
Turkey was around 34.5 per cent in 1965 but 27.2 per cent for East Turkey. If we exclude small towns that were 
hardly indistinguishable from a large village, the urbanisation level was 12.3 per cent in the latter (Besikci, 
1970, pp. 46-47).  
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agricultural surplus and usury income from informal credits granted to smallholders were 
invested by tribal elites in urban commercial and service sectors as well as in rent-creating 
activities (Besikci, 1970, pp. 94-96, 135-137). 
As Besikci (1970, p. 124) however argues , the surplus generated in eastern Turkey was 
significantly transferred to western Turkey in a manner that intensified less development of 
East Anatolia. In those years, public investments made by the state raised the dependency of 
Kurds to the central political power, and that semi-feudal institutions were not replaced but 
distortedly amalgamated with capitalist institutions (Besikci, 1990, p. 90). In political terms, 
the position of Kurdish “sovereign class” - large landholders, tribal leaders and sheiks - in the 
dominant coalition, always remained lower than that of the Turkish elites (Besikci, 1990, pp. 
90-94). Therefore, the social capital formed by Kurdish and Turkish elites after 1950 - mostly 
relying on linking social capital between the tribal social capital and the state – perpetuated 
the less development of the SAR. 
Contrary to the social capital formation between Kurdish and Turkish elites, intra-ethnic 
social capital among Kurds in the political-economic periphery and inter-ethnic social capital 
between them and their Turkish counterparts did develop. The former explains the emergence 
of the PKK; the latter explains the relationship between Turkish leftists and the Kurdish 
political movement.  
After the 1960 military coup and the introduction of the 1961 Constitution that safeguarded 
democratic rights, leftist movements in Turkey grew in strength due to increased (class) 
awareness, in return enhanced by improvements in universal education in Turkey (Yavuz, 
2001). In those years Kurdish nationalism re-flourished in Turkey as Kurds gained insight 
into their developmental backwardness and cultural differences between eastern and western 
Turkey as a result of migration (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 32). Against the state that had perceived 
Kurds as “prospective-Turks”, a counter-perception extended that Kurds may not be Turks 
(Yegen, 2009). The nationalist sentiments of Kurds coincided with a period – 1960s and 70s - 
during which leftists and peasant revolts became quite common across developing countries. 
Many talented but poor Kurds, who received university education in west Turkey, interacted 
with Turkish Marxists and grouped together to question the economic and political status of 
Kurds, even joining the Turkey’s Workers’ Party, the Confederation of Revolutionary 
Workers Unions and the Federation of Revolutionary Youth (Romano, 2006, p. 42). 
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Fervent Kurdish leftists and nationalists also endeavoured to turn intra-ethnic social capital 
into political collective action, organising “meetings of the East” in Kurdish-populated 
eastern cities to foster national consciousness, and set up the Revolutionary Cultural Centres 
of the East movement (Gunes, 2012; Yavuz, 2001). Though many leftists and Kurdish 
organisations were closed down by the state after the 1970 coup, they re-activated themselves 
under different organisations. The prominent Kurdish political networks throughout the 
1970s were the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan, the PKK, Rizgarî, the Kurdistan 
National Liberationists, Kawa, Ala Rizgarî and Tekoşin. 
After the 1980 military coup, the backbone of leftist movements was broken by the military 
and legal authorities in Turkey. Furthermore, Kurdish nationalism and religion-based 
relations in the Kurdish-populated areas were oppressed via supressing cultural identities 
through assimilation policies. But these policies had the opposite effect: the national 
awareness of Kurds actually increased and the PKK established its organisational and 
military capacity within political and cultural structures (Yavuz, 2001). 
As a result of the disintegrated sharecropping system, a large group of Kurds migrated to 
urban areas and established relationships beyond the control of the tribal system and 
boundaries of their tribal identities (Romano, 2006, pp. 41-42). Other decisive factors behind 
the migration were the law of diminishing returns, which effects were exacerbated by Islamic 
inheritance law (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 16), and the forced displacement and negative political 
economic conditions inflicted by the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state. 
It is difficult to find detailed studies depicting how Kurds have structured their national 
identity in modern everyday life. We can, however, observe that modern urban lifestyles have 
helped the informal institutional formation of the national Kurdish identity in the 
juxtaposition of weakening tribal sense and norms of belonging. It has impelled Kurds 
develop trust, reciprocity, institutions and networks, thus intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic social 
capital. 
3.6 The Military Narrative and the Development Narrative around the Kurdish 
Question 
In this section, we will discuss how the state has approached the Kurdish Question after the 
emergence of the armed conflict with the PKK. Note that the Turkish state does not accept 
the Question as coming from lack of democracy, an argument that the Kurdish political 
movement proposes. As seen in the previous section, the state has significantly blocked or 
banned their participation into the country-level decision-making processes. 
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The Military Narrative: The PKK formulated its political standpoint under the banner of a 
liberation movement, based on a socialist economic order and nationalism of the oppressed 
nation to overcome social injustice and political and cultural repressions. They were 
supported by landless farmers, smallholders, university youth, the urban petite bourgeoisie, 
and young, urban and socio-economically excluded Kurds (Ozcan, 2006, p. 205; Yavuz, 
2001). The leadership and militant cadres of the PKK were composed of both Kurds and 
Turks (Kucukaydin, 2016, p. 26), suggesting that the Kurdish political movement had strong 
inter-ethnic social capital. 
After the 1980 coup, the military increasingly militarised eastern Turkey and oppressing 
leftist or Kurdish organisations in the political arena. A few years later, in 1984, the PKK 
launched its first armed attack on Turkish army, and they employed a successful rural-based 
guerrilla war strategy from 1984 to 1993, and swelled its ranks in a ten year period to around 
12000 militants, based in mountain camps. Furthermore PKK supporters or militias in 
villages and towns were roughly 8 or 10 times more that figure (Pamukoglu, 2003, p. 60). At 
first, the army, deploying a conventional military strategy, only defended their posts but was 
not capable of defeating the PKK (Pamukoglu, 2003, pp. 35-36). Later, in the 1990s, they 
gradually changed their mindset and strategy, reorganised the units, acquired better 
equipment and conducted an integrated counter-insurgency strategy (Jongerden, 2015, pp. 
83-92). The most important features of this strategy were the aggressive use of the village 
guard system38 - based to a large extent on Kurdish tribal social capital -, and of ‘forced 
village evacuations’39 in order to isolate the PKK from its rural network, important for 
logistics, shelter, finance and recruitment (Gurcan, 2015; Jongerden, 2010b).  
Two narratives dominated the Kurdish Question at that time: a military narrative and a 
development narrative. As Yegen (1999) expresses, the Question was discursively 
constructed in the military narrative as a political reaction, banditry or tribal resistance and in 
the development narrative as regional backwardness (but not as an ethno-political question or 
a democratisation question). 
The military narrative considered an armed response to eliminate the PKK necessary for the 
integrity of the state. However, it was useful to obstruct other threatening opponents to the 
military bureacuracy dominating Turkey’s politics.  
                                                          
38 The total number of village guards operating with the Army was raised from 800 to approximately 55000 
between 1984 and 1994 (Gurcan, 2015).  
39 Local officials presented two options: become village guards and stay in your village or leave your village 
(Yukseker, 2008, p. 150).  
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When civilian governments, formed by centre-left and centre-right parties, increasingly lost 
their popularity in the eyes of ordinary citizens because of political fragmentation (Bozarslan, 
1996, pp. 140-141) and their inability to address a wide range of economic and political 
problems (R. Olson & Bozdaglioglu, 1996, pp. 163-164), the rise of the pro-Islamic WP took 
place. This alarmed the military bureacracy as the protector of secularism (Bozarslan, 1996, 
pp. 140-141, 145). Anti-militarism was limited to a small group of intellectuals and human 
rights advocates at the time (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 2003). The military narrative, therefore, was 
readily accepted for fear of disintegration of the country; the politicians accusing each other 
attempted to leverage this fear for political ends (Bozarslan, 1996). In such a political setting, 
the military narrative greased the wheels to extend the conventional political autonomy of the 
military bureaucracy from fighting with the PKK to controlling civilian politics more tightly 
(Cizre-Sakallioglu, 2003; Gurbey, 1996, pp. 12-21). The political power of the army reached 
so far that they were able to remove the pro-Islamic WP and the True Path Party government 
in 1997 by re-engineering the civil political structure with the support of a wide range of 
urban secular people (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 2003; Cizre & Çinar, 2003). 
The Development Narrative: This narrative is an effort to frame the Kurdish Question as a 
problem coming from development imbalances in eastern Turkey, disregarding the link 
between the Question and lack of democracy in Turkey (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 2003) and ethno-
political demands of Kurds (Kizilkaya, 2014, pp. 101, 105). Our research may be criticised 
for the same reason, yet we acknowledge that a democratic solution to the Question is 
required. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the democratic participation of peripheral 
movements - including the Kurdish political movement- and the recognition of democratic 
rights are required. 
A key attempt by the Turkish state to solve the Question from a development approach is the 
the GAP (see Chapter 4). The project was first planned in 1977 with the integration of 
projects – such as dams, reservoirs and hydroelectric plants - in the lower Euphrates and the 
Tigris Basin (GAP-RDA, 1993b) but was turned into a multi-sector, integrated regional 
development project in 1989. Economically, the main purpose was to foster agricultural 
development of the SAR through irrigation investments, to then introduce industrialisation 
and ultimately close the developmental gap between eastern and western Turkey.  
One of the aims of the GAP was to increase opportunity costs of joining the PKK through 
development. Development here acts to solidify military counter-insurgency strategies (Ozok, 
2004, p. 49). The state bureaucracy and governments have frequently interpreted the 
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development narrative with the military narrative for this reason. Indeed, state officials have 
constantly forged a link between security and development with regards to the Question 
(Bilgen, 2014). For example, Mehdi Eker, an ex-minister responsible for agriculture, 
expressed, “there are socio-economic problems that the terrorist organisation [the PKK] 
exploit; we point out that solving those socio-economic problems through the GAP Action 
Plan is crucial” (2010, 23 June). The GAP Regional Development Administration Directorate 
(1993a, p. 1) (GAP-RDA) shows how the GAP will purposefully instrumentalise 
development for security: 
Putting into practice the investments of the South-eastern Anatolia Project (of the GAP), 
that would give momentum to the regional economy, particularly agricultural 
investments, will contribute to the solution of problems of unemployment and economic 
backwardness, and this will largely eliminate economic and social sources of terrorism 
[emphasis added].  
The GAP was also expected to change the social structure of Kurds. Taking a post-modernist 
perspective, Ozok (2004) argues that the state conceives a dichotomy between tradition and 
modernity. From this perspective, developmental efforts in the region are carried out to tackle 
the tradition or tribal social formation which are seen as barriers to modernisation. Jongerden 
(2010a) asserts, “the GAP could turn Kurds into Turks”, transforming traditional, tribal-based 
agriculture into state-dependent, modern and market-oriented agriculture. However, the 
intention of the Turkish state to turn Kurds into Turks has remained predominately theoretical 
and discursive without significant outcomes. The state identity politics related to economic 
development has not gone beyond vulgar practices such as demolishing Kurdish heritage by 
constructing dams (Jongerden, 2010a), inciting strong reactions among Kurds. Kurds have 
engaged in modernisation and market-based agricultural transformation, but they have not 
turned into Turks through their strong intra-ethnic social capital. The expansion of the 
Kurdish political movement in the 2000s and 2010s proves this point.  
Kurds have long not owned the negative perception of modernisation. As explained earlier, 
the Kurdish Question itself is a result of Turkey’s modernisation process. The Kurdish 
political movement is a modern movement, which has, since the 1960s, fought against 
traditional or tribal social formations. They ideologically accepted a dichotomy between the 
oppressor and the oppressed rather than modern and traditional. Once they defined the issue 
in this way, both the state and tribal leaders became their antagonists. For example, they 
promoted land reform against tribal leaders to solve the problem of unfair land distribution in 
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the SAR, but the state never got involved in this, afraid to harm the interests of large 
landholders, including tribal leaders (McDowall, 2004, pp. 591-592). In other words, political 
realities forced the state to act against modernisation, so supported tribal leaders in the armed 
conflict. 
Modernisation itself has attraction. Even tribal leaders showed their willingness in the 1950s 
to engage in modern agriculture to generate more surplus. They later envisaged the GAP as 
an opportunity to increase their agricultural income as well as to steer their investments into 
industry (Savas, 1998). 
Furthermore, Kurds are confidently welcoming public investments despite the political 
intentions of the state. A member of parliament from the pro-Kurdish party explains (Düzel, 
August 6, 2012): 
[…] All the cities in Kurdistan are backward. […] You have lived together so far; all 
have happened through your taxes, water, dams and natural resources, too. If they set up 
a factory in the GAP, you, just benefit from it as Kurds. Separating from Turkey will 
economically not be beneficial for Kurds. Also, Turkey has experiences in functioning 
state and law. It has political experience. These are all beneficial to Kurds.    
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we critically assessed Olson’s collective action theory, neglecting the analysis 
of political collective action. Taking the case of Kurds, we proposed that the political 
collective action of large groups could take place if they have developed social capital. 
Afterwards, we discussed the social capital theory of Ostrom and her colleagues and 
Miedema’s adaptation of social capital to ethnicity to understand the Kurdish political 
movement. This discussion revealed that ethnicity is an important factor that structures a 
person’s intrinsic norms associated with his trustworthiness, so creating an ethnic-based value 
rationality. For this reason, a peaceful solution to ethnic problems in a highly ethnically 
polarised society is difficult to attain. 
Another suggestion is that the formation of Kurdish ethnic social capital has nullified the 
effects of the policies designed by the Turkish state to transform their identity into 
Turkishness. Kurds have developed a significant level of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic social 
capital, which enable them amplify their political movement within themselves and extend it 
to other groups.  
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More importantly, the formation of social capital has over time induced the transformation of 
the tribal Kurdish identity into the modern Kurdish identity, and created two main groups: 
conservative Islamists Kurds and secular nationalist Kurds. Today, the former group 
generally support the JDP government under Islamic brotherhood whereas the latter comprise 
the Kurdish political movement encompassing the pro-Kurdish parties and the PKK. 
The armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state shaped the political terrain. The 
military bureaucracy strengthened its power and dominated Turkey’s politics in the 1990s 
through the military narrative. As we will discuss later, the political, economic and social 
costs of the armed conflict at the same time undermined their power and paved the way for 
the rise of the conservative periphery.  
The development narrative is the derivative of the political conflict between the Kurdish 
movement and the Turkish state. It is used to mask the demand of democratic rights proposed 
by Kurds. Apart from this, development is instrumentalised for the elimination of economic 
reasons of championing the PKK. Making Kurds alienated from it is regarded as the main 
aim. The subtle aim is to turn Kurds into Turks by changing their mindset via societal 
changes. We have showed that this approach has not yielded expected results for the state. 
Kurds are seemingly willing to attract public investments and adopt modern institutions, 
which are believed to develop their political power and social capacity. 
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Chapter 4: Turkey’s Political Economy and the South-eastern Anatolia 
Region’s Agriculture 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss Turkey’s political economy and neoliberal agricultural policies 
covering the period between 1980 and 2001. Special attention will be given to the political-
economic terrain that helped the rise of Islamist political movement. This will help to better 
understand the challenging relationship between the military-bureaucracy and the JDP 
government, and the Kurdish Question between 2002 and 2017.  
The ARIP, a dramatic measure to advance neoliberal agricultural transformation, and 
modifications in agricultural policies without diverting the neoliberal path will be discussed 
to provide further insight into Turkey’s agriculture in nearly the last two decades. 
In the final section, we will introduce the GAP and discuss its content and transformation in 
the neoliberal period. In doing this, the argument that the SAR is a relatively less developed 
region in Turkey will be supported by evidence, and further details about the SAR’s 
agriculture will be provided. 
4.2 Turkey’s Political Economy and the Neoliberal Agricultural Transformation 
between 1980 and 1989 
Though protectionist economic policies enabled Turkey to succeed in industrial development 
to a certain degree (Şenses, 1990, pp. 62-63; Taylor, 1990, p. 270), economic bottlenecks in 
the 1970s led to a change in political economic mindset. The outward-looking strategy 
adopted was initially underpinned by a structural adjustment programme initiated in 24th 
January, 1980, which aimed to create surplus for export by lowering wage levels and 
reducing total national demand (Yeldan, 2006, p. 44). This was a radical neoliberal 
transformation (Yasli, 2014, p. 33), which ‘chang[ed] and redefin[ed] the policy parameters 
regulating and shaping income distribution against labor in general’ (Boratav, 1990). As 
Harvey (2007, p. 90) states, the degree of transitioning to neoliberalism in the world relied on  
‘the balance of class forces’ and ‘the degree of dependency of the capitalist class on the 
state’. Given that no political party obtained a majority within a political environment 
frustrated by civil disturbance and economic turmoil in the 1970s, and that there were 
politically active working class networks in Turkey, the implementation of the programme 
seemed extremely difficult. The military-bureaucratic class therefore applied a level of 
coercion to establish a rule for carrying out neoliberal policies, especially by disorganising 
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networks associated with the working class and leftists (Bayar, 1996) and letting business 
associations getting more involved in shaping policies (Boratav, 1999, p. 75).  
Internal factors were essential for the transition to a neoliberal economic order. Because the 
capital accumulation process did not work effectively in the 1970s, the secular bourgeoisie 
sought to combine capital-intensive modern industries with their labour-intensive, export-
oriented industries (Aydin, 2005, p. 42). Given that Turkey’s technological capacity was low, 
this required integration with world capitalism through trade and partnerships (Aydin, 2005, 
pp. 42-43), but at the same time the bourgeoisie continued to rely on the state, obtaining 
export subsidies and tax exemptions (Ş. Pamuk, 1987, pp. 163-165). The Islamist 
bourgeoisie, which had mainly organised itself in small and medium-scale enterprises 
(Savran, 2015, p. 45), too, gained substantial advantage during this period, selling their goods 
to domestic and global companies through a subcontracting and outsourcing format (Yasli, 
2014, p. 23). Savran (2015, p. 45) argues that this fraction within the bourgeoisie pointed to 
an intra-class conflict, reflected in the political domain with the initiation of the first Islamist 
party in 1972. Ultimately, those who economically lost during this period were farmers and 
workers (Boratav, 1990). 
Turgut Ozal, a former prime minister of Turkey, managed the neoliberal transformation 
between 1980 and 1991, as the leader of the Motherland Party after 1983. The main aim of 
agricultural policies during his leadership was to fully replace pre-capitalist relationships in 
agriculture with more systematic and organised capitalist relationships (Oral, 2006, p. 63). A 
dramatic change in agriculture therefore occurred between 1980 and 1989 through structural 
and sectoral adjustment loans (as well as institutional and technical assistance) granted by the 
WB on condition that certain  measures (listed in Table 4.1) were taken (Oral, 2006, p. 69). 
Table 4.1 displays the main characteristics of the agricultural policies implemented in the 
period of 1980-1989. 
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Main Points The Details of the Implementations 
Subsidised 
Purchases 
* Subsidised purchases continued but were greatly kept lower in value. The numbers of the 
agricultural crop types subsidised were reduced from 24 to 10 within a decade. 
* Private companies were allowed to operate in the domestic agricultural commodity 
markets in which state-owned agro-industrial companies had kept monopoly rights before. 
Prices 
* Floor prices for crops were kept lower in real terms to render exporters and agro-
industries competitive in international markets. 
* Increases in floor prices for crops were considerably kept behind increases in input 
prices. 
Trade 
Liberalisation 
* Taxes and fees on imported food were lessened in 1984 so that they could spike in 
volume in the following years. 
Loans 
* Subsidised agricultural loans were reduced in amount. The share of agricultural loans in 
total loans therefore dropped by around 63 per cent. 
* Interest rates were allowed to be set by market actors. For agricultural loans, the interest 
rate mounted from %16 to %46.5 in almost a decade; loan terms were decreased. 
Input Subsidies 
* Input subsidies were gradually lifted. 
* Input prices were allowed to be set by market actors. Consequently, the index of sale 
prices of crops increased 41 times in nominal terms between 1980 and 1990 but the index 
of input prices 64 times. 
Privatisation 
* The distribution, production and sale of inputs to farmers were completely left to private 
actors.  
* The state companies dealing in farm inputs were privatised. 
Organisational 
Changes 
* The state greatly abandoned production, distribution and sale activities in agriculture. 
* The organisational structure of the Ministry of Agriculture was changed, and thus, they 
started to only monitor and regulate the sector. 
Table 4.1 The Main Points and the Details of the Agricultural Transformation Carried out in 
the 1980s (Oral, 2006, pp. 63-69; M. Öztürk, 2012, p. 68) 
Unlike most African countries, Turkey had become one of the few less developed countries 
that had achieved self-sufficiency in food production through protectionist policies as earning 
foreign exchange from agricultural export and supplying raw materials to the industry 
(Cakmak & Yeldan, 1994, p. 225; Luan, Cui, & Ferrat, 2013).40 These successes were not 
deemed sufficient. “The 24th January Decisions”, terminating protectionist policies in 
agriculture, were introduced but could not yield the expected results. 
                                                          
40 Turkey reached the frontier model in agriculture in the 1960s, that is, there were no arable lands to be 
exploited. Increases in productivity in the first half of the 1970s therefore emanated from increased agricultural 
fixed capital investments and technological development programs (Cakmak & Yeldan, 1994, p. 225). 
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The average agricultural growth rate in the 1980-89 period (0.68%) was lower than that of the 
period 1969-79 (around 1.59%) (The World Bank, 2017). And agricultural productivity 
remained the same between 1981 and 1998, unlike most other developing countries which 
experienced growth (The World Bank, 2000, p. 298).  
Agriculture’s domestic terms of trade is the ratio of prices of agricultural crops or food to 
prices of industrial goods. If 1968 is taken as a benchmark 100, it rose to 131 in 1978 but 
dramatically dropped to 70 by 1988 (Boratav, 2009). Clearly, it seems that industrialists took 
advantage of worsening agriculture’s domestic terms of trade at the expense of farmers. 
Indeed, agriculture’s domestic terms of trade with respect to industrial-based input prices 
dropped from the benchmark of 100 in 1976 to 60.8 in 1982 (Boratav, 1999, pp. 46-47). 
Reductions in real prices received by farmers did not benefit urban consumers but merchants  
who increased their profit margin and the Treasury which saw a reduction in the costs of 
subsidised purchases (Boratav, 1999, pp. 48-49). From Bates’s standpoint stated in “Markets 
and States in Tropical Africa”, producers of exportable cash crops should have received more 
profit without any state interventions under free market conditions (Bates, 2005, pp. 11-29). 
Yet, looking at tobacco and cotton, Boratav (1999, p. 49) shows that the differential between 
export prices of the crops and the prices received by farmers grew by around 180% between 
1979 and 1989, at the expense of farmers, through trade liberalisation and liberalised 
exchange rates. Moreover, agricultural export rose by 42% in the 1980-89 period whereas 
agricultural import spiked 24.8 times (from 51 to 1318 million US dollar), and foreign trade 
surplus in agriculture ended up contracting by 33%. 
It is obvious that the roll back of state interventions from agriculture adversely affected the 
rural people. The economic shock along with the ongoing effects of diminishing returns in 
agriculture induced migration from villages to the suburbs of industrial cities. Those who 
settled in suburbs tended to become workers in the informal sector and mostly fell into 
poverty, with social welfare expenditures reduced under the neoliberal transformation (Buğra, 
2008, pp. 200-202). A struggle eventually emerged in the 1990s between people who 
originated from poorer families of small towns and villages with conservative values, and 
those who had settled in urban areas long time ago. This struggle was about who would 
occupy ‘the mid- and senior-level posts within the state apparatus and […] jobs in the private 
sector’ (Savran, 2015, p. 46). As Savran (2015, p. 46) articulates: ‘this second dimension of 
intraclass struggle really converts what would otherwise have remained a friction within the 
class of capitalists into a more mass phenomenon […].’ Islamic networks acted as 
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associations of interests which banded together working classes with conservative values and 
Islamic bourgeoisie (Savran, 2015, p. 59). This struggle within the working class coincided 
with the struggle between the Islamic and the secular bourgeoisies, which would come to 
influence politics in the 1990s. 
4.3 Turkey’s Political Economy and the Neoliberal Agricultural Transformation 
between 1989 and 2000 
The neoliberal economic transformation continued between 1989 and 2000, but experienced 
some problems. The new capital accumulation regime stagnated in 1988-89, showing 
mismatches with the export-based industrialisation model relying on the private sector. That 
is, the share of manufacturing investments in total private investments (around 30%) hardly 
improved by 1987 and even contracted (24% in 1993) over the following years, as a result of 
investments directed to the construction sector, which was of course unable to earn foreign 
exchange. Given reduced public investments, Turkey’s economy returned to low growth and 
high inflation rates (Yeldan, 2006, p. 48).  
To overcome this impasse, new institutions and deregulations were put into effect, that is, full 
convertibility of the Turkish lira and free flows of international capital into Turkey’s recently 
founded financial markets were allowed by the government (Önder, 1998). The institutional 
change had important political and economic effects. Short-term capital flows helped to 
preclude balance of payment difficulties, but their excessive flows overvalued Turkish lira 
and encouraged consumption and imports. Particularly, the improving ability to import was 
used by various governments for political populism to remain in power (Yeldan, 2006, pp. 
40, 50-51, 55). The combined negative effects of neoliberal populism41 showed themselves in 
“mini cycles of growth-crisis-stabilisation” (Aydin, 2005, p. 119), where investments were 
not adequately channelled into productive areas such as the manufacturing industry (Oral, 
2006, p. 85). Abrupt outflows of short-term capital, and unmanageably swelling public debts, 
which came from increased interest rates and raises in real wages in the public sector and in 
rural income transfers, were the main reasons of the crises or recessions of 1994, 1998-99 and 
2001 (Yeldan, 2006, pp. 50, 53). Note that all of them were attempted to be overcome 
through typical stabilisation or structural adjustment policies. 
                                                          
41 Neoliberal populism is a term that brings two elements together. The first one relates to neoliberal economic 
policies, which aims at phasing out state interventions and leaving economic efficiency and growth to free 
markets. The second one refers to the way that the economy is reformed, that is, “reforms tend to be initiated in 
a top-down fashion, often launched by surprise and without the participation of organized political forces”; see 
also “liberal policies with illiberal politics” (Öniş, 2004).  
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Table 4.2 Prominent Political Parties in Turkey between 1987 and 2001 
Some major political events also shaped Turkey’s political economy in this period. The 
leaders who had been prohibited from engaging in politics after the 1980 military coup were 
granted the right to resume their political lives as a result of the 1987 referendum. 
Afterwards, the emergence of diverse political parties in terms of ideology (see Table 4.2) 
and policies mounted political rivalry throughout the 1990s (Secor, 2001). As no party could 
get the majority of the seats in the parliament, coalition governments (see Table 4.3) were 
supposed to rule the country, with their composition frequently changed. In this political 
environment, agricultural supports were, to some extent, expanded by governments prior to 
elections to assure rural votes (Aydin, 2005, p. 101). 
 
Table 4.3 Coalition Governments in Turkey during the 1990s 
Populism remains inadequate to understand the expansion of agricultural support. According 
to Aydin (2005, p. 159), ‘the state was capable of liberalising the economy on all fronts; […] 
The Name of the Party Political Position Ideology Political Leader Active Period as a Leader
Turgut Ozal Until 1991 (Became President)
Mesut Yilmaz Between 1991 and 2001
Suleyman Demirel Until 1993 (Became President)
Tansu Ciller Between 1993 and 2001
Erdal Inonu Until 1993
Murat Karayalcin Between 1993 and 1995 
Deniz Baykal
Between 1995 and 1999
Between 2000 and 2010
Altan Oymen In 1999 and 2000
The Democratic Left Party Centre-Left
Kemalism & Social 
Democracy
Bulent Ecevit Between 1989 and 2004
The Welfare Party (Banned in 1998) Far-Right Islamic Conservatism Necmettin Erbakan Between 1987 and 1998
The Virtue Party (Banned in 2001) Far-Right Islamic Conservatism Recai Kutan Between 1997 and 2001
The Nationalist Work Party 
(Joined in the NMP in 1993)
Far-Right Ultra Nationalism Alpaslan Turkes Between 1987 and 1993
Far-Right Ultra Nationalism Alpaslan Turkes Between 1993 and 1997
Far-Right Ultra Nationalism Devlet Bahceli Since 1997
The Rebuplican People's
Party
Centre-Left
Kemalism & Social 
Democracy
The Nationalist Movement Party
The Motherland's Party Centre-Right
The True Path's Party Centre-Right
The Social Democratic Populist 
Party (Joined in the RPP in 1995)
Centre-Left
Liberal 
Conservatism
Liberal 
Conservatism
Social Democracy
Coalition Governments The Period of Service
The True Path's Party & The Social Democratic Populist Party November1991 - October 1995
The True Path's Party & The Rebuplican People's Party October 1995 - March 1996
The Motherland's Party & The Democratic Left Party March 1996 - April 1996
The Welfare Party & The True Path's Party April 1996 - June 1997
The Motherland's Party & The Democratic Left Party June 1997 - May 1999
The Democratic Left Party & The Motherland's Party 
& The Nationalist Movement Party
May 1999 - November 2002
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the financial and industrial sectors were given priority treatment.’ There were far fewer 
benefits from agriculture to be reaped by the bourgeoisie. More importantly, the 
unsustainability of neoliberalism in less developed countries alarmed the IMF and the WB, 
and therefore policies for coping with poverty, particularly among the rural population, were 
suggested to pre-empt adverse political outcomes which would hamper the operation of 
markets (Buğra, 2008, p. 78).42 Indeed, the socio-economic repercussions of neoliberalism 
manifested themselves in the rise of leftist movement, and ended the rule of the Motherland 
Party in 1991. The True Path Party and the Social Democratic Populist Party, which had 
promised improvements in social welfare of the working class and agricultural producers, 
entered a coalition government. However, they could not abandon neoliberal economic 
policies and commitments to international organisations working within the boundaries of  
the neoliberal paradigm (Önder, 1998).43 Ironically, the rise in agricultural support served for 
easing rural political risks to allow for the implementation of the neoliberal transformation.  
Increases in agricultural subsidies and significant recoveries in the agriculture sector’s 
domestic terms of trade occurred in the 1990s, aimed to obtain rural votes and keeping rural 
problems within bounds. Total support in relation to GDP is estimated to have risen from 
3.53% in 1986 to 3.98%  in 1989 and  5.99%  in 1999 (the OECD, 2018). If 1968 is taken as 
a benchmark 100, agriculture’s domestic terms of trade were 131 in 1978, 70 in 1988 
but126.3 in 1998 (Boratav, 2009). Did Turkey deviate from the neoliberal path? Önder 
(1998) highlights that the essence of the neoliberal transformation was concerned about the 
transformation of the state itself rather than about whether the levels of agricultural 
interventions were increased. The organisational and legal structure and functions of the state 
were continued to be altered in line with the premises of the neoliberal paradigm, i.e. 
deregulation and liberalisation. Thus, the state did not depart from neoliberalism by 
increasing agricultural subsidies, which in fact worked to avoid adverse political results of 
rural poverty and social exclusion (Buğra, 2008, pp. 201-202). Moreover, increased 
                                                          
42 Both agricultural support and social expenditures were increased in the 1990s to alleviate poverty and reduce 
the political risks of neoliberal policies. For example, the percentage of public social expenditures in Turkey’s 
GDP increased from % 5.53 in 1990 to % 9.7 in 2000, a percentage similar to many OECD countries (OECD, 
2016b). 
43 Even though a social democratic party came to power as part of the coalition government, it could not enforce 
a change in the economy from neoliberal transformation to one that favoured workers and agricultural 
producers. This was nearly a universal phenomenon: left-wing parties were undergoing an ideology crisis 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and this opened the way for disorganisation and 
depoliticisation of the people (Kucukaydin, 2013, pp. 70-71). Centre-left parties, which are politically adaptive 
to the military-bureaucracy of Turkey, actually functioned as a tool to justify neoliberalism, and their social 
policies could not go beyond welfare policies recommended by the IMF and the WB.  
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agricultural subsidies and agriculture’s domestic terms of trade apparently created positive 
incentives for agricultural producers. The average growth rate of agriculture under the 
aggressive neoliberal Ozal’s government between 1980 and 1991 was 1.06% but between 
1992 and 2000 it stood at 1.83%. 
The neoliberal agricultural transformation was still ongoing in the 1990s. After the 1994 
economic crisis, the IMF called for the usual measures to be implemented in agriculture in 
return of financial assistance. Disinflationary restrictions were put on agricultural subsidies 
and support prices, and on financing state agricultural enterprises and agricultural 
cooperatives in the following years; reductions in interest rates as offered by the Agriculture 
Bank on loans were not allowed any longer (the IMF, 1998). Affected by internal economic 
problems and economic crises in Asia and Russia, Turkey signed another stand-by 
programme in December, 1999, and promised to implement serious structural reforms in 
agriculture (the IMF, 1999). 
The privatisation of agricultural state enterprises was also part of the liberalisation 
programme. The state had already relinquished part of its monopoly rights over the tobacco 
market by allowing the import of tobacco in 1988 and allowed multinational tobacco 
companies to enter and produce for the national tobacco market in 1991 (Oral, 2015b, p. 
300). After the mid-1990s, state-controlled companies which had been established for 
fostering the diary sector, such as the Feed Industries and the Meat and Fish Cooperation, the 
Milk Industries Foundation, were also privatised. Consequently the diary market was, over 
time, turned into an oligopolistic one instead of a market involving small and medium-scale 
enterprises (M. Öztürk, 2012, p. 91). 
Trade liberalisation and foreign investments in agriculture and agro-industry were advanced 
even further in the 1990s. A dramatic decline in the production of livestock and animal 
products (i.e. meat, cheese, butter, ice cream) continued because of increased imports, which 
had started in 1984 when tariffs on food imports had been lowered (Keyder & Yenal, 2014, 
pp. 115-116). The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Customs Union 
with the EU also caused an agricultural trade deficit (Ay & Yapar, 2005). Turkey’s 
development, according to market liberalism, would have been achieved by increasing 
export, but imports increased, even in agriculture which had a trade surplus before. The 
liberalisation also helped foreign investors to increase their market share and even obtain 
oligopolistic positions in the national food market. To reduce risks and obtain profits from 
their intellectual property and franchise rights, multinational companies got more involved in 
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partnerships with domestic companies of the secular bourgeoisie in western Turkey and/or 
took over their firms to produce, pack and sell wide range of food items (Keyder & Yenal, 
2014, pp. 117-134). Note that local, small-scale enterprises had a greater hold over the 
national food markets before 1980, unlike their counterparts in Latin American countries 
(Keyder & Yenal, 2014, p. 112).  
Let us finally outline how power distribution in the central coalition took place in the 1990s. 
The alliance between the secular, western Anatolian bourgeoisie and the military-bureaucracy 
gradually weakened in the 1990s, mainly because of the economy increasingly becoming 
integrated into global capitalism. This  made the bourgeoisie act more independently from the 
state (Beris, 2008). Moreover, the enormous cost of the armed conflict against the PKK 
(Mutlu, 2011)44 gave rise to dissatisfaction among the capitalist classes, pointed at the 
military-bureaucracy. The conflicting interests between the two helped the Islamic 
bourgeoisie to strengthen its political-economic power in the 1990s, obtaining the support of 
the people in the periphery who objected to the secular mindset of the army officials (Beris, 
2008).45  
4.4 The Agricultural Reform Implementation Project 
This section discusses agricultural policies implemented in the ARIP and post-ARIP period. 
Such periodisation does not refer to any diversion from the neoliberal agricultural 
transformation but the re-configuration of agricultural policies to avoid negative economic 
and political impacts. 
Figure 4.1 explains the difference between the two periods. The figure simplifies the different 
political-economic regimes of agriculture with regards to varying levels of state interventions. 
The more a country moves away from the centre, the more the level of state interventions 
increases. For example, A denotes the agricultural regime of the US, while D denotes the 
agricultural regime of the Soviet Union. Twentieth century history has taught us that 
transition to another circle requires a change in the prevailing political-economic paradigm in 
that country, frequently coinciding with a serious change in the international power structure 
(i.e. the Great Depression, the emergence of the Third World and the collapse of socialism).  
                                                          
44 Mutlu’s study (2011) shows that the total economic cost of the war was around 200-225 billion Turkish liras 
between 1984 and 2005. 
45 Some economic factors helped the Islamic bourgeoisie to improve its position in the political-economic 
rivalry, such as growing trade with the Middle East, developing economic relationships with Islamic finance 
from Gulf countries, and the capital accumulation based on tenders granted by the municipalities that were 
gained by the Islamist WP after the 1994 local elections (Savran, 2015, pp. 61-63).   
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Figure 4.1 Different Political-Economic Regimes Applied to the Agricultural Sector 
The centre of the figure represents a pure neoliberal regime, in which every matter of 
agriculture is utterly left to market dynamics with no state interventions. The regime of pure 
neoliberalism in agriculture remains theoretical as agricultural commodity markets have 
unique qualities. For one, demand for most agricultural commodities is inelastic, that is, 
increases in their amount for any reasons (due to for instance an increase in productivity, 
favourable weather conditions) will not result in large increases in demand/consumption but 
depressing prices, resulting in revenue loss for agricultural producers. Given that the 
replacement of a crop with ones with higher prices is often difficult because of factor-specific 
conditions (i.e. climate, soil type, geography), an individual agricultural producer, who lacks 
sufficient market power for setting crop prices in global markets, will try to increase the 
amount of the crop to cover his revenue loss. When all the producers act similarly, 
oversupply will occur and cause an additional fall in the crop price, and financially 
vulnerable agricultural producers will consequently go out of business (Bosso, 2017, pp. 20-
21). Again, changes in supply, especially food shortages, may cause wide range of 
fluctuations in prices and resultant civil strife (Bosso, 2017, p. 22). To avoid such political 
impacts, governments endeavour to secure the populations’ access to food by intervening in 
agriculture, and therefore, pure neoliberalism in agriculture is unlikely. 
In the developmentalist era, countries (denoted as C) intervened heavily in agriculture to 
divert agricultural surpluses to the industry. The costs of this policy resulted in budget 
deficits and distortions in the economy, creating disincentives especially for petty agricultural 
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production. Today, most countries have neoliberal agricultural regimes. Developing countries 
are generally positioned at any point close to B in the figure but most developed countries to 
A. The difference between the ARIP-period and the post-ARIP period should be understood 
as a swing from A to B. 
In the ARIP-period, production-required subsidies and subsidised purchase prices were 
phased out in favour of the direct support payment (DIS), thus moving closer to pure 
neoliberalism. In the post-ARIP period, revoking the DIS, Turkey gave more importance to 
subsidies encouraging production, but has still continued along the path of neoliberalism. The 
positive effects of subsidies encouraging production and the adverse impacts of the 
insufficient level of agricultural support due to commitments to neoliberalism are things that 
will be emphasized throughout this study. 
The Content of the Project: In December 1999, Turkey signed a 3-year standby programme 
with the IMF, which was aimed at restoring fiscal balance for solvency and reducing the 
inflation rate. The programme included typical neoliberal structural reforms in agriculture, to 
eliminate all distortions resulting from interventions and to gradually replace indirect support 
with the DIS. As projected, the reforms would be in transition during 2000 through a pilot 
programme, but fully implemented in 2001 on the national level (the IMF, 1999).  
In December 1999, another important political event occurred; Turkey’s candidacy for full 
membership of the EU was accepted. The gradual adoption of the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy (the EU-CAP) would impel Turkey to adhere more strictly to neoliberal reforms in 
agriculture. Given the existing commitments to the GATT and the World Trade Organisation  
- which call for measures to liberalise trade, to gradually phase out production subsidies and 
to lessen export subsidies, as well as the structural conditionality46 towards agriculture 
framed by the IMF and the WB - this matched well with the EU-CAP (Aydin, 2005, p. 161). 
                                                          
46 The structural conditionality aims at utilising the IMF’s financial resources in accord with purposes and 
provisions determined by employing specific tools, such as performance criteria, prior actions, and indicative 
targets and benchmark (the IMF, 2001, p. 5).  
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Table 4.4 The ARIP’s  Policy Implementations (The World Bank, 2001a)  
The Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) in the coalition government objected to contractions 
in agricultural supports fearing that it would lose many of its rural votes (Arpac & Bird, 
2009). But the 2001 economic crisis ended any opposition against structural reforms among 
the coalition government parties. Kemal Dervis from the WB was assigned to determine and 
coordinate macroeconomic policies, and the ARIP (see Table 4.4) was initiated in 2001. The 
programme was expected to reduce market-distorting agricultural economic interventions and 
to foster productivity in agriculture by letting AEs make their decisions under market 
dynamics. As Aydin (2005, p. 162) nonetheless states, Turkey was ‘pushed by the IFI 
[international finance institutions] to sacrifice its agriculture in order to receive additional 
financial resources to combat its recent fiscal crisis’. Whether the ARIP produced positive 
results will be discussed hereafter. 
The Effects of the Implementation of Neoliberal Policies in the ARIP Period and the 
Post-ARIP Period : The ARIP was in effect between 2001 and 2008, and ‘the so-called aim 
for ARIP was to eliminate inefficiencies in agriculture by “getting the prices right” while 
increasing the fiscal soundness of the government budget through eliminating subsidies, a 
typical neoliberal recipe’ Unal (2012, p. 153). 
The main aim of the DIS, a substantial element of the programme, was to create a neutral 
scheme in which agricultural producers were entitled to support payments whether they 
would produce or not so that agricultural markets would not be distorted (Togan, Bayener, & 
Nash, 2005, p. 48). It however created disincentives to agricultural production, and hence the 
The Introduction of the Direct Income Support to Replace 
Agricultural Subsidies
The Introduction of National Farmer Registry and the 
Completion of Land Registry and Cadastre
The Partial or Complete Privatisation of State Agricultural 
Monopolies
The Implementation of the Alternative Crop Program to 
Lessen Oversupply of Tobacco and Hazelnuts
The Adjustment of Crop Prices in Subsidised Purchases to 
International Market Prices
The Transformation of Agricultural Sales Cooperative 
Unions into Retrenching Autonomous Cooperatives
The Withdrawal of Subsidised Credits Offered by 
Agricultural Credit Cooperatives with the Financial Support 
of the Agriculture Bank
The Policy Implementations of the ARIP
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amount of cultivated land gradually declined (M. Öztürk, 2012, p. 97)47 between 2000 and 
2008 by 7%, accounting for 1.87 million hectares (ha) (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). 
Eraktan, Abay, Miran, and Olhan (2004, p. 61) argue that on average DIS payments 
generated agricultural value-added 2% less than what would have been generated if 
production-required support payments had been granted to agricultural producers. They also 
assert that the DIS payments did not significantly make agricultural producers better off 
(p.65), not change the types of crops cultivated (pp.73-74) or improve the use of inputs (pp. 
75-76). Overall, it tended to benefit LAEs and MAEs more than SAEs (Eraktan et al., 2004, 
p. 69). The DIS was not suitable for selectively stimulating agricultural activities, and for 
political bargaining on agricultural support between farmers, farmer associations and the 
government (The World Bank, 2009, p. 10). According to Mehdi Eker, the former Minister 
responsible for agricultural policies, the IMF and the WB required Turkey to apply the DIS in 
return for receiving credits for stabilising the economy, and the DIS did not help the country 
to foster crop productivity, quality and standard in agriculture (Eker, 2015, pp. 87-88). This 
support payment remained unpopular in the eyes of most of the stakeholders in agriculture, 
and its implementation was ceased after 2008.  
The post-ARIP period started in 2009, but its institutional basis was established with the 
introduction of the Agriculture Act in 2006, a legal and policy framework to re-structure 
agriculture (Eker, 2015, p. 39). The ARIP mainly involved policies aimed at correcting 
distortions and introduce neoliberal institutional measures. The Act, however, was a 
commitment to development – as defined by international development organisations - such 
as good governance, transparency and participation in agricultural policymaking and policy 
practices. Defining the new support regime as a hybrid regime, Güven (2009) argues that the 
shift from the ARIP is ‘a compromise between the continued political charm of populist 
corporatism and the global drive toward better targeted subsidies.’ However, it is difficult to 
approve his argument. The main premise that market dynamics are key to the agricultural 
transformation has not changed in the post-ARIP period. Maintaining their commitment to 
neoliberalism, the government just endeavoured to adapt agricultural production to market 
demand conditions in terms of quality, competitiveness, productivity, and diversification of 
products. To this end, agricultural support has been used as “a reward” during the post-ARIP 
                                                          
47 I was told several times during the fieldwork that some large landholders in the SAR received the payment but 
did not use it for producing crops. I was also shown a property in Diyarbakir, where a large landholder had 
constructed a mansion-like house with a swimming pool near his agricultural land allegedly paid with DIS 
payments. Agricultural enterprises were not required to submit any official evidence to show whether they had 
cultivated the land or not as the DIS payment was paid subject to owning agricultural land.    
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period instead of a welfare transfer mechanism, to help AEs align their production to market 
demand conditions (Keyder, 2014, p. 215). 
 
Figure 4.2 Agricultural Support in relation to Turkey’s GDP (the OECD, 2018) 
The changing agricultural support policy does not imply that Turkey deviated from neoliberal 
policies as Güven (2009) claims. The share of total agricultural support payments in GDP has 
decreased as seen in Figure 4.2. When the IMF programme ended, it had been dropped from 
3.3% to 2.81%, falling further in the-post-ARIP  to 1.98% in 2013 (the OECD, 2018). 
Considered by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a 
diversion from the ARIP’s market-oriented aims (the OECD, 2011, p. 11), the abandonment 
of production-not-required subsidies and the augmentation of various production-required 
subsidies nevertheless came to the fore in the post-ARIP period. Two types of subsidies have 
especially prevailed: diesel and fertilizer support, and deficiency payments. The former is as 
a cash payment per decare. In addition, the certified seed support and the area-based soil 
analysis support are given to farmers to foster crop productivity and standardisation. Figure 
4.3 shows that agricultural production has been less supported in the period of 2001-2016 
compared with the year 1999 through different forms of production-based subsidies. 
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Figure 4.3 Shares of Different Support Types in Total Agricultural Production (The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018) 
Deficiency payments or the so-called premium payment have been administered to AEs in 
the form of a lump sum for every production period, with the intention of increasing supplies 
of the agricultural products  that are found insufficient to meet the national consumption (the 
OECD, 2011, p. 48). In order to make the premium payment an efficient tool, “the Production 
and Support Model for Agricultural Basins” was introduced in 2010. This dynamic, 
information technology-supported system was based on market-based economic, ecological 
and social data to render agricultural production planning appropriate for the EU’s 
agricultural implementations ("Tarım Havzaları Yönetmeliği [The Regulation of Agricultural 
Basins]," 2010). 30 agricultural basins and 16 crop types - to be cultivated in those basins - 
were specified, and the premium payment scheme was adjusted to this. The share of support 
payments on commodity output in total producer support payments dropped from 90.61% in 
2000 to 76.29% in 2002 but peaked at 89.67% in 2009 (the OECD, 2018). 
Table 4.5 shows Turkey’s agricultural performance. Turkey applied highly interventionist 
policies in agriculture prior to 1980, representing point C in Figure 4.1, and highly liberal 
agricultural policies in the period of 1980-91 and 2001-2008, representing a point close to A. 
The figures show that Turkey’s agriculture grew more in the highly interventionist 
36.44
16.87
30.92 30.92
24.63
29.66
21.33
25.1
27.66
30.47
15.05
25.58
25.4519.18 26.14 17.87
22.07
24.11
5.97
3.04
1.45 1.01 0.71 0.77 0.88 1.84
3.43 3.44 2.81 3.52 3.78 3.15 3.50 3.03 2.88 3.55
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
%
Year
Chart Title
Producer Support
as a Share of Total Agricultural Production
Support Based on Commodity Output as Share of Total Agricultural Production
Input Subsidies as a Share of Total Agricultural Production
82 
 
developmentalist era, on average 3.4%, than during the highly liberal policies, on average 
1.1%. The agricultural growth rate in the neoliberal period between 1980 and 2016 (1.79%) is 
less than that in the developmentalist era (3.43%) with heavily government interventions. It 
seems that production-required agricultural supports in the post-ARIP period stimulated the 
agricultural economy more than the production-non-required DIS payments in the ARIP 
period. 
 
Table 4.5 Turkey’s Agricultural GDP Growth Rates in US Dollar (Sengul & Saribal, 2015, p. 
135; The World Bank, 2017) 
Table 4.6 shows the relationship between agricultural support payment and agricultural GDP, 
arranged with the periodization that is determined by declining and increasing trends in 
Turkey’s agricultural support payment growth. The table reveals that generally the higher the 
agricultural support payments, the higher the agricultural GDP growth rate is.  
 
Table 4.6  Turkey’s Agricultural Support Growth and Agricultural GDP Growth (the OECD, 
2018; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017f) 
Table 4.7 shows that the total area of cultivated land has declined by around 17% in the 
neoliberal period, whereas it increased by around 11.3% in the developmentalist era. Even 
relaxing neoliberal policies with production-based payments have slowed reductions in 
cultivated lands, that is, the reduction in total cultivated lands is in the post-ARIP period 
(3.24%) lower than the reduction in the ARIP-period (7%). Clearly, the neoliberal 
agricultural transformation has adversely affected the total area of cultivated land in Turkey. 
Time Period 1950-1960 1960-80 1980-91 1991-2000 2000-2008 2008-2016
Average Agricultural 
Growth Rate (%)
5.3 2.5 1.06 1.56 1.25 3.52
Periods 1998-2001 2001-2006 2006-2007 2007-2010 2010-2013 2013-2015
Agricultural
Support Growth -49.67% 67.74% -24.79% 48.72% -30.24% 28.45%
Agricultural
GDP Growth -7.47% 21.94% -6.22% 17.19% 8.16% 7.18%
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Table 4.7 The Total Area of Cultivated Land (Turkish Statistical Institute, 1967, 1998, 2000, 
2017e) 
Table 4.8 exhibits shares of AEs by size in the total land size and the total AE number 
between 1980 and 2006. Assuming that if AEs with land equal to or less than 100 decares are 
SAEs, between 100 and 500 decares are MAEs, and more than 500 decares are LAEs. Then, 
the proportion of SAEs declined by 4.20% whereas their land share markedly shrivelled by 
around 17%. In contrast, the proportion of LAEs in the total AE number and their land share 
grew considerably (respectively % 125 and around 75.5%). As for MAEs, their share in the 
total number of AEs highly climbed (around 14.50%) but their land share shrunk somewhat 
(around 4.50%). It appears that the neoliberal agricultural transformation favoured LAEs at 
the expense of SAEs and some MAEs, helping LAEs add more land. Nevertheless, the 
number of SAEs in the total AE number has only slightly decreased though the rural 
population has dramatically dropped (M. Öztürk, Jongerden, & Hilton, 2018). In fact, the 
former could have decreased much more because Turkey’s inheritance law has a raising 
effect on total numbers of AEs in each category. According to Unal (2012, p. 116) the very 
strong inverse relationship between farm size and agricultural productivity in Turkey, may 
explain why the withdrawal of SAEs has slowed down. SAEs tend to utilise their lands much 
more intensive than LAEs through intensive use of labour, and land fragmentation has 
positively influenced agricultural productivity in Turkey (Unal, 2012, pp. 117, 119).  
The government clearly forces AEs to become competitive in a market-oriented agriculture; 
yet, adaptation to technology and new types of information and methods bring financial 
hardships and redundant family labourers to smallholding families (M. Öztürk et al., 2018). 
Where non-agricultural expenditure increases but agricultural income drops because of a fall 
in relative prices of agricultural goods, smallholding families have followed different 
strategies: a) they have sold their lands and moved  to urban areas, living in poverty; b) young 
family members have migrated to urban areas to earn money and transferred part of their 
Years 1960 1979 1980 2001 2008 2017
Total Cultivated Areas (1000 hectares) 25324 28625 28175 26350 24505 23385
Periods
Change 11.26%
1960-1980 1980-2001 2001-2017
-6.48% -11.25%
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income to their family in rural areas, which results in the aging of rural population ; c) they 
have stayed in the rural areas but worked in non-farm or agricultural jobs. 
 
Table 4.8 The Percentage Distribution of Number and Land Share of AEs by Size (M. 
Öztürk, 2012, p. 78; Turkish Statistical Institute, 1983, 2017b) 
It is clear that average agricultural GDP growth was higher in the developmentalist era than 
in the neoliberal period, as a result of government interventions. Moreover, Turkey was one 
of the countries achieving self-sufficiency in food production (Cakmak & Yeldan, 1994, p. 
225). Interventionist policies, intermingling political interests of politicians, caused economic 
inefficiency and resultant crises in developing countries that were exacerbated by external 
shocks and the global crisis of capital accumulation48. This way of policy interventions in 
agriculture executed by top-down decision-making turned out to be unsustainable, but 
brought some success in Turkey. Since the period when dramatic shifts were made to 
neoliberal policies that have heavily reduced the level of interventions, the evidence shows 
that agricultural growth rates have slowed down to its lowest level, and rural poverty has 
continued (Unal, 2012, pp. 12-16). Indeed, the percentage of rural poor has increased ( from 
34.48 to 38.69% between 2002 and 2009) (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017e). What matters 
                                                          
48 According to J. O'Connor (1984, p. 56), a capital accumulation crisis occurs when the struggle between the 
working class and capitalist classes, the emergence of new forms of capitalist competition, the state apparatus 
and the dynamics of the society become barriers to advance capitalist accumulation, referring to inadequate 
production of the surplus value and its unproductive use after it has been generated once. 
Size (da) Unit of Criterion 1980 2001 2006
Change between
1980-2006 (%)
Number (%) 30.2 33.36 24.8 -17.88%
Land (%) 4.14 5.32 3.3 -20.29%
Number (%) 31.9 31.46 32.7 2.51%
Land (%) 15.9 16.02 12.9 -18.87%
Number (%) 20.25 18.53 21.4 5.68%
Land (%) 21.25 20.68 18.1 -14.82%
Number (%) 82.35 83.35 78.9 -4.19%
Land (%) 41.29 42.0 34.3 -16.93%
Number (%) 11.55 10.83 12.7 9.96%
Land (%) 23.85 23.81 21.0 -11.95%
Number (%) 5.3 5.1 6.6 24.53%
Land (%) 22.84 22.82 23.6 3.33%
Number (%) 16.85 15.93 19.3 14.54%
Land (%) 46.69 46.63 44.6 -4.48%
Number (%) 0.8 0.72 1.8 125.00%
Land (%) 12.02 11.35 21.1 75.54%
Number (%) 100 100 100
Land (%) 100 100 100
Sub Total
0-20
20.01-50
50.01-100
100.01-200
Total
200.01-500
Sub Total
500.01+
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is to find out how agricultural interventions can be designed and financed in order to achieve 
high agricultural growth but without imposing a heavy burden on the economy. Chapter 7 
points out some aspects of well-designed agricultural interventions in reference to SAR’s 
agriculture. 
4.5 The South-eastern Anatolia Development Project and Agriculture 
Below we show how the GAP has transformed over time. Note that the agricultural 
government interventions for this project are different from those executed at the national 
level. In the final section we argue that the SAR is a less developed region compared to other 
regions in Turkey, and describe the various characteristics of SAR’s agriculture. 
4.5.1 The South-eastern Anatolia Development Project 
Turkey’s regions were first defined at the First Geography Congress held in 1941, based on 
their geographic characteristics. Much later, the Turkish Statistical Institute defined 12 main 
regions and 26 sub-region for statistical purposes (see Figure 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.4 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics- Statistical Regions of Turkey 
Adapted from (Civelek, 2011, under the licence of Creative Commons Attribution-Share 
Alike 3.0 Unported)  
The SAR includes nine cities and two transboundary rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris (see 
Figure 4.5). Designed at first for benefitting from these rivers, the GAP’s history dates back 
to the early period of the Republic. The first studies collecting data for the Euphrates were 
conducted in 1936 and in 1945 for the Tigris, by setting up gauging stations in 1954; the 
studies were accelerated and ended up compiling basin-level reports. The most important 
project in the Upper Euphrates basin, the construction of Keban Dam, was launched in 1966 
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and came into service in 1974. By 1980, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI in Turkish 
acronym) integrated the reports that had been prepared for the Lower and Middle Euphrates 
basins and for the Dicle basin into a single project, which was called the GAP (DSI, pp. 10-
11). In the developmentalist era, the GAP was just designed as an infrastructure project, 
building twenty-one dams to regulate water flows, generate electricity with seventeen hydro-
plants and irrigate farmlands.49 Upon completion the regional irrigation systems were 
supposed to irrigate about 20 per cent of Turkey’s total irrigable land; hydropower plants 
would generate over 20 per cent of Turkey’s total economically exploitable electricity 
potential (GAP-RDA, 2014; The State Planning Organisation, 1990, p. 18). The GAP has 
raised people’s hopes for economic development, but at the same time caused ecological 
alterations and triggered a strong reaction following the destruction of Kurdish heritage, as 
seen in the case of Hasankeyf that will be submerged in Ilisu Dam’s reservoir (Jongerden, 
2010a). 
 
Figure 4.5 The South-eastern Anatolia Region and Its Cities, Adapted from (Baydin, 2006, 
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported; Musser, 2005, Creative Commons 
Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Generic) 
A major transformation in the GAP happened during the first decade of the neoliberal period. 
With the GAP Master Plan, introduced in 1989, it turned from an infrastructure project into a 
multi-sectorial, integrated economic and social development project, particularly 
concentrating on agriculture, industry, infrastructure and social sectors. The main reason for 
the transformation of the project was that the SAR was one of least developed regions in 
Turkey (The State Planning Organisation, 1990, p. 1). Indeed, the region’s per capita income 
(637 US Dollar) was less than half Turkey’s average (1350 US Dollar) in 1985 (Unver, 1997) 
                                                          
49Later updated to 22 dams and 19 hydro plants. 
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and  less than a third of the most developed Marmara Region (2182 US Dollar) (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2017b). The regional contribution to Turkey’s GDP was low (4%), and 
the prevailing economic sector was agriculture (around 40%) (Unver, 1997). 
The exacerbating armed conflict with the PKK partly induced the state to make such changes 
to the project, adding social objectives to the economic ones. The rationale was simple: the 
more the wellbeing of the people in the region improves, the lower the support for or 
participation in the PKK (Ozok, 2004, pp. 27-28, 36). But beyond this, the transformation of 
Kurds into Turks had been an ambitious aim for the state from the outset. According to Ozok 
(2004, pp. 39-50), the studies and surveys conducted by the GAP-RDA treated the regional 
population as “observable, quantifiable objects”; social programmes were implemented to 
control them; GAP activities were, in a sense, intended to undermine  the PKK’s cause. 
If we leave its social objectives and scope aside, the Master Plan essentially envisaged that 
the SAR would became an export region based on agriculture (The State Planning 
Organisation, 1990, p. 5), complying with the national strategy of export-oriented 
industrialisation, which Turkey had adopted in 1980 along with the neoliberal mindset. The 
Plan specifically projected the establishment of agro-industries that could produce exportable 
goods from a range of industrial crops to be cultivated through irrigation. In this way, the 
state indicated her willingness to intervene in the regional economy, but encouraging private 
actors to be involved in the necessary investments (The State Planning Organisation, 1990, 
pp. 3-4). In this sense, the subsidisation of industrial crops, the policy of adjusted agricultural 
irrigation prices, the improvement in the distribution of land rights in favour of smallholders 
and tenant farmers, the policy of selective investments in industry, and the provision of 
credits and various financial incentives to farmers and industrial entrepreneurs were 
envisaged as the components of interventionist policies to be applied in the region (The State 
Planning Organisation, 1990, pp. 23-26). However, the objectives of the plan were not 
realised because of the armed conflict with the PKK and the intermittent financial crises 
which occurred in the 1990s (The GAP-RDA, 2002b, pp. 2-3), and the contribution of private 
actors to investments remained limited. 
The completed GAP projects related to agriculture in the 1990s were the construction of 
Ataturk Dam and the linked irrigation systems in part of Sanliurfa. This tripled agricultural 
value-added per decare in 1995 when irrigation water was first provided (Unver, 1997). It 
should however be noted that just over 12.5 per cent of the envisaged  land to benefit from 
irrigation water actually did so by 2002 (The GAP-RDA, 2003, p. 19). According to Isgin’s 
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study (2006), the average agricultural income in Sanliurfa increased 3.5 times in ten years 
after the Ataturk Dam first supplied irrigation water to Sanliurfa’s plains; yet, the unfair 
distribution of land rights in the region favoured LAEs. In contrast to the commitment made 
in the Master Plan, the land right system did remain intact. 
Another transformation of the GAP was made in the late 1990s. Having conducted a 
successful counter-guerrilla war during nearly a decade, the Turkish state eventually put an 
end to the armed conflict, capturing the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999. Once this 
outcome became more likely in the mid-1990s, the state moved to a post-conflict period, and 
to a global development mentality (Ozok, 2004, pp. 106-107), based on the Agenda 21 of the 
Rio Summit in 1992, which promotes a vision of sustainable development grounded in 
environmental sustainability, participatory governance, combatting poverty, international 
cooperation for capacity building in developing countries (The United Nations, 1992). The 
first step was to launch a programme under the supervision of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP): the GAP would now be seeking to realise sustainable 
human development at the regional level ("Strengthening the Integrated Regional 
Development and Reduction of Socio-Economic Inequalities in the GAP Region," 18 March, 
1997).  
As Ozok (2004, pp. 107,109) argues, the concept of sustainable human development was 
disguising the neoliberal way of development underpinned by rising global capitalism, which 
takes ‘the market [as] the major mechanism around which the economic, political and social 
relations’ are re-structured. The role of the state in development, as the former president of 
the WB, Barber Conable states, should smooth the path for market actors by improving 
human resources, especially of the poorest; by creating a favourable environment for market 
actors that incorporates competitiveness, adequate infrastructure and well-functioning 
institutions; by integrating the national economy into the global economy, and by placing the 
economy on a stable macroeconomic footing (The World Bank, 1991, p. iii). Ozok (2004, pp. 
110-135) however points out that development has in fact  been tailored for the needs of 
capitalists rather than those of the poor, and presents that the social programmes of the GAP 
have worked in the same way by establishing a conceptual and practical link between 
sustainable human development and market-led development.  
The GAP Development Plan 2002-2010 was the product of the participatory planning of 
different stakeholders, including international, national and local public organisations, 
universities and non-governmental organisations (The GAP-RDA, 2002c, p. 16). The Master 
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Plan had rested on public investments to achieve its aims whereas the GAP Development 
Plan gave an important role to private actors, especially for industrial investments. The state 
also committed to further the market economy and invest in infrastructure and public goods, 
e.g. education programmes for the disadvantaged and agricultural extension, where 
sustainability, human development, and participation were taken as the required criteria for 
development within possible technical constraints (The GAP-RDA, 2002b, pp. 7,10; 2002c, 
pp. 20, 38-39). As for agriculture, market-oriented production supported by irrigation 
investments, participatory rural programmes, ecological preservation and the alleviation of 
poverty of the landless, marginal smallholders50 and those who had left agriculture and 
became the urban poor were also addressed in the plan (The GAP-RDA, 2002b, pp. 23-28). 
Two action plans were prepared for the period of 2008-2012 (The GAP-RDA, 2008) and for 
2014-2018 (The GAP-RDA, 2014), complying with the EU’s acquis for stimulating regional 
development through financial assistance from the union. Regional development agencies 
were established in 2008-2009 all across the country, and the legislative and institutional 
frameworks were gradually improved in line with the EU acquis underpinned by the global 
development mentality (Sungur, Keskin, & Dulupçu, 2014). As a result, EU’s financial 
assistance (the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance), including regional, rural and human 
development assistance, had amounted to around 2.5 billion euros by 2017 (Directorate for 
EU Affairs, 2017). 
As a result of all the efforts, irrigated land in the SAR increased from 180,000 ha in 2002 to 
546,000 ha in 2017, accounting for 30% of the total planned irrigated land (The GAP-RDA, 
2018, pp. 29-30). The total vegetative production of Turkey and the SAR in nominal values 
and at current US dollar rates had accrued by around 118% and around 209% respectively 
between 1994 and 2016. The SAR, in this sense, outperformed the most developed regions in 
the west Turkey, the Aegean Region (nearly 82%) and the Western Marmara region (around 
84%) (Turkish Statistical Institute, 1994, 2018a). The total export of the SAR, mostly agro-
products, increased by 16 times between 2000 and 2017, far more than Turkey’s average (4.6 
times) (The GAP-RDA, 2018, p. 38). As Table 4.9 illustrates, the SAR increased per capita 
income more than Turkey’s average between 1985 and 2016 but is still lower. The SAR is 
still economically one of the relatively less developed regions in Turkey. Western Anatolia, 
in comparison has a per capita income of 7876 US Dollar (The GAP-RDA, 2018, p. 16). 
                                                          
50 Marginal smallholders are those who have land areas that are too small so that they cannot yield the required 
level of income to save oneself from poverty, even with the adoption of improved technology. 
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Table 4.9 The Comparison between the SAR and Turkey in Terms of Per Capita Income (The 
GAP-RDA, 2018, p. 16) 
4.5.2 The South-eastern Anatolia Region and Agriculture 
The SAR is a relatively less development region in Turkey. The per capita income of the 
SAR is just over half of Turkey’s average. Its poverty level51 (28.8 % in 2017) is higher than 
Turkey’s average (20.5%), and just over 26% of Turkey’s poor reside in the SAR (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2017b) though the SAR’s population is just over one-tenth of the total 
population. In terms of the human development index value, an indicator of the average 
quality of health, education and material life of the people, 7 out of the 9 cities in the region 
were among the 20 cities with the lowest rankings in 2000 (The UNDP, 2004, pp. 63-65). In 
terms of the socio-economic development value, the same cities are ranked among 15 cities 
with the lowest values in 2010; all of SAR’s cities had seemingly regressed from 1996 to 
2010 except for Batman, Sirnak and Siirt (Baday Yildiz, Sivri, & Berber, 2012).  
 
Table 4.10 The Sectorial Shares of Each City in the SAR in 2017 (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 2018a) 
There is a relation between lack of development, poverty and the prevalence of agriculture. 
The shares of agriculture and industry in GDP are around 11.85% and 27.70% respectively 
                                                          
51 The figure shows the regional share of the poor by poverty threshold, 60 per cent of Turkey’s median income 
adjusted by purchase power parity.   
Regions 1985 1998 2016
Change Between
1985-2016
The SAR 637 1685 3256 411%
Turkey 1350 3243.5 6337 369%
Cities
Agriculture/
Provincial GDP
Industry/
Provincial GDP
Services/
Provincial GDP
Agriculture/
Regional 
Sectorial GDP
Industry/
Regional 
Sectorial GDP
Services/
Regional 
Sectorial GDP
Gaziantep 4.03% 41.52% 42.90% 10.83% 47.79% 27.90%
Adıyaman 12.65% 30.39% 45.40% 7.84% 8.07% 6.82%
Kilis 20.94% 15.19% 52.32% 2.82% 0.88% 1.70%
Şanlıurfa 23.39% 19.42% 45.63% 31.93% 11.36% 15.08%
Diyarbakır 12.39% 22.79% 53.26% 19.70% 15.52% 20.50%
Mardin 17.75% 14.83% 55.86% 14.16% 5.07% 10.80%
Batman 10.82% 29.32% 48.30% 5.40% 6.27% 5.84%
Şırnak 6.33% 13.00% 69.11% 2.85% 2.51% 7.53%
Siirt 15.07% 19.98% 53.40% 4.46% 2.54% 3.83%
The SAR 11.85% 27.66% 48.94% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Turkey 6.59% 28.20% 53.66% 6.59% 28.20% 53.66%
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for the SAR but around 6.60% and 28.20% for Turkey (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a).52 
However, as displayed in Table 4.10, there is an uneven development in the SAR. 
Gaziantep’s industrial GDP accounts for 48% of the total regional industrial GDP. Though 
Sanliurfa and Diyarbakir have large agricultural land (see Table 4.11), half of the industrial 
firms in the region (mostly textile and agro-food firms) are conglomerated in Gaziantep (The 
GAPRDA, 2012, p. 46). The distribution of agricultural land is uneven among the cities as 
seen in Table 4.11. Batman, Sirnak and Siirt lack wide flat agricultural land because of 
topographical conditions characterised by isolated hills and mountains.  
 
Table 4.11 The Distribution of Agricultural Lands Among the SAR’s Cities (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2017b) 
In 1985, agricultural employment accounted for around 71% of total regional employment 
but this decreased to 25% in 2017, still more than Turkey’s average (19.4%) (The State 
Planning Organisation, 1989, p. 111; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). This has happened 
not just because of economic development policies but also due to diminishing returns as a 
result of population growth as well as due to the forced displacement carried out by the state 
and the insecure rural milieu during the armed conflict. The influx of rural people into urban 
areas has swelled the urban service sector, which provides low-paid insecure jobs. The 
figures of the last five cities (the east SAR cities) in the table that suffered from the armed 
conflict at the highest level give ample evidence for the swelling service sector.53After all, the 
ruralisation rate is still high, around 30.40%, implying an urbanisation rate of 69.60%. It 
means that the region falls behind the West Anatolia Region (90.6%) and the East Marmara 
Region (85.12%) in terms of urbanisation rate (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017d). As 
                                                          
52 When we exclude Istanbul’s GDP from the national GDP, the share of agriculture in the national GDP 
increases to around 9.40%. 
53 Given the share of industry in Batman’s GDP, the city cannot be considered as a distinct case as it is based on 
petroleum industry. If that industry did not exist, Batman would be similar to other East SAR cities. 
Cities
Their Share in Total
 Regional Agriculural Lands
Gaziantep  11.85%
Adıyaman  7.91%
Kilis  3.46%
Şanlıurfa   37.35%
Diyarbakır   19.39%
Mardin  10.55%
Batman  3.07%
Şırnak  3.60%
Siirt  2.82%
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illustrated in Table 4.12, the urbanisation rate substantially varies among the cities of the 
region. In addition, given that agro-industry is prevailing in the region, agriculture is of 
importance for earning livelihood and sustaining and fostering economic development.  
 
Table 4.12 Urbanisation and Ruralisation Rates of SAR’s Cities in 2012 (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 2018a) 
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of agricultural land in the SAR as to their utilisation in the 
mid-1980s as well as the agricultural land to be irrigated according to the Master Plan. As 
over thirty years have passed, the figure probably does not fully reflect the current land 
utilisation. For example, a certain amount of agricultural land that was close to main stream 
or tributaries of the Euphrates and Tigris must not be seen in the figure as they submerged 
following the construction of dams and reservoirs. Again, some agricultural land has been left 
idle for years as their owners abandoned them or were forced to abandon their villages during 
the armed conflict, which mostly occurred in the right side of the red line, denoting the 
administrative boundary between the west SAR’s and the east SAR’s cities. 
 
Figure 4.6 The Use of Lands in the South-eastern Anatolia Region in the mid-1980’s Adapted 
from The State Planning Organisation (1990, p. 15)  
Gaziantep Kilis Adiyaman Sanliurfa Diyarbakir Mardin Batman Sirnak Siirt
Urbanisation rate 89.18% 71.54% 61.38% 55.36% 72.56% 59.26% 74.70% 64.01% 61.66%
Ruralisation rate 10.82% 28.46% 38.62% 44.64% 27.44% 40.74% 25.30% 35.99% 38.34%
The West SAR The East SAR
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Although academic material and statistics showing the effects of the armed conflict on the 
SAR’s agriculture are limited and/or absence, Table 4.13 shows that the east SAR was 
severely affected by the armed conflict, and in particular by the counter-guerrilla strategy of 
the state. It is clear that the forced village evacuations imposed by the state, often followed by 
their subsequent destruction and the insecure environment heavily hit the east SAR’s 
agriculture. Croplands, orchards, vineyards, trees, hives, livestock, harvested crops, barns and 
houses were destroyed in the fight between the PKK and the security forces (KHRP, 2002, 
pp. 69-72; TGNA Inquiry Commission, 1998, pp. 21-22). The use of agricultural land, 
pastures and plateaus remained limited because of the landmines placed along the PKK 
militants’ routes to Turkey or in rural areas or towns (TGNA Inquiry Commission, 1998, pp. 
50-51). Furthermore, state officials prohibited the use of pasture and plateaus in some cases, 
which adversely affected livestock farming (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1993, p. 9). 
Staple and cash crops being grown were also uprooted by village guards and security officials 
(Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 30) to compel villagers to leave the contested rural areas, 
thus impairing the PKK’s logistic capabilities (TGNA Inquiry Commission, 1998, p. 22). 
Consequently, agricultural production in tons fell by nearly 14% in the east SAR while it rose 
by around 9 in the west SAR and by around 13.50% in the entire country when the counter-
guerrilla war of the Turkish state against the PKK started (Turkish Statistical Institute, 1989, 
1999). 
 
Table 4.13 Changes in the Total Cultivated Lands in the SAR between 1989 and 1999 
(Turkish Statistical Institute, 1989, 1995, 1999) 
Where the regional agricultural market was immature, the destruction of agricultural 
production structure compounded rural life conditions and necessarily frustrated the 
Change
Regions/Years 1989 1999 1989-1999
The West SAR 1,605,529 1,633,423        1.74%
The East SAR 1,362,020 1,295,965        -4.85%
The SAR 2,967,549 2,929,388        -1.29%
Turkey 25,477,000 24,814,000      -2.60%
Change
Regions/Years 1989 1999 1989-1999
The West SAR 35,539,208      41,189,749      15.90%
The East SAR 5,325,885        4,786,037        -10.14%
The SAR 40,865,093      45,975,786      12.51%
Turkey 554,300,000    572,565,000    3.30%
Total Amount of Cultivated Areas Including Fields, 
Vegetable Orchards and Vineyards (ha)
Total Number of Trees in Fruit Orchards
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development of a market economy. The neoliberal agricultural transformation started in 1980 
had already forced a large group of SAEs in the SAR to produce at or below subsistence level 
following the minimization of government interventions in economic activities (P. J. White, 
1999). These drops in subsidised purchases and other subsidies deeply impacted the SAR’s 
agriculture (Yukseker, 2009, p. 266 cited by Keyder & Yenal, p.162). Furthermore, those 
who produced export cash crops such as tobacco and cotton were deeply affected by the 
devaluation in Turkish lira (Boratav, 1990, pp. 212-215). During the armed conflict, the 
agricultural production base of the east SAR was further destroyed. The result was the 
disintegration of the traditional peasantry54, referring to subsistence farming, and 
subsequently market orientation could be extended into the entire rural area of the region at 
the start of the ARIP (Keyder & Yenal, 2014, pp. 161-162).  
 
Figure 4.7 The Areas Intended to Be Irrigated within the Scope of the GAP in 2015, Adapted 
from Erşan (n.d.)  
The land available for agricultural production in the SAR is 42% (7.5 million ha), and around 
44% of this is allocated for vegetative production. Pastures, and forests and shrubberies 
                                                          
54 Here, we keep ourselves away from any discussion about the tribal or semi-feudal system. The traditional 
peasantry in the sense of a class that exists in a feudal system has already been disintegrating since the 1950s. 
Agricultural mechanisation, the destructive effects of the armed conflict and the neoliberal agricultural 
transformation that has obstructed the sharecropping system by lowering crop prices and profit margins are all 
factors here.  
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respectively cover around 29.5% and 19% of these (The GAP-RDA, 2018, p. 23). The SAR’s 
potential irrigable land accounts for 2.1 million ha, 26% of which is actively irrigated 
presently (The GAP-RDA, 2018). The upper half of Figure 4.7 shows the areas that were 
planned to be irrigated within the scope of the GAP: around 1.8 million ha. The lower half of 
the figure displays the actual state of those areas in 2015. A large part of the light green areas 
are now under operation, too. 
AEs located in the plains or low-elevation areas (see Figure 4.8) partly take advantage of 
irrigation, surface and ground water. AEs in villages located in valleys, which the Euphrates 
and Tigris and their tributaries have shaped, can also appropriate water to cultivate crops. The 
rest is supposed to grow crops under rain-fed conditions. Agro-ecological, climatic and 
geographical conditions of the region allow AEs to grow different types of crops according to 
their sizes. 
 
Figure 4.8 The Main Geographical Features of the SAR, Reproduced from The GAP-RDA 
(2002a, p. 174) 
Under Mediterranean climate conditions, summers are hot and winters temperate, although 
the north SAR is colder than the south SAR during the winter. The average annual 
precipitation level is ranked the second lowest among Turkey’s regions (The General 
Directorate of Meteorology, 2018). The south SAR is semi-arid, the north and east  SAR 
semi-humid, the area between both of them and the north-west and west SAR semi-arid but 
low-humid (The General Directorate of Meteorology, 2016). These climatic conditions 
influence the agro-ecological conditions of the region, and thus land utilisation. As seen in 
Figure 4.6, field crops are commonly be grown in more fertile plains and relatively low-
elevation areas. Highly profitable pistachio and olive trees are mostly planted in poor, stony 
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and arid lands of low-elevated areas. Various types of fruits and vegetables tend to be grown 
in relatively high-elevation areas. Livestock production tends to take place in areas close to 
pastures, mostly in high-elevation areas. Modern livestock facilities that have been set up in 
low-elevation areas in the last decade, furthermore, contribute to this. Table 4.14 shows what 
crop types are most commonly grown in the cities of the SAR. Note that field crops (around 
79%) outweigh fruits (around 18.70%) and vegetables (around 2.30%) in production (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2017b), as displayed in Table 4.15. 
 
Table 4.14 The Most Cultivated Crop Types in the SAR’s Cities in 2017 (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 2017b)55 
                                                          
55 Red-coloured crop types are the most grown in each category. 
Cities Fieldcrops Vegetables Fruits
Adiyaman
Wheat, Barley, Vetch, Chickpea, 
Red Lentil, Cotton, Tobacco, 
Maize
Watermelon, Melon, Bell 
Pepper, Garlic
Grape, Pistachio, Almond, 
Walnut, Pomegranate, Olive
Batman Wheat, Barley, Red Lentil, Maize  
Watermelon, Melon, 
Tomato
Grape, Pistachio
Diyarbakir
Wheat, Barley, Vetch, Chickpea, 
Red Lentil, Cotton, Maize, 
Sunflower, Paddy  
Watermelon, Melon, 
Tomato, Bell Pepper, Green 
Pepper, Cucumber, Onion, 
Aubergine
Grape, Plum, Mulberry
Gaziantep
Wheat, Barley, Vetch, Chickpea, 
Red Lentil, Cotton, Maize, Sugar 
Beet  
Watermelon, Melon, 
Aubergine, Garlic, Mint, Red 
Pepper, Onion, Cucumber
Grape, Apple, Cherry,
 Pistachio, Olive, Walnut, 
Pomegranate
Kilis
Wheat, Barley, Cotton, 
Chickpea, 
Red Lentil
Red Pepper, Onion, Tomato Grape, Pistachio, Olive
Mardin
Wheat, Maize, Red Lentil, 
Barley, 
Chickpea, Cotton
Watermelon, Melon, Cucumber, 
Gherkin, Tomato
Grape, Cherry, Olive, Pistachio
Siirt
Wheat, Barley, Vetch, Maize, 
Red Lentil
Tomato, Melon Grape, Pistachio
Sanliurfa
Wheat, Barley, Vetch, Red 
Lentil, Cotton, Maize, 
Sunflower, Sugar Beet, Clover, 
Sesame
Watermelon, Melon, Red 
Pepper, Bell Pepper, Cucumber, 
Aubergine, Gherkin, Onion, 
Tomato
Grape, Pistachio, Almond,
 Olive, Pomegranate
Sirnak
Wheat, Maize, Barley, Red 
Lentil, 
Cotton, Clover, Peanut, Vetch 
Watermelon Grape
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In terms of land ownership, LAEs tend to be more common in low-elevation areas rather than 
high-elevation areas, and SAEs tend to be more common in high-elevation areas rather than 
low-elevation areas (Gürsoy, Sessiz, Eliçin, Akın, & Esgici, 2013). The structure of land 
ownership and the possibility of accessing irrigation relate to agricultural mechanisation. 
LAEs rely more on agricultural mechanisation than SAEs, and they tend to use it more for 
irrigated farming, which allows a wider range of crop types to be cultivated several times. 
Again, AEs located in plains and low-elevation areas are more likely to use agricultural 
mechanisation more than those in high-elevation areas (Gürsoy et al., 2013). 
 
Table 4.15 The Shares of Areas Allocated for Field Crops, Vegetables and Fruits (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2018a) 
As the Turkish Statistical Institute conducted their last agricultural census in 2001, we do not 
know how agricultural enterprises and landownership in the SAR have altered in the last 17 
or 18 years. Table 4.16 shows however that there is an unfair land distribution in favour of 
LAEs and against SAEs in the region, and it seems that this tendency is stronger in the East 
SAR than the West SAR. 2.95% of total AEs in the region control around 31.70% of 
agricultural land whilst around 72% of total AEs only possess around 22.15% of agricultural 
land. The land controlled by all the LAEs in the region is 1.43 times more than those 
controlled by all the SAEs; for Turkey, the ratio is only around 0.27. 
Cities Fieldcrops Vegetables Fruits
The SAR 78.94% 2.30% 18.76%
Gaziantep  38.04% 2.78% 59.18%
Adıyaman  76.14% 2.41% 21.45%
Kilis  44.24% 4.74% 51.01%
Şanlıurfa   85.25% 1.81% 12.95%
Diyarbakır   93.17% 2.38% 4.45%
Mardin  84.87% 2.45% 12.68%
Batman  84.40% 3.20% 12.40%
Şırnak  95.13% 1.24% 3.63%
Siirt  71.03% 2.58% 26.39%
98 
 
 
Table 4.16 The Percentage Distribution of Number and Land Share of AEs in the SAR and 
Turkey in 2001 by Size (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2001) 
4.6 Conclusion 
This section started with a discussion of the neoliberal agricultural transformation in Turkey 
and proceeded to explain its evolved character and interactions with Turkey’s political 
economic terrain and economic classes. Turkey’s agricultural economy has performed worse 
during the neoliberal period than during the developmentalist era. Also, the neoliberal 
transformation greased the wheels of Islamism and Islamist bourgeoisie in the 1980s and 
1990s, in opposition to the military-bureaucratic class and the secular bourgeoisie, which 
managed to direct the long-standing reaction of the Islamist people in the periphery via 
religious community networks to their interests in the name of Islamic brotherhood. 
Another reaction from the periphery came from Kurds, who mobilised under the PKK. The 
armed conflict started in 1984 and ended in 1999 with the arrest and imprisonment of the 
PKK leader Ocalan. One of the results of the armed conflict was the special-war regime set 
up by the high-level military commanders. The operation and political costs of such a regime 
provoked negative reactions by the secular bourgeoisie over time; in other words, the central 
coalition started to corrode in the mid-1990s.  
One of the attempts to halt the PKK was to introduce a development plan in the SAR. We 
elaborated how this plan was first created and evolved in the national course of political 
economy interacting with changes in neoliberalism on the global level. The SAR’s 
agriculture used to rely on pre-capitalist farmers subject to subsistence farming prior to the 
armed conflict. In the course of the armed conflict, the coercion applied by the state turned 
Size (da) Unit of Criterion Adiyaman Diyarbakir Gaziantep Mardin Siirt Sanliurfa Batman Sirnak Kilis The SAR Turkey
0-20 Number (%) 33.55 33.07 22.64 37.20 62.83 5.75 24.13 16.16 10.31 27.18 33.36
Land (%) 6.78 4.08 2.07 3.78 10.86 0.33 2.78 0.75 1.29 2.45 5.32
20.01-50 Number (%) 39.19 32.82 20.45 19.85 21.01 19.24 26.18 25.67 34.78 26.23 31.46
Land (%) 25.02 9.92 6.56 6.90 17.00 3.31 10.11 5.67 12.96 7.77 16.02
50.01-100 Number (%) 16.43 14.00 22.62 18.15 6.26 25.12 20.53 16.57 26.99 18.58 18.53
Land (%) 22.90 9.19 15.31 14.46 9.92 8.68 17.43 8.04 20.82 11.92 20.68
Sub Total Number (%) 89.17 79.89 65.71 75.20 90.10 50.11 70.84 58.40 72.08 71.99 83.35
Land (%) 54.70 23.19 23.94 25.14 37.78 12.32 30.32 14.46 35.07 22.14 42.02
100.01-200Number (%) 7.16 8.59 20.94 12.71 5.54 25.00 16.57 19.08 19.25 14.75 10.83
Land (%) 20.12 11.49 27.66 20.10 17.85 16.96 26.88 17.27 27.41 18.60 23.81
200.01-500Number (%) 3.26 7.66 11.02 10.00 2.83 19.18 11.77 16.37 7.29 10.31 5.10
Land (%) 15.64 24.12 30.24 34.92 18.72 27.29 37.20 32.38 21.79 27.55 22.82
Sub Total Number (%) 10.42 16.25 31.96 22.71 8.37 44.18 28.34 35.45 26.54 25.06 15.93
Land (%) 35.76 35.61 57.90 55.02 36.57 44.25 64.08 49.65 49.20 46.15 46.63
500.01+ Number (%) 0.41 3.86 2.33 2.09 1.53 5.71 0.82 6.15 1.38 2.95 0.72
Land (%) 9.54 41.20 18.16 19.84 25.65 43.43 5.61 35.89 15.73 31.71 11.35
Total Number (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Land (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.01 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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this agricultural structure into a market-oriented one rather than the development plan itself, 
of which the execution was partly hampered by economic crises. Furthermore, the neoliberal 
agricultural transformation apparently did not help the region to close the developmental gap. 
Per capita income of the region is still half of the country’s average, and poverty is prevalent. 
It however appears that the government interventions under the development plan have 
generally produced good results in Sanliurfa’s economy, making the state more determined to 
follow the plan. We can conclude that if government interventions had not been 
implemented, the developmental gap between the region and the most developed regions 
would have widened. 
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Chapter 5: Turkey’s Political Economy and the Kurdish Question Since 
2001 
5.1 Introduction 
This analysis chapter seeks to understand why Turkey has, since 2001, simultaneously 
implemented both neoliberal agricultural policies and government interventions for 
agricultural development in the SAR. This requires to examine the role of politics in framing 
development policies between 2001 and 2017. The concurrent application of neoliberal 
agricultural policies and governmental interventions are a derivative of the political contest 
within the dominant coalition and between the centre and the periphery. 
After critically assessing Violence and Social Orders written by North et al. (2009), we 
argued that focussing on intra-elite relationships in the dominant coalition can partly help us 
to understand changes in state formations, and that the conflicting interaction between the 
centre and the periphery should also be taken into account to comprehend intra-elite 
relationships and changes in the dominant coalition and state formation. 
Shaped on conflicting interests, complicated political interactions within the dominant 
coalition and between the centre and the periphery in Turkey since 2001 are the main issues 
to be assessed. We shall discuss how intra-elite relationships have developed and transformed 
within the dominant coalition, and how the periphery has influenced those relationships, 
pursuing their own interests. 
In the context of the political conflicts, neoliberal transformation and populism has played an 
important role in forming alliances in the dominant coalition, to shape the periphery and to 
get support from external forces to consolidate political power. 
The political conflict between the Islamic movement and the Kemalist or secular 
establishment has shaped agricultural policies. The JDP government, representing interests of 
the conservative bourgeoisie, came to power with the support the conservative people in the 
periphery. When the government was faced with resistant from the secular elites and 
periphery, they needed to get the support of international organisations, Western states and 
the large-scale secular bourgeoisie having partnerships with Western corporations. They have 
determinedly followed neoliberal policies at the national level to raise their power in 
domestic politics and isolate the secular establishment. 
The Kurdish question and the Kurdish political movement with its growing social capital 
have driven the government to engage in development interventions. The military narrative 
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had given power to the military in the 1990s. The JDP government intended to prevent any 
increase in the power of the military, so attempted to satisfy the ordinary Kurds with 
democratic openings and development. As they became the second most popular party in the 
SAR in the 2002 general election, they also planned to cut the support of ordinary Kurds to 
the Kurdish political movement so that they would firmly establish their legitimacy in the 
dominant coalition, and among ordinary people by promoting themselves as peacemakers. As 
a result, neoliberal policies at national level have been coupled with development 
interventions, especially in the scope of the GAP-based agricultural projects in the SAR. 
A promising, peaceful environment shaped the SAR between 2009 and 2015, especially after 
the government initiated the Kurdish Opening in 2013. For a few years, Kurds had access to 
country-wide political bodies and promoted their views among the Turkish population. The 
strategy - called ‘becoming part of Turkey’ (Türkiyelileşmek) - prevailed among Kurds, 
along with democratisation processes, and as a result, regionalism remained less attractive.  
After the June 2015 election, the JDP government saw that democratic openings and peace 
talks had benefitted the Kurdish political movement more than the JDP. Alarming with the 
Kurdish forces that expanded their territories in Syria, the government started to suppress the 
Kurdish political movement limiting their political access and participation. 
While addressing Bates’ views about regionalism, we objected to his argument that regional 
cultural, political and economic diversities leads to regionalism which shapes the political 
terrain in a way that obstructs political economic development. From our standpoint, 
regionalism emerges or gains strength, where a high degree of centralisation restricts political 
access and participation. In the case of the Kurdish Question, Kurds abandoned their strategy, 
called ‘becoming part of Turkey’, and reverted to regionalism because the highly centralised 
state regarded their political extension to other people in Turkey politically risky to the 
dominant coalition. 
In this context, the course of the Kurdish question in the period between 2001 and 2017 will 
be our main focus. We will see that the Kurdish question provided an arena, where the 
interplay between three political forces took place: the JDP government, the military-
bureaucratic class and the Kurdish political movement. 
International political actors influenced this political interplay. Nyeck (2010) makes a critical 
assessment on When Things Fell Apart written by (Bates, 2008) that “[i]n emphasizing 
rational choice and decision-making, Bates neglects the international dealings of rulers of 
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weak states and the outcomes of international bargains on either failure or relative strength of 
the ‘specialists in violence’.”  
It was discussed earlier that the military-bureaucratic class and their representatives in 
politics adapted themselves flexibly to changing international power structures, and thus, the 
state with its dominant coalition engaged in international dealings to keep their power and the 
creation of systematic rents. International bargains have inevitably shaped the political terrain 
of Turkey. For example, in line with the strategy of the West, Turkey fought with 
communism in Turkey. During this fight the state control over Islamism was relaxed; 
nationalist policies were advanced; the Kurdish Question was attempted to be solved by 
coercive acts. The chapter will show that JDP government skilfully tapped the relationships 
with the EU, the US and international organisations in order to outperform its political rivals 
and receive assistance for the developmental efforts in the SAR. The implementation of 
neoliberalism has surely been part of these international dealings, and later financial and 
technical assistance for development became part of them. Furthermore, development 
interventions in agricultural development of the SAR were a product of international dealings 
and plans with the West in the Middle East. 
The combined implementation of neoliberal policies and development interventions in 
agricultural development of the SAR were the result of the political factors we have 
explained. Figure 5.1 shows the share of GAP investment expenditures in the total public 
investments in Turkey. After the 2001 economic crisis, the share declined and remained 
below the average level of the 1990s. From when the JDP government overruled the military 
after 2007, they found a chance to carry out their grand strategy in the Middle East. The share 
of public expenses for promoting agricultural development increased during the period of 
democratic openings. After the military narrative came to the fore in 2015 as Turkey’s 
economic performance was gradually deteriorating, the share declined again.  
In the second section, we will address the conflicting relationship between the JDP 
government and the military bureaucratic class. In the third section, we will address the 
changing political course of the Kurdish question in the political struggle between the centre 
and the periphery, particularly taking account of the relation between the development 
narrative and the military narrative. In doing all, we will emphasize the influence of 
international relations on the political course of the Kurdish Question. The fourth section will 
synthesize what we discuss in the chapter, and the conclusion section will summarise the 
entire chapter. 
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Figure 5.1 The Percentage Values of Public Investment in the GAP Reproduced from The 
GAP-RDA (2018, p. 19)  
5.2 The Conflicting Relationship between the JDP Government and the State 
Bureaucracy 
A brief summary of the composition of the dominant coalition in the early 2000s is needed 
before starting our analysis. The military bureaucracy, orchestrating components of the state 
bureaucracy (i.e. the judiciary, the Council of Higher Education responsible for universities) 
in times of political crisis, was filling the central or core position in the dominant coalition. 
Their ally in the dominant coalition was the secular, westernised bourgeoisie in west Turkey. 
The coalition government parties, loyal to the Kemalist ideology endorsed by the military 
bureaucracy, had been unable to provide a solution to the Kurdish question or the thorny 
economic problems frustrating the capital accumulation process before 2002.  
Whilst the military bureaucracy had managed to arrest the rise of the working class and 
Kurds in the 1970s, they had opened the way for Islamisation, which would later came back 
to undermine its political power. The WP came to power in a coalition government in 1996 
but was ousted from power through a military coup. Afterwards, the conservative bourgeoisie 
changed their strategy and aligned themselves with the EU and the US (Kucukaydin, 2013b, 
pp. 40-41). After the 2001 economic crisis, the JDP, representing the conservative 
bourgeoisie, gained support of those who were highly dissatisfied with economic hardships. 
This led to a political economic conflict between conservative and secular elements of the 
periphery. 
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5.2.1 The State Bureaucracy Attacks on the JDP Government  
The outcome of the general election held in November 2002 was a shock to the system. The 
coalition parties and opponent parties were all blamed for economic and political crises and 
corruption during the 1990s, and voted out of parliament. It was clear that the centralised 
state was faced with a legitimacy crisis (Yildirim, İnaç, & Özler, 2007). Subscribing to 
market economy underpinned with statism, the CHP, which secured around 20% of the votes, 
was representing most secular Sunni, Alevis and state officials. The JDP, the other party in 
parliament, had been established in 2001 by the some political notables having left the 
banned Virtue Party56. The JDP leaders, called themselves conservative democrats rather than 
Islamists, and secured just over 34% of the votes, representing the interests of conservative 
Muslims and the conservative bourgeoisie. The result of the election provided a great 
opportunity to the Islamists and/or conservatives to ‘restructure political landscape and 
expand the public sphere’ (Yavuz, 2003, p. 256). However, it was difficult to formulate and 
implement cross-cutting policies to satisfy three different sets of demands: state demands, 
demands from their political base, and global demands (Yildirim et al., 2007).  
Given that there was a pressing need for tackling economic problems, the JDP government’s 
efforts centred on this first. They, over time, achieved high growth rates and low inflation 
rates and integrated Turkey more into the global market by adopting ‘conservative 
globalism’, the synthesis of liberalism and conservatism, which made possible the attainment 
of wide support from different socio-economic groups despite heavy social costs of the stand-
by programme (Öniş, 2009). To succeed, they only followed the neoliberal recipe having 
provided by the IMF to the then coalition government after the 2001 economic crisis, so 
gained some credibility from the international economic organisations. 
They also improved their relationship with the EU, complying with the Copenhagen Criteria: 
a set of institutions and standards of democratisation (E. Doğan, 2005). In an attempt to 
consolidate and expand their constituency, they occasionally engaged in contested topics 
conducive to widen the secular-conservative cleavage and entered into ethnic discourse. This 
triggered resistance and scepticism not only “from the central elite but also from the 
traditional block of the right and the left” (Yildirim et al., 2007).  
                                                          
56 The Virtue Party was the successor to the WP, which was banned from politics in 1998 after the military 
bureaucracy had taken the 28 February measures. The Virtue Party was later banned in 2001, being accused of 
violating the secular order. 
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The confrontation between the JDP government and the secular establishment peaked in 2007 
with the presidential election. The likelihood of a person with political Islamic views to be 
selected as the next president was the main issue between the two political sides. After 
Erdogan proclaimed that Abdullah Gul, a founder of the JDP and the minister of foreign 
affairs, would be the candidate of the party for the presidential election, resentment among 
the CHP’s representatives grew further. 
While boycotted by all opposition parties, Gul was selected as the president. The CHP 
appealed at Constitutional Court to cancel the decision, arguing that the required quorum was 
not constitutional. On 27th April 2007, the General Staff declared an ‘e-memorandum’ (e-
muhtıra in Turkish) highlighting that they would defend secular principles, relying on their 
mandate from the legal framework of the state ("A Declaration from the General Staff," 2007, 
27 April). The then president of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, had already claimed that the 
country’s regime was under an unprecedented threat where internal and foreign forces were 
cooperating to change the secular republic into a moderate Islamic one ("The Sezer's 
Speech," 2007, 13 April). Furthermore, the stormy but inconclusive Republican meetings 
against the JDP government took place in five cities. Hundreds of thousands from the secular 
periphery gathered in each meeting, of which many were the wage earners espousing the 
revitalisation of Kemalism, referring to the founding principles and ideology of the Republic 
(Yasli, 2014, p. 134).  
The Court cancelled the decision made by parliament, and another session was convened. But 
the president could not be selected, as the required quorum could not be attained. Erdogan, in 
response, called for a general election and a constitutional change that would allow the 
people to elect the president. The people in the periphery with right-wing views and those 
who benefitted from policies of the JDP government brought succour to him during the 
election. The JDP ended up increasing its votes from 34% to around 46.5%, the CHP lost 
seats while the NMP entered parliament again. Gul was selected by parliament as the 
president of Turkey in August 2007. The constitutional change was also accepted in a 
referendum. However, the challenge against the JDP government from the secular 
establishment did not stop. A final step was to open a legal investigation for the closure of the 
JDP; yet, the constitutional court rejected the closure.  
In conclusion, the military bureaucracy, the judiciary and the CHP attempted until 2008 to 
remove the JDP government from power and to discredit them in the eyes of the people. The 
deadlock at the elite-level was only overcome when the conservative periphery did not take a 
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step back and supported the JDP government. Particularly, the right-wing people who had not 
give their votes to the JDP in the 2002 general election, backed the ruling government in the 
2007 general election. Consequently, the reaction of the periphery to the centre brought a 
great chance to the JDP to shape the dominant coalition.  
5.2.2 The JDP Government Gains the Upper Hand 
We will now discuss how Erdogan and his the JDP government has strengthened his political 
power and gained the upper hand since 2002. After 2007 he has had nearly undisputed 
political power, through social capital among elites and the ordinary conservative people in 
the periphery. The implementation of neoliberal policies have become imperative for his 
government to gain legitimacy from different actors and keep his power since they came to 
power. 
As Teazis (2010, pp. 16-18) argues, the JDP’s political identity originates from the Second 
Group57 in the first parliament that was founded during the Independence War, which 
espoused to attract foreign investors and set up a liberal conservative order. Following the 
Second Group, the DP in the 1950s (Aydin, 2005, p. 28; Teazis, 2010, pp. 21-24), the 
National Order Party and the National Salvation Party in the 1970s, the WP in the 1980s-
1990s (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 212-213), all gave importance to market-based development and the 
freedom of religion in a liberal, religion-based democracy. This political tradition allowed the 
party elites to accommodate the political economic needs of global and national capitalists 
under the neoliberal regime, obtaining consent from the poor through conservative values and 
a conservative political agenda (Öniş, 2009). 
After the WP and the Virtue Party were banned subsequently because of their violations on 
secular principles in the constitution, the reformists in the Virtue Party well defined the 
reality that if they did not modernise their views, the conservative bourgeoisie with liberal 
conservative values would not back them, who had been economically harmed with the 
measures and strict inspections applied by state after the 28 February measures (Yildirim et 
al., 2007). When the reformists constituted a new party, the JDP, they invited many 
politicians from other centre-right wing parties to their cadres (Teazis, 2010, pp. 135-136). 
After forming their elite-cadres, the JDP altered their programme in accord with the actual 
political economic conditions. In the party programme, the JDP adopted cosmopolitan views 
instead of strong nationalism; decentralisation and good governance rather than 
                                                          
57 The Second Group was composed by the representatives who objected to the First Group that would later 
found the Republic under the leadership of Ataturk. 
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centralisation; the full extent of neoliberal and foreign investors-friendly policies refusing 
redistributive policies of the state; a wider range of human rights rather than solely religious 
rights; good orientation to the Western institutions and a balanced approach to the Middle 
East instead of anti-Western and anti-Israel political positions (Öniş, n.d.). 
Their orientation to Western political interests and neoliberal economic policies helped the 
government gain support from the global capitalist classes, the US and the EU (Savran, 2015, 
p. 68). No matter how the secular bourgeoisie had some interest conflicts with the 
conservative bourgeoisie, they supported the single party government executing neoliberal 
reforms (Savran, 2004, p. 36). Erdogan eventually bypassed the parliament in the following 
years, and his government implemented unpopular policies at the expense of the working 
class; for example, 80 per cent of privatisation realised in the last three decade have been 
made by the JDP government (Savran, 2015, pp. 68-69). Being backed by the entire 
bourgeoisie and western countries, the JDP government managed to isolate the state 
bureaucracy in the political arena. 
Here we should ask how Erdogan acted at the expense of the working class (or the periphery) 
while at the same time maintained their consent. Remember that before the JDP came to 
power, different elements of the dominant coalition (i.e. the existing parties, state officials 
and the secular large-scale capitalists) had lost their credibility in the eyes of the of people 
because of economic problems and corruption (Laçiner, 2001). Until the JDP closure trial in 
2008, the government managed to achieve high economic growth rates (averagely 7.9%) and 
low inflation rates (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017e); per capita income increased by 
around 1.9 times in the period between 2002 and 2010 (Öniş, 2012). It was realised through 
fiscal and monetary stability attracting high capital flows to the national economy under 
neoliberal policies, which grew domestic credits and led to exchange rates under a free 
floating currency regime, thus lowering perceived prices of imported goods (Öniş, 2012). 
This enabled the incumbent government to apply neoliberal populism and design 
redistributive mechanisms, which reduced poverty from 27% in 2002 to 18% in 2009 (Öniş, 
2012). This economic circumstance was what helped the JDP government to defeat rival 
parties and to successfully obtain high electoral support from the working class  
Furthermore, the establishment had showed weakness in being able to deliver aid to those 
affected by the 1999 earthquake (Engin, 1999). Given that the military bureaucracy had also 
fuelled resentment among Kurds during the armed conflict and among the conservative 
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because of 28 February measures, the majority of the people or the working class lost its trust 
in the state. All of these factors strengthened the JDP’s hand in the political contest. 
Another factor explaining the support of the working class comes from the existing cultural 
cleavage across the working class. Perceiving this cleavage, Erdogan augmented cultural 
polarisation intentionally to divide and rule the working class and the middle class, obtaining 
votes under the guise of a cultural struggle for the oppressed (Kucukaydin, 2013b, pp. 43-48; 
Savran, 2015, pp. 70-71). He later exploited this cultural struggle to socially construct a 
Sunni nation interacting with the idea of Neo-Ottomanisation, a strategic initiative to 
revitalise Ottoman-like hegemony in the Middle East under the guise of “brotherhood” 
among Sunni Muslims (Yasli, 2014, pp. 55-61, 163-166).58  
The JDP government also created privileges for the conservative periphery to maintain their 
electoral support. The clash between the middle classes from different social strata to fill 
mid-and senior-level posts within the state bureaucracy and local municipalities, and jobs in 
the private sector (Savran, 2015, p. 46) becomes evident from the following:  
There is cutthroat competition between the formerly hegemonic intellectual and 
professional elites reared in well-to-do families in big cities and educated at the cream of 
Turkish universities or abroad, often polyglot and wielding a cosmopolitan outlook and 
lifestyle, on the one hand; and a newly rising layer with the same professional 
qualifications, but mostly coming from poorer families residing in small towns or even 
villages, some educated in the new provincial universities of Anatolia […], usually at a 
disadvantage when it comes to speaking foreign languages […] and with a more 
restricted outlook on the world and a more conservative lifestyle, on the other hand. 
The JDP government opted for employing the latter group to consolidate its political base by 
monopolising public jobs (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). While neoliberal policies were 
coupling with development interventions, the conservative educated people were employed in 
the existing and newly founded organisations in the field of development, such as 
development agencies, the Agricultural and Rural Development Support Institution, the GAP-
RDA and its affiliated organisations. 
                                                          
58 The harsh response to this cultural polarisation as well as neoliberal policies was the Gezi Protests, taking 
place in May-June 2013, which symbolised greatly the rising reaction of ‘an emerging new middle class and a 
declining/proletarianizing middle class’ and partly of students and workers with Alevi or Kurdish background 
(Yörük, 2014). All of which can be classified from cultural aspects as republicans, socialists, Alevis, LGBT 
individuals58, and secular Kurds and women from the periphery (Yasli, 2014, pp. 186, 203). 
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The JDP government and local municipalities also nourished the growth of the Anatolian 
conservative bourgeoisie, and businessmen strongly loyal to Erdogan (Esen & Gumuscu, 
2018; Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). Though the incumbent government was relatively more 
willing to allow auditing over public expenditures between 2002 and 2007, in the following 
years, they gradually lifted the judicial auditing and relaxed enforcement over public 
expenditures or procurements (Esen & Gumuscu, 2018).59 Since the JDP government back 
the Anatolian bourgeoisie, the small- and medium-scale enterprises that deal with them 
benefit from that backing, and thus align themselves with the ruling party. In the case of the 
SAR, they are supported by project and programmes created within the GAP, and thus, the 
government confidently secures its political base in the SAR. 
In the same vein, the workers employed by the business groups and the municipalities the 
JDP holds also align themselves with the politics of the ruling party (for example; Artigercek, 
2018, 04 June; A. Çelik, 2008, 24 July; Köseoğlu, 2014, 19 May). Aside from this, probing 
three subsequent general elections between 2002-2001, Çarkoğlu (2012) attributes the JDP’s 
subsequent electoral victories to ‘a partisan commitment’ among their voters. More 
strikingly, the JDP won another victory in the 2013 local election despite corruption 
allegations, underpinned with leaked recordings of top-level government officials.  
The final crucial factor in explaining JDP’s political power is the networks of Islamic orders 
or communities, which function as intermediary entities between a large group of adherents 
and the party in generating consent for the ruling government. Capable of politically 
controlling their members with their economic and social resources, the Islamic orders own 
holding companies to help sustain their power (Ö. Öztürk, 2015). 
To resist the political attacks of the military bureaucratic class, Erdogan did rely on both the 
conservative elites and the conservative people in the periphery. They strengthened the social 
capital of Islamic orders, facilitating the diffusion of political power and control to the 
conservative society. After 2007, the JDP government allied with the Gulen Movement to 
strike back to the military. Many secular, Kemalist and Euroasianist military officials were 
purged from their positions through judicial trials (Eldem, 2017, pp. 179-180; Rodrik, 2011). 
In other words, they leveraged the struggle between the centre and the conservative 
periphery, gained support from the latter, secured their political power and re-structured the 
                                                          
59 Esen and Gumuscu (2018) elaborately present how the JDP government is transferring resources and rents to 
the Anatolian bourgeoisie and the circle of loyal businessmen. The main transfer mechanisms are ‘public 
spending; privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public goods; and transfer of private capital from 
disfavoured groups to privileged circles. 
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dominant coalition. It should be noted that the JDP government gained a chance to secure the 
consolidated civil control of the military, but they just replaced the purged officials with the 
members of the Gulen movement, which later attempted to mount a military coup against the 
government. The conservative periphery took to the streets, just after the military coup on 
15th July, 2016, to demonstrate their support for Erdogan. Afterwards, the ordinary people in 
the periphery helped Erdogan to have the extraordinary authority to set up the one-man rule 
and for the conservative elites to foster unrivalled systematic rent creation.  
Turkey has not been able to transition to an open-access order. On the contrary, the country 
has experienced a high degree of erosion in one of the two doorstep conditions, the rule of 
law based on impersonality, and consequently regressed to a relatively more fragile limited-
access order. The Gezi Protests were a backlash of the secular periphery against such an 
erosion of order but failed (Yasli, 2014, pp. 197-200; Yörük, 2014). 
In the second chapter, we questioned North’s Violence and Social Orders that it ignores the 
reaction of the people in the periphery against the centre can be employed by a faction in the 
dominant coalition to improve its position. We have showed that the conservative periphery 
reacted against the negative effects of rent creation among secular elites and their exclusion 
from economic rents created for the periphery to keep their support. The conservative 
bourgeoisie and the JDP political elites leveraged their reaction to improve their position in 
the dominant coalition and generate more political power and economic rents. Neoliberal 
populism were combined with development interventions in the case of the SAR especially 
after 2008 to keep the electoral support high and secure the constant support of the 
bourgeoisie. 
After corruption scandals were uncovered in December 2013, an intra-elite conflict between 
the Gulen Movement and the JDP government escalated. Erdogan started to feel insecure,  
fearing a coup or riot that could remove him from power (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018), and 
accelerated instability and the establishment of the one-man rule (Yasli, 2014, p. 193). All 
this happened under Islamist conservatism and neoliberal restructuring and populism in the 
context of globalisation (Bozkurt, 2013), which has been sustained with the electoral support 
of the urban and rural poor (Yörük, 2014), on which the neoliberal state and Islamic charities 
bestowed financial aid or aid in kind to tackle poverty under the guise of Islamic solidarity.  
Neo-liberalisation is, as asserted by Harvey (2007, p. 19), “a political project to re-establish 
the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites.” Though 
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he examined the relationship between interventionist developmentalist states and clientelism 
in African countries in Markets and States in Africa, it should be noted that Bates has not 
addressed the relationship between neoliberal states and clientelism in his subsequent books 
concerning the political economy of development in less developed countries. As Karadag 
(2010) establishes, “the JDP […] has followed the tight fiscal and monetary policy 
recommendations of the IMF to put an end to rampant cronyism and the overall rentier 
mentality which, supposedly, was a by-product of the country’s statist tradition”. Yet, the 
outcome was the clientelistic neoliberal state creating uncompetitive rents for elites.  
In conclusion, the implementation of neoliberalism for the JDP government has played an 
important role for keeping political support from international actors but mostly from 
domestic actors. 
5.3 The Kurdish Question in the Era of the JDP Government and the Development 
Narrative 
We have discussed why neoliberal policies have been implemented by the JDP government. 
It will be argued hereafter that the combination of neoliberal policies with development 
interventions in agriculture is a product of the political competition between the JDP 
government, the military-bureaucracy and the Kurdish political movement. Until the June 
2015 general election the JDP government had employed the development narrative, along 
with the introduction of cultural rights and democratic norms urged by the EU. It also 
allowed for democratic opening up towards the Kurdish question. The main rationale was that 
the development narrative would require the use of the developmental methods and tools 
devised by the government rather than the use of military methods that would grant the 
initiative to the military. Given that the wide acceptance of the military narrative had 
facilitated the establishment of a war-regime in the 1990s that had nearly turned political 
parties into puppets of the military, the development narrative prevented this. But the military 
narrative has merged with the development narrative again after the June 2015 general 
election, which coincided with the political control of territories west of Euphrates by Kurds 
in Syria.60  
The JDP government leveraged the Kurdish question to increase its advantage in the political 
struggle. We shall argue that neoliberal policies were coupled with GAP-based agricultural 
                                                          
60 We should note that the political interplay has always been active between the JDP government and the 
military, the CHP and the ultranationalist the NMP about the Kurdish question, and the latter group generally 
used the military narrative and the nationalist discourse to box the JDP government into a corner by tapping into 
nationalist sentimentality of the Turkish-origin constituency. 
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interventions to persuade the Kurdish bourgeoisie (including large landholders) to politically 
act in concert with the state and the government. The government also intended to obtain 
consent from Kurdish-origin citizens by creating employment, to consolidate the political 
support of Islamist Kurds, Turks and Arab-origin citizens through development investments 
and grants, and to make the Kurdish political movement bereft of a political base and have it 
abandoned its arms.  
We shall now address two important theoretical issues. Recall that we discussed Ostrom and 
Ahn’s studies (2008; 2009) and Miedema’s study (2010) about social capital in the third 
chapter. Our main inference was that ethnicity is an important factor imposing itself on a 
person’s preferences and make them hard to change, and that in a highly polarised society a 
person’s choice based on her individual preference is highly influenced by her ethnicity.  
All the development interventions efforts in the SAR and the introduction of cultural rights 
and democratic openings have not resolved the Kurdish question, because of the strong 
Kurdish intra-ethnic social capital formed by Kurdish individuals in their daily lives. But all 
the interventions have re-constituted the Kurdish question, which have exaggerated the 
existing inter-ethnic social capital between the Kurdish political movement and the secular 
opponents who have been oppressed.  
Increasing political participation by the Kurdish political movement in a relatively free 
environment helped them to extend their political reach from the region to the entire country. 
However, the state and government felt threatened, attempted to intimidate and coerce both 
groups, constrained their political participation, and drove Kurds back to regional politics 
again. This shows what Bates’ argument lacks. To him, regional diversity creates different 
regional rationalities and shape political terrains and the use of power, and that regionalism 
based on regional rationalities impel the elites at the centre to coerce regional actors instead 
of cooperate with them (Bates, 2017, p. 117). To us, an excessively centralised state that 
restricts political participation through various means, such as intimidation, coercion, legal 
restrictions, forced people to concentrate on their regional diversities and politics, thereby 
hampering development. 
5.3.1 The Kurdish Question between 2001 and 2008 
After PKK leader Ocalan was arrested in Kenya in 1999, the top cadre declared a ceasefire 
and ordered their militants to retreat to North Iraq in order to remodel themselves as a 
political organisation (Gurcan, 2015). They intended to become a political party for the entire 
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country rather than just for overwhelmingly Kurdish-populated regions. Ocalan (2001) 
defined the post-2000 period as “a process that we engaged in a democratic republic period, 
which means the reflection of the will of the people on the base of a democratic process” 
(p.170) and offered “freedom and the option of a democratic union” rather than separation 
(p.171). The PKK’s top cadre welcomed his message and urged for the recognition of cultural 
rights, rather than attempting to found an independent Kurdistan (Yegen, 2011, p. 75). 
Subsequently, the PKK did innovatively espouse the idea of a united Kurdistan through 
democratic confederalism and the establishment of a democratic republic encompassing the 
whole of Turkey (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011). In December 1999, Turkey and the EU 
decided at the Helsinki Summit to initiate Turkey’s candidateship process. This triggered 
further democratisation, somewhat relaxing constraints on political participation of Kurds: 
the capital punishment of Ocalan was turned into life sentence; the state of emergency which 
lasted for two decades was lifted and so was the ban on the use of the Kurdish language. 
Intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic and linking Kurdish social capital have played a key role in the post-
2000 period. Kurds have formed a strong diaspora under many pro-Kurdish organisations, 
especially since the 1980s, deriving benefits from transnationalism and technological 
developments in communication to develop all the types of social capital (Curtis, 2005). They 
effectively interacted in diplomatic and public spheres (Kayhan Pusane, 2015) through 
different means and methods, such as face-to-face interactions, media, demonstrations, daily 
activism, etc. (Grojean, 2011, pp. 189-191) to justify the cause of the Kurdish political 
movement. In the nation states encompassing different parts of Kurdistan, the Kurdish 
political movement instituted a new, complex party line through organisational changes and 
ideological transformation with respect to the concept of democratic republic and 
confederalism (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011, pp. 147-148). These efforts were also continued 
in politics. The pro-Kurdish party, the Democratic People’s Party, achieved 6.2% of the votes 
in 2002, mostly from densely Kurdish-populated areas. The political support for the Kurdish 
movement could not be thwarted by the Turkish state, despite Ocalan’s arrest. However, the 
rise of the autonomous political body in Iraqi Kurdistan pushed the PKK into uncertainty in 
political competition among Kurds (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011, p. 154). 
The upshot of the Iraq War in 2003 shifted the attitude of the Turkish state. Three important 
developments were underlying this shift: the Kurdish regional government emerged in Iraq 
after the collapse of the Baath regime; the military-bureaucracy, which saw that the 
democratisation process was undermining their political power, increasingly became 
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dissatisfied with the EU process and; the PKK resumed their attacks (Yegen, 2011, p. 76). 
While all of these factors were inciting national sentiment among Turks, it was greasing the 
wheels of the military in their political struggle against the JDP government. As for Kurds, 
hundreds of thousands risked being arrested or coerced, carrying posters of Ocalan and 
Kurdish flags during the Newroz61 demonstrations in 2005. The state defined them as pseudo-
citizens, threatening to cut financial assistance and social services and allowing nationalists to 
violate their human rights (Yegen, 2011, pp. 76-78). When the PKK’s attacks peaked in 2007 
and 2008, US officials and the General Staff agreed on intelligence cooperating, resulting in 
(futile) air strikes on the guerrilla bases in Northern Iraq. The PKK’s attack of the Aktutun 
military border post with over 500 militants in October, 2008 resulted in hatred among 
ordinary Turks to the US because of perceived insufficient intelligence support. The General 
Staff lost credibility and political power, and a commission was set up in November 2008 
between the US, the JDP government, Iraq and Kurdistan regional government in Iraq, 
bypassing the military-bureaucracy and military solutions (S. Yılmaz, 2012). 
The first constructive step to the Kurdish question taken by Erdogan was during the 
Diyarbakir meeting in 2005. While Turkish officials and academics with a more nationalist 
leaning had generally referred to the problem as “the terrorism problem” or “the Eastern 
problem”, the recognition of the issue as the Kurdish question by Erdogan was a historical 
moment for Turkey (The Economist, 2005, April 18th). Apparently, the JDP’s success in 
winning municipalities in some densely Kurdish-populated cities in the 2004 local election 
impelled him to initiate such an opening to increase its influence over Kurds and get their 
support in Erdogan’s power struggle with the army commanders. Even the leader of the True 
Path Party, Mehmet Agar, who had served for the security-bureaucracy at the highest level in 
the struggle with the PKK in the 1990s, said, “let them do politics on the plain instead of 
holding arms in the mountain” (Küçükşahin, 2006, 8 October). Furthermore, the politics of 
rapprochement with Kurds within Middle East politics was adopted by the government in 
2005, which resulted in close political and economic consultations with Mesud Barzani, the 
leader of the Kurdish regional government in Iraq, and in the first political consultations with 
Ocalan (S. Yılmaz, 2012). 
As a result of the 2007 general election and the aforementioned unsuccessful military 
operation against the PKK, the JDP and the Kurdish political movement became the two 
parties competing over political power in the SAR. State officials, therefore, felt obliged to 
                                                          
61 Newroz is celebrated for the arrival of spring. 
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support the JDP government against the Kurdish political movement. This indicated that the 
development narrative would prevail over the military narrative, especially after the military 
failed in the cross-border military operation to destroy the PKK’s militants. This change was 
further supported by the EU approving in 2005 the start of negotiations for Turkey’s access to 
the EU, which would bring financial and technical assistance to Turkey. As we shall see in 
Chapter 7, this assistance greatly helped the expansion of agro-industries and agricultural 
mechanisation in the SAR.  
The intra-ethnic social capital of Kurds helped them to move beyond resisting the state. The 
relative unsuccessful result of the 2004 local election forced the Kurdish movement to re-
organise their legal political network under the name of the Democratic Society Party (DTP 
in Turkish acronym). The party followed a new way to pass the 10% election threshold, 
nominating independent candidates in highly Kurdish-populated. They won 21 seats in 
parliament and formed a party group for the first time in the history of the Kurdish movement 
in Turkey. The key feature of the party was to advocate the theses of democratic autonomy in 
line with democratic confederalism62 (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011, p. 155) to debunk the 
accusation of being an ethnic political party (Kavak, 2012, pp. 153-157). The peripheral 
movement of Kurds targeted the excessive centralisation of the Turkish state, and adopted a 
democratic, local, decentralised, peaceful, leftist agenda, endorsing Turkey’s access to the EU 
(Kavak, 2012, pp. 159-162). This proves our point that when the political participation of 
Kurds was allowed, they displayed a willingness to contribute to Turkey’s political agenda 
instead of only focussing on regional politics. 
The pro-Kurdish party won only one seat in the West SAR. In the East SAR, the JDP won 15 
seats but the DTP 11 seats. Fierce competition in the region continued during the next 
elections. The JDP obtained votes from Turks and Arabs as well as Kurds. Many of those 
Kurds tend to support Islamic conservatism, others accorded with the state or the current 
political economic system in return for political economic benefits (Medyascope.tv, 2018, 23 
March). More specifically, we can divide the Kurds in three categories: those who have 
limited educated and earn low incomes tend to vote for the existing pro-Kurdish party, as do 
those who are higher educated and earn relatively higher incomes; those who have limited 
education but earn relatively higher incomes tend to vote for the JDP (Medyascope.tv, 2018, 
23 March). According to Kucukaydin (2013b, p. 138), the working class has a leading role in 
                                                          
62 Kurdistan includes territories in four nation states: Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Democratic confederalism 
requires the establishment of non-state-based self-governing bodies controlled by local communities.  
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the Kurdish political movement whilst the Kurdish bourgeoisie is supposed to follow, and the 
conflicting interests of these classes both constrain and support the movement.  
In fact, the JDP government agrees with the interests of the Kurdish bourgeoisie as the 
government represents the interest of the bourgeoisie. Given that large landholders, sheiks 
and tribal leaders have long got involved in capitalist accumulation, from Besikci’s 
standpoint (1990, pp. 90-94), we can say that the Kurdish bourgeoisie, including urban 
capitalists, have long been collaborating with the state and incumbent governments. That is, 
they are a part of the dominant coalition. However, their position in it is far weaker than the 
Istanbul and Anatolian conservative bourgeoisies. As we discussed before, neoliberal policies 
helped the entire bourgeoisie, including the Kurdish one, to advance their capital 
accumulation. Development interventions would work in the same way, and the government, 
therefore, would be able to get the support of Kurdish capitalists.  
When the JDP government used the development narrative to frame the Kurdish question, the 
Kurdish bourgeoisie gained in importance. That is, they are of importance as long as they can 
control the Kurdish peripheral movement with democratic requests and keep them within the 
boundaries of the current political economic order. In this context, as Kucukaydin (2013b, p. 
138) points out, the political bases of the Islamist and the Kurdish movements are the 
working class people, but “the decisive factor avoiding their convergence is not class-based 
interests but their cultural and historical backgrounds”. In other words, the dichotomy 
between Turkishness and Kurdishness has created different forms of intra-ethnic social 
capital whereas the dichotomy between Islamic conservatism and the political culture shaped 
by the interaction with leftism has created other forms of intra- and inter-ethnic social capital. 
Increasing political participation of Kurds could have removed these dichotomies, and 
induced the rise of class-based politics and radical democracy. As we shall see, whenever 
such an opportunity did raise, the state and the JDP government prevented it. 
5.3.2 The Kurdish Question between 2009 and 2013 
The 2007 general election and the presidential election results favoured the Islamist 
government. But the political contestation between the secular Kemalists and the JDP 
government carried over to the judiciary (Casier, Jongerden, & Walker, 2015). While the 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, conducted by Gulenists in the police and the judiciary in 
order to purge Euroasianist and secular Kemalists, the secular establishment challenged the 
JDP government over the Kurdish Question.  
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The JDP government - boosted in their confidence due to the result of the general election - 
became more involved in the Middle East. Ahmet Davutoglu, the then minister of foreign 
affairs, was behind Turkey’s international political shift. He had proposed in the Strategic 
Depth the international strategy that Turkey should follow. That is, Kemalist political elites 
had turned away from Turkey’s historical and geo-cultural background and her central 
position to the Islamic civilisation and welcomed the West and its values. But the attempt to 
adopt the political-cultural system of the West had resulted in tension between political elites 
(or the centre) and the people (or the conservative periphery) (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 83). To 
him, ‘neither is Turkey a colony with a weak historical background, nor is she a pivotal 
country with a well-established political structure in the world system’ (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 
83). In this sense, Turkey was to shift to Turk-Islamic values to overcome the tension, 
building a Sunni-Turk nation and forging a Sunni Islam axis in the Middle East under 
Turkey’s leadership (Yasli, 2014, p. 166). This policy shift reflected itself in two immediate 
policy practices. The regional leadership in the Middle East was thought to be secured with 
the use of soft-power, especially in its relationship with Iraq and Syria (Yasli, 2014, p. 163). 
The national integrity was intended to be attained through solving the Kurdish Question by 
transforming Kurds into having an overriding Islamic identity instead of Kurdishness. 
However, the Kurdish movement, as stated before, is inherently a modern, secular movement 
linked with leftist ideologies, and therefore Islamic networks (i.e. Turkey’s Hezbollah) and 
Barzani’s political influence were used by the government to break the PKK’s influence over 
Kurds (Yasli, 2014, pp. 163-164).  
A series of events took place in Turkey associated with the previously described political 
terrain. The DTP won back local municipalities from the JDP in 2009. The Union of 
Communes in Kurdistan (KCK in Kurdish acronym) had been influencing the region 
politically and ideologically since 2007, which serves in all parts of Kurdistan for setting up 
“democratic republic”, “democratic confederalism” and “democratic autonomy” (Casier et 
al., 2015) as checking Kurdish urban political elites who interact with the Kurdish 
bourgeoisie as a matter of urban politics (Kucukaydin, 2011, 20 November). Meanwhile, the 
PKK’s attacks and urban protests of the Kurdish poor were continuing in the SAR, and some 
prominent members of the party cadre were detained by the police. A few months later, the 
government urged the opposition parties to support “the Kurdish opening”. The alliance 
between Gulenists and the JDP government intended to disarm the PKK, criminalise Kurdish 
politicians, disorganise the KCK, and weaken leftist national sentiments of Kurds and 
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transform their political mindset by setting up a liberal-Islamist conservative party (Yasli, 
2014, pp. 173-174) working closely with the relatively far weaker Kurdish bourgeoisie. 
Another element of the plan was to boost the regional development through the GAP 
investments (Casier et al., 2015). In other words, development interventions in agriculture 
was to a product of political plans of the JDP government. 
As a part of the Kurdish opening, some guerrillas returned Turkey’s territories to surrender as 
a goodwill gesture, enthusiastically welcomed by many Kurds. This led ordinary Turks and 
the opposition parties to accuse the government of treason and separatism (Gunter, 2013). 
The General Staff also bitterly repeated their commitment to the integrity of the nation and 
fight against terrorism (Hilton, Casier, & Jongerden, 2009). The JDP government started to 
fear that they would lose their nationalist political base (Gunter, 2013), and retreated to ‘a 
democratic opening’ involving the democratisation of minority rights and freedom of religion 
and faith. Later they moved to a more backward position and launched ‘a national unity 
project’ against terrorism (Kökce, 2010, p. 135). The constitutional court stepped in and 
banned the DTP from politics. This was when the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP in 
Turkish acronym) was founded by the Kurdish movement. However, the state bureaucracy 
frequently tried to undermine the municipalities controlled by pro-Kurdish parties, and 
carried out KCK operations to disorganize the network of the Kurdish movement (Casier et 
al., 2015).  
According to Kucukaydin (2011, 20 November); (2013, 4 August), all the operations and 
openings were conducted to help the Kurdish bourgeoisie to gain more control over the 
political movement. Recall that the Kurdish bourgeoisie has made their capital accumulation 
through benefits provided by the state, their economic relationships with the Turkish 
bourgeoisie and through investments in west Turkey. As a result, the intra-ethnic social 
capital of Kurds could not be dissolved, despite KCK arrests, an illegal organisation gaining 
support of the Kurdish poor (Kucukaydin, 2011, 20 November). The Kurdish opening came 
to an unsuccessful end. However, the government never ceased increasing public investments 
for agricultural development of the SAR; they kept their relationships with the Kurdish 
bourgeoisie; and development interventions continued. 
5.3.3 The Kurdish Question between 2013 and 2017 
When the Arab Spring started in the Middle-East in 2010, some Arab leaders governing 
secular regimes in the Middle East were overthrown. This historical period created political 
incentives for Erdogan’s government to realise their plans for forging the Sunni axis under 
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Turkey’s leadership. They influenced the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt through soft-power 
politics and implemented hard-power politics against Syria’s secular regime by supporting 
Islamic militants in the civil war.  
The most important event in the course of the Kurdish question occurred as the Syrian Army 
made a strategic move retreating from North Syria in the mid-2012. This allowed the 
Democratic Union Party, following Ocalan’s political programme rather than Barzani’s 
political vision, to set up democratic autonomy (Yasli, 2014, pp. 175-176). This political 
development impelled the JDP government to negotiate with Ocalan and other Kurdish 
political elites with the open support of Great Britain and the EU (Gunter, 2013), and 
eventually to declare a new peace process in early 2013. This was aimed to gain support of 
Kurds against the Shia axis in Iran and Iraq and to set up a federation including the region 
controlled by Barzani, who would agree with the US’s interests (Yasli, 2014, pp. 177-180). 
The Gezi protests in May-June, 2013 started several months after the peace process was 
initiated. Initially, Kurdish political elites took an ambiguous approach to the protests, fearing 
that a nationalist plot would end the peace process ("the Demirtas's Comment," 2013, 1 June; 
"the Ocalan's Message," 2013, 7 June).  
The Kurdish political movement, understanding its political fault in the Gezi protests, then set 
up a new party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party, embracing ‘the spirit of the Gezi’, including 
Turkish leftists, Alevis, environmentalists, feminists and LGBTs63 (Göksel & Tekdemir, 
2018) under the banner of ‘becoming a part of Turkey’, referring to the project of the 
democratic republic. In the election that choose Erdogan as president of Turkey, Selahattin 
Demirtas, the co-head of the pro-Kurdish party, obtained around 9.8% of the votes. The result 
was outstanding for the Kurdish movement in the June 2015 election; the newly founded 
party secured 13.1% of the votes, the highest in the history of the movement. Erdogan’s 
administration had relaxed constraints over the political participation of Kurds to reach their 
political aims through the peace process. The moderate political environment had therefore 
facilitated the capability of Kurds in cementing their bridging social capital, which they had 
already forged with Turkish leftist parties and organisations under Peoples’ Democratic 
Congress in 2011. All these efforts, coupled with the need for frustrating Erdogan’s 
determination to replace the parliamentary system with an authoritarian presidential system, 
resulted in the JDP having lost ruling party status. 
                                                          
63 The abbreviation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
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Erdogan’s administration then waged a war against the Kurdish political movement after the 
election to restore his political power. According to Kucukaydin (2015, 9 November), he 
found political support in the military-bureaucracy, which was alarmed by the control of Tal 
Abyad by Kurdish guerrillas in Syria and the possible emergence of the Kurdish state. The 
urban warfare against Turkey’s Kurds lasted a year, and state control over Kurdish-populated 
areas was restored eventually. When the military-bureaucracy recovered its political power 
relying on the military narrative, the military coup against Erdogan’s administration was 
staged in 2016 by mainly Gulenists and other opponents. Since the failed coup, according to 
Ö. A. Çelik (January 8, 2019) conducting an interviewing with Ozgur Ozel, a prominent 
parliamentary member from the CHP, that there has existed an agreement between Erdogan’s 
administration, the military-bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. His administration allied with 
the military-bureaucracy to maintain the excessively centralised state depending on the one 
nation ideology, and with the bourgeoisie to provide them with clientelistic benefits with low 
legitimacy (Karaoğlu, 2018, 10 July). 
5.4 The Combination of Neoliberal Policies with the GAP-based Development Policies 
We now need to respond to the question why neoliberal economic policies have been 
combined with the GAP since 2001. The response should be focused on the development 
narrative of the Kurdish question, which matches with the GAP and GAP-related government 
interventions in the SAR’s political and economic context. But why has the development 
narrative come to the fore since 2001? This is because the dichotomy of the political solution 
and the military solution to the Question emerged from the political struggle between the JDP 
government (or the Islamist social capital) and the military-bureaucracy on the national level. 
The promotion of the political solution underpinned by regional development interventions 
has been employed to keep the military bureaucracy away from politics as possible. On the 
regional level, the social capital of the Kurdish political movement were aimed to be 
dissolved. Neoliberal policies and development interventions were simultaneously used to 
attract the Kurdish bourgeoisie to ally with the government as well as ordinary Kurds to cut 
their ties with the Kurdish political movement. 
The reason why neoliberal economic policies have been carried out is linked with the 
political struggle between the military-bureaucracy and the JDP government. Islamists acted 
flexible in 2001 and oriented their political programme with the interests of the different 
segments of the bourgeoisie (including Kurdish capitalists), the Western countries and 
international organisations. Neoliberal policies were a must to get political support and 
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alienate the military-bureaucracy whilst neoliberal populism was useful to consolidate and 
expand the right-wing political base.  
In the political course of the Kurdish Question, the development narrative has been exploited 
for Erdogan’s internal and external political objectives. As Erdogan’s government challenged 
the military-bureaucracy, they mostly kept the military away from the military options, which 
would otherwise have bestowed political power to the military. The development narrative of 
the question has offered him the required tools to shape the political terrain. In his political 
struggle with the military, Erdogan was required to lean on different segments of the 
bourgeoisie. Recall, the secular, westernised bourgeoisie withdrew their support from the 
military in favour of the JDP government, which applied neoliberal policies, thereby creating 
enormous economic benefits. Furthermore, the GAP as a multi-sectoral integrated project has 
been essential in generating economic benefits for capitalists from different ethnic groups in 
the SAR through governmental development interventions such as tax exemptions, selective 
credit mechanisms, financial incentive programmes, etc. 
The development narrative of the Kurdish Question was a component of a grand strategy in 
the Middle East under the name of neo-Ottomanisation, aimed at the foundation of the 
federation of Turkey-Kurdistan governed by a centralised state structure (Karaoğlu, 2018, 10 
July). The creation of interdependence between neighbouring countries by means of 
development was important in this context. The intention was to promote closer economic 
integration between the neighbouring countries and the SAR by establishing the cross-border 
trade, unlocking the industrial and agricultural potential of the SAR catalysed by the GAP. As 
Davutoglu states in the Strategic Depth, the creation of economically integrated areas 
including the SAR, North Syria and North Iraq (under Barzani’s control), mostly populated 
by Kurds, was thought as an efficient way to isolate and eliminate the PKK and foster 
prosperity (Davutoğlu, 2001, pp. 146-147). The formulation of the solution for the Kurdish 
question has therefore rested on political and development contexts, sidelining the military-
bureaucracy. The particular economic policy was effectively executed between Turkey, Iraq 
and Syria especially prior to the Syrian Civil war, creating economic benefits to the SAR 
(Müftüler-Baç, 2014; Ozer, 2007).  
The development narrative and the GAP have been used for isolating the PKK. The then 
deputy prime minister, Cemil Cicek, said, ‘security measures are not enough to avoid 
terrorism, an economic package is necessary […]’, and he added, ‘if you say there is no 
economic package of this [Kurdish opening], the GAP is the economic package of it.’(Turkey 
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Grand National Assembly, 2009, December 25, p. 69). As Orhan Miroglu, a Kurdish 
politician, reports in an interview that the nascent Kurdish bourgeoisie has inherently a class-
based interest conflict with the PKK, thus neither willingly supports nor completely objects to 
it in fear of the coercive acts to be made by Turkish state (Basaran, 2011. 5 December). From 
this, the government attempted to more tightly control the Kurdish bourgeoisie with the GAP, 
using it as a fountain of privileges. Indeed, Miroglu contends that the Kurdish capitalists who 
collaborated with the state grew their economic and political power during the armed conflict 
(Basaran, 2011. 5 December). Obviously, development interventions are introduced to 
alienate the Kurdish capitalists from the PKK.  
It was also envisaged that economic prosperity induced by the irrigation investments of the 
GAP could help the government to obtain political consent from ordinary Kurds. The 
discourse of democratisation was exploited to make them dream of security and prosperity. 
Meanwhile, it was thought that the political division between Barzani and the PKK could be 
used to impose Islamic identity on Kurds. However intra-ethnic social capital of Kurds has 
strengthened and followed their political agenda with their own networks and institutions. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this analysis chapter, we addressed different but connected themes. We showed that the 
relationships between elites in the dominant coalition are not enough to comprehend state 
formations, and that the relationships between the centre and the periphery are of importance 
in understanding how intra-elite relationships change. This is what North et al (2009) do not 
recognise for the countries such as Turkey. When the JDP elites came to power, they 
attempted to involve the conservative and later the Kurds into the system, who had felt 
mistreated by the secular establishment. The existing level of impersonality has worsened 
over time. The consolidated control on military power has not been achieved as Gulenists and 
the JDP elites sought to exploit the capability of the military-bureaucracy to make their power 
incontestable. Even worse, the country declined to a relatively more fragile limited-access 
order with the deterioration of impersonality under an authoritarian regime. This increased 
discriminations and restrictions on Kurds’ political participation. Favourable global liquidity 
gradually ended after 2013, and the country entered an economic slowdown on account of 
clientelistic economic relationships under the alliance between an excessively security-
oriented group in the military and Erdogan. 
Let us return to Bates and his argument that regional diversities leads to regionalism as a 
result of the political interplay with the incumbent political elites and regional elites. 
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However, as Harris (2008) contends, discriminatory, coercive state practices over Kurds have 
triggered the PKK’s violent reaction; the latter have subsequently generated state authority; 
cultural diversities have been formed by this conflict.  
Apart from this, we saw that Kurds constituted a country-wide policy such as democratic 
republic and stepped forward to put it into practice under the rubric of “becoming part of 
Turkey” once the excessive centralised country eased political participation. It was displayed 
that international relations and dealings influenced the political economic development of the 
SAR, such as Turkey’s plan over the Middle East and the development of a Kurdish state 
during the Syrian civil war. The latter drove the Turkish state to terminate the peace process 
and to wage a war against the Kurdish movement, which caused Kurds to pursue no longer 
“becoming part of Turkey”. 
Neoliberal policies with populism were applied by the JDP government to get support from 
the different sections of the bourgeoisie, international organisations and Western countries. 
Neoliberal clientelism has enabled the government to provide privileges and rents to the 
bourgeoisie and the conservative periphery in return of votes. The Kurdish bourgeoisie also 
benefitted from these possibilities to keep themselves align with the state policy. Public 
expenses, tax exemptions, grants and other financial incentives were increasingly granted 
after 2008 to Kurdish capitalists and agricultural enterprises through different programmes, 
particularly within the GAP. The combination of neoliberal policies with development 
interventions are mainly product of national and international political strategies and aims of 
the JDP government. 
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PART 2: NEOLIBERAL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Chapter 6: The Neoliberal Agricultural Transformation of Less Developed 
Countries  
6.1 Introduction 
Until the 1980s, most developing countries had employed an inward-looking industrialisation 
model. As demonstrated before, increases in petroleum prices and contractions in export 
engendered international trade and budget deficits in the 1970s, and the resultant debt crisis 
in developing countries prompted serious criticism against the development models that had 
been pursued until then (Mudge, 2008). In particular, government interventions, political 
patronage and protectionism for industries were blamed by the proponents of the free market 
in the late-1970s for having created distortions that led to development failures (Weiss, 1993, 
pp. 26-41). The debt and development crisis triggered neoliberal policy interventions 
(conditionalities) in the 1990s.  
The role of the IMF and the WB in the neoliberal economic order and the link between 
neoliberal economic policies and structural adjustment programmes will be discussed, and we 
will show how RCT has been established in politics and interacted with neoliberalism. This 
interaction is present in the structural adjustment programmes supervised by the IMF and the 
WB. Finally, we discuss how RCT approaches agricultural development and critically 
question the results of the neoliberal agricultural transformation in less developed countries. 
It is argued that the urban coalition - i.e. the bourgeoisie, professionals, state actors - has kept 
its power in the neoliberal era whereas urban workers were cast aside. Furthermore, many 
agricultural producers in the periphery were unable to adapt to the new policy climate.   
6.2 Neoliberalism and Neoliberal Economic Policies 
Neoliberalism is a somewhat vague term (Venugopal, 2015) and can refer to different 
concepts: a set of policies, a hegemonic project, an ideology, a governmental programme, etc. 
(Gilbert, 2013). Here, we mainly take neoliberalism as a set of policies. 
According to Rodrik (2017, November), ‘[i]n broad terms, [neoliberalism] denotes a 
preference for markets over government, economic incentives over social or cultural norms, 
and private entrepreneurship over collective or community action.’ As Mudge (2008) argues, 
neoliberalism has three faces including: an intellectual face, a bureaucratic face and a 
political face. Its intellectual face reflects the Anglo-American mindset accompanied with 
125 
 
trans-nationality that gives importance to the market “as a source or arbiter of human 
freedoms”, rejecting Keynesian and socialist state interventionism (Mudge, 2008). Its 
bureaucratic face can be characterised by “liberalization, deregulation, privatization, 
depoliticization64 and monetarism”, which require that the state facilitates “unfettered 
competition” by retreating back from the economic domain and even from public services 
such as education and health (Mudge, 2008). Finally, its political face is related to the politics 
focused on markets, which limits state authority and favours certain economic groups, such 
as companies and white-collar professionals (Mudge, 2008).  
The pinnacle of neoliberalism  - the Washington Consensus - perceives neoliberalism as a set 
of policies, such as: financial liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, financial discipline to 
limit inflation, tax reform including broadening tax base and cutting marginal tax, trade 
liberalisation together with competitive exchange rates, and the elimination of restrictions 
over foreign direct investment together with securing property rights (Williamson, 1993). In 
this sense, criticism of neoliberal policies in the 1990s generally focused on their potential 
risks to create further economic crises (Harvey, 2007, pp. 94-97; Stiglitz & Schoenfelder, 
2003; Toussaint, 1999, pp. 191, 222-226), their political-economic costs for the poor, leading 
to further inequality (Harvey, 2007, pp. 70-71; Huber & Solt, 2004; Toussaint, 1999, pp. 142-
146, 194), and socio-economic implications of the state retracting from economic areas and 
public services (Harvey, 2007, pp. 163-164; Toussaint, 1999, pp. 141-142).65 Williamson 
(2004), however, blames developing countries, the IMF and the WB for not properly 
adhering to the set of policies stipulated under the Washington Consensus. 
Unsustainable political economic costs of neoliberal economic policies, as well as the 
emergence of economic crises in the second half of the 1990s, brought modifications to 
neoliberal economic policies.66 Strong critique from intellectuals and disadvantaged socio-
economic groups, however, did not result in the abandonment of the Washington Consensus. 
Rather, transparency, good governance and competition-enhancing policies, the 
                                                          
64 It entails “the separation of regulatory authority from the executive branch” and the insulation of “regulatory 
authorities from political influence” (Mudge, 2008). 
65 The main reason for intensifying criticism stemmed from the results of neoliberal policies in developing 
countries. In the 1990s, transition economies could not recover “the deep and prolonged collapse” in their output 
after the socialist period; Sub-Saharan African economies could not increase by leaps and bounds despite all the 
structural reforms and international aid; economies of Latin America, East Asia, Russia and Turkey seriously 
crashed at unexpected times (Rodrik, 2006). 
66 For example, the Mexican crisis occurred in 1995-1996, The Argentine Great Depression between 1998 and 
2002, The Russian financial crisis in 1998, the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. 
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establishment of strong financial institutions, and improved safety nets to tackle poverty were 
added to the list of neoliberal policies (Stiglitz, 2007). 
The IMF and the WB have always played an important role in supervising whether 
developing countries exercise neoliberal policies correctly (Williamson, 2004) and embrace 
the required policies to repay their restructured debts (Busch, 2010). Briefly, the important 
tasks of the WB are to assist the IMF by giving recommendations to developing countries and 
to conduct research to develop a theoretical framework to undergird neoliberal policies 
(Toussaint, 2008, pp. 168-175). The latter was essential in introducing good governance, 
poverty reduction and sustainability to counter various criticisms levelled against neoliberal 
policies in the 1990s. It is worth noting that the relationship between the IMF and the WB 
changed after the 1994 Mexican crisis. The IMF possessed more control than the WB over 
shaping governmental policies of debtor countries under stabilisation (short-term) or 
structural adjustment programmes (see Table 6.1) (Toussaint, 1999, p. 135), which is 
believed to help them stabilise their balance of payments and achieve steady economic 
growth (Killick, 2003, pp. 18-21). To sum up, there has always existed a link between 
neoliberal economic policies and structural adjustment programmes or IMF programmes. 
Have neoliberal economic policies or IMF programmes been successful for less developed 
countries? A set of methodological problems make it difficult to evaluate the effects of IMF 
programmes on an economy. There are many other factors stimulating or hindering an 
economy such as other finance programmes and aid granted to less developed countries 
(Killick, 2003, p. 37). Despite all this, Bird and Rowlands (2017) draw the conclusion that 
IMF programmes have generally not promoted economic growth in less developed countries. 
They do however have some positive effects on economic growth of low-income countries in 
the subsequent two years following the signing of an agreement with the IMF (Bird & 
Rowlands, 2017). According to Killick’s study (2003, pp. 67-71), whilst IMF programmes 
have made substantial improvements on the balance of payments accounts of the countries, 
most of them have produced either minor positive effects or negative effects on inflation rates 
over the longer term.  
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Table 6.1 Main Policies and Aims of a Typical Structural Adjustment Programme (Killick, 
2003, pp. 25-26; Toussaint, 1999, pp. 140-150) 
If we compare the period of 1961-1981to 1981-2016 in terms of economic growth (Table 
6.2), the world and low and middle-income countries enjoyed lower average GDP (and per 
capita) growth rates in the neoliberal period. 
Policies Aims Policies Aims
Devaluation and the 
creation of a uniform 
exchange rate
*Paying real prices to direct producers
*Helping export-oriented sectors become more 
competitive and increase their revenues
Trade liberalisation
*Making the national economy
 more competitive
Reductions in
budget deficits
*Alleviating inflationary effects of public 
spending
*Accumulating surplus for repayments of debts
Liberalisation of the 
banking system
*Setting interest rates on the free market to 
improve the allocation of financial resources
*Increasing domestic savings and attracting 
foreign financial resources
Price liberalisation by 
terminating subsidies 
and price controls
*Letting market mechanism set the real price 
for efficient resource allocation
Privatisation of 
state-owned firms
*Decreasing budget deficits stemming from 
high duty losses
*Increasing economic efficieny of the firms 
privatised 
Setting prices of oil 
products and public 
services
*Increasing public revenues
*Decreasing budget deficits
Tax reform
*Expanding the tax base and increasing public 
revenues
*Improving the allocation of economic 
resources
De-indexation of 
salaries
*Decreasing public expenditures and 
inflationary effects
Land privatisation
*Raising public revenues
*Benefitting from scale of economies by selling 
lands to large landholders and investors
Relaxing labour 
market regulations
*Increasing labour mobility to deal with 
unemployment
Reforms in trade unions
*Improving income distribution by eliminating 
privileges as far as possible that comes from 
political power of trade unions
Reforms in 
pension systems
*Using pension funds effectively by turning 
them from public into private one.
Poverty and 
social safety nets
*Managing poverty 
*Alleviating adverse effects of contractions in 
social public expenditures
Good governance
*Keeping the management of economy away 
from political considerations
The First Phase: Short-Term Macroeconomic Stabilisation The Second Phase: Structural Reforms
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Table 6.2 Average Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product and Per Capita Income of 
Income Country Groups and the World as a Whole (The World Bank, 2017) 
Examining the experiences of Latin American countries from 1982 to 1995 that were 
supervised by the IMF, Huber and Solt (2004) find that ‘higher levels of liberalisation and 
more radical processes of liberalisation are associated with high levels of inequality and 
poverty.’ More importantly, it appears that deviations from market fundamentalism have 
turned out well on the other side of the world. China, India and several other Asian countries 
have made significant inroads in alleviating poverty since the 1990s by adapting themselves 
to the market but deviating from neoliberal premises through a high level of trade protection, 
limited privatisation and interventionist industrial policies (Rodrik, 2006). 
Toussaint (1999, pp. 140-150) claims that the neoliberal policies in a structural adjustment 
programme generally impose high socio-economic burdens on ordinary households, the 
working class and small producers and favour wealthy people. IMF programmes are therefore 
politically costly for politicians, but they have to implement them to be able to access short-
term loans from international creditors to recover their economy (Toussaint, 1999, p. 136).  
Still, it is safe to state that neoliberalism has not enabled developing countries to develop 
their economies to a desired level. The foremost reason is that neoliberalism provides a single 
set of solutions that has proved to be unsuccessful in development (Rodrik, 2017, November; 
Stiglitz, 2007), especially in a context of “hyper-globalisation” (Rodrik, 2017, November). 
Policies designed within a local context and carried out with government interventions 
adaptive to changes – such as happened in many East Asian countries, are most likely to 
produce the desired results (Rodrik, 2017, November; Stiglitz, 1996, 2007). Another reason is 
that both rapid liberalisation and excessive protectionism do not create economic growth in 
developing countries (Stiglitz, 2007). 
Country Groups
1961-1981 1981-2016 1961-1981 1981-2016
Low & middle income countries 5.36 4.15 2.93 2.54
Low income countries N/A 3.43 N/A 0.70
Middle income countries 5.42 4.20 3.18 2.66
Lower middle income countries 4.53 4.45 2.03 2.57
Upper middle income countries 5.72 4.07 3.45 2.97
World 4.67 2.84 2.57 1.43
Average Growth Rate
 of Per Capita Income (%)
Average Growth Rate of 
Gross Domestic Product (%)
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6.3 Rational Choice Theory and Its Links with Neoliberalism 
This section briefly depicts the link between neoliberalism and RCT to better understand the 
effects of neoliberal policies in agriculture. 
Given its relationship with neoclassical economics, RCT is an important theoretical source of 
neoliberalism, with the conception of individuals as utility maximizers (Becchio & Leghissa, 
2017, pp. 12, 17). RCT rests on the assumption that individuals act rationally, thus 
maximizing their expected utility function. This logic is followed when moving from the 
individual to the social level, that is, a society can enhance its welfare by maximizing the 
social utility function (Becchio & Leghissa, 2017, p. 113).  
[N]eoliberalism is the use of maximization as the general rule to get any rational 
outcome in any framework. Choice involves means; ends are given, and they are not 
questionable. Individuals, social groups, institutions which are able to follow this way of 
choosing are bound to get the most rational possible result (benefit) and, simultaneously, 
to get it by the minimization of effort (cost) (Becchio & Leghissa, 2017, p. 114).  
Those who first sought to use RCT in politics accepted the conception of neoclassical 
economics that an individual seeks to maximize his political interests in a political domain, as 
he does in a market for his utility maximization (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962, pp. 17-20). 
According to Buchanan and Tullock’s (1962, p. 20): ‘[…] the representative or the average 
individual acts on the basis of the same over-all value scale when he participates in market 
activity and in political activity’. Espousing this idea, Becker (1986, p. 109) claims, ‘[…] the 
economic approach is uniquely powerful because it can integrate a wide range of human 
behaviour’, and adds, ‘[r]ather, all human behaviour can be viewed as involving participants 
who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal 
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.’ After acknowledging that 
people have different opinions about what is morally correct, and that there is no prospect of 
having a consensus among people in this sense, Tullock (1976, p. 5) says, ‘[v]oters and 
customers are essentially the same people’, and maintains: ‘[t]here is no strong reason to 
believe his behaviour is radically different in the two environments [in the supermarket and 
the voting booth]. We assume that in both he will choose the product or candidate he thinks is 
the best bargain for him.’ 
Bates (2005, p. 2), in “Markets and States in Tropical Africa”, contradicts the generally 
accepted assumption of agricultural economists that an economic man is rational, but a 
government policymaker is incapable or corrupt. He indeed proves throughout his book that 
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politicians too seek to maximise their political interest. In this regard, his analysis as to why 
Africa had failed in development until 1980, are self-explanatory: 
[…] political action is purposeful behaviour, and […] among the major purposes of 
government are the pursuit of certain social objectives and the resources needed to 
achieve them. Foremost among the social objectives of government in the developing 
areas is to shift the basis of their economies away from the production of agricultural 
commodities and toward the production of manufactured goods. […] they set prices in 
markets in order to capture resources [and foreign exchange] from agriculture. […] we 
also recognise that more personal motives animate political choices. Governments want 
to stay in power. They must appease powerful interests. And people turn to political 
action to secure special advantages- rewards they are unable to secure by competing in 
the marketplace. […] For to secure any given objective, governments can choose from a 
variety of techniques. […] they find project-based policies politically more useful [than 
pricing policies] […], or they can subsidise the costs of farm implements […] because of 
superior political attractions. […] Agriculture in Africa is […] taxed. […] To increase 
output, governments finance production programs. But doing so, they introduce 
characteristic distortions (Bates, 2005, pp. 3-5).  
Thus, government interventions produce market distortions, resulting in development failure. 
E. Ostrom (2010a) underlines by referring to Alchian’s study (1950) that ‘what is called 
“rational choice theory” [italic in original], is not a broad theory of human behaviour but 
rather a useful model [italic in original] to predict behaviour in a particular situation — a 
highly competitive market for private goods.’, and she adds, “[t]his model of the [rational] 
individual has fruitfully generated useful and empirically validated predictions about the 
results of exchange transactions related to goods with specific attributes in a competitive 
market but not in a diversity of social dilemmas.’  
The appropriation of common pool resource gives rise to a social dilemma among its users, 
such as the tragedy of the commons67. According to the seminal work, Governing the 
Commons, government interventions could cause a positive effect on collective action in 
appropriating a common pool resource productively and sustainably by adjusting the set of 
incentives to shape their acts over it and solving the problem of incomplete information with 
low costs (E. Ostrom, 2011, pp. 138-160-161). 
                                                          
67 The tragedy of the commons is a term used in social science to describe the depletion or degradation of 
common pool resource caused by users who strive to maximise their benefits but not to cooperate to sustain it. 
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Nevertheless, government interventions are considered in RCT as likely to produce failures 
and to lead the economy to achieve a less than Pareto optimal state68 under competitive 
markets, in which private goods are exchanged (Krueger, 1990). This is because non-
competitive rent-seeking takes place, associated with differing interests of private 
beneficiaries, bureaucrats and politicians (Krueger, 1990; Moore, 1990) and because of 
market distortions created by public policies. Such evaluations made by RCT scholars were 
called into play by the IMF and the WB in designing structural adjustment programmes after 
1980 (Stein, 1992). In particular, arguments about the crisis of African agriculture in Market 
and States in Tropical Africa by Robert Bates were readily accepted by the WB (Leys, 1996). 
The main aim was to dilute the adverse effects created by politicians on determining policies 
and development outcomes (Leys, 1996).  
6.4 Rational Choice Theory and Neoliberal Policies in Agriculture  
Our main purpose is to show how neoliberal policies have been applied to the agricultural 
sector of developing countries. We focus on two questions. How does RCT approach 
government interventions in agriculture? And how have neoliberal economic policies and 
structural adjustment programmes affected agriculture of developing countries, according to 
RCT opponents?  
Prior to the late 1970s debt crisis that led to a dramatic change in economic policies, the main 
problem of many less developed countries (according to Bates) were the intentionally created 
distortions and inefficiencies in markets. But politicians had not acted irrationally in doing so; 
in effect, they sought to consolidate their power and squeeze agricultural surplus to aid 
industrialisation after independence. They acted rationally, establishing coalitions with 
bureaucrats, industrialists and manufacturers, urban dwellers, and rural elites, based on 
mutual interests, but to the detriment of small-scale producers (Bates, 2005, pp. 11-12, 14).  
Two policies were adopted to appropriate agricultural surplus from cash crop producers. The 
marketing boards with monopsony power, which had been inherited from the colonial 
powers, were used for controlling the export of cash crops and diverting the accumulated 
foreign exchange to industrial development projects, which was never paid the boards back. 
The execution of this policy was conditional upon another policy: the low-priced crop policy 
(Bates, 2005, pp. 12, 15-18). In addition to being protected against global competition, local 
                                                          
68 Pareto optimality/efficiency states that, “[a] given economic arrangement is [Pareto] efficient if there can be 
no rearrangement which will leave someone better off without worsening the position of others (Musgrave & 
Musgrave, 1989, p. 60).” 
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industries benefitted from purchasing raw materials at (artificial) lower prices than global 
market prices. Nevertheless, these industries generally proved to be unproductive due to 
failures in both design and operation (Bates, 2005, pp. 20-26, 62-70). 
As for food crops, the low-price policy was of importance for the government to consolidate 
the political coalition with industrialists, and urban workers and consumers. Bates (2005, p. 
30) elaborates: 
Political pressures for low-cost food come from two main sources. One, of course, is the 
urban worker. The other is the employer, who, when his workers are faced with high-cost 
food, is forced to pay higher wages. For political reasons, African governments must 
appease the urban worker; but as major employers and as the sponsors of industry, 
governments share the interests of those who pay the wage bill. To appease consumers 
while pursuing their own interests, governments therefore join with workers and industry 
in seeking low-cost food (p.30). […] Not only have consumer interests remained 
militant; government have remained vulnerable to consumer disaffection (p.31). […] 
And, hungry for capital to promote further investments, many governments strive to 
maintain an attractive environment for foreign investors. For all of these reasons, 
governments in Africa tend to resist demands for higher wages […] (p.32). [They] aimed 
at reducing the cost of living, and in particular the cost of food. Agricultural policy thus 
becomes a byproduct of political relations between governments and their urban 
constituents (p.33). [However], [w]here the elite engages in the production of a food 
item, policies are not employed to depress its price (p. 43). 
Reinforcing the policy of low-cost food, import of food was facilitated through several 
measures, such as overvalued exchange rates and a low level of protective tariffs. A ban on 
the export of food and the administrative control over food prices through marketing boards 
with monopsony power were also put into practice (Bates, 2005, pp. 35-39). The latter 
resulted in financial pressure on public budgets and corruption.69 Even when agricultural 
supply fell due to low-price crop policy, governments subsidised agricultural production and 
imported food but did not offer higher crop prices to agricultural producers.(Bates, 1983, pp. 
112, 119-120). Consequently, agricultural producers carried all the economic burden imposed 
by the political coalition between the government and the bureaucracy. 
                                                          
69 Local branches of marketing boards were staffed but rising costs of growing staff members and inefficiency in 
marketing operations compounded the financial pressure on public budgets (Bates, 2005, pp. 26-27). 
Furthermore, some officials perverted their power to increase their personal wealth allowing farmers to evade 
the policies in exchange for bribes (Bates, 2005, pp. 27, 42-43). 
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The necessity of augmenting food supplies to appease urban elements of the coalition 
directed the government to ally with the rural elites, who were more inclined to lobby their 
interests than smallholders. Commanding a domestic food market that had dispersed 
throughout a country was far more difficult than controlling the export of cash crops, which 
passed through ports where transactions and rules could easily be monitored and enforced. 
Adding to this challenge facing the central government was the above mentioned corruption 
among officials who were bribed by farmers. This ultimately forced governments to 
implement different policies to boost food production and keep food prices low. First, they 
directly engaged in it begetting heavy economic losses and debts (Bates, 2005, pp. 46-47). 
Second, they supported farm schemes and irrigation projects that ‘tend[ed] to be privately 
profitable for those fortunate enough to gain access to them’, namely, rural elites (Bates, 
2005, p. 48). Finally, governments subsidised inputs, imported through overvalued exchange 
rate and sold at administratively supported prices, rather than raising food prices. Again, this 
policy benefitted rural elites (rather than smallholders) who were more engaged in modern 
agriculture (Bates, 2005, pp. 49-56). 
‘The governments want[ed] cheaper food; they therefore lower[ed] the prices offered to 
producers. But such a measure only create[d] shortfalls in supplies and shortages result[ed] in 
higher prices’ (Bates, 1983, p. 120). From the perspective of RCT, they created market 
distortions, generated “non-competitive rents” and resultant economic inefficiencies that 
directly thwarted improvements in social welfare. However, politicians reached their own 
political goal: the preclusion of possible political challenges from organised interests (Bates, 
1983, pp. 120-122). The problem of small-scale agricultural producers is that they are unable 
to organize and take collective action to receive higher prices from the government, despite 
representing large in numbers (Bates, 1983). Consequently, they were doomed to pay higher 
prices for industrial goods but receive low prices for what they produce (Bates, 2005, p. 81).  
Some nuance is necessary here. When the main political support base of governments was in 
rural areas, or the agricultural marketing systems rested on farmers’ associations, favourable 
prices were likely granted to farmers. But if the government and the marketing system of a 
country relied on the urban constituency and commercial interests (the small and large-scale 
bourgeoisie), lower prices than global market prices were probably conferred on farmers  
(Bates, 1983, p. 113).  
As for the structure of production in agriculture, when small-scale production prevailed in 
agricultural sector, as in the case of the cultivation of coffee and tea, governments were 
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inclined to offer less favourable prices to farmers. When large-scale agricultural enterprises 
dominated in the cultivation of a crop such as rice, wheat, cotton, etc., they were more able to 
demand favourable prices (Bates, 1983, p. 114).  
The structure of the industry matters as well. When local processing industries 
overwhelmingly depended on locally produced agricultural raw materials, thus using a large 
portion of the agricultural output, lower prices were possibly offered by governments to 
farmers to guarantee the supply of raw materials to those industries (Bates, 1983, p. 114). 
However, it was possible for farmers to receive better prices from government agencies 
through their electoral power when the local industry consisted of large-scale processors 
(Bates, 2005, pp. 86-87).  
Generally, African governments allied with industrial capitalists, and this powerful coalition 
did not allow farmers to participate in decision-making processes. Where rural populations 
had generally predominated in less developed countries before 1980, the coercive power of 
states was a major threat for the farmers in the political periphery when resisting against the 
unfavourable policies. Oppositions were repressed, arrested and exterminated for “reasons of 
state” (Bates, 2005, pp. 81,106-107). As Bates (1983, p. 131) accepts, ‘the end result of [such 
policies] has been the neutralization of the majority of the African citizenry’, and continues, 
‘[t]his form of politics […] could only be expected in the absence of meaningful party 
competition’. This is evident in the case of Turkey after transitioning to a multi-party system 
in 1950. The Democrat Party offered agricultural producers higher prices, guaranteed 
purchasing crops, and provide input and credit subsidies (Aydemir, 2000, pp. 218-219; 
Başkaya, 1991, p. 173; Keyder, 1979, p. 57; Robinson, 1952) in order to expand its political 
base and hold the power. 
The most important element of the urban coalition is the domestic and foreign commercial 
and industrial bourgeoisie in Bates’s analysis. Farmers were generally repressed in order to 
cater to the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie. Even when low-priced food was provided 
to urban workers, the main purpose was to alleviate the pressure of salary to be paid by the 
industrial bourgeoisie. The commercial bourgeoisie - backing the ruling party - was granted 
licences to import goods, and rents created by public policies were unfairly appropriated by 
the bureaucracy (Bates, 2005, pp. 101- 105). In return, doomed to economic havoc because of 
unfavourable policies, farmers sought alternatives and averted direct challenge against the 
excessive central power. For example, they cut back higher value-added cash crop 
production, changed their production mix in a manner that would inhibit specialisation in 
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production, migrated to become urban workers in order to maintain their average income 
levels and sold their crops on the black market (Bates, 2005, pp. 80-86). As witnessed later, 
neoliberal policies and the third wave of democratisation nevertheless shook the central 
power of most less developed countries. African states collapsed and lost their control over 
rural areas; triggering violence rather than allowing for democratic participation of the 
periphery. 
6.5 The Critical Appraisal of Rational Choice Theory and Neoliberal Agricultural 
Policies 
As Polanyi (1945, p. 13) argued in Origins of Our Time: Great Transformation, ‘the idea of 
self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length 
of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society’, and ‘inevitably, 
society took measures to protect itself’. He further argued that the state itself established the 
market by its purposeful actions such as monitoring, controlling and regulating it (1945, pp. 
82-90).  
Pointing out that the underlying factor behind economic crises in the 1970s was 
governmental interventions, the fervent market-oriented ideas may appear rightful in their 
complete termination. However, Bienefeld (1988) criticises such views as they deem 
government interventions completely harmful: 
“[The micro economic evidence of the new orthodoxy] consists of a seemingly endless 
catalogue of ‘failed’ projects or sectoral ‘disasters’70, in which the state is said to have 
played a significant role. Although this catalogue contains many deplorable cases, it 
cannot be used to support the orthodoxy’s general conclusion. In fact this evidence only 
serves to knock down a quite absurd straw man who allegedly argues that any type of 
economic intervention by any sort of state is desirable.”71 
He contends that newly industrialised countries in Asia such as Taiwan and South Korea 
reached a substantial degree of economic development by applying highly interventionist 
policies in production, capital markets, trade, and research and development in line with their 
highly coherent national long-term economic policies. In this general policy framework, they 
successfully intervened in agriculture to augment agricultural productivity and rural income 
                                                          
70 Bates (2005, pp. 20-26, 56-61) does the same in Markets and States in Tropical Africa, showing how African 
states failed in their interventions in agriculture and industry. 
71 Bienefeld (1988) made a reference to the World Development Report published by the WB, which 
emphasises that “[t]he key factor determining the efficiency of an enterprise is not whether it is publicly or 
privately owned, but how it is managed” (The World Bank, 1983). 
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levels (Bienefeld, 1988). China has adopted market-oriented policies in agriculture but 
applied them with both government interventions and “unfamiliar institutional arrangements” 
interacting with local context (Rodrik, 2017, November). For example, the so-called 
household responsibility system that allows farmers to only rent agricultural lands for a long 
time period, rather than possess as property, have altered incentives, encouraged farmers in 
production for markets without the need for privatisation, and resulted in substantial success 
in agricultural productivity (Huang & Yang, 2017). Apart from income support, price 
intervention programmes are introduced, removed or adjusted with regard to crop types, 
changing conditions of international markets and national targets in order to raise rural 
income levels and ensure agricultural security; input subsidies are implemented for bolstering 
innovative input use to raise agricultural productivity; public investments are made in 
research and development (Huang & Yang, 2017). We can conclude that state 
interventionism can function well if the local context is taken into account in design. 
As shown in Table 6.3, the average growth rate of China’s agriculture is 4.56% annually 
since 1981 (The World Bank, 2017). Apparently, South-east Asian countries can largely 
converge on crafting their agricultural policies to secure development and food security 
through interventions along with high interaction with international markets (de Koninck & 
Rousseau, 2013; OECD & FAO, 2017, pp. 73, 77-80). It seems that many of them are more 
or less successful as China (D. J. Green & Vokes, 1997), despite any neoliberal criticism 
pointing to emergent market distortions, lack of private banks in the sector and ambiguity in 
property rights (OECD & FAO, 2017, pp. 71-75, 91). The Philippines is relatively the most 
unsuccessful country because of agricultural liberalisation that resulted in low growth rates 
(Paderon, 2005 cited in Connell & Dados, 2014) and smallholders leaving their lands due to 
soaring influx of imported crops and losses in livelihood (CETIM, 2000). Note that the same 
data (The World Bank, 2017) also exhibits Turkey’s average agricultural growth rate has only 
been 0.05% in the neoliberal period, which means that the neoliberal agricultural 
transformation has not met expectations in Turkey’s agriculture.  
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Table 6.3 Growth Rates of Agricultural Value Added in East Asian Countries between 1981 
and 2016 (The World Bank, 2017)72 
Table 6.4 compares various regions in terms of agricultural growth rates starting from 1981. 
Sub-Saharan African countries as a whole have somewhat outperformed East Asian countries 
in agriculture. Yet, there are wide differences in agricultural performance among Sub-
Saharan African countries (unlike their East Asian counterparts). For example, Kenya’s 
agricultural growth rate is 0.16% annually in the neoliberal period whereas that rate stands at 
4.00% for Malawi.  
However, South- East Asian countries grew their economies far more than Sub-Saharan 
countries in the period of 1960-2006. The main factor behind this success is that they have 
intervened in rural and agricultural development especially through pro-poor and pro-rural 
policies, later mediated by markets (Kees, David, & Peter, 2012). The assisting policies have 
consisted of linking industrial development with agricultural development, enhancing 
farmers’ orientation towards market by giving them more freedom in their economic 
activities73, granting them credit, fertilizer and seed subsidies, applying effective price 
interventions and restricting export of food crops (Kees et al., 2012).  
                                                          
72 The data provided by the WB has some deficits for some years. For example, the relevant data of Cambodia 
was started to be shared with the WB in 1994. Apart from this, we accept that the year of 1981 roughly 
represents the beginning of the neoliberal period in developing countries. 
73 The fact that they have helped smallholders enter into market relations more freely must not be ‘interpreted as 
an argument for laissez faire or the minimisation of state intervention’. It has been just offered within the 
context of state-led rural development, and thus market just function as supportive (Kees et al., 2012).  
East Asian Countries Average Agricultural Growth Rate (%)
China 4.56
South Korea 2.20
Indonesia 3.20
Malaysia 2.25
Thailand 2.45
Vietnam 3.47
Myanmar 5.18
Cambodia 3.90
Laos 3.27
Philippinnes 1.90
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Table 6.4 The Comparison between Various Regions as to Agricultural Growth Rates in the 
Period between 1981 and 2016 (The World Bank, 2017)74 
Apart from relatively lower agricultural growth rates, neoliberal policies included in 
structural adjust programmes also led to de-industrialisation75. This is evident in African 
countries (Stein, 1992) though average growth rates of agriculture (3.79%) in Sub-Saharan 
Africa has been relatively high since 1981 (The World Bank, 2017). In light of poor data 
quality, Jalilian and Weiss (2000) conclude that seven out of sixteen countries in Africa have 
experienced a degree of de-industrialisation, which implied a partial negative process in 
manufacturing. Given that the first phases of industrialisation are associated with processing 
agricultural raw materials, policy solutions stemming from RCT may have negatively 
affected agriculture and agroindustry in African countries. Some evidence from Turkey also 
displays that a degree of de-industrialisation has taken place after the adoption of export-
oriented industrialisation combined with trade and financial liberalisation (Tonus, 2007). 
Neoliberal policies can hinder development and propel farmers to abandon their agricultural 
activities. Swelling interest rates to attract financial capital have curbed agricultural 
investments in rural areas, where shrinking public investments have led to the deterioration of 
rural infrastructure (Chakraborty, 2015; Kelly, 2001). When farmers need to obtain 
agricultural credits, they have faced limited amounts of credits (due to declining state-backed 
credits) and higher interest rates because of market reforms (causing more dependence on 
                                                          
74 The data provided by the WB has some deficits; for example, former socialist countries have no data for the 
period between 1981 and 1991.  
75 Regardless of any consensus on its definition and indicators in the literature, de-industrialisation may be 
recognised as declining manufacturing in Stein’s study (Stein, 1992), and the absolute size of manufacturing and 
its share in GDP have dropped below their predicted levels (Jalilian & Weiss, 2000).  
Regions
Average Agricultural 
Growth Rate (%)
Latin America & Caribbean 2.34
Middle East & North Africa 3.51
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.79
South Asia 3.17
East Asia & Pacific 3.53
Europe & Central Asia 
(excluding high income countries)
0.87
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informal credits). Given that low crop prices have decreased their income level, the ability of 
small and medium-scale farmers to repay debts has considerably eroded (Enriquez, 2010 as 
cited in Horton, 2013), which resulted in their marginalisation in land, input and commodity 
markets, selling lands to affluent farmers and rural elites and seeking employment in urban 
informal sectors (Banerjee, 2015; Toussaint, 1999, pp. 144-146). 
Furthermore, ‘instituting rules promoting liberal capital markets and deregulating banking to 
attract capital flows […] with rising interest rates’ caused financialisation (Arrighi, 2007, 
p.145 as cited in McMichael, 2012), and financial capital were directed in the 2000s to make 
profits from speculation in land, food and biofuel (McMichael, 2012). Such speculative 
transactions have given rise to soaring agricultural prices after 2003, and investments have 
been directed to purchase physical agricultural assets, such as lands, processing plants, in 
developing countries that offer relatively low-cost natural resources and labour (McMichael, 
2012), which means the dispossession of local farmers by global corporates (B. White, Borras 
Jr, Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012). 
As developing economies gear up to international market conditions, structural adjustment 
programmes require devaluation to recover the balance of international payments and create 
competitive exchange rates. Devaluation, however, dramatically increases the operational 
costs of industrial and agricultural enterprises and poses a high risk of failure in satisfying 
export targets and demand for industrial and agricultural goods (Stein, 1992). Some evidence 
shows soaring agricultural prices straight after the implementation of structural adjustment 
programs which create shocks and obstruct the supply of industrial goods (Stein, 1992).  
According to the presumption made by Bates (2005) in Markets and States in Tropical 
Africa, agricultural trade liberalisation must have favoured agricultural producers regarding 
price levels. Chart 2.1 displays that neoliberalism or pro-market actors have not fulfilled their 
commitment to conferring more favourable prices on agricultural producers. Indeed, real food 
prices drastically fell between 1990 and 2003, especially at the expense of staple crop 
producers, such that per capita cereal production has nearly remained static over last three 
decades (Chakraborty, 2015). Though there has been a rising trend in agricultural commodity 
prices since 2008, Chakraborty contends, ‘[I]t is the fallout of demand deflationary neoliberal 
policies that have squeezed the incomes of the peasantry and agricultural workers, especially 
in developing countries, to such an extent that even simple reproduction in this sector had 
been difficult […]’, and he adds, ‘this led to a decline in the supply of agricultural 
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commodities, […] triggering a supply-demand imbalance in the international market, which 
eventually caused an upsurge in the prices of these commodities’.  
 
Figure 6.1 Agricultural Commodities Price Index from 1950 to 2017 (Jacks, 2017) 
Not only levels of crop prices but also increasing input costs is an underlying factor behind 
supply deficits. Given that technological and chemical inputs such as machinery and 
fertilizers account for substantial increases (respectively 50% and 35%) in agricultural output 
in developing countries (Fulginiti & Perrin, 1998), increases in agricultural input prices and 
credit costs and cutbacks in input subsidies have highly bedevilled economic activities of 
small-scale agricultural producers (Banerjee, 2015; Kelly, 2001; Oya, 2007). It is clear that 
those producers have been economically harmed through trade liberalisation, which makes 
them susceptible to economic actions of large urban capitalists, multinational companies and 
actors in retail markets (Chakraborty, 2015). Given increasing production costs, imported 
food has become more competitive in domestic markets due to liberalisation in trade, and this 
has forced agricultural producers to leave their economic activities (Toussaint, 1999, pp. 142-
143). It is noteworthy that despite influx of imported food, many people in developing 
countries find difficulties to equally access food in both rural and urban areas (Oya, 2010). 
As a result, where agriculture is shaped by market-based relationships, smallholders have 
been worse off than before while local big landowners and traders have boosted their power 
and wealth (Oya, 2007) in addition to a number of giant corporations dominating markets 
globally (Chakraborty, 2015). Large scale commercial operators and industrial exporters 
rather than export-oriented agricultural sector have been able to reap benefits; devaluation, 
competitive exchange rates and decreasing prices of agricultural crops between 1980 and 
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2003 were the driving factors (Toussaint, 1999, p. 140). We can conclude that there is still an 
urban bias, at the detriment of smallholders, under neoliberal policies. Although the WB 
criticised the self-interested urban elite (Bienefeld, 1988) as one of the main reason for 
economic crises in the 1970s, this case holds true today not only in practice but also in 
policy-making processes. In other words, neoliberalism has not altered the dominant political 
position of the urban coalition at the centre and peripheral actors (e.g. smallholders) have 
been kept away from the decision making processes on national and international levels, set 
aside some local agricultural projects and resources. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the characteristics of neoliberalism and neoliberal policies and 
showed the main critical comments on these policies. Neoliberal policies came into practices 
as pro-market policies after severe crises especially hit less developed countries which had 
applied government interventions for development. These policies include deregulation, 
privatisation, monetarisation, and the depoliticisation of the economy. After they caused 
some political-economic problems, they were upgraded in the 1990s to foster good 
governance and ease poverty.  
Neoliberal policies are applied by the supervision of the IMF and The WB at the global level. 
The less developed countries that carry out neoliberal transformation are faced with problems 
such as inequality, poverty and de-industrialisation. South-Asian countries have shown 
significant performance in developing their economies during the neoliberal period, but their 
success has come from government interventions to their economy rather than neoliberal 
policies. 
After the chapter showed the relationship between RCT and neoliberalism, it discussed how 
RCT has contributed to shaping neoliberal agricultural policies. The removal of input 
subsidies, subsidised purchases, and the state-funded project and programmes are 
recommended by this theoretical approach. Criticising state-manipulated lower food price 
policies, it suggests leaving crop prices to be set under free-market conditions. However, the 
chapter showed that agricultural crops prices have dramatically declined under market 
dynamics after 1980, and agricultural input prices have surged. Obviously, capitalist classes 
benefit from neoliberal policies at the expense of smallholders. 
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Chapter 7: A Political Economy Analysis of Agricultural Development of 
the South-eastern Anatolia Region  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will address the question of how Turkey’s neoliberal agricultural transformation 
and government interventions, especially those within the scope of the GAP, have affected 
the agricultural development of the SAR since 2001. The question will be approached from 
different perspectives. While we focus on the effects of neoliberal policies on the SAR’s 
agriculture, we will probe into how decreasing agricultural subsidies have affected AEs in the 
region. Because agricultural policies including subsidy policies are formulated at the national 
level by the MOAF, the main elements of the agricultural liberalisation programme have been 
implemented in each region in a somewhat similar fashion.  
But what markedly differed the SAR from other regions in terms of development policies are 
the government interventions made within the GAP. Each region has adopted an action plan 
for development in recent years, but these are not as comprehensive as the GAP. It is noted 
that regional formal institutional capacity also matters for regional development. The effects 
of government interventions on agricultural development of the region through the GAP-
RDA and other regional organisations will be scrutinized.  
Agricultural support payments, the main part of government interventions on the national 
level, are no longer the only external source of income for farmers. Non-farm income 
possibilities have considerably developed in last fifteen years in west Turkey but are still 
limited in east Turkey. This has driven family members in east Turkey to migrate to urban 
areas all across Turkey to find urban employment; those remaining behind maintain their 
status of small-scale producers and find farm or non-farm jobs to raise their income level (M. 
Öztürk et al., 2018). Those who migrated are transferring money and goods to those in the 
rural, while those who do semi-subsistence and subsistence farming are actively be able to 
operate in the market and change their consumption patterns through this urban-rural 
network. A similar condition, as well as seasonal migration to other regions, are prevailing in 
the SAR among SAEs and landless people (V. Koçal, 2015).  
At first, the tribal system played an important role in farmers’ livelihoods. But then tribal 
leaders became large landholders getting involved in capitalist production. The sharecropping 
system has almost disappeared, except for some places in Sanliurfa. Therefore, tribal system 
143 
 
is excluded from our analysis as it lost its role in dictating how to undertake agricultural 
activities.  
In order to maximise their profits, agricultural producers carry out transactions allocating 
their resources to two main activities: production and sale. Three main markets determine 
their real income and activities. They purchase production factors from the input market, 
bearing production costs and sell what they produce in the commodity market to earn 
revenue. 
Our analysis will start with the first two markets on the regional level. The position of 
agricultural producers in the market of consumer goods can easily be assessed through 
agricultural terms of trade. As was discussed in the background chapter, agriculture’s 
domestic terms of trade were against agricultural producers, that is, income transfers have 
been made through the price mechanism from agricultural producers to the producers and 
sellers of consumer goods in the period examined. Most industrial and commercial goods and 
commodities have traditionally flowed from west Turkey to east Turkey. Relatively higher 
transportation costs and intermediary actors in the region adding their own profits, increased 
these. We thus presume that income transfers from agricultural producers in the SAR have 
been more than agricultural producers in west Turkey. 
The analysis will continue discussing the privatisation of the TEKEL monopoly and the 
dominance of free-market dynamics on the tobacco market. The political conflict that 
emerged in the tobacco market will help us to critically assess present arguments of RCT. 
Finally, we will focus on the critical appraisal of Bates (1983, p. 119; 2005, pp. 45-61) who 
argues that government interventions in the form of projects and programmes are 
indisputably doomed to fail because of political intentions and arrangements of governments. 
We will argue that well-designed government interventions based on the poly-centric 
governance approach could create positive effects for agricultural development. 
7.2 The Effects of the Neoliberal Transformation on Agricultural Production in the 
South-eastern Anatolia Region 
The most powerful element of the ARIP on agricultural production was the DIS payment, 
which was allocated according to land size. It did not yield much on Turkey’s and the SAR’s 
agricultural production by creating disincentives (see Table 7.1), favoured LAEs more than 
SAEs given unfair land distribution in the SAR and encouraged LAEs to end their contracts 
with sharecroppers to legally obtain the payment (Güven, 2009). Some SAEs were forced to 
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leave their agricultural activities because of insufficient payments and soaring production 
costs. Given that land prices soared after the introduction of the DIS (Güven, 2009), those 
SAEs must also have felt impelled to sell their lands.76 
The former minister claims that productivity, quality and standard could not be reached 
through the DIS (Eker, 2015, p. 88). It was replaced over time with a wide range of 
production-stimulating support payments, such as area-based input payments, deficiency 
payments, and compensatory payments. This shift in agricultural support policy has received 
strong criticism from OECD (2011, pp. 111-112) arguing that it led to market and trade 
distortions. Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that the government has deviated from 
agricultural liberalisation.77  
 
Table 7.1 Annual Average Growth Rates of Turkey and its Regions at 2011 Prices (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2017e, 2017f, 2018a)78 
Table 7.1 gives us insight into how agricultural policies have influenced different regions of 
Turkey in the ARIP and the post-ARIP periods. It shows that relatively less developed 
regions including the SAR performed slightly worse (1.40%) than the developed ones 
(1.59%) in the ARIP period in terms of annual agricultural growth rate. It is interesting to see 
that the SAR had the second-worst performance in that period. In the crisis years of 2001-
                                                          
76 According to Turkish Statistical Institute, AEs in Turkey equal to or smaller than 10 ha owned 42% of total 
agricultural lands in 2001, 34.3% in 2006, 29.1% in 2016 (M. Öztürk, 2012, p. 78; Turkish Statistical Institute, 
19 April, 2018, 2017b). It is clear that SAEs have long been selling their lands to larger groups of AEs. From 
this point, some SAEs faced with economic difficulties in the SAR must have disposed of their lands while land 
prices were soaring. 
77 It has reduced the share of total agricultural supports in Turkey’s GDP (OECD, 2018), not saved sales 
cooperatives from bankruptcy, continued to protect intellectual property rights of global input providers (i.e. 
seed improvements), left agricultural producers getting more loans from private banking companies and 
privatised companies providing electricity for irrigation. 
78 The relatively less developed regions have been defined as ones that have per capita income level less than 
three in four of Turkey’s average per capita income level in Turkish lira.    
Regions/Period Regions/Period
Relatively Less Developed Regions Relatively More Developed Regions
The SAR -1.96 5.87 3.39 The West Anatolia Region 0.92 4.47 3.07
The Central East Anatolia Region 3.48 5.27 4.72 The Mediterrenian Region 3.79 0.18 1.28
The North East Anatolia Region -3.88 5.91 2.08 The West Marmara Region 1.49 0.59 0.87
The North Black Sea Region 7.59 1.02 3.00 The East Marmara Region 0.13 2.08 1.48
The West Black Sea Region 0.70 0.74 0.73 The Aegean Region 1.60 2.73 2.38
The Central Anatolia Region 2.45 3.60 1.70 Turkey 1.11 2.50 2.07
Annual Agricultural Growth Rate (%) Annual Agricultural Growth Rate (%) 
2004-2008 2008-2017 2004-2017 2004-2008 2008-2017 2004-2017
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2002, the cultivated lands increased by around 121,250 ha, since the prospect of being 
employed in urban areas was significantly damaged, and since some of the displaced people 
returned to their villages after the end of the armed conflict. However, the land under 
cultivation fell by around 340,000 ha between 2002 and 2008 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 
2018a) and the number of the employed in agriculture hit rock bottom at 255,000 in 2006 
(451,000 in 2004) (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017b). The underlying factor was that 
Turkey’s economy grew by 5.84% annually between 2002 and 2008, so drove the rural to 
find urban employment. Another important factor was that the diminution of agricultural 
support and the withdrawal of the government from subsidised purchases rendered 
agriculture in the region less attractive, where low productivity agricultural production took 
place because of lack of capital investments (Koçtürk & Avcıoğlu, 2007). 79  
In the period between 2008 and 2017, the SAR recovered its loss and has reached the second 
highest annual agricultural growth rate (5.87%). The impressive performance of three sub-
region of east Turkey between 2008 and 2017 inevitably catches our attention. Once the 
armed conflict ended, they started to integrate more into input and commodity markets. The 
dramatic neoliberal economic measures taken after the 2001 economic crisis may have 
caused delays to reap benefits from market relations. Indeed, the high annual agricultural 
growth rate has been reached despite the land under cultivation dropping by around 200,000 
ha in the SAR between 2008 and 2017 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). This indicates 
that a high increase in total factor productivity in agriculture has been behind the relative 
success in the post-ARIP period.80 Given that paid agricultural workers rose from 49,000 in 
2007 to 117,000 in 2017 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017b), it can be concluded that the 
mode of production is increasingly being oriented to a productive market-oriented, capital-
intensive one. 
Apart from the rising orientation to the market, the GAP investments (i.e. public irrigation 
and village and farmer-level investments), which were dramatically raised by the government 
since 2008 (The GAP-RDA, 2018, p. 18), have played an important role in agricultural 
growth and the adaptation of farmers to markets. Added to these investments are the private 
                                                          
79 The Central East Anatolia Region, having similar agricultural economic conditions with the SAR, enjoyed 
agricultural growth rate of 3.48% per annum between 2000 and 2008. The underlying factor is that its cultivated 
lands constantly increased by around 61800 ha between 2000 and 2006, and the employed in agriculture 
increased from 318,000 in 2004 to 372,000 in 2006 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017e, 2017f, 2018a). 
80 According to International Food Policy Research Institute (2017, p. 108), Turkey enjoyed a far higher total 
factor productivity in agriculture in the period of 2008-2013 (4.8%) than compared to previous periods (1.6% 
for 1991-2000; 1.3% for 2008-2013). 
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rural investments that were financially supported through the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance in Rural Development (IPARD) after 2007 as a part of Turkey’s EU membership 
bid. Finally, the grants for agricultural mechanisation that were provided by the MOAF under 
the Rural Development Support Programme (the RDSP) investments were important for the 
transformation of agricultural production mode to a productive capital-intensive, market-
oriented one. 
The shift in the composition of agricultural supports was also an important factor. Though the 
government reduced the weight of total agricultural support payments in GDP, the proportion 
of production-based support payments in total was raised (by around 42% in US dollars) 
(OECD, 2018). Although these are the highly distorting policy tools, it appears that they have 
improved incentives to production and led to positive results in the SAR. We can claim that 
more production subsidies would likely have encouraged more agricultural production by 
avoiding decreases in cultivated areas. The total cultivated areas in Turkey declined by 
around 2,994,000 hectares in the period between 2000 and 2017 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 
2018a). Whilst almost all the regions have experienced this problem, the SAR have had the 
second-highest decline in cultivated lands, which amounts to around 420,000 ha (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2018a). What is interesting about the figures is that the fall in the 
cultivated areas was just about 135,000 hectares between 1989 and 1995 during the worst 
phase of the armed conflict (Turkish Statistical Institute, 1989, 1995). 
7.2.1 The Main Production Strategies of Agricultural Producers and Changes in the Use 
of Agricultural Lands Associated with Crop Types 
Table 7.2 shows how the use of land for cultivation has changed in Turkey and the SAR. As 
there is no significant difference between Turkey’s other regions and the SAR in this sense 
(Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a), we can derive from the data three possible common 
strategies that have been adopted by AEs in the SAR to cope with changing agricultural 
policies: a) leaving agricultural activities in a way that leads to depeasantation (M. Öztürk et 
al., 2018), b) bringing their fallow lands into production, c) contracting areas for field crops 
and vegetable production and allocating their factors of production to fruit production.  
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Table 7.2 Changes in the Use of Agricultural Lands in Turkey and the SAR between 2000 
and 2016 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a) 
A category of farmers across Turkey, especially those who had relied on rain-fed farming, 
were forced to leave agricultural activities for economic reasons. New production cost 
structures turned out unfavourable for them due to decreased input subsidies and the 
increased use of modern inputs (Ates et al., 2017; M. Öztürk et al., 2018). They also run into 
difficulties with the changing environment of marketing operations because of the removal of 
subsidised purchases by state-owned economic enterprises, the deterioration of relationships 
between cooperatives and farmers, and farmers’ inability of accessing commodity markets 
(Ates et al., 2017). These exacerbated their conventional problems such as the vulnerability to 
price structure and bad weather, the low productivity of rain-fed farming, and the lack of 
capital and/or knowledge to invest in new agricultural equipment and methods (Ates et al., 
2017; M. Öztürk et al., 2018). Consequently, they left farming. 
Bringing more fallow lands into production has become another strategy to increase 
production and revenues. Yet, this strategy must have increased the use of fertilizer to keep 
soil nutrients sufficiently high, and in turn, production costs. Özuğurlu (2011, p. 107) puts 
forward that premium payments given to field crops are playing a part in boosting their 
production by reducing fallow land areas. It is however noteworthy that according to the 
Turkish Statistical Institute, AEs tend to let a higher proportion of land lie fallow as their 
scales raise (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018b). First MAEs, then SAEs (except for those 
smaller than 1 ha) started to bring more fallow land into production (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 2018b). Apparently, this strategy was employed by SAEs in an attempt to stay in 
farming.  
AEs in all scales have diminished farmlands and vegetable gardens for producing more fruits 
and other perennial crops in vineyards and orchards, and they have been more inclined to turn 
more lands into vineyard and orchards as their scales diminish (Turkish Statistical Institute, 
2018b). These crops provide higher value-added than do field crops and mostly tend to be 
stored longer than vegetables. Furthermore, the fruit types that require less water, energy and 
fertilizer consumption are preferred such as pistachio, almond, grape and pomegranate. 
Region/Use of Lands Fallow Lands Croplands Vegetable Gardens Vineyards and Orchards
The SAR -58665 -440862 -11795 151534
Turkey -827670 -2463143 -100235 718275
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Finally, their production requires labour-intensive maintenance and harvesting practices such 
as pruning and handpicking. Therefore, the use of family labour has become part of the 
strategy to take cost advantages (M. Öztürk et al., 2018). In this regard, SAEs with unwaged 
family labour force are more advantageous than MAEs and LAEs. AEs equal to or smaller 
than 100 da have expanded the area of vineyards and orchards more than MAEs and LAEs 
(Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018b). An interesting phenomenon is that even SAEs are 
drawing on agricultural mechanisation in field farming by either purchasing or renting 
agricultural machineries (Özuğurlu, 2013). It indicates that they are relying on family labour 
less than before, and the young having remained idle are departing from farming to find non-
farm jobs (Özuğurlu, 2013) and transferring money to the rural in order to sustain family-
based agricultural production (M. Öztürk et al., 2018). As I observed, some male members of 
smallholding families are both working in city or town centres for wages and getting involved 
in agricultural activities.81 
 
Table 7.3 Crop Groups and Changes in the Cultivated Areas in the SAR and Turkey between 
2000 and 2016 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a) 
Table 7.3 demonstrates how the cultivated areas of main crop groups in the SAR and Turkey 
have altered during the neoliberal agricultural transformation. It is clear that the decrease in 
                                                          
81 Özuğurlu (2011) points out that this phenomenon has been prevailing all across Turkey. He uses a concept of 
“the necessity for labour force of household” to explain it. If the necessity of labour force of a household is low, 
the labour force reserve could be transferred to non-farm activities to increase income. In the same vein, the 
necessity of labour force of a household is relatively higher, the labour force reserve is more likely to be 
allocated to farming activities (pp.98-99). The scale of AEs are also important here. Insofar as it grows, the 
household tends to allow the family labourers to hunt for non-farm jobs and hires waged labourers (pp.99-100).  
Grains (ha)
Potato and 
Pulses (ha)
Oil Seeds 
(ha)
Feed Plants 
(ha)
Olive (ha) Fruits (ha) Grapes (ha)
Vegetables 
(ha)
Plants Used 
 In Textiles 
(ha)
Plants Used 
In the Sugar 
Industry (ha)
Raw 
Tobacco 
(ha)
2000 1596544 440494 33390 1667 43014 224857 126982 82942 317049 1484 30600
2016 1778126 255825 10471 36812 80902 347352 118133 71147 238326 2587 11522
Change 11.37% -41.92% -68.64% 2108.28% 88.08% 54.48% -6.97% -14.22% -24.83% 74.33% -62.35%
2000 13608574 1487197 634166 361400 600000 1475942 535000 904377 655368 408179 236569
2016 11361896 844966 902396 1867202 845542 2048448 435227 804142 416009 321957 92505
Change -16.51% -43.18% 42.30% 416.66% 40.92% 38.79% -18.65% -11.08% -36.52% -21.12% -60.90%
The SAR
Turkey
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cropland has come from a dramatic decrease in the cultivated areas allocated to pulses, oil 
seeds, cotton, raw tobacco and cumin as a spice plant (see Table 7.4). First the production of 
feed plants (maize silage and others), then of grain and sugar appears to have slowed the 
decrease in cropland.  
Dramatic changes in the cultivated areas of fruits and other perennial crops should be noted. 
Pistachio and olive are the most preferred crops when farmers decide to alter the mix of their 
crop production. Further, AEs appears to have directed their resources to nuts (e.g. almond 
and walnut) and to the fruit types they expect more profits, such as pomegranate, apple, 
cherry and strawberry. The production and cultivated areas of all the grape types (e.g. table 
grapes, wine grapes, grapes for raisins) have been on the decrease since 2010, which amounts 
to areas of around 14500 ha and to around 47500 tonnes (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017c).  
In the following sections, we shall focus on how neoliberal agricultural policies and 
government interventions have induced these changes in agricultural production and created 
positive and negative results.  
7.2.2 Agricultural Production Costs, Input Subsidies, and the Input Market 
Having a critical discussion about government interventionist policies, Bates (2005, pp. 50-
51) emphasises that ‘[g]overnments in Africa subsidise[d] fertilizers, seeds, mechanical 
equipment, and credit’ through the overvaluation of manipulated exchange rates that 
decreased the perceived prices of imported inputs, and ‘the governments of Africa thus 
intervene[d] in in the markets for farm inputs […] to depress the price of the inputs and 
thereby enhance the profitability of farming’ (p.54). African governments framed their 
policies in such a way that subsidised inputs are not available for SAEs but for LAEs through 
political influence (p.55). This policy created disincentives for SAEs to produce more crops 
and the result is agricultural stagnation and food insecurity. The neoliberal prescription for 
solving the failure has involved the removal of input subsidies and the determination of input 
prices and exchange rates under free market conditions. However, in Turkey, it was adapted 
to the prevailing conditions in its agricultural sector. Indeed, Turkey ended input price 
subsidies and left the determination of input prices to markets (Oyan, 2015, pp. 120-121); yet, 
she has been gradually lessening the weight of input supports in GDP from 5.96% of 
agricultural GDP in 1999 to 2.88%  in 2015 (OECD, 2018). 
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Table 7.4 Cultivated Lands and Production Levels of the Most Produced Crops in Each Crop 
Groups in the SAR between 2004 and 2016 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017c)82  
                                                          
82 The Turkish Statistical Institute just provides the statistics for each crop type starting from 2004 (for those of 
tomato from 2006 and of cucumber from 2005). This is why Table 7.4 cannot demonstrate the 2000 figures. 
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Our analysis will show how dynamics in the input market have affected agricultural 
producers in the SAR vis-à-vis various input providers. We, in doing so, will show that an 
insufficient level of input subsidies has not eased the problems of agricultural producers, but 
input subsidies promoted productivity, encouraging the use of highly productive inputs. The 
question of who has reaped their benefits will reveal the character of neoliberal 
transformation in agriculture.  
Commonalities 
Input and input-related subsidies became one of main elements of the agricultural support 
system after the introduction of the Agriculture Act in 2006 (The OECD, 2011, p. 47). 
Among the most prominent are the improved, certified seed, seedling and sapling (ICSSS) 
support83, the area-based diesel and fertilizer (DF) support, the area-based soil analysis (SA) 
support and loan concessions.  
We need to highlight three issues about input subsidies. First, production-based supports 
require the use of innovative agricultural inputs sold in the market, such as improved seed 
varieties, fertilizers, pesticides and machineries. Second, various production-based supports 
including input subsidies, were raised nominally in US Dollar after 2005, and this has led to 
productivity increases ever since (as seen in Table 7.4).84 Nevertheless, the level of input 
subsidies (%3.55 of agricultural GDP in 2016) has remained less than its 1999-level (5.97%) 
(OECD, 2018). I was told during fieldwork that nominally increased input subsidies are still 
far from easing concerns on agricultural production costs.  
Every enterprise must make a profit by keeping their production cost, especially input costs, 
as low as possible. However, the manipulation of input costs is hardly possible for AEs as 
inputs are commercialised by national and multinational companies under the market 
conditions structured by liberalisation and globalisation (Keyder & Yenal, 2014, p. 34). A 
few companies with high financial power have substantial control in the oligopolistic input 
market through intellectual property rights (Fuglie, Heisey, King, & Schimmelpfennig, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Further, the total production values of pistachio are highly erratic in the examined period due to its periodicity 
tendency or environmental factors such as drought. For this reason, we have taken the 2006 figure instead of the 
2004 figure to make our assessment reasonable. 
83 The improved, certified seed, seedling and sapling support is given to AEs after they purchase those inputs. 
Payments are made in cash relying on the total cost in the receipt, which is matched to the reference amount 
based on land size that was recorded for each AE in the Farmer Registry System beforehand. Thus, the 
improved, certified seed, seedling and sapling support is, an area-based subsidy. 
84 Input subsidies were around 1706 US Dollar in 1999, 400 US Dollar in 2005 (the ARIP period), around 1495 
US Dollar in 2011 and around 917 US Dollar in 2015. 
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2012). They invest in research and development activities for the production of innovative 
inputs yielding high productivity, and farmers are willing to pay higher prices for inputs, 
explaining the rising input costs in recent years (Fuglie et al., 2012). However, the factor that 
has raised concern among farmers in Turkey is that rises in input prices have exceeded rises 
in commodity prices (Olhan, 2012). 
Farmers are today dependent on importing innovative inputs to raise agricultural productivity. 
Overvalued exchange rates under the free floating regime, which was strongly recommended 
in the IMF programme after the 2001 economic crisis, have heightened this dependency.85 
The Turkish lira that greatly depreciated after the 2001 economic crisis became re-overvalued 
in 2004 and remained so by 2016 thanks to increased international capital inflows (Ertuna, 
2005). This matter has moderately kept the difference between input and commodity price 
increments. With its highly productive characteristic, innovative inputs have helped AEs to 
substantially grow production volume and revenue. When Turkish lira inescapably started to 
dramatically depreciate after 2015 with the influence of contracting international capital 
flows, AEs all across Turkey, which already complained about the high input prices 
determined by big companies with oligopolistic power (Ates et al., 2017), started to 
experience problems (Donat, May 24, 2018). 
The following excerpt from an interview with focus group F3 (personal communication, July 
14, 2015) in Diyarbakir clarifies that even middle-scale and large-scale landholders are 
running into trouble with managing production costs.   
F3: […] I told [this] friend, “You were making wheat cultivation 50 years ago”. 50 years 
later, he is still making agriculture on 500 or 1000 decares. Those lands belong to him. 
He is my close friend; his name is Hajji K […]. […] Let me tell you what he wanted to 
say. He told, “We used to do some work with manpower but some work with animal 
power, I mean ox power or horse power, [for] ploughing, harvesting, etc.” […] Today, 
we are cutting [wheat] with a tractor, and then we have turned to a combined harvester. 
At that time, we were cultivating—we were not giving [chemical] fertilizer [to our 
lands]; we were giving animal manure; we were getting more quality products. […] If 
five or six grains on every ear of wheat got ripe, [then] it was saving us. Today, even if 
15 grains got ripe on an ear of wheat, -we have [here] mentioned new seeds, new 
varieties, and the new agriculture- they would not save us. Because all business is done 
                                                          
85 Overvalued exchange rates have always been a chronical problem for Turkey’s economy. Before the 2001 
economic crisis, Turkey had the same problem under the fixed exchange rate regime recommended by the IMF. 
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by commercial payments, [such as renting] a combined harvester via a payment [or] a 
tractor via a payment, [and buying] fertilizer via a payment […]. 
Interviewer: […] If [agricultural] supports ceased, would you give up production 
completely? 
Hajji K: [we would do it] willy-nilly 
F3: Because it would not save us.86 I would quit. 
In fact, agricultural producers throughout Turkey are seriously in need of getting more 
subsidies to keep up the use of productive innovative inputs (Ates et al., 2017). Otherwise, 
they use less inputs to reduce production costs, ending up with a loss of productivity. As 
Bates (2005, p. 82) argues, ‘in the face of declining prices, producers devote fewer resources’ 
to production in the short run, that is, ‘they harvest less intensively and place fewer acres 
under production’. Bates talks about the African agricultural development having impeded 
with highly interventionist policies; yet, the neoliberal transformation is pushing the Turkish 
agriculture to a similar failure.  
This case is easily seen in the cultivation of grains, pulses, maize and cotton which prevail in 
the region examined. Those crops are more productive through capital-intensive methods, 
which inherently require the use of more chemical and biological inputs in order to mount 
agricultural productivity. Increases in the relative price of inputs to crops are forcing farmers 
into financial vulnerability. Another pressure comes from the nature of using capital intensive 
methods. Their costs diminish over time, and therefore AEs cannot easily alter their crop 
patterns in the short run when they face economic instability or vulnerability (Keyder & 
Yenal, 2014). In this lock-in situation, they follow the only way: reduce the production costs 
to cope with shocks. This, however, could impair crop productivity. In a focus group session, 
F8b (personal communication, July 26, 2015) explains how cost-saving negatively affects the 
full exploitation of agricultural techniques and methods. 
F8b: […] in view of avoiding costs, (any farmer, here,) does not plough his field 
properly. For instance, now, the state would tell him to spread 20 kilos of cotton seed on 
his field. It is really enough if you prepare your field well. But, now, that farmer would 
think that he hasn’t made a proper field preparation, so he would spread 30 kilos of the 
seed. It is just equivalent to the 20 kilos of seed the state suggested. […] There would be 
10 kilos of difference because of [insufficient use of] diesel [for ploughing]. As for 
fertilizer, […] he can buy 1 kilo of fertilizer with 3 kilos of wheat. So, he cannot properly 
                                                          
86 It means that it would not fully cover the cost. 
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use fertilizer. For instance, I would tell him, “let me give you leaf fertilizer as a 
supplement for the top of plants”. He would reply me, “I cannot earn money, so don’t 
give me it”. If possible, he would not use pesticides. […] [Consequently, we are] 
working on cotton for getting agricultural support [premium payments, a.n.]. 
As things stand, the complete removal of subsidies would result in an inevitable failure in 
agriculture in the SAR. F487 (personal communication, July 14, 2015), cultivating grains and 
lentil on a 125 decare of non-irrigated land, expressed that the ICSS subsidy was a decisive 
factor for his use of certified wheat seeds, as without it he would not use such seeds. During 
our focus group discussion, F9c (personal communication, July 26, 2015) from Mardin 
argued that he was spreading certified, improved wheat seeds on his 60 decare of non-
irrigated land because of its high productivity, and firmly claimed that if the subsidy was 
abolished, he would use certified seeds to cultivate the first year crop but select his own seeds 
from that crop to produce the second and third year crops.88 In fact, some small- and medium-
scale producers told me that they were employing such a strategy to lessen their production 
costs at the expense of degrading the quality and productivity of their crops and ultimately 
receiving lower prices from the agro-food industry. 
Improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, machineries and equipment are, indeed, highly 
productive inputs. AEs should not have to give up their use because of lack of subsidies. One 
can regard cooperatives as a market-adapted solution to get those productive inputs at lower 
prices, where uncompetitive market conditions in the input market work against AEs. Yet, as 
an inherent characteristic of agricultural producers they are vast in number, spread out over a 
large geographical area, and this imposes a great barrier on them to act collectively to lower 
the prices of the inputs they buy. 
Despite all this, there had been cooperatives granting inputs to farmers before the ARIP, 
financially assisted by the government. After the ARIP, the existing sales cooperatives were 
doomed to a failure with the withdrawal of financial assistance. For example, the Guneydogu 
Birlik went into liquidation; the Gapbirlik entered an inactive position; the Cukobirlik is very 
limitedly operating with a low level of financial resources after serious cutbacks. All of them 
would however distribute inputs to AEs at subsidies prices before 2001 (Karli & Çelik, 2003, 
pp. 64-65). The manager of the Cukobirlik at Sanliurfa city centre (N2, personal 
                                                          
87 He owns a factory for poultry farming, for which his wheat production is used as forage. 
88 For example, F18, a focus group including a smallholder (F18a) and a medium landholder (F18b) from 
Sanliurfa, argued that the prices of certified seeds are higher than the prices they expect, and that the subsidy the 
state gives is far from being worth all their efforts. 
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communication, April 29, 2015) expressed that they can operate in accordance with market 
dynamics, but the government must inject financial resources into the cooperative, as they did 
to the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACC) before. The ARIP cooperatives were, 
however, forced to find financial resources from the market but not from public financial 
organisations. The cooperatives in the SAR therefore could not repay their debts they 
obtained at the market interest rate and lost their capability of offering inputs and credit to 
their members. In fact, the ACC staff received technical assistance as well, instructing how to 
operate in the market. The staff of the sale cooperatives did not receive such assistance, and 
without financial resources they easily failed in executing their tasks. 
Where the agricultural cooperatives in the SAR are unable to attract support from the 
government, it should be noted that producers unions have been encouraged to be set up 
through financial and technical assistance supplied by the government and international 
organisations such as the UNDP and the EU within the scope of the IPARD and the EU-CAP. 
According to Abdullah Aysu, the Chairman of the Confederation of Farmer Unions, the law 
of Agricultural Producers Union does not however give a mandate to these unions to 
purchase inputs wholesale at lower prices from input providers and sell to their partner 
farmers (Aysu, 2013).  
Obviously, a vast number of AEs are unlikely to obtain inputs from their own organisations at 
lower prices. As many SAEs in the SAR have no economic power to pay nominal costs of 
inputs in cash, they apply to formal and informal credit mechanisms. Private banking 
companies have expanded their operations in the SAR after subsidised credit was removed 
within the ARIP. However, the Agriculture Bank and ACCs started after mid-2000s to 
provide AEs with loans at interest rates lower than market interest rates or at a zero interest 
rates with a view to support the purchase of productive inputs89 and the use of innovative 
methods such as organic agriculture and good agricultural practices. I was however told that 
smallholders are supposed to pledge a high value of collateral despite owning a low level of 
assets. Even worse, land is occasionally used to secure loans at the risk of losing them if 
defaulted on the loan. The risks posed by the unsolved Kurdish Question have also kept the 
required level of collateral high. For all these reasons, SAEs are far more inclined than MAEs 
and LAEs to seek credit from informal sources ranging from relatives to input providers or 
merchants. 
                                                          
89 Those productive inputs and investments that can be bought at lower interest rates are improved livestock 
breed, modern bee hives, poultry and fishery animals and equipment, agricultural machineries and equipment, 
improved certified seeds, seedlings, saplings, irrigation equipment, modern greenhouse investments, etc. 
156 
 
The informal credit mechanism can be characterised as an exploitative mechanism at the 
expense of SAEs. F17, a smallholder in Adiyaman says: 
F17: […] For instance, one would bring fertilizer, diesel and seeds by loan. […] assume 
that fertilizer and seed are 900 Turkish liras, if you brought them by loan, they would be 
1200-1300 Turkish liras. […] [Later on] he would sell earlier what is in his hand to pay 
money for [renting] a combined harvester or [buying] fertilizer. 
Interviewer: Actually, fertilizer and varieties of wheat are normally available, but you 
have always a financial problem. 
F17: Smallholders always have financial problems. The government does not give us 
fertilizer now but before; […] [thus,] they made agricultural lands adapted to fertilizer. 
[…] farmers are buying fertilizer in cash now. 
Prior to the planting season, many SAEs often apply to a merchant or a broker or an input 
seller for a loan to gain the required inputs, so paying interest after harvesting. Assume that a 
SAE is supposed to repay by selling their crops to that merchant just after the harvest, that 
SAE would miss a chance to sell his crops later for a higher price by taking advantage of 
seasonal supply deficit and market fluctuations, but the merchant would have such a chance 
to augment his profit margin. In this way, the market mechanism and lack of subsidised credit 
and input subsidies have clearly led to the exploitation of especially SAEs and MAEs. I was 
told that the formal credit mechanism explicitly works in favour of LAEs in the SAR. Bates 
(2005, pp. 56-58) puts forward the usefulness of market-based policies by arguing that 
government interventions were responsible for LAEs accessing credits at the expense of 
SAEs in African cases. The case of the SAR however shows that market-based policies have 
not worked well for SAEs. 
In respect of obtaining inputs, farmers have been crippled by formal institutional 
arrangements at the national level as well. For example, with the introduction of the Act of 
Seed Growing, only the seeds that have been registered and patented by the MOAF are 
accepted legal to be produced and traded, and farmers, therefore, cannot legally sell or 
exchange their own seeds for trade ("Tohumculuk Kanunu [The Act of Seed Growing]," 
2006). The act definitely sought to favour the global and national seed companies that have 
financial and technical capability of registering and patenting seeds (M. Öztürk et al., 
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2018).90 As Değirmenci (2014, pp. 148-149) states, after the seed growing sector was opened 
up to private actors in 1984, the General Directorate of Agricultural Enterprises (TIGEM) 
have already lost its status of being a state monopoly over the production of seeds and have 
not even fulfilled the function of regulating the seed market later. Consequently, national and 
global seed companies are diffusing their power in the seed market and forcing AEs to 
become almost entirely dependent to them.  
This is evident in the case of F1 hybrid seeds91 that are planted for the cultivation of cotton, 
maize, field fruits (e.g. melon and water melon) and vegetables. These highly productive 
seeds are improved by global seed companies, spending large sums on research and 
development to obtain their intellectual property rights. Those who sow F1 hybrid seeds do 
not receive any ICSSS support although they are supposed to buy those seeds every year to 
maintain their agricultural production (they cannot be re-selected from the harvested crop 
owing to technical-biological impossibilities). The Act of Seed Growing here renders them 
more dependent to global seed companies by preventing farmers from trading their own 
seeds. Given that most vegetable producers are comprised by SAEs, the lack of subsidy for 
F1 hybrid seeds also makes them more vulnerable. 
This is also evident in the case of national seed growing companies. The seeds of many field 
crops are improved by public research bodies, and the government covers research and 
development expenditures with public financial resources. The improved seeds are 
distributed to national seed growing companies, where global companies do not consider the 
production or import of most of such seeds profitable (Acikgoz, 2005, p. 5). The 
subsidisation of research expenditures has actually averted a possible market failure. 
However, national seed companies offer high prices to farmers buying those certified, 
improved seeds although they barely invest in research and development. F7b clarifies the 
unfair price differential between the seed price and the crop price: ‘[a ton of] certified [wheat] 
seeds is 1400 Turkish liras. The commodity [a farmer] would sell is 700 Turkish liras. There 
is a hundred per cent of difference.’ It is manifest that the market mechanism and the lack of 
                                                          
90 This act also facilitated the establishment of an internet-based network between urban gardeners and peasants 
getting involved in the exchange of seeds (M. Öztürk et al., 2018). However, the mass production of agricultural 
commodities has been possible with the use of commercial seeds to a very great extent. 
91 The scientific meaning of F1 hybrid in biology is out of our interest. However, for any readers in the field of 
political science, we can explain main characteristics of it within our context. O9 (personal communication, 
September 30, 2014) tells me that the maize cultivation is depended on F1 hybrid seeds. The main characteristic 
of hybrid seeds is that if any farmer generated seeds from them for his cultivation in the next year, he would 
exactly yield no crops because germination would be impossible. Hybrid seeds, providing high productivity, 
lead farmers to become dependent on the terms offered by seed companies. 
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government interventions in the seed market (e.g. TIGEM’s inability to regulate it) work at 
the expense of farmers. 
Farmers have been also harmed by the lack of governmental interventions in agricultural 
research and development. R7 (personal communication, July 24, 2015), a manager-
researcher in a regional agricultural research organisation, stated that unlike field crops, 
vegetable and fruit seeds, seedlings and saplings have not been properly improved by national 
and regional research bodies so far, except for pistachio, olive and grape. SAEs, therefore, 
devote their resources to these three types of fruits since they do not know how to grow other 
types of fruits because of lack of public agricultural extension, which limits alternative ways 
of earning income. 
AEs have been left alone in the input market against big private companies during the 
neoliberal agricultural transformation. They have lacked the required support from the state 
and the farmer organisations that weakened with the withdrawal of government support. 
Where imperfect competition is prevailing in the input market, increased agricultural 
surpluses are being transferred to global and national input providers, local input sellers, and 
to those renting out machinery. Note that the economic benefits derived from innovative, 
productive inputs are also being exploited by agro-industrial companies benefitting from 
lower market prices to buy agricultural commodities, and intermediaries such as banking 
companies and merchants.  
Variations 
Depressing relative prices of crops to inputs is a major problem, especially in dry-land 
farming as compared to irrigation farming, since the former is less productive than the latter 
(see Table 7.5). The focus group interview conducted with F9 included smallholders in 
Mardin, and explains how lack of irrigation water and adverse changes in relative prices of 
crops have forced SAEs, small-scale tenants and sharecroppers to abandon their activities. 
F9a: […] water is not available any more. Those who cultivate wheat have a lot of 
difficulties here. […] There were no people in the village; all of them migrated [to urban 
areas]. Now, there are two or three old people in the village. That’s all. 
F9b: […] Fifteen years ago I was cultivating cotton on my lands. There was a worker 
irrigating and farming in return of 1.5 tons of cotton. He could get by on 1.5 tons of 
cotton. Now, if I gave him 5 tons of wheat, I mean if we cultivated jointly, then we could 
not make even a little bit profit. 
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F9a: He could not get by on it. Now, producers [here] are only landholders. In the past, if 
you had not owned a land, you could have got by on a 10 decare of land by renting, but 
now even landholders are unable to live on [agricultural income]. Look, wheat price was 
600-700 [for one ton] earlier; it is the same now. In the past, we can buy 2 [units of] 
fertilizer for one [unit of] wheat but it’s totally opposite right now. […] In the past, they 
did not give us agricultural support money but our due, I mean, the real price of wheat.   
‘The real price of wheat’ here indicates the agricultural prices subsidised in the past, which 
the smallholder interviewed deems as the real return of his effort. F9a is definitely 
dissatisfied with the price level determined by market dynamics as it has lessened relative 
prices of wheat to fertilizer. Önal (2013) shows that this case is also applicable to other field 
crop types.  
 
Table 7.5 Productivity Differences between Rain-fed and Irrigated Agricultural Methods in 
the Case of Sanliurfa (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017a) 
In addition, the increasing use of commercial inputs has necessarily resulted in raised 
production costs (Önal, 2013)92 and narrowed profit margins. However, some AEs with 
access to irrigation water have a chance to cultivate what they want from a wider range of 
crop types available (i.e. cotton, maize, wheat, soybean, pepper, tomato, etc.) and 
furthermore, they can harvest twice or three times in a year with higher productivity. Profit 
margins occurred under both conditions therefore vary greatly, most notably in dry years 
(look at the figures of 2014 that represents a dry season in Table 7.5). This difference 
between rain-fed farming and irrigated farming has caused a quintuple income disparity 
between AEs in favour of those engaging in irrigated farming (The State Hydraulic Works, 
2012). 
                                                          
92 In the period between 2002 and 2015, diesel fuel prices increased by about 236%, the index of fertilizer prices 
by about 327%. As for agricultural crops, increase rates in wheat and maize prices (relatively by 239% and 
312.5%) predominated the increase rate of diesel fuel price in the same period but not the increase rate of 
fertilizer prices. The increase rates of maize, red lentil, cotton was lower than the increases of these input prices, 
relatively 195%, 153% and 47.5% (The Institute for Agricultural Economy and Policy Development, 2015). 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014
Durum Wheat 236 208 88 462 446 377 95.76% 114.42% 328.41%
Barley 289 257 128 428 429 436 48.10% 66.93% 240.63%
Red Lentil 180 127 73 231 189 192 28.33% 48.82% 163.01%
Chickpea 97 95 68 180 180 192 85.57% 89.47% 182.35%
Agricultural 
Crops
Productivity under Rain-
fed Conditions (kg/da)
Productivity under 
Irrigated Conditions 
(kg/da)
Productivity Difference (%)
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Dramatic contractions in the lands allocated to pulses, barley and oil seeds (see Table 7.3 and 
7.4 again) have resulted from the market-based policies that negatively affect the 
smallholders doing rain-fed farming. True, the agricultural enterprises which can access 
irrigation water have stabile income patterns, and they could take advantage of increases in 
agricultural commodity prices in any drought year due to the reduced supply of agricultural 
crops (F15, personal communication, August 26, 2015).93 
Furthermore, they can decrease water consumption and costs and raise crop productivity with 
efficient irrigation through modern irrigation equipment, such as drip irrigation and sprinkler 
irrigation systems. In particular, the government grants given after the mid-2000s to cover 
half the cost of their purchase and installation have helped AEs to increase crop productivity. 
Although O5 (personal communication, May 5, 2015) claims that LAEs are financially more 
capable than SAEs to afford the remaining cost, Table 7.6 points to the fact that SAEs have 
substantially benefitted from the government grants to set up drip irrigation systems (an 
increase of around 42.5% ) in vineyards, orchards and gardens. Accordingly, the increased 
use of modern irrigation equipment through government grants has been one of the 
underlying factors that helped AEs to offset loss of agricultural production coming from 
uncultivated lands and to enhance their income to remain in agriculture. 
Period
Various Pump
 Types
Sprinkler Irrigation 
System
Drip Irrigation 
System
2002-2005 3.18% 12.19% 4.10%
2005-2015 3.03% 11.41% 42.43%
The Types of Irrigation Equipment 
 
Table 7.6 The Average Growth Rates of Different Types of Irrigation Equipment in the SAR 
(Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016b) 
In spite of their advantages stemming from irrigation, AEs involved in irrigated agriculture 
still have problems with production costs. The focus group of F794 (personal communication, 
July 24, 2015) shows that even MAEs and LAEs that get involved in irrigated farming in 
Diyarbakir complain about costs and lack of input subsidies: 
                                                          
93 The average price of durum wheat and barley was respectively 760 Turkish Lira (TL)/Ton and 587 TL/Ton in 
2012, but 885 TL/Ton and 660 TL/Ton in 2014 (Turkish Grain Board, 2012, 2014). It is clear that rises in crop 
prices do not offset the loss of crop production made under rain-fed conditions. 
94 In addition to agricultural activities, F7a and F7b run businesses in the centre of Diyarbakir selling fertilizer, 
seeds and pesticide.  
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F7a: The support is low; input [costs] are high; diesel is expensive95; labour cost is high. 
[The government] left prices to the market […]. 
F7b: [A ton of] certified [wheat] seeds is 1400 Turkish liras. The commodity [a farmer] 
would sell is 700 Turkish liras. There is a hundred per cent of difference. […] He would 
spread fertilizer on his field two times, and seeds. A litre of diesel is 4.5 Turkish liras. 
This would not save that man. Labour cost must be added. […] If supports were ceased, I 
would give up agriculture, definitely.  
Those who engage in irrigated farming differ from each other in terms of how water is 
conveyed to their lands, and this criterion determines their production costs.  
Some AEs can directly access the irrigation water that can be extracted through a pump 
engine from a dam reservoir or from the tributaries of the Euphrates and the Tigris. They 
fortunately incur relatively low electricity or diesel costs of using water (F26, personal 
communication, July 1, 2015; F20, personal communication, July 5, 2015). Even 
smallholders, therefore, have the capability to produce crops for markets with high profit 
margins (Gultekin, 2013). Many SAEs that are located in the mountain villages illustrate this 
case. They generally produce tobacco and various types of fruits and vegetables in vineyards, 
orchards and gardens whilst AEs in low-elevated areas mostly cultivate field crops with 
irrigation water, such as wheat, maize, cotton, pepper, tomato, water melon, melon, tobacco, 
etc. 
If the water is conveyed by gravity-fed irrigation, then the cost of water per cubic meter is 
relatively cheap, and thus the profit margin is high. AEs with varying scales in Harran and 
Akcakale plains in Sanliurfa can directly reach water through open channels connected with 
the gravity irrigation system constructed as a part of the GAP. According to Isgin’s study 
(2006), the average agricultural income in Sanliurfa increased 3,5 times in the first ten years 
after the Ataturk Dam had started to supply irrigation water to Sanliurfa’s plains. However, 
not every agricultural enterprise has increased their agricultural income at the same level 
because of unfair distribution of agricultural lands favouring LAEs (Isgin, 2006) and the 
political-economic dominance of LAEs in irrigation unions (F15, personal communication, 
August 25, 2015). 
                                                          
95 Turkey is one of the countries with the most expensive diesel among OECD countries. Both increases in the 
price of raw petroleum and in tax on diesel consumption have mounted diesel prices in Turkey, which has nearly 
offset the positive effect of the diesel support payments. While other OECD countries lifted tax on diesel 
consumption in agricultural production, Turkey has not done so yet. Consequently, the diesel cost in agricultural 
production is four or five times greater in Turkey than in the US (Aktaş, İpek, & Işık, 2010). 
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But there area AEs which use irrigation water and which are experiencing financial troubles. 
Pumping wells are set up through individual investments. Their success is based on the depth 
of groundwater bodies below the surface (directly effecting electricity bills) and the amount 
of water available. As costs of drilling, maintaining and operating a pumping well are high, 
LAEs tend to exploit groundwater more than SAEs (see Figure 7.1 for the main area in which 
those AEs using pumping wells exist). Easily meeting the criteria about collateral, LAEs can 
access loans with a low interest rate from the Agricultural Banks and the ACC to invest in 
pumping wells (O5, personal communication, May 5, 2014). Regardless of scales of 
economy, the cost of electricity to operate pumping wells creates financial problems for most 
of the AEs extracting groundwater (F19, personal communication, July 5, 2015; O6, personal 
communication, April 28, 2015; N1, personal communication, September 16, 2014). A few 
agriculture enterprises in the region are very fortunate as they can substitute the water 
extracted from pumping wells for water pumped from rivers (F11, personal communication, 
July 27, 2015).  
 
Figure 7.1 Most of the Area in the SAR where Bore Wells Are Excessively Being Used 
(Google Maps, 2017) 
Many AEs in the SAR can access water through the pumped irrigation systems of the GAP 
despite their higher elevations than the water reservoirs, but then its costs are relatively 
higher due to associated electricity cost than for those relying on gravity-fed irrigation water 
(The State Hydraulic Works, 2012, p. 5). This is certainly true in the case of AEs in Bozova 
of Sanliurfa and Samsat of Adiyaman, which are supposed to pay electricity cost putting a 
strain on their finance (Erdil, 2014, July 24). Further, irrigation unions in Adiyaman could not 
pay electricity costs of irrigation water in many cases and ended up out of service (O16, 
personal communication, September 22, 2014; The Town Governorship of Samsat, 2013). 
The need for state intervention in such cases is clearly expressed by an official in the region 
(O16, personal communication, September 22, 2014): 
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“[…] the water of the Ataturk Dam cannot be turned reversely, cannot be flowed to 
Adiyaman by the gravity, and energy is required to [do] this. In fact, how it can happen; 
if the state does a favour for farmers, in favour of farmers, in terms of the charge for 
water use, I mean, of charge for spending [electricity], our farmers can benefit from this. 
If she does not, farmer[s] cannot.”   
The agricultural enterprises affected, regardless of their size, abandoned the cultivation of 
high value added crops and turned to low value-added ones such as wheat and barley (F24, 
personal communication, July 7, 2015). The following discussion with farmers captures this 
(F24, personal communication, July 7, 2015):  
“F24a: We had extracted water from the dam for some period. We had cultivated cotton 
for eight years and bankrupted. 40 billion Turkish liras96 of electricity bill were charged 
every year. […] We have 3 or 5 flats and sold them. […]. 
The interviewer: […] there is [now] no irrigation water [supplied] to your current lands?  
F24a: No, there is not. 
The interviewer: This is why you are doing rain-fed agriculture? 
F24a: […] the distance between us and the reservoir is 300 metres. […] there is even no 
drinking water. […] we benefit from neither water nor anything; the property submerged 
[in water reservoirs] was ours. […] Over 1000 decares of land of our village were 
submerged. […] some of us could put [the expropriation money] to good use but the rest 
could not. 
F24b: They bought two or three flats. 
F24a: They bought them, all right, but we wasted them for that [water pump]. 
The procurement of electricity and water would be subsidised for agricultural irrigation until 
2001 (Güresinli, 2015, p. 66). This was left with the ARIP, and the electricity market was 
later privatised. The privatisation enabled the government to leave economic decisions about 
electricity to the market. However, privatised electricity distributors in Turkey receive a 
licence for certain regions, hence having monopolistic power in a certain regional market 
("Elektrik Piyasasi Kanunu [The Act of Electricity Market]," 2013). For example, the Tigris 
Electricity Distribution Incorporated is the only service provider in six cities: Diyarbakir, 
Sanliurfa, Batman, Mardin, Siirt and Sirnak. The market for electricity production is indeed 
                                                          
96 In 2005, Turkey introduced the new Turkish lira, equivalent to 1 million of the old Turkish liras. While 
speaking in their daily life, Turkey’s people sometimes use the old Turkish lira. The electricity bill was 40,000 
Turkish liras per year, which equals to around 9300 pound for 60 decares of land cultivated.  
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limitedly competitive (The Energy Market Regulatory Authority, 2015, p. 22). And the unit 
price of electricity is higher in Turkey than the average unit price in the OECD countries 
(Aktan, 2006). In addition, the government does not subsidise the electricity use of agricultural 
enterprises or irrigation unions and does not guide or direct them in their decision-making 
process. The local representative of an agricultural non-governmental body (The Chamber of 
Agricultural Engineers in Mardin, 2012) summarises the case well: 
“[…] Although [agricultural] producers approximately know the cost of all types of 
inputs, they cannot even guess the cost of electricity. While 3 or 5 thousand Turkish liras 
of a bill is charged for a year for the pumping well used in production, 25 or 30 thousand 
Turkish liras might be charged for the same well the following year. Moreover, it is said 
that some bills issued are equal to a hundred thousands Turkish liras. While this 
inconsistency is doing serious harms to producers, they are avoiding paying these bills, 
too. […] that the price [per unit] of electricity is so expensive is another problem. The 
price of electricity produced in agriculture must be subsidised. Given that the Mardin 
[and Ceylanpinar irrigation] canals of GAP will be finished at a near future date, farmers 
are supposed to be saved from the burden of the accumulated debt.” 
However, the government has yet to intervene in the electricity market. Even worse, they 
have put agricultural support payments on hold to force agricultural enterprises to pay their 
electricity bill since 2014 (F5, personal communication, July 24, 2015, The Cabinet, 
2014/6052). It was expected that this decision would force farmers to settle the issue with the 
electricity distributor. In reality, this pressure has acted as a disincentive for agricultural 
enterprises, which has resulted in reduction in the value added. Private electricity distributors 
have not made the required investments in the regional electricity grid. As a result, the 
electricity network frequently breaks down due to high electricity consumption, especially in 
summer. This electricity cut resulted in loss of agricultural values in the past years, 
approximately 115 million Turkish liras just for Mardin in 2010 (Irmak, 2012).97   
Overall, the GAP investments in irrigation have the potential to enhance agricultural 
productivity; yet, these investments alone are insufficient. The study of Türkekul and 
Unakıtan (2011) proves that the subsidisation of energy is required to foster agricultural 
productivity. However, the lack of subsidies, and the high cost of electricity as a result of the 
privatisation ostensibly hamper agricultural economic activities in the region. Note that the 
State Hydraulic Works is currently trying to find an innovative solution without harming 
                                                          
97 It is around 26.7 million pounds. Power cuts also cause pump engine break downs. Its total cost to farmers in 
Mardin in 2010 was approximately 20 million Turkish liras or 465,000 pounds (Irmak, 2012). 
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market dynamics; they are constructing solar panels for irrigation unions to decrease their 
energy costs for pumped irrigation (The State Hydraulic Works, 2015). The success of this 
initiative will determine whether any government intervention in the electricity market is 
required. 
7.3 Agricultural Commodity Markets 
The main aim of this section is to discuss how neoliberal policies towards and lack of 
government interventions in agricultural commodity markets have influenced AEs in the 
SAR.  
For easiness, agricultural commodity markets will be addressed in two main categories: the 
fresh food market and the processed agricultural commodities market. We will address the 
relationship between main actors in these market within the boundaries of government 
agricultural policies and their adaptation to the international institutional framework. In doing 
so, we will show that neoliberal agricultural transformation in agricultural commodity 
markets has advanced at the expense of SAEs. 
7.3.1 The Fresh Food Market 
The crops sold in domestic markets for the direct consumption of urban dwellers are 
generally fresh fruits and vegetables. Some crops that are refined with simple treatments (e.g. 
drying and roasting) are also included in this model. Since Turkey has a high sufficiency in 
fresh fruits and vegetables (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016a), some portion of these are 
exported to international markets, and tropical fruits, which gained popularity in the last two 
decades, are imported to be traded in domestic markets. Figure 7.2 points to the simplified 
model depicting the agricultural marketing network of fresh produce. 
Fresh fruits and vegetables are secured in the domestic market through AEs growing these 
crops and importers bringing especially tropical fruits to supply to the domestic market. The 
total supply of fresh produce is eaten by consumers at their houses and restaurants to meet 
daily diet. What decreases the total supply is that merchants gather some of the produced 
fresh fruits and vegetables and trade in international markets to earn foreign exchange. What 
I learnt from my conversation with the local people is that most of the fresh vegetables 
produced in the region are consumed within its boundaries. However, its historical heritage, 
and its culture surrounding food have attracted many tourists to the SAR since the armed 
conflict ended. This adds to the total demand of the fresh produce cultivated in the region. 
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AEs could have been expected to get higher prices, but some practices of agricultural 
liberalisation have not allowed this. 
 
Figure 7.2 The Main Supply Line of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables 
Although Turkey has adopted the agricultural trade liberalisation imposed by the Uruguay 
Round Agreement, it has continued to protect raw agricultural products, including fruits and 
vegetables, with higher tariff rates without violating the agreement. The exclusion of raw 
agricultural products from the EU Common Custom Tariffs also provides a room for the 
government to protect the AEs growing them (the OECD, 2011, pp. 50-51). According to the 
OECD (2016b, p. 23), the Turkish trade regime can be considered liberal given its tariff 
structure; yet, several factors such as standards, procedures, ‘mutual recognition agreements’, 
and fees and charges, etc. are rendering Turkey more restrictive in international trade than 
most OECD countries. As a result of this hybrid approach to international agricultural trade, 
average agricultural prices received by AEs in Turkey have turned out to be 20% higher than 
world prices in 2015 (the OECD, 2016a, p. 123). Still, this is lower than the price levels in 
the 1990s. After the ARIP, the agricultural prices received by farmers have dramatically 
dropped due to the lowered international trade barriers, leading to the income loss of AEs (M. 
Öztürk, 2012, pp. 94-95).  
One of the important changes made within the ARIP engendered the exclusion of agricultural 
sale cooperatives (ASCs) and unions (ASCUs) at the expense of AEs. This policy change was 
to cease governmental financial support to them as they had purchased crops from their 
members at a loss. The most important factor behind the financial loss was that the floor 
prices had been set higher than market prices, having inevitably created incentives to 
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producers. Another important factor was that the sale cooperatives were forced by the 
politically-motivated government to get the excessive volume of crop purchases (Oral, 2015a, 
p. 330). Worse, storage costs and the sale of crops to merchants and industrialists at a loss 
because of overstuffed inventories heavily harmed their economic efficiency (Oral, 2015a, p. 
330). These cooperatives therefore formed a heavy financial burden on the public budget. 
ASCUs were restructured with the ARIP and compelled to offer prices to their members  
without compromising their competitiveness (M. Öztürk, 2012, p. 90), to obtain financial 
resources from the market (the OECD, 2011, pp. 42-43). Today, the main problem of 
agricultural producers in the SAR is that they are heavily dependent on merchants in the 
commodity market, so unable to set prices in the absence of sales cooperatives and the 
collective action they had provided before. The ASCUs that were operating in the SAR in the 
1990s are seen in Table 7.7. 
 
Table 7.7 The Cooperative Unions in the SAR, Their Current Status and Their Areas of 
Operation 
The Gapbirlik is officially still active but in reality it is not. As we will mention in the next 
section, the Cukobirlik is active but on a limited level. The Guneydogubirlik went into 
liquidation. Instead of ASCUs losing their power in agricultural marketing, producers unions 
(see Table 7.8) have been encouraged by the government across the country. Affiliated with a 
centre union of producers union as to crop groups, these unions are mostly organised on 
town-level, involving a small group of farmers. Most of them have succeeded in reaching 
export markets, thereby getting higher prices from brokers, merchants and exporters (Demir 
Kaya, 2016a; Parlak, June 8, 2018) and even guaranteeing their future sales through contracts 
(Demir Kaya, 2016a). The unions are, however, not connected with each other and 
sometimes even compete with each other, and thus most of them cannot enhance their 
bargaining power to get even higher prices from merchants or brokers. ASCs, nevertheless, 
would cover most of the farmers engaging in the production of a certain crop type, collect 
most of them through subsidised purchases and sell them to merchants at higher prices thanks 
to their monopolistic status.  
Cooperative Unions Current Status Agricultural Commodities
Guneydogubirlik Closed Pistachio, Red Pepper, Red Lentil, Raisins, Olive and Olive Oil
Gapbirlik Open But Not Active Cotton, Lentil, Pistachio, Soy Bean, Red Pepper, Raisins, Maize
Cukobirlik  Limitedly Active Cotton, Groundnut, Soy Bean, Sunflower, Kanola
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Table 7.8  Crop Types in Which Each Producers Union Carries Out Agricultural Marketing 
Operations (The General Directorate of Agricultural Reform, 2017) 
The Guneydogubirlik is an instructive case. Its former general directorate, Ökkeş Kıroğlu, 
blames politicians and the authorities in the chamber of commerce and the commodity 
exchange in Gaziantep for the closure of the Guneydogubirlik: 
“[…] Now, producers are in a terrible state, especially in pistachio, lentil, pepper and 
grape. They [politicians and the authorities] guessed that after the cooperative got closed, 
they would make a lot of money. Those who are earning from this business now are just 
hoarders. [The importance of] its absence has been come out. When the cooperative 
exists, it would release the commodity to the market if it disappeared. […] the price 
would not rise. […] the market would be stabilised itself. If it was too much in the 
market, the cooperative would purchase it. Then […] the price would come to stability. 
Everyone would have confidence. Producers would sell their products well. The 
shopkeepers would get their product well. Hoarders would not earn (Kınacılar, 2018, 3 
August).”  
Hoarders here refer to a group of merchants who own inventories and adequate financial 
resources to make economic operations in the market to maximize their profits. They can 
speculate in the market or easily benefit from price fluctuations where there are no well 
functioning cooperatives. As SAEs and MAEs have no capability to store and process, they 
do not have this bargaining power in agricultural marketing networks. This case is also 
applicable to the other regions of Turkey for the sale of other fruits and vegetables, with 
merchants and supermarkets being behind the lower prices received by producers and higher 
prices paid by consumers (Lemeilleur & Codron, 2011) (see Table 7.9). The more merchants 
Cities Crop Types
Adiyaman Grape; Hard Shelled-Fruits; Organic Fruits; Milk; Meat
Batman Strawberry; Grape; Pistachio; Aquaculture Products; Milk, Meat
Diyarbakir Grape; Cotton; Grains; Organic Grains; Organic Fruits; Milk, Sericulture; Honey; Vegetable
Gaziantep Cherry; Milk; Meat; Egg
Kilis Organic Olive; Vegetable
Mardin Olive; Grains; Cherry; Milk; Honey; Meat
Sanliurfa Natural Flower Bulb; Milk; Pepper; Pistachio; Honey; Meat
Siirt Pomegranate; Honey; Pistachio; Milk
Sirnak Grains; Milk
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get involved in conveying fresh produce to urban areas, the higher the prices paid by urban 
consumers owing to transportation costs. 
 
Table 7.9 The Prices of Fresh Agricultural Commodities at Different Nodes of the 
Agricultural Marketing Network in 2018 (Turkey Union of Chamber of Agriculture, 2018)  
Most households and restaurants prefer to acquire their fresh food from sellers at open 
markets or local shopkeepers, who secure their products from whole markets. At wholesale 
markets, commission agents add a 3-8% of commission to their prices (Atasoy, 2013; 
Lemeilleur & Codron, 2011). Their intermediary position is guaranteed by law in return of 
tax, that is, the producers who do not sell their products to exporters and agro-food industries 
must sell them to wholesale markets if the volume of sale per day is under the level set by 
local municipalities (Atasoy, 2013; Lemeilleur & Codron, 2011). 
Supermarkets are another major actor supplying fresh produce to consumers. They are 
increasing their share in the retail market in recent years (The Competition Authority, 2011, 
p. 6), but their sales of fresh fruits and vegetables compose a small portion of the total 
(Lemeilleur & Codron, 2011) because of their higher price policy (see Table 7.9). One of the 
important cases in the organised retail sector is that conservative capitalists in Anatolia 
associated with the ruling party have increasingly invested in this sector, which causes 
competition with secular and international capitalists and the resultant intensification of 
market-based relationships in the food sector (Atasoy, 2013). The outcome is that small 
producers are increasingly developing their ties with supermarkets in value chains (Atasoy, 
2013). As I observed, while local supermarkets are spreading across urban areas in the SAR, 
Crops
The Prices 
Received
 at Farm Gate 
(TL/Kg)
The Prices at 
Wholesale 
Markets 
(TL/Kg)
The Prices at 
Open Markets 
(TL/Kg)
The Prices at 
Supermarkets 
(TL/Kg)
The Price 
Differential 
Between Farm 
and Wholesale 
Markets
The Price 
Differential 
Between Farm 
and Open 
Markets
The Price 
Differential 
Between Farm 
and Supermarkets
Apple 1.31 3.06 3.33 5.21 133.59% 154.20% 297.71%
Aubergine 0.94 1.49 2.17 2.77 58.51% 130.85% 194.68%
Watermelon 0.48 0.76 1.00 1.34 58.33% 108.33% 179.17%
Tomato 1.58 2.10 2.83 4.08 32.91% 79.11% 158.23%
Cucumber 1.50 1.79 2.33 3.08 19.33% 55.33% 105.33%
Pistachio 40.00 N/A 70.00 82.80 N/A 75.00% 107.00%
Raisin 7.30 N/A 12.00 13.60 N/A 64.38% 86.30%
Pepper 1.86 2.24 3.00 3.45 20.43% 61.29% 85.48%
Onion 1.75 2.43 2.67 3.05 38.86% 52.57% 74.29%
Beef 29.04 N/A N/A 47.13 N/A N/A 62.29%
Lamb 39.43 N/A N/A 63.50 N/A N/A 61.04%
170 
 
a very small group of farmers directly sell their fresh produce to them, most sell at local open 
markets or to agents in wholesale markets. 
It is clear that merchants and brokers appropriate the agricultural surplus generated by fruit 
and vegetable producers under free-market conditions. Though they are complaining about 
the intermediary positions of merchants and brokers, they despairingly admit that this 
traditional supply chain will not change in the near future. They do not receive any price 
support, and there is no market intervention by any board. The neoliberal agricultural policies 
certainly support merchants and supermarkets at the expense of producers and urban wage 
earners. O35 (personal communication, August 6, 2014), an official expert on marketing in 
the MOAF, elaborates on the problems of producers in trading their products: 
O35: Those who got out of the [whole sale] market feel impelled to engage in systems 
like district-level open markets [or] things in between like alternative marketing systems. 
It is because they are not able to access national markets. It is because getting products to 
over there is a must for accessing [national markets], [and] paying taxes is required. For 
example, you cannot sell products without getting involved in the whole sale market [...]. 
In the whole sale market for fruits and vegetables, the share of merchants and brokers is 
about 70-80%, farmers 5% and farmer organisations 2-3%. What does it mean? In the 
market of agricultural products [or] of fresh vegetable and fruit, merchants and brokers 
play a dominant and prevalent role. The price of tomatoes [per kilogram] which is 50 
kurus98 or 1 lira at the farm increases by two or three times when [buyers go through] 
checkout in the whole sale market. When they arrive at Istanbul, their price goes up by 4 
or 5 times. […] the share of producers in the [total] value-added […] is low; it is far 
lower for small producers. […] large scale ones can directly reach to supermarkets and 
markets through their means. [Yet,] small producers are to sell them to one or several 
intermediaries. […] This is not a sustainable and competitive structure. Today, not only 
Turkey but also FAO are doing research for not losing smallholders or family farmers by 
addressing how their integration with the market will take place. […] Another question is 
that there are supermarkets in our [country] […] like Aldi or Tesco in the Europe. They 
are disintermediating [merchants and brokers] and directly buying products from 
producers and farmlands but still tomatoes for 50 kurus [for agricultural producers]. They 
are claiming the profit of intermediaries and still have a negative effect on producers. 
[…] while the retail sector is growing, there is no improvement in [economic] welfare of 
producers. 
                                                          
98 100 kurus is equal to 1 liras. 
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Where real agricultural prices in Turkey have nearly remained constant since 2001 (A. 
Yılmaz & Arı, 2013), intermediary actors have increased their profit margins and have forced 
agricultural producers to acquiesce to reductions in their profit margins (Baydur, 2015).  
In the hope of getting higher prices, some of AEs directed their resources to organic crop 
production, preferred by the urban middle class (M. Öztürk, Jongerden, & Hilton, 2014). In 
fact, organic farmers in the SAR have received higher prices than non-organic farmers but 
not to the expected level (Monis et al., 2012, pp. 29-31, 41). As O9 (personal communication, 
September 30, 2014) stated, the subsidy for organic farming is given by the government to 
encourage agricultural producers; yet, it has remained low for SAEs, and generally favoured 
LAEs, since it is granted subject to land size. Another way encouraged by development 
agencies and the GAP-RDA was to produce local agricultural products having genuine 
qualities that are recognised and certificated by the EU as products with geographical 
indication, offering protections, so higher prices, to agricultural producers (B. Aslan & Demir 
Kaya, 2017). 
We mentioned that urban consumers have been the other actors paying for the costs of 
agricultural policies, and worse, they have been confronted with decreases in real wages since 
2001 (A. Yılmaz & Arı, 2013). They are still paying higher prices for agricultural 
commodities than international prices, but this has gradually been reduced as a result of 
agricultural liberalisation. Domestic agricultural prices at the farm gate were 60% higher than 
international prices in 1999, 29% in 2007, 22% in 2013 and 32% in 2016 (The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018). It shows that the loss of urban 
consumers’ wages has been alleviated with domestic agricultural prices getting closer to 
international market prices.  
Why has the government allowed producers to be protected from international competition by 
not designing policies that would converge domestic and international agricultural prices? 
According to Keyder (2014, p. 208), ‘most of the agricultural producers in Turkey are not 
able to compete with the world regarding productivity for the reasons of the agronomic 
qualities of soil, the technology used, the scale of enterprise and climate.’ The issue points to 
structural problems. Agricultural liberalisation and market dynamics have apparently not 
overcome these problems. And the rise in uncultivated land implies that the convergence of 
domestic and international prices would have brought devastating results for agricultural 
production. 
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It should be noted that fruit and vegetable producers receive higher prices than field crop 
producers as they have comparative advantages in international markets. This advantage 
pertains to the cultivation of fruit and vegetable types involving the peculiarity of Turkey and 
Mediterranean geography and climate. Despite high sufficiency in their cultivation, their 
export decreases the level of the supply to the national market, so keeping these prices 
relatively high. This allows the government not to give premium payments based on output to 
fruit and vegetable producers. Except for input subsidies, fruit and vegetable producers 
competitively operate under free market conditions.  
All the effort to increase agricultural productivity are greatly exploited by merchants and 
middle- and large-scale capitalists at the end of the day, which form a strong political base of 
the ruling party at regional and national levels. 
7.3.2 The Processed Agricultural Commodity Market 
Processed agricultural commodities enter domestic markets via three channels: domestic and 
international processors and importers (see Figure 7.3). International agro-processors do not 
have any weight in the industrial production of the SAR but in the regional consumption 
through their vendors and through the domestic importers merchandising their products to 
supermarkets and local retailers.  
 
Figure 7.3 The Main Supply Line of Agricultural Raw Materials and Processed Food in the 
SAR 
Both globalisation and trade liberalisation have created a suitable environment for the 
international agro-industrial companies and importers to expand their commercial operations 
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across the world. In this sense, Turkey has gone beyond what is expected regarding 
international trade, with the adoption of the EU Common Custom Tariffs. For example, 
Turkey’s protection of processed agricultural commodities has remained far lower than the 
level imposed by the Uruguay Round Agreement (the OECD, 2011, p. 50). Varieties and the 
range of brands in food, beverages and textile products have therefore expanded more. The 
organised retailing sector has long been supported by the government creating incentives, 
loan concessions and exemptions in order to diminish the weight of unrecorded commerce 
leading to loss of tax income (A. A. Koç et al., 2007). They therefore increased the share in 
the fast-moving consumption good sector from around 31% in 2004 to around 51% in 2011 
(The Competition Authority, 2012, p. 5). The upsurge in the use of credit cards and consumer 
loans after mid-2000s thanks to decreasing interest rates and flourishing future expectations 
(Mazibaş & Tuna, 2017) has helped households to grow their consumption with user-friendly 
cooking and storing devices, fast-moving consumption goods, fast-food and apparels (A. A. 
Koç et al., 2007),99 justifying neoliberal policies in the eyes of urban people in spite of 
decreasing real wages.  
Meanwhile, international agro-processors have bolstered their partnerships with domestic 
large-scale capitalists in west Turkey, which help them fully exploit potential benefits from 
their intellectual property rights such as patents and brands (Yenal, 2014, pp. 113-126). This 
development marks the intensification of the existing surplus transfer mechanism from the 
SAR to west Turkey, of which the urban areas have densely been populated in the last two 
decades, and to abroad. As I observed, the organised retailing sector has a place in the city 
centres but hardly in the towns, except for local ones.  
One of the important phenomenon is the increasing share of discount supermarkets in the 
retailing sector, which sell products with their own private labels and of little-known brands 
(The Competition Authority, 2012, pp. 6-8). Conservative Anatolian capitalists play an 
important role in manufacturing processed food for such supermarkets through 
subcontracting and also serve as subcontracted manufacturers for international and national 
textile companies with popular brands (Hosgör, 2011). 
How is the position of agro-industries of the SAR in such a competitive environment? The 
competitiveness of the agro-industries in the SAR, mostly at small and medium scales, tend 
to be less than those in west Turkey because of several reasons. First, their financial and 
                                                          
99 Around 25% of total household expenses in Turkey are made for food, beverages and tobacco products 
(KMPG Turkey, 2018, p. 8).9 
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technical abilities of marketing their products to the national market are limited, and therefore 
they generally produce commodities as subcontractors yielding lower profits (N9, personal 
communication, May 11, 2015). Another reason is that they have technical and financial 
barriers to smoothly proceed from the level of simple processing to advanced levels. For 
example, the SAR is ranked first in cotton production; ginneries have spread across the 
region, but the industries of cotton spinning, dying and textile have remained nascent (Deniz, 
2010, p. 23). An expert in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Diyarbakir, N9 
(personal communication, May 11, 2015) pointed out that grains are processed to produce 
flour, bran and bulgur but rarely to make pasta and biscuits, and that agro-food products are 
commonly packaged and branded in other regions. As N9 stated, capitalists outside the region 
(conservative Anatolian capitalists) get into agro-manufacturing to take advantage of low-
cost raw materials and low-paid workers. In addition, local capitalists generally invest in 
agro-processing industries, composed by Kurdish capitalists and conservative capitalists from 
different ethnic groups. The large-scale secular and conservative capitalists have engaged in 
the sectors requiring high capital levels such as retailing, cement production, mining and 
energy in the last two decades. 
In an effort to overcome these problems, agro-industrial companies are financially and 
technically being assisted by the government and international organisations in line with the 
development strategy of the GAP, and by the EU with a view to adapt Turkey’s agriculture to 
the accession conditions of the Union. Conservative local capitalists, thanks to their political 
rapport with the ruling government, are obtaining the required support from the government. 
Again, the Kurdish capitalists have also been backed in the same way, as a part of the 
government strategy that aims to strengthen ties with the loyal Turkish and Arab-origin 
capitalists and to assure the economic dependency of Kurdish capitalists to the state. 
According to N9 (personal communication, May 11, 2015), an official in Diyarbakir 
Chamber of Commerce, such capital owners are receiving grants, tax exemptions, loan 
concessions through different schemes to make investment in the sub-sectors they have 
comparative advantages, such as industrial feed, packed milk products and meat, packed 
pulse products, edible oil, flour, bakery products, ginning, irrigation equipment, etc.100  
The number of food processing firms in the SAR has increased fourfold between 2002 and 
2017 (from 294 in 2002 to 1198 in 2017) thanks to these financially backed investments, and 
                                                          
100 In this way, the total value of annual private industrial investments in the SAR that are financially supported 
by the government grew by nearly 18 times from 451 million Turkish lira in 2002 to 8.5 billion Turkish lira in 
2017 but 69% in Turkey (The GAP-RDA, n.d.-a). 
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the number of firms in textile, apparel and leather sectors raised by nearly 1.5 times (from 
511 in 2002 to 1227 in 2017) (The GAP-RDA, n.d.-b).101 The total value of industrial export 
and agricultural export have been mounted by 12.5 and 11.8 time respectively since 2002, 
recording around 2.6 billion dollar in foreign trade surplus (The GAP-RDA, 2018, pp. 39-40). 
In the period between 2004 and 2017, the SAR’s industrial economy has annually grown 
(16.22%) more than Turkey’s (15.13%) in current prices (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). 
Agro-industrial companies sell their products to consumers through supermarkets and local 
retailers and additionally export them mostly to Middle-East countries. As such, compared 
with supermarkets and merchants, agro-processors tend to operate with greater profit margins 
(Dağlı & Eker, 2016; Kazak, 2018; Turkish Exporters Assembly, 2016, p. 27).102 Therefore 
agro-processors are expected to be the most prominent beneficiaries of agricultural 
production in the SAR.  
The owners of agro-industries secure raw materials from the crops of their agricultural land 
as well as the merchants and brokers who acquire them from agricultural producers at 
different scales. Again, some owners of LAEs can directly sell their crops to manufacturers in 
the region, receiving higher prices than SAEs and MAEs. To a large extent the Turkish Grain 
Board and producer unions and Cukobirlik to a lesser extent also become involved in the 
provision of raw materials (see Figure 7.3). 
7.3.2.1 Cooperatives  
As mentioned earlier, ASCUs were re-organized after the ARIP, turning their processing 
facilities into corporations as a part of privatisation (Oral, 2015a). Oyan (2000 cited in Oral, 
2015, p.331) criticised at that time that those policies would undermine industrial and 
commercial capacities of the ASCUs, so deteriorating the bargaining power of AEs against 
other actors in the market. The Guneydogubirlik is an instructive case. Its former general 
directorate, Ökkeş Kıroğlu, emphasizes that the factories of the Guneydogubirlik processing 
various crops were closed and sold for close to nothing, and AEs have thus been doomed to 
failure in the favour of merchants (Kınacılar, 2018, 3 August).  
                                                          
101 All the mentioned agro-industrial sectors account for around 57% of total industrial firms in the region. Note 
that about 66% of the total industrial firms agglomerate in only two cities, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa (The GAP-
RDA, n.d.-b). 
102 It must be noted that there are disparities between firms at various scale regarding profit margins. As 
expected, economies of scale prevail in Turkey’s food processing sector, that is, the larger the scale of a firm, 
the greater the profit margin (Dağlı & Eker, 2016). 
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As Karli and Çelik (2003) point out, financial problems after the restructuring drove the 
cooperatives in the SAR to withdraw from the market. The Cukobirlik has about 15,300 
members in the SAR,103 but what I learnt from my fieldwork was that most of those members 
do not actively work with the cooperative. For example, the total number of the members at 
the central district of Sanliurfa is about 3,000 on paper. Yet, only 100 to 200 cotton 
producers, and mainly large and medium scale AEs, actively collaborate with the Cukobirlik. 
As the manager of the Cukobirlik at Sanliurfa city centre (N2, personal communication, April 
29, 2015) expressed, the vast majority of cotton producers gave up working with the 
cooperative since the withdrawal of state funds thwarted the operational effectiveness of the 
cooperative, and only the agricultural producers which harvest low quality cotton are now 
willing to bring their products to the cooperative. The Cukobirlik has long had difficulties to 
repay the debt borrowed during the restructuring period (Çavdarcı, February 23, 2017). The 
cotton purchased by the cooperative therefore declined from around 208,500 ton in 1998/99 
to around 82,700 in 2007/2008 (TGNA Inquiry Committee, 2008, p. 272), which resulted in 
their sale operations only concentrating on areas outside the SAR. According to Cahit Ari, a 
deputy in Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA): 
[…] if we especially look at [the issue] with regard to cotton, the cultivated areas for 
cotton as the most important raw material for textiles and the oil industry declined from 
7,210,770 decares in 2002 to 5 million decares in 2017. A decrease of 30% has come up 
from 2002 to 2017. The import policies have been maintained in cotton, too; the 
insufficiency has been tackled through import. Consequently, the import of cotton has 
rose by 56.25% between 2003 and 2017. In this context, there is great importance in 
increasing efficiency of TARIS, Cukobirlik and Antbirlik. Additionally, the support 
[payment] given to cotton production is not adequate (TGNA Directorate of the Minutes 
Services, November 16, 2018, p. 75). 
Turkey has a comparative advantage in textiles. In 2015, Turkey ranked eighth globally and 
third among European countries with regard to the production of clothing. The country is in 
the group of top-ten exporter countries globally in textiles (The Ministry of Economy, n.d). 
Despite the high competitiveness in this sector, the lack of subsidies, the absence of 
cooperatives in marketing, and the lower prices for cotton have created disincentives to AEs 
in Turkey, rewarded AEs abroad and resulted in losing foreign currency. The fact that the 
                                                          
103. They also show that Cukobirlik had over 63,000 members at its peak but now only has15,000. 
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SAR accounts for around 57% of Turkey’s total cotton production (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 2017c) indicates that AEs in the region have suffered. 
Where the neoliberal agricultural policies have trivialised the cooperatives in the SAR, 
producers unions have sprouted to some extent as mentioned earlier. Some of them have been 
processing and packaging the crops they collect for a few years, and some are still 
constructing the required facilities through national and international financial and technical 
assistance. We shall address the case of Kilis Organic Olive and Olive Oil Producers Union 
in the following sections, as an example of a success story. 
7.3.2.2 The Turkish Grain Board 
The Turkish Grain Board was responsible for purchasing grains and pulses at the declared 
prices when required, monitoring the national reserve and assuring the required stock for 
possible shocks in demand or supply (M. Öztürk, 2012, p. 94). Until 2001, the Board had 
generally relied on public funds and the write-off of debts by the government to curb 
overproduction and sharp contractions in prices (the OECD, 2011, pp. 43-44; M. Öztürk, 
2012, p. 94). It was remodelled to better handle market fluctuations and sustain the stability 
of the grain market (The World Bank, 2009, pp. 1, 4, 9). In this regards, the Board ceased 
preventing dramatic declines in grain prices owing to overproduction, lifted import barriers, 
started to give lower prices to farmers as lessening purchases and set the minimum purchase 
quantity at the expense of SAEs (M. Öztürk, 2012, p. 94). The main aim was eventually to 
lower the subsidised prices to the level of world prices. 
Modernising its labs, facilities and equipment after 2001104, the role of the Board in the 
market is now to alleviate sharp market fluctuations with price interventions. O26 (personal 
communication, September 26, 2014), an official in Turkish Grain Board in Diyarbakir 
clarified this policy: 
O26: When you would look at [the data of] some year in the past, we totally purchased 
360,000 tonnes of wheat and 275,000 tonnes of maize. […] but when we look at [the data 
of] 2014, we did not purchase even one kilogram of wheat. 
Interviewer: Why not? 
O26: The intervention purchase price was not declared. 
Interviewer: Why was it not declared? 
                                                          
104 The modernisation of facilities, labs and equipment of Turkish Grain Board should be considered as an 
attempt to innovatively increase institutional capacity. For example, the pricing of grains became a scientific 
endeavour using the modern equipment evaluating the nutrient and quality values. 
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O26: Assume that as merchants purchase wheat from the market for 800-900 liras per 
ton, if the price we declare was 700 liras, we would dismay producers […]. Last year, 
[…] the purchase price was 635 liras. We will increase it by the inflation rate, 8%. When 
you added it [to the intervention price], it accounts for approximately 700 liras. If you 
declared it as 700 liras and the wheat price was 800 liras, it would mean that your policy 
is against producers. It would mean that you do not implement your mission [properly]. 
We have a mission to protect both producers and consumers. It would mean that […] you 
side with industrialists. If we declared it as 700 liras, that price of 800 liras immediately 
would decrease to 650 liras. […] Why? This is because Turkish Grain Board would cut 
official expenses from the declared price […]. All of them account for 5%. […] The 
market [actors] would immediately calculate it and [declare,] “I am purchasing [wheat] at 
660 liras.”[…] [Additionally], when you get wheat to the Board, there is a transportation 
cost [to pay]. […] [Merchants] would tell them, “Do not go run in circles, brother, and 
get your 650 liras. I will come to your farmland to get your products”. […] When the 
price drop to 650 liras, if the Board was not be able to gather enough wheat [from 
producers], - here is so important- merchants would increase the wheat price to 900 liras 
three months later [at the expense of industrialists]. If the Board did not have enough 
wheat in hand, she would import [wheat] or sell her stock, in order to protect consumers 
[and industrialists]. 
If we look at what the official said, we might conclude that the price regulatory mechanism is 
working smoothly in favour of all actor groups in the market. However, Ali Ekber Yildirim 
(May 27, 2015), a journalist writing about agriculture, points to the trouble on agricultural 
producers posed by the Board’s policy: 
The production [of wheat] that amount to 22 million 500 thousand tonnes in 2013 fell to 
19 million tonnes in 2014. Additionally, the quality of the products was not at the desired 
level. But the price increased because of the decreased production. The Turkish Grain 
Board did not declare any intervention price as “the price was high”. 
The case is so different this year. Both production and quality are high.  
[…] The concern of the producer is that the price of 820 [Turkish] lira [per ton] could 
decrease as long as the [total] yield increases. […] The wheat producer argue that costs 
have risen too much, and a decrease in price would negatively affect the next year’s 
production. 
The date of the announcement of the price by the Board is underlined here. When costs rise 
year by year, any drop in the price could easily bankrupt the agricultural producers with 
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financial vulnerabilities. They, therefore, call for the Board intervening in the market to keep 
the price up. Indeed, many SAEs complained during the fieldwork about the price policy 
conducted by the Board. A smallholder cultivating grain in Adiyaman, F24 (personal 
communication, July 7, 2015) provides an illustrative case: 
We sell barley to merchants in the [local] wheat market. […] Will we wait for the state! 
[If] we have a harvester reaped [barley], then we pay fee for the harvester. For the debt 
[owed] for fertilizer, we pay [back the required] money. […] If the state had offered us a 
price, we would not have brought [to merchants]. I mean we would have waited. They 
[the Board] are now purchasing [grains], [but] I have nothing. […] I obtained [loan] from 
a fertilizer seller. He added 250 liras [to the total payment] as interest. I had to [do this], 
no way. 
The late announcement of purchase prices results from the Board monitoring the market for 
price stability; the officials do not intervene in the grain market until they have assessed if 
grain prices would economically harm consumers, producers or industrialists. As discussed 
earlier, SAEs mostly obtain inputs by borrowing from input sellers, merchants and broker. 
After all, they are supposed to pay back loans with interest just after the harvest. It means that 
they are unable to take the advantage of the price that will later be declared by the Board, 
thus selling their crops to merchants at lower prices and failing to fully derive potential 
profits (Ihlas News Agency, July 6, 2017). When prices increase within the season, 
merchants get the extra returns. 
7.3.2.3 Agricultural Producers versus Merchants and Agro-Industries 
We need to understand market-based relationships between agricultural producers, merchants 
and agro-industries within the context of support policies. As mentioned, subsidised 
purchases were eliminated with the ARIP reshaping cooperative and the Turkish Grain 
Board. The premium payments subject to the sale of certain crops were later introduced so 
that the supply of agricultural raw materials could be secured by agro-processors.   
The Premium Payment 
The market price support policy is essentially based on the deficiency or “premium” payment 
in Turkey, which is given to AEs as a payment per unit, without intervening in the market 
price and the amount of the supply. The government actually aims for AEs to continue their 
crop-specific production through this policy. OECD (2011, p. 112) criticizes the Turkish 
government that the deficiency payments are ‘potentially the most distorting and inefficient 
forms of support in transferring income to farmers’ and are supposed to be replaced by 
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decoupled policies such as the DIS payment, which have ‘no or minimal impact on 
production and trade’ (OECD, 2006, p. 9). The DIS, however, did not yield the expected 
results and resulted in a decrease in the cultivated areas, as shown before. 
In order to protect agricultural producers against a decrease in the prices of the selected crops 
and to promote self-sufficiency (The MOAF, 2016; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016a)105, 
the government pays the premium payment as to the amount of the crop sold. The crops 
included in the premium payment policy framework are grains, pulses, oil seeds, maize and 
cotton, which are seen by the government as strategic crops (The MOAF, 2013, p. 51). As it 
is, LAEs can reap far more benefits from the premium payment than SAEs through their 
relative advantages in land size. 
The production of those crops is vital for the export industry. For example, Turkey is ranked 
fourth in pasta production and third in its export (The Ministry of Economy, 2017, pp. 2-3), 
fourth in bulgur production and first in its export (Ankara Commodity Exchange, 2016), fifth 
in the export of bread and baked products (Ankara Commodity Exchange, 2018) and finally 
first in the export of flour (Turkish Flour Industrialists' Union, 2012, p. 16). Middle Eastern 
and African countries are the main consumers of these Turkish products; for example, around 
45 per cent of Turkey’s exported flour is purchased by Iraq (Turkish Flour Industrialists' 
Union, 2015). Given its geographical position, the continuation of producing those crops and 
of the premium payment are of critical importance for agro-industries in the SAR. True, 
about 78 per cent of total value of SAR’s export relies on agriculture and agro-processing 
sectors (The Exporter Unions of the South-eastern Anatolia, 2016). 
Securing agricultural raw materials is essential for the competitiveness of the agro-industries. 
Recall, the cultivated areas of Turkey have declined by 3 million ha, and many AEs relying 
on rain-fed farming have withdrawn from the cultivation of field crops and kept their lands 
idle. In this case, the premium payment is deemed an effective tool to make AEs to proceed 
with the production of agricultural raw materials. Yet, the premium payments have remained 
largely inadequate to fulfil the commitment to decreasing the share of agricultural support in 
GDP. For example, the premium payment for wheat has been 50 Turkish lira (TL)/ton since 
2007 despite raising inflation rates; the premium for barley was 40 TL/ton in 2007 but just 50 
                                                          
105 According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (2016a), wheat hit rock bottom in 2008, that is, its sufficiency 
rate was 94.5 per cent in 2008. The sufficiency level of maize has never exceeded 93.2 per cent in the period 
between 2000 and 2015. Beans dropped to its lowest sufficiency level, 71 per cent, in 2007. Red lentil 
sometimes reached high levels of over-sufficiency but dropped drastically to 45.2% in 2008. Green lentil 
production diminished greatly despite the premium payments; its sufficiency was 39 per cent in 2014. Unlike 
most field crops, fruit and vegetables have almost always maintained their sufficiency level over 100 per cent.  
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TL/ton in 2018 ("The Premium Payments in 2008," 2008; The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forest, 2018).  
Gül Yavuz, Miran, Gürer, Yürekli Yüksel, and Demir (2016, p. 67) argue that the wheat and 
maize prices are key factors in determining their total supply quantities, and that if the 
premium payment was lifted for maize and wheat, there would be no difference in the 
amounts supplied. It implies that the premium payment is not sufficient in stimulating 
production. As Erdal and Erdal (2008) put forward, the premium payments do not encourage 
AEs to allocate more land to the cultivation of sunflower and soy bean but only provide 
protection against unfavourable market prices. Unlike maize, the total amount of cultivated 
areas for cotton has not been influenced by the premium payment because of its insufficient 
amount (Erdal & Erdal, 2008). 
As it is, the government does not opt for the augmentation of the premium payments. The 
import of certain agricultural crops (e.g. grains, pulses, cotton, etc.) are allowed without 
custom tariffs. That is, the agro-industrial company that imports agricultural crops without 
paying tariffs must process in Turkey and export. This step of trade liberalisation was long 
underpinned by overvalued exchange rates set by market dynamics by 2018. This policy 
clearly favoured first the domestic agro-processors that seek to acquire agricultural raw 
materials at international prices, and later AEs abroad rather than those in Turkey.  
The SAR is ranked first in the country for cotton production, important for the Turkish textile 
industry as it is one of the primary sectors providing employment and foreign exchange, with 
the country being almost self sufficient in cotton production. One, therefore, would expect 
that AEs are financial viable; however, they would operate at a loss without the input 
subsidies and the so-called “premium” payments (Ş. G. Yılmaz & Gül, 2015).106 F8b 
(personal communication, July 26, 2015) says ‘he is working on cotton only for agricultural 
support’ as a smallholder, and what he indicates is that the profit derived cotton production is 
formed by premium payments, and that there is no possibility for sustaining cotton 
production without any support payments. What F15 (personal communication, August 26, 
2015) says is that he would prefer to grow a crop type with lower total cost rather than cotton, 
if the premium payment was abolished. When it comes to grain and pulse production under 
rain-fed farming, a farmer in the F5 focus group (personal communication, July 24, 2015) 
                                                          
106 According to Yilmaz and Gul’s study (2015), AEs with land between 16-30 decares are in loss although all is 
subsidized, while AEs with land between 61 and 100 decares make no profit or loss despite all subsidies, AEs 
with land above 100 decares generate profit by 5 per cent. This study clearly proves the importance of subsidies 
in cotton production. 
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said that he would switch to wheat production. In other words, the cultivation of food crops 
would be preferred to cash crops in the absence of the premium payment. However, it does 
not mean that cotton producers would shift to more profitable or less heavily taxed crops as 
Bates (2005) suggested for his African cases; rather, they would just regress to less added-
value food crops.  
Given that the price level of any crop is determined by market dynamics, O21 (personal 
communication, August 27, 2015), an official working in the irrigated Harran Plain, asserted 
that if the deficiency or premium payment for cotton had been phased out, machinery and 
equipment specific to cotton production would stand idle. That would mean that their efforts 
would be wasted without recouping investment costs. It also implies that switching from one 
crop to another and preparing AEs for market conditions in this way is not straightforward for 
most SAEs. 
Non-Market Institutions to Solve Information and Measurement Costs for Agro-
Processors 
We can draw a conclusion at this point: support payments in the neoliberal period are used to 
keep AEs in agriculture to maintain the high competitiveness of agro-industries. The case of 
the ICSSS subsidy proves this. As R7 (personal communication, July 24, 2015) stated, one of 
the reasons for subsidising improved certified seeds is to help the agro-industry to distinguish 
durum wheat, used for pasta production, from bread wheat, thus increasing the quality of 
processed food. ICSSSs are indeed important for the agro-industries to increase their 
competitiveness in international markets by improving the quality of raw materials, and for 
farmers to sustain agricultural activities in line with market demand conditions (N6, personal 
communication, May 8, 2015). O26 (personal communication, September 26, 2014) 
elaborates: 
[…] the consciousness of producers, this is very important factor. […] Especially after 
2001 and 2002, they have obtained different types of supports. […] Apart from this, they 
are endeavouring to produce quality products. […] they are looking at the market [to find 
out] what kind of products and what variety of them industrialists want to buy, and which 
product has a more price level. […] They are looking at which variety of products is 
resistant to cold and diseases. […] I am not telling this for only wheat [producers]. […] 
In the past, everything was subject to the Board. […] [They were thinking that] the Board 
would buy [their products] in the end. […] In the past, the industry was not developed to 
the current degree. My hometown is Mardin. There were four or five enterprises 
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producing flour and pasta 10 or 15 years ago but 80 or 90 ones now. Our purchases have 
not decreased because of our policy change but the development of the industry, the 
awareness of producers, the emergence of new varieties and increases in supports. 
The feedback mechanism to convey to AEs requests for crop quality of the agro-industry is 
generally based on informal, indirect processes through merchants. Other actors in the system 
can somewhat relay market information and signals to AEs. The extension and information 
system between research bodies, public extension staff, private extension firms, and farmers 
are suffering from the weaknesses of a top-down system (Ozcatalbas et al., 2011). The 
infrastructure of information and communication technology is weak in rural areas (the 
OECD, 2016b, p. 102). Television channels operated by private and public initiatives, and the 
staff members of the GAP-Agricultural Education and Extension Project (GAP-TEYAP), are 
more concerned with the dissemination of cultivation methods and institutional changes than 
they are with disseminating market-based information. With the effects of globalisation in 
agriculture, failure to receive and correctly interpret signals about fluctuating market prices 
and return rates is still confounding AEs not only in the SAR but across the country (Keyder 
& Yenal, 2014, p. 52). The withdrawal of the state from purchases has somewhat exacerbated 
the case. O26 (personal communication, September 26, 2014), an official in the Turkish 
Grain Board highlights this issue: ‘In the past, everything was subject to the Board. […] 
[They were thinking that] the Board would buy [their products] in the end.’ AEs were, thus, 
rarely interested in changes in market conditions. In the neoliberal period they are supposed 
to follow changes in markets. Finding an efficient way of obtaining information, and its costs, 
remain a challenge for AEs, which the government has not effectively handled.  
The agro-processors have solved the problem of information costs and measurement costs in 
the market, with the help of non-market institutions, and they can thus gather a substantial 
amount of raw materials to assure low costs per unit. The owners of agro-industries, mostly 
large landholding families, allocate their crop production for agro-food production first. In 
the next step, they obtain the required crop-based raw materials from other large landholders, 
purveying crops in high volume and of similar standards (O26, personal communication, 
September 26, 2014). Finally, they bargain with merchants over the price of crops that will 
make up the remainder, which are normally collected from SAEs. Here, smallholders can find 
out what varieties of a crop are preferred by agro-industries via merchants, on whom they are 
already highly dependent in commercial and financial terms. As for non-market institutions, 
through the inward processing relief help, agro-industries acquire a large amount of high-
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quality raw materials (providing that their products are exported). Again, the Turkish Grain 
Board and the commodity exchanges that modernised their facilities, labs and equipment, can 
scientifically price any crop type in terms of nutrient and quality values. In this way, they 
classify raw materials according to the needs of agro-processers, inform AEs of what 
standards the agro-processors demand, and create price dispersions to award AEs for keeping 
their crop at higher quality. The ICSSS subsidy has also driven AEs to use improved, 
certified seeds to get higher prices and adapt to market demands for raw materials. AEs 
however tend to cut their production costs, decreasing the use of modernised inputs because 
of lack of subsidies. 
Bates (1989/2005, pp. 73-84) examines the origins of institutions in Beyond the Miracle of 
the Market taking Kenya as a case, and details that information costs and the problem of 
quality were not be dealt with through market dynamics but through non-market institutions. 
Bates (1989/2005, p. 77) argues that ‘given the high costs of monitoring the quality of 
products, control over farm inputs thus replaces the evaluation of outputs, and rules and 
regulations replace markets in efforts to enforce quality standards’, where price dispersion 
did not work well in rewarding AEs producing high-quality products.  
In Turkey, as shown, the non-market institutions have not replaced markets but helped 
market actors to sustain or improve the quality of products. As displayed, the use of 
standardised inputs are secured through non-market institutions. The ICSSS subsidy and the 
soil analysis subsidy are driving AEs to yield crops with certain nutrition values. The Act of 
Seed Growing is obstructing the use of uncertified seeds by farmers. The state-funded 
research bodies also work or help for the use of productive farm inputs but do not impose any 
control over them. The Board employs price dispersion to award AEs producing high quality 
products. The inward processing relief offers high quality raw material to agro-processors at 
international competitive prices. 
Struggle over Agricultural Commodity Markets 
The expansion of agro-food industries has presented significant opportunities to AEs, 
merchants and industrialists, and therefore the withdrawal of subsidised purchases has not 
resulted in excessive political pressure on the government. In fact, the pressure from rural 
families has also eased with increased urbanisation and non-farm jobs (supplementing rural 
incomes). The former indicates a marked decline in the electoral power of the rural whereas 
the latter refers to complicated or fragmented interests.  
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Before the 2000s, coalition governments experiencing harsh political competition, at times 
endeavoured to favour AEs with higher prices and agro-processors with lower prices. As we 
shall demonstrate, an Olson-like argument is today valid in agricultural commodity markets 
under the neoliberal regime. A small groups of merchants and agro-industrialists act 
collectively to reap benefits but most AEs cannot. Although farmers are complaining about 
this fact, they cannot lobby the government because they lack collective action (and because 
of the factors mentioned above). This contradicts what Bates (1989/2005, pp. 85-89) explains 
about the Kenyan industrial struggles. That is, the political mutual relationship between 
politicians and rural and urban dwellers resulted in Kenyan agro-processors being squeezed 
between them. They were ‘large-scale, vocal and active lobbyists’ but not effective ones ‘for 
want of an ability to take refuge in economic alternatives, thus not resisting predation’ (Bates, 
1989/2005, pp. 86, 89). 
In the neoliberal period after 2001, as explained before, the dominant coalition is formed by 
the bureaucratic class, different factions of the bourgeoisie, and the ruling government, 
representing the interests of the latter but having obtained support of the conservative 
periphery to come to power. In this political setting, whilst agricultural producers are 
exploited by merchants and agro-processors, the government, as mentioned in the 
background chapter, mobilises non-market actors (e.g. local officials and religious networks] 
and provides assistance via informal mechanisms to alleviate political repercussions. As a 
result, agricultural producers, lacking collective action to lobby the government to change 
policies, fall victim to predation in the market as well as being exploited by merchants and 
agro-processors. 
An expert at the Chamber of Agriculture in Adiyaman, N5 (personal communication, 
September 19, 2014) claimed that merchants and brokers acted like a cartel to control price 
levels in the market. O26 (personal communication, September 26, 2014) confirmed that 
claim, stating that industrialists make a deal with buyers on a certain price beforehand, and 
then also make a deal with the merchants based on that price. Finally, the merchants join 
together to control prices in the local market, which somewhat reduces profits for SAEs. As 
mentioned before, the Board generally intervenes in grain markets where prices are kept at a 
low level by merchants or wait until SAEs repay their debt to merchants by selling outputs at 
lower prices. A lack of intervention-oriented to the interests of AEs leads to SAEs making a 
loss and possibly withdrawing from agriculture, thereby resulting in reduced grain 
production, impacting on urban populations. When a supply deficit emerges in the grain 
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market, interventions made by the Board or the import of grains, which are facilitated by the 
relatively more liberalised trade regime, depresses increasing prices in favour of urban 
consumers and industrialists, at the expense of farmers (M. Öztürk, 2012, pp. 94-95). The 
former groups can obviously put more political pressure on the government than the AEs.107 
Apart from local merchants depressing prices through setting up a cartel, merchants from 
other regions also visit the SAR to purchase agricultural commodities on the cheap. F7a 
(personal communication, July 24, 2015) highlights this fact: 
[…] When [a crop] season in Adana ends, and when the crops are released, for example 
its price is 1100 Turkish liras. When the crops cultivated here are released, its price is 
decreased by 200 or 300 Turkish liras by Cukobirlik.108 This is true for cotton and other 
crops. […]They say, “After all, everything got abundant”, and they start dropping prices. 
There is ever no price stability.  
If merchants from other regions can buy enough crops in their own region, they do not feel a 
pressing need to purchase crops cultivated in the SAR. In such a case, buying crops from the 
SAR is regarded as an extra business to gain extra profit. They therefore have a high 
bargaining power and offer lower prices to producers in the region (Borlu, 2015). This 
phenomenon sharply distinguishes the SAR from the other regions. Lack of capital leads to 
lack of agro-industries, insufficient total market depth to absorb agricultural production and 
to the further exploitation of agricultural producers in the SAR by merchants and agro-
industries from Turkey’s western regions. 
Another decisive factor behind the exploitative dependency of AEs in the SAR on merchants 
and agro-processors is that the marketing network is marked by the lack of competition 
between market actors in purchasing agricultural crops, although the regional agro-industrial 
capacity has expanded in recent years. Statistics confirm that there is still an imbalance 
between the regional agricultural production and industrial production. The share of the 
regional industrial production to Turkey’s total industrial production is around 5.10 per cent, 
whereas the share of regional agricultural production to Turkey’s total agricultural production 
is around 10.38 per cent (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). F17, who lives in Adiyaman, 
                                                          
107 Every Turkish citizen over 30 years old was taught in primary school that: “Turkey is one of seven countries 
that can totally feed itself.” Whenever agricultural commodity prices increase in Turkey, urban people blame the 
government, and the government relaxes trade barriers to allow the Board to import grains. However, protests 
made by farmers about low agricultural prices, are often ignored by politicians and the media. See also Keyder 
and Yenal (2014, pp. 14-15)  
108 The Cukobirlik cooperatives actively work in several cities. The mentioned cooperatives come to the SAR 
from other regions to buy crops as merchants but not as actors of a cooperative. 
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which has fewer industrial firms than Gaziantep, Sanliurfa and Diyarbakir, draws attention, 
albeit exaggeratedly, to a different aspect of this imbalance:  
F17: Farmers have nothing to sell to [the firms located in] the organised industry zone. 
There is an edible oil production facility but there is no cotton and maize [grown in 
Adiyaman]. They come from outside [the region] for textiles. If there is not any 
[irrigation] water, you cannot produce them. 
The guest: In that textile [industry], [fabric] pieces are brought from large facilities […]. 
They are brought from Istanbul and assembled [by sewing] here […]. 
F17: […] How cheap labour force is in China […]. Here, Adiyaman is Turkey’s China. 
In fact, field crop producers are complaining less than vegetable and fruit producers in selling 
their crops to agro-industries but mostly feeling disgruntled because of the low prices they 
receive. Among field crop producers, both tobacco and cotton producers are complaining 
about the lack of industrial capacity to absorb their production. For example, a farmer in 
Harran, Sanliurfa, F34 (personal communication, August 27, 2015) with 360 decares of 
irrigated land, compared cotton producers in west Turkey to those in the SAR, with the latter 
receiving lower prices due to lack of capacity in the SAR textile industry. N9 (personal 
communication, May 11, 2015) explained that cotton was produced in the SAR but fabric 
was produced elsewhere. She commented that fabric was brought back to the SAR to produce 
textile products and clothes. 
Fruits and vegetable producers in the SAEs are also complaining about the lack of industries 
to purchase their products. The pomegranate is a case in point. F17 (personal communication, 
September 6, 2014), a smallholder in Adiyaman, described how difficult it is to sell 
pomegranate, talking about a case with an industrial firm which attempted to buy 
pomegranate for juice production: 
Interviewer: Is contract farming widespread? 
F17: […] that man says, “How is the average price of pomegranate in the market? Its 
[ton] is 700 liras. I would buy it for 500 liras. If you like, give it to me, otherwise do not. 
He does not buy at the normal price [level]. 
Interviewer: There is no long term contract, I mean, for 5 or 10 years. 
F17: No. […] The Hejaz type of pomegranate is appropriate for Adiyaman’s climate. It is 
for factories, I mean, can be processed in factories. It can be made into pomegranate 
treacle and juice. Then, it can be consumed edible. Keeping this [type of pomegranate] in 
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a cold storage lasts longer. […] But everyone is attempting to uproot them because there 
is no market […]. 
Interviewer: There is no guidance of the government? 
F17: No, there is not. I mean, […] the government tells “you must plant it in the first 
year, but you cannot pull it in five years.” […] I spent 4000 liras for pesticide, 3000 liras 
for electricity and 2000 liras for diesel. Then, I sold pomegranate but realised that it did 
not cover my cost. […] if you have 50 bovines, there is the milk support, 15 kurus [per 
liter], when you sold it. If the support existed as 15 kurus per kilogram, farmers would go 
on [pomegranate production] at least. […] yet, my tree[s] are seven years old. If I cut 
them, I will be disappointed. […]If it covered my cost, it would be enough for me. 
[…][Unfortunately,] I will do dry-land farming instead. […] For example, farmers are 
planting almond [trees] but its market [conditions] will be the same. To whom you will 
sell almond. […] everyone will plant it and then it will cause trouble because no export is 
done. If export was possible, and the provincial agricultural directorate brought buyers 
from abroad, [maybe] […]. 
Pomegranate cultivation was financially encouraged under ARIP to divert farmers from 
tobacco production, but resulted in commercial failure. One can argue that such support 
interfered with the decision making process of AEs. Several years ago farmers decided under 
market rules to plant almond receiving a relatively higher price, which can be stored longer 
than pomegranate. However, most of them are unable to profitably sell it.109 
In conclusion, SAEs and MAEs have the most disadvantage position in agricultural 
commodity markets, a market which favours merchants, brokers, exporters, supermarkets and 
agro-processors (which compose the bourgeoisie). What O17 said (personal communication, 
May 5, 2015), an official in the Mardin agricultural directorate, is self-explanatory: 
O17: Believe me, farmers cannot earn anything now but could they if organised. 
The interviewer: […] why do the state not alter the system depending on brokers and 
merchants? 
O17: […] Now, [one of] the biggest sectors in Turkey is the food sector. […] Everybody 
now talks about the arms sector, but the biggest problem in the world is the food sector. 
Few companies keep [the sectors of] food and seed in their hands, and they have started 
                                                          
109 Smallholders in the focus group of F18 (personal communication, August 26, 2015), located in Sanliurfa, 
stated that they had a different variety of pomegranate to enable them produce it earlier than Hejaz producers, 
thus receiving a higher price. Despite all this, they cannot find sufficient number of buyers to sell their products. 
They also added that this problem is prevalent in fruits and vegetable farming in general. 
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to control the world [through this power]. It is, now, not seen in Turkey that the 
wealthiest people are dealing in food. How would they be disintermediated? Turkey has 
not been able to transition to a system of corporations like the United States of America; 
yet, merchants and building contractors are governing Turkey. They might be 
disintermediated one day in the future. No one shoots their rich people in their feet; the 
system is now working in this way. 
7.4 The Privatisation of the TEKEL Company and the Tobacco Market 
One of the neoliberal policies that have affected the SAR was the withdrawal of the state 
from the market of tobacco and tobacco products. The main reason of such a policy was that 
the unsold tobacco in the TEKEL’s inventories was leading to a loss and in turn laying a 
substantial burden on the public budget during the 1990s. It was mainly made up of tobacco 
from the east regions, as it was less demanded by tobacco companies compared with the 
tobacco produced in the western regions because of its poorer quality (Kayaalp, 2009, p. 140; 
Yürekli et al., 2010, p. 16). 
Prior to the ARIP, a quota for tobacco production was re-introduced in 1999. When the 2001 
economic crisis severely hit Turkey, 30,000 poor tobacco producers, including SAEs and 
sharecroppers, were abruptly forced to give up agriculture in Adiyaman (Kaya, 2015; 
Kayaalp, 2009, p. 165), where the tobacco production of the SAR is traditionally 
concentrated. The ongoing process was finalised with the privatisation of the TEKEL. The 
outcome was a fall of about 55% in Adiyaman’s tobacco production between 2000 and 2005 
and of a further 9.5% between 2005 and 2015. As for the entire SAR, decline rates in tobacco 
production were even more dramatic in the mentioned two periods, respectively 51% and 
46% (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017a). Adiyaman’s vegetative production, adjusted at 
2009 prices, annually contracted by 9.17% between 1999 and 2001. In the ARIP period, it 
dropped again by 3.08% annually between 2001 and 2008. The contraction in tobacco played 
an important part in the decline of vegetative production (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). 
While the cultivated areas of tobacco in Adiyaman plunged from around 15365 to around 
7530 ha between 1995 and 2015, the anticipated shift from tobacco to alternative crops 
within the ARIP did not materialise (Karabacak, 2017). Adiyaman’s vegetative production 
has later grown by 4.51% averagely in the period of 2008-2017; with its value in 2017 nearly 
recovered to its 1999 value (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a). Interviewees complained 
during the fieldwork that pomegranate, almond and walnut are being grown as alternative 
crops to tobacco, but they have not yielded the same result because of marketing problems. It 
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is therefore reasonably to infer that the removal of subsidised purchases of tobacco have 
adversely affected Adiyaman’s agriculture and the wealth level of agricultural producers. 
O16 (personal communication, September 22, 2014), an experienced official in Adiyaman, 
explains how such sharecroppers have been sifted out since 1999: 
[…] we had 40,000 [actual] owners of registration cards. […] I mean, 40,000 are 
multiplied by 5; it was a matter of interest for 200,000 people at least. In Adiyaman, 
tobacco was equally as important as grain. Those people became like a fish out of water 
when the state stopped buying tobacco. Those 200,000 people were all not in the same 
situation. 20,000 or 30,000 of them had [already] owned a land. The rest, 170,000 or 
180,000 of them, had been working […] as sharecroppers. […] tobacco production is a 
labour-intensive one […]. […] the state suddenly quitted this. Around 200,000 people, in 
a small-scale city like Adiyaman, were out of employment. What does it mean? I do not 
want to list the words like the burglar, the prostitute, the racketeer, the snatcher and the 
drug seller. I mean, we started to think of such words rapidly. […][the state] never 
figured out, “I am applying such a project but how will I evaluate the potentiality 
resulted from this?”   
7.4.1 The Tobacco Law 
In 2002, the tobacco law, legalised in line with Turkey’s commitment to the IMF, enabled the 
free market mechanism in the tobacco sector through contract farming. This worked as “a 
market device” that would eliminate politics and distorting state interventions (e.g. the 
subsidised purchases of tobacco) from the economic domain (Kayaalp, 2009, pp. 151-153). 
As mentioned earlier, the government commenced to gradually abandon the DIS - 
independent from production between 2005 and 2009 - and instead expanded production-
required subsidies without renouncing the market-oriented perspective. As a traditional 
export crop, tobacco would never be subsidised again. Based on the tobacco law, the 
subsidised purchase of tobacco was completely abolished in 2008 through the privatisation of 
the TEKEL, and from then multinational tobacco companies have totally dominated the 
Turkish tobacco market (Yürekli et al., 2010, p. 16). After market dynamics became totally 
dominant, tobacco sales from east Turkey to private companies have contracted and come to 
bring producers lower prices than have those from west Turkey (The Tobacco and Alcohol 
Markets Regulatory Authority, 2016).110  
                                                          
110 Varying prices between regions is another issue leading to dissatisfaction and the feeling of being 
discriminated. Farmers in the SAR fervently believe that their own tobacco is the best in Turkey and even in the 
world. According to state-based data (The Tobacco and Alcohol Markets Regulatory Authority, 2016), the 
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The termination of state interventions in the tobacco sector, with the enactment of the 
Tobacco Law, evoked three different responses from tobacco producers. One group started to 
engage in contract farming, as directed by the Tobacco Law. Another group preferred to 
illicitly sell loose tobacco in the unregulated market. A final group commenced to grow 
alternative crops, which the government subsidised for several years under the ARIP to 
alleviate the economic problems that would arise from the liberalisation of the tobacco 
market. Note that we will address this last group when discussing well-designed and ill-
designed government interventions. 
7.4.2 Contract Farming in Tobacco and Illicit Tobacco Sales 
The tobacco law altered the marketing system in tobacco, introduced contract farming111 and 
then proceeded with the application of quotas to obviate any oversupplied, unsold tobacco in 
the inventories of the TEKEL. After the privatisation of the TEKEL in 2008, the quota policy 
was necessarily abolished, and the method of contract farming totally dominated the market 
regulated and monitored by The Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regulatory Authority (TAPDK 
in Turkish acronym). In the meantime, the demand for oriental tobacco in the regulated 
market slumped for several reasons: a determined effort for tobacco control made by the 
government in line with the global framework stipulated by the World Health Organisation; 
increases in taxes relevant to tobacco control, which in turn expanded the illicit loose tobacco 
market; new developments in cigarette production regarding input types, and the adaptation 
of cigarette blends in response to changes in customer tastes and preferences (Yürekli et al., 
2010).  
In addition to the dramatic drop in the demand of oriental tobacco in the regulated market, 
tobacco growers have not enjoyed the practice of contract farming itself so far (Gumus, 
2008). Kayaalp (2009, pp. 154-155) explains the case: 
Farmers stuck with their contracted buyers do not have any choice but to sell their crops 
to them. The tobacco market being structured under contracts strictly binds sellers to 
buyers. The underlying logic of contract farming is to initiate a competitive market 
setting, but instead it has brought about a more strictly designed and controlled structure 
preventing all kinds of competition. Furthermore, it is not a secret that tobacco leaf 
companies negotiate with each other about the price they will offer to farmers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
regional disparity between west Turkey and east Turkey is 54 per cent with regard to oriental tobacco prices. 
Tobacco prices offered to farmers in west Turkey was 14.18 liras but only 9.17 liras for those in the SAR. 
111 In contract farming, an agricultural enterprise and a buyer (the leaf company in this context) make an 
agreement prior to crop production, in which they agree on the price level, farming methods, production 
standards, assistance or extension, etc.  (Kayaalp, 2009, pp. 74-75). 
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Afterwards, (Kayaalp, 2009, pp. 155-156) compares the old tobacco market with the new 
one: 
In the old tobacco market, on the other hand, tobacco farmers used to have the flexibility 
of choosing their buyers. […] After grading tobacco, TEKEL used to announce the 
maximum price offered for the best quality crop. Farmers, having different grades for 
their crops from different merchants, were then able to calculate how much they would 
earn. They had the option of choosing their buyers, usually the highest grader, and then 
conclude their agreements. This tobacco market offered a more competitive setting with 
its diverse choice of sellers and thus prices. […] It is correct that the monopoly's 
purchase of all grown tobacco gradually raised the supply side and created a big hole in 
the budget. But it is very hard to claim that the monopoly's price intervention was really 
an obstacle to the development of a competitive market. On the contrary, the old market 
was relatively more competitive and "free" compared to the contract system […]. […] 
From the perspective of the international financial institutions, as well as national 
proponents of neoliberal policies, free market simply implies the non-intervention of the 
state [but not the formation of a competitive market]. 
In other words, the aim is clearly to create a market operating in favour of first multinational 
or international and then national large-scale capitalist classes in the case of tobacco. 
Interestingly, the new “competitive” marketing system has created illegal tobacco sales 
between producers and the tobacco leaf companies or the brokers who sell the tobacco 
collected to multinational tobacco manufacturers. Those manufacturers are not bound by any 
formal contract, thus buying tobacco from tobacco leaf companies at varying quantities every 
year. When the demand for tobacco decreases, tobacco leaf companies transfer this decrease 
to tobacco purchases from farmers at that year, exploiting the flexible nature of contracts; for 
example, they refer to the required quality standards to not buy a specific amount of tobacco 
(Kayaalp, 2009, pp. 186-188). When there is unsold tobacco in their possession, tobacco 
producers are supposed to sell them in auctions arranged by the TAPDK. As auctions would 
lead to the loss of time and of quality in tobacco because of bureaucratic red tape, unsold 
tobacco is often sold ‘under the table’ to tobacco companies via brokers at lower prices 
(Kayaalp, 2009, pp. 74-75, 185). Where the lack of well-functioning tobacco cooperatives 
prevails, tobacco growers are unable to enhance their bargaining power against those actors 
and receive a higher price. Apparently, the termination of the monopoly through privatisation 
has resulted in the welfare transfer from tobacco producers to multinational cigarette 
manufacturers, tobacco leaf companies and brokers.  
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Moreover, given that tobacco manufacturers, tobacco leaf firms, private and public research 
bodies specialising in tobacco, and the Union of Aegean Tobacco Exporters have 
agglomerated in the western regions, it is clear that the current system is working against 
farmers in the East.112 F23 (personal communication, September 8, 2014), a focus group 
including several members of the Association of Adiyaman Tobacco Growers113, involved in 
selling tobacco illicitly, clarifies this further: 
F23a: Private companies give only their tobacco [seeds to farmers] for their cultivation. 
Interviewer: It means that they do not furnish them with advisory and extension service 
or knowledge. 
F23a: No. They just gather tobacco leaves. 
F23b: With a low price. 
F23a: With a miniscule price. I mean, [they imply to the folks] “do not be idle, and 
work”. I mean, we [illicitly] sell this by 20-30 liras per kilogram, [but] private firms 
purchase it by 5 or 6 liras.  
F23b: If a man plants [tobacco] on a 2 decares of land, and grow it for 5 or 6 liras per 
kilogram, he would make 200 or 300 liras per year. [In this way,] would he sustain his 
kids’ education or live on?114 
F23a: If they bought my product for 20 or 30 liras, why would I sell it illicitly? […]  
Interviewer: […] You, [the farmers in] the Aegean [region] and Adiyaman, have the 
same [market] conditions. I would like to turn to local conditions. They established an 
exporter union, but you don’t have it here. 
F23a: We do not have a financial power. […]No matter which state organisations we 
have visited, their doors are closed to us. After that, our farmers are afraid. They avoid 
being organised. For example, if the government decides that this is free in a legal 
                                                          
112 The system is working in favour of tobacco growers in East Turkey. According to Gumus (2008), 76 per cent 
of the surveyed farmers in west Turkey are not satisfied with contract farming, particularly due to the low 
tobacco price. 
113 Its name sounds highly formal; yet, this association has less than 10 members and relies on an informal 
network. 
114 The farmers interviewed do not provide a more quantitative insight into the production and income levels 
coming from tobacco. According to Turkish Statistical Institute (2017a), the average production per decare was 
78 kilograms in 2015 in Adiyaman, and a 2 or 4 decare of plot is generally used for producing and selling loose 
tobacco (Uznay & Gümüş, 2016). A SAE with  3 decares of land would be able to make 234 kilogram of 
tobacco and around 179 liras per month (around 45 pound) given that the average tobacco price is 9.17 liras in 
2016 under contract farming (The Tobacco and Alcohol Markets Regulatory Authority, 2016). For a 
smallholding family, such an income level is not sufficient to live on. Nonetheless, a kilogram of tobacco is 
worth 60 liras in the illicit market; therefore, the same SAE would make 1170 liras per month (around 296 
pound), which is almost sufficient to sustain life. 
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manner, […], the sense of misgiving among farmers will end. […] We would double 
[what] the Union of Exporter in the Aegean [region has done]. 
Interviewer: What is their advantage? 
F23a: They can come here and freely have tobacco planted. They distribute seeds. […] 
The Union of Aegean [Tobacco] Exporters buy it [from farmers] for 7 liras and then sell 
it for 40 liras. [However,] when I buy it for 20 liras, I can sell it 30 liras […]. […] There 
is nothing in farmers’ hand. Wheat and barley always make a loss. There is no water to 
plant maize and cotton here. There is no alternative for farmers. There is no way except 
tobacco. Otherwise, they would be glue-sniffers or thinner-sniffers. 
A group of farmers, who overwhelmingly own SAEs, bootleg loose tobacco in the 
unregulated market, under the unofficial brand of Celikhan, a town in Adiyaman famous for 
its own distinctive tobacco. The farmers do not have any direct relationship with the tobacco 
leaf companies. Uznay and Gümüş (2016) argue that the establishment of tobacco 
cooperatives, technically and financially assisted by the government, is required to help them 
legally operate in the regulated market. However, amendments in the tobacco-related legal 
framework, the provision of technical machinery and information and the improvement of the 
marketing channels must take place.115 Kayaalp (2009, p. 196) asserts that farmer groups in 
Celikhan intended to establish a cooperative, engaging in production and sale without any 
assistance from the government; yet they realised that this highly costly investment would 
fail because of the high tax on tobacco products. SAEs and MAEs generally pay low tax rates 
deducted at source, varying between 2 and 4 per cent, when selling their crops to market 
actors (Hayran, 2013). However, if those farmers groups in Celikhan had initiated the 
production of tobacco products such as cigarettes, they would today pay the tax rate of 83.4% 
for a box of cigarette (Çakmaklı, Demiralp, Yeşiltaş, & Yıldırım, 2018). 
Tobacco producers operating in the unregulated market are often unemployed and 
marginalised (Kayaalp, 2009), and their small plots do not allow them to sustain their lives 
without tobacco production (Karakaş, 2014). Loose tobacco production takes place in towns, 
in which people have so far been susceptible to the armed conflict between the Turkish state 
                                                          
115 Uznay and Gümüş (2016) establish that tobacco farmers in Celikhan are okay with paying taxes and receive a 
lower price in return of being accepted in the legal tobacco market, and then put forward a detailed plan for the 
loose tobacco market. According to this plan, a protected geographical indication for Celikhan tobacco should 
be obtained from the Turkish Patent Institute. A special tax and incentives on loose tobacco, providing an 
advantage to its producers and consumers, should be introduced in line with the EU legal framework. The 
tobacco cooperative and facilities for processing tobacco should be set up and supported financially by the 
government. Finally, the legally determined production capacity for such a facility should be decreased 15 
tonnes to 1 ton; the strict condition on installing new technology-based machinery should be changed. 
195 
 
and the PKK, such as Celikhan town of Adiyaman, Gurs District of  Mardin, and Lice and 
Kulp towns of Diyarbakir (Uznay & Gümüş, 2016). For example, the ongoing bans on 
pasture use has inflicted a blow on livestock production in those towns, and in turn hit their 
income resources. As F4 (personal communication, July 14, 2015) asserted, when agricultural 
subsidies on tobacco were terminated, tobacco producers in Lice, Diyarbakir directed their 
attention to the long-existing illegal cultivation of cannabis. This case proves that the lack of 
government intervention to foster alternative farm and non-farm income resources has 
created the unregulated illicit market in tobacco. 
7.4.3 The Political Conflict on Tobacco 
Despite the political tussle, both regulated and unregulated tobacco markets have been 
maintained for more than a decade. This phenomenon evidently contradicts with both Olson’s 
and Bates’ arguments. 
According to Olson (2002, p. 33), ‘small groups can provide themselves with collective 
goods without relying on coercion or any positive inducements apart from the collective good 
itself’. He explains the reason: 
This is because in some small groups each of the members, or at least one of them, will 
find that his personal gain from having the collective good exceeds the total cost of 
providing some amount of that collective good; there are members who would be better 
off if the collective good were provided, even if they had to pay the entire cost of 
providing it themselves, than they would be if it were not provided. 
Olson would predict that multinational tobacco companies as a small group would succeed in 
having the illicit tobacco market abolished by lobbying the government, which has so far not 
happened in the case of Turkey’s tobacco market.  
Bates (1989/2005, pp. 86-89) argues that politicians in the single-party system could prevent 
large-scale processors by skilfully handling the legal framework and public authorities from 
imposing higher prices for their products and paying lower prices for raw materials, where 
urban consumers and small farmers constitute the vast portion of electoral power. 
Consequently, the interests of local politicians interact with the interests of those who can 
operate effectively on the national political domain. And large-scale processor could find 
themselves squeezed between all the mentioned groups. 
Olson and Bates consider such cases as a zero-sum game. Large groups (e.g. too many 
smallholders) suffer from predation in Olson’s argument but so do small groups (e.g. large 
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processors) in Bates’s argument. But in the case of Turkey’s tobacco market, each group has 
received benefits. 
Governments are political machines as much as they are economic ones. The Tobacco Law 
had been delayed for many years by various governments shying away from losing the votes 
of tobacco producers. The 2001 economic crisis forced them to take a step forward, as the 
economic assistance given by the IMF and the WB were contingent upon the enactment of 
various laws, including the Tobacco Law (Kayaalp, 2009, pp. 66-67). In accordance with the 
law, the government privatised the TEKEL, changed the tobacco marketing system, 
eliminated the state purchases in tobacco and let global tobacco companies dominate the 
tobacco market. Implementing neoliberal policies as required, they succeeded in obtaining 
financial assistance from international organisations and in convincing international creditors 
of the fact that they are on track. They overcame the economic crisis, boosted the economy 
and in turn successively won many general and local elections. They also justified heavy 
taxes on tobacco products, referring to the commitments given to the World Health 
Organisation for tobacco control, thus securing more public revenues. 
Big tobacco companies have obtained many benefits. The TAPDK was established as a non-
market institution within the Tobacco Law, in line with global standards (Kayaalp, 2009, p. 
67). The TAPDK having financial and administrative autonomy assumed the mandates of 
regulating, monitoring and enforcing the production and sales of tobacco leaves and tobacco 
products, licensing manufacturing, and sanctioning those who violate the law, in order to 
secure free market conditions without government interventions ("Law on Regulating 
Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Alcohol Market," 2002). It is noteworthy that the TAPDK 
has never allowed big tobacco companies to be represented on its board and thus they could 
not influence the decisions of the board this way (Kayaalp, 2013). No matter that the TAPDK 
has largely been under political influence and hardly fulfilled its mandate because of its 
technical incapability (Ozel  & Atiyas, 2011), the regulatory agency and the government have 
never obstructed contract farming in tobacco that assures lower prices for raw materials for 
big tobacco companies. Furthermore, the agency also stifled any attempt to produce cigarettes 
by small producers by putting high-level barriers based on legal and technical conditions116 
(O. Doğan, 2012, p. 84), thus letting big tobacco companies spike their market concentration. 
                                                          
116 Those who intend to establish a factory are bound to set it up with the minimum capacity of 2 million 
cigarettes a year and to install machines with up-to-date technology. 
197 
 
Although the government has frequently raised taxes on tobacco products, big tobacco 
companies have succeeded in increasing  their sales and profits through innovative products, 
strong marketing and pricing strategies, cost-saving strategies, and the ineffective tobacco 
control implementations of the government (Keklik & Gultekin-Karakas, 2018). Given that 
the state monopoly withdrew from the tobacco market in 2008, the tobacco companies have 
enjoyed the market share left by the monopoly. They also benefit from state subsidies given 
for production, export and import of tobacco products without any obstruction (Keklik & 
Gultekin-Karakas, 2018).  
The main complaint the tobacco companies made about the tobacco sector is the illicit sales 
of loose tobacco, which are produced by tobacco farmers in the SAR, especially in 
Adiyaman. It is illegal because they do not have a licence that must be obtained from the 
TAPDK for the sales of tobacco. This licence requires paying taxes and making certain 
investments, which render the business unprofitable for the farmers. 
Selling their products without any licence, tobacco producers occasionally had problems with 
security officials but can run their business one way or the other. F23a (personal 
communication, September 8, 2014), the head of the Association of Adiyaman Tobacco 
Growers, explains: 
Interviewer: […] there is a problem with being organised? 
F23a: Yes, there is. […] I set up this association, and I am the head of it. A man readily 
thinks if pressure was put on the association, what would happen. He is afraid of coming 
to the association [because] he experienced a trouble in the past. […] He thinks that if the 
state terminated the association, all of us would be prisoned. But [the state] is somewhat 
winking at [this illicit tobacco sale]. If they allowed this by legislation, I would feel more 
relaxed. Then, I would even send it to the Europe and the Middle East. 
Although the constituency of Adiyaman have mostly voted for the ruling party, the 
representatives find it difficult to lobby at the top-level of the state mechanism in favour of 
tobacco producers, a complaint that they were frequently making during the fieldwork. 
However, it is clear that the government has mostly overlooked their businesses, and the 
gendarmerie often have done the same, as I learnt from the tobacco producers. The ruling 
party has assured their votes from tobacco producers this way. Apart from this, Adiyaman is 
a Kurdish densely populated province, which has given a little support to the cause of the 
Kurdish political movement. It seems that, to increase their bargaining power, the local 
notables and the tobacco producers generally use a discourse referring to their ever-present 
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support to the state against the PKK ("The Adiyaman Tobacco Would Not Belong to the 
PKK," June 29, 2017). I think that the state and government officials do not push these 
people to the arms of the Kurdish political movement, so implicitly permitting the illicit 
tobacco sales. Consequently, the TAPDK without any security power have remained 
ineffective in its sanctioning. 
The interviewer: The state says, ‘produce tobacco how ever you want to produce, but if 
you sell it in this way, I cannot allow you. Am I right? 
F23a: Yes 
The interviewer: But there is a tobacco market in Urfa and Diyarbakir. Are they 
intervening in them [to avoid tobacco sales]? 
F23a: No. They are not intervening in the market. They are not intervening in tobacco in 
your hand, but if the gendarmerie catch us on the road [to sell it out of Adiyaman], then 
they intervene in it. 
Many tobacco producers in the SAR benefit from the tobacco sales. It is estimated that the 
illicit tobacco market is equivalent to 14% of the legal one in Turkey (Uznay & Gümüş, 
2016). One way or the other, the big companies, and tobacco producers and illegal sellers 
take benefits from the tobacco market without being into complete predation. 
7.5 Successful and Unsuccessful Cases of Government Interventions 
Our analysis has so far focussed on the issue that the government interventions within the 
neoliberal agricultural regime that are made because of inherent characteristics of agriculture 
itself, have created positive results in the SAR, but their insufficient level has limited its 
success. In some cases, the withdrawal of government interventions have badly affected AEs, 
especially smallholders. In this section, we will focus on project and programmes that have 
been implemented by the government in the SAR’s agriculture. 
One who read Markets and States in Africa would see a lot of examples of failed projects and 
programmes, indicating that government interventions are generally harmful to economic 
development (Bates, 2005, pp. 45-61). In Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa, 
(Bates, 1983, p. 119) contends,  
An important objective of African governments is to increase food supplies. To secure 
greater supplies, they could offer higher prices for food or invest the same amount of 
resources in food-production projects. There is every reason to believe that the former is 
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a more efficient way of securing the objective. But governments in Africa systematically 
prefer project-based policies to price-based policies. 
In this section, drawing upon cases from the SAR, we argue that how well projects and 
programmes are designed is a key factor in how much government interventions become 
successful. The somewhat normative term ‘well’ refers here to the government devising 
projects and programmes with the help of stakeholders in the agricultural system, 
contributing to efforts put for agricultural development in the SAR. In fact, we have never 
ignored the importance of higher prices for agricultural production, but have showed that the 
agricultural surplus produced are appropriated by commercial and industrial capitalists, 
thereby encouraging AEs to leave agricultural activities. In this circumstance, well-designed 
projects and programmes have stimulated agricultural development, which in turn slowed the 
exodus of farmers from agriculture. 
7.5.1 Designing Government Interventions through the Poly-Centric Governance 
One of the important contributions in RCT was made by E. Ostrom (2011) in Governing the 
Commons, who focused her efforts to understand self-organising and self-governing common 
pool resources, such as grazing areas, closed fishery areas, groundwater bodies. However, the 
implications of her study can be extended to self-governing resource or public good systems, 
or even highly specialised systems which may be special districts, private associations or 
parts of a local government (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 283). Government interventions in 
agricultural development can be deemed as a public good. In this regard, when a rural 
development fund is formed, our presumption is that it is to be designed, financed, distributed 
and enforced with the participation of public and private bodies in order to achieve success. 
Ostrom addresses failed and successful cases and shows how users set up institutions to 
specify how to benefit from common pool resources and maintain them for securing the 
constant stream of the benefits, how to modify those institutions to changing conditions, and 
how to resolve disagreements or conflicts. She also notes that ‘most of the institutional 
arrangements used in the success stories were rich mixtures of public and private 
instrumentalities’ (E. Ostrom, 2011, p. 182).  
From similar studies, Ostrom and her colleagues have devised and developed over a long 
period the polycentric governance approach ‘for the analysis of collective-action problems 
involved in the provision of diverse public goods and services’ (E. Ostrom, 2010b). One of 
the important aspects of public goods is that those who do not participate in paying for costs 
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made cannot be excluded from their consumption because of prohibitive costs of doing so. 
The free-rider problem emerges in such a case, and private agencies, therefore, cannot 
provide such goods and services as they are unable to impose prices on each consumer (T. 
Cowen, n.d.). 
Public goods are provided by public agencies, and the issue of how to provide them gives rise 
to several basic questions such as how to organise public agencies, how to govern the whole 
organisation, and how to solve conflicts between agencies, etc. In this context, ‘[p]olycentric 
systems are characterized by multiple governing authorities at differing scales rather than a 
monocentric unit’ (E. Ostrom, 2010b). When the term was first coined in study of V. Ostrom, 
Tiebout, and Warren (1961), it addressed the assumed pathologically chaotic order of 
producing and providing public goods in metropolitan areas by diverse public and private 
agencies at different layers of governance. It proposed that polycentric governance could be 
more successful than a political governance with a single dominant centre for making 
decisions:  
"Polycentric" connotes many centers of decision-making which are formally independent 
of each other. Whether they actually function independently, or instead constitute an 
interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question in particular cases. To the 
extent that they take each other into account in competitive117 relationships, enter into 
various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms 
to resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function 
in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To 
the extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a "system." 
As E. Ostrom (2010a) infers from the literature, decentralised governance systems, including 
the small but many providers of public goods, are far more likely to outperform large, 
centralised governance systems, in terms of technical efficiency and output.  
One of the important aspects of the polycentric governance systems is that it requires to 
authorise civil or private stakeholders (e.g. the users of smaller-scale common pool resources) 
to define policies, set up institutions and check the system. Their participation would 
definitely bestow advantages for improving and sustaining the system, such as the utilisation 
of both local and issue-specific disaggregated knowledge, building trustworthy for promoting 
                                                          
117 It indicates that competition between different producers and providers of public goods would help the 
governance system develop through self-regulating tendencies that forces them to find the more effective 
solution. In particular, the separation between producer and provider of the public good significantly matters to 
reach success (V. Ostrom et al., 1961). 
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social capital, better adaptation to the system, lower enforcement costs, the establishment of 
parallel autonomous systems that lowers the possibility of any failure to afflict the entire 
connected milieu (E. Ostrom, 2005, pp. 281-282) 
Ostrom and her colleagues have developed an institutional analysis framework that involves 
the most general set of variables the researcher may use to investigate various ranges of 
institutional settings. Doing an analysis through that institutional framework goes beyond the 
limits of this research. In the next section, we just shall take some cases from the SAR to 
show that to what extent governmental interventions in the form of projects and programmes 
are governed by the polycentric approach have determined the degree of achieving success. 
7.5.2 Unsuccessful Cases in the SAR of Government Interventions 
We shall take two cases here. The first one is concerned about the alternative crop production 
project created within the ARIP to encourage farmers to abandon tobacco production. The 
second one addresses the Harran irrigation union and its problems ailing its operation. 
An Unsuccessful Case: The Alternative Crop Production Instead of Tobacco Production 
The replacement of previously highly supported and overproduced crops (i.e. hazelnut and 
tobacco) with alternative crop types was one of the objectives of the ARIP. The safety net 
was based on a simple mechanism, that is, when the price subsidies were decoupled, 
producers of those crops would face a disincentive to produce these crops. To make the 
transition smoothly, an incentive was created. The one-time cost of the shift, such as costs of 
buying inputs and preparing and tending fields in the transition period, would be covered by 
financial assistance provided by the WB (The World Bank, 2001b, p. 14). The WB and the 
concerning ministry did not contact local producers for devising the plan or in order to find 
out their circumstances and opinions. The project had a top-down management style, 
governed by a single dominant centre. 
Support for the alternative crop production was available between 2002 and 2007. In this 
period around 97 per cent of the total support for the replacement of tobacco was paid to 
those who had left its production in Adiyaman (Gül, Arısoy, Sivük, & Ataseven, 2009). The 
total areas cultivated for tobacco declined by 35% in the implementation period of the 
project, and most of those who decreasingly engaged in it over years, started to cultivate 
grain types with far lower profit margins, such as canola, wheat and safflower (Gül et al., 
2009).  
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O16 (personal communication, September 22, 2014), an experienced official in the Adiyaman 
agricultural directorate, explained why this project failed: 
[…] that [alternative crop] project succeeded but within its own scope. What is that 
scope? You do not remove people from lands but set them adrift. […] Is the rest of the 
life of this man only one year or two years […]? […] The support that [the state] gave 
was 100 or 200 liras [per decare]. It is that funny, [but] the alternative crop project was 
applied. [But,] it was a small application [designed] by small minds. It provided no 
benefits […] 
The application period of the projects was short and the support payment was insufficient: it 
almost seemed that the project did not actually aim to replace tobacco with an alternative 
crop but to withdraw SAEs gradually from agriculture.  
The WB and the ministry did not try to understand local conditions of tobacco producers. 
Where lack of irrigation water in the plots where tobacco was grown, alternative crop 
production was difficult, and therefore producers generally directed their resources to low-
value added. 
A number of tobacco producers in Adiyaman opted to grow higher added-value crop types. 
F17 (personal communication, September 6, 2014), a smallholder in Adiyaman, was one of 
those former tobacco producers: 
We got support [payments] for [pomegranate] saplings, […] in the first year, [but] 
nothing was [given to us] in the following years. But, for instance, they did not set up its 
market as encouraging it. You would plant pomegranate but sell to whom [and how]. 
There is not a cold storage [in hand]. They do not educate us, [I mean], the provincial 
agricultural directorate. Private firms do it, [I mean], pesticide firms, […] to sell their 
pesticide in the end. […] There is no cooperative in Adiyaman [to sell pomegranate]. 
[…] Now, there are around 30,000 decares of pomegranate orchards in Adiyaman, 
including large enterprises. Now, everyone is trying to install their own cold storage 
using their [financial] possibilities. The government supports [the instalment of] cold 
storages. However, I have 2000 [pomegranate] trees. If I thought of installing a cold 
storage, 40,000 liras would be gone. […] [Actually] there is a certain time limit for 
storage. After four months later, […] pomegranates in hand would be rotten. […] Now, 
there is a firm in Adiyaman from Elazig; they will sell organic pomegranate juice to the 
Migros [supermarket chain] and out of Turkey. […] but there is no price guarantee. He 
says “the average price for [a ton of] pomegranate in the market is 700 liras so I will buy 
it for 500 liras. If you want to sell it, do it or if not, don’t sell it.” […] Everyone here is 
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seeking to uproot their pomegranate trees], because there is no market for 
[pomegranates]. 
As understood, the WB and the ministry did not underpin the project with an extension 
programme that could have involved private and public extension staff, set up a mechanism 
to document the problems that those who engaged in the project would face or did face, 
improve the system with stakeholders to solve the emerging problems, and cooperate with 
them to build a sustainable sales cooperative for alternative crops. 
A Partly Unsuccessful Case: The Case of the Irrigation Unions in the Harran Plain 
The irrigation unions in the Harran Plain, which farmer members cooperatively administer 
via the board they select, have been responsible for over twenty five years of managing and 
maintaining irrigation water conveyed by open channels. As they fulfil their tasks, they 
maintain close contact with the provincial branch of State Hydraulic Works. No matter how 
much AEs in the Harran Plain have increased their agricultural income thanks to irrigation 
water, their irrigation unions have had serious problems limiting their effectiveness and 
causing the problem of waterlogging and salinisation. 
Some of the problems, in fact, result from Turkey’s existing institutional weaknesses. 
Although the country is endeavouring to adapt new global principles associated with socio-
economic development and water management, such as participation of stakeholders, good 
governance, and sustainability, there still exist institutional problems in water management: 
the inadequate awareness of environmental and economic aspects of water resources; the lack 
of coordination between public stakeholders in the water sector and; the confusing structure 
of domestic legal sources (Kibaroglu & Sumer, 2007). These institutional problems are the 
main factors behind what would hamper the functioning of a polycentric governance system 
over water resources as common pool resource. For example, the inadequate awareness of 
environmental aspects of water resources combined with the hastiness of the incumbent 
government of getting political benefits. Agricultural producers in Harran that accessed 
irrigation water for the first time in their lives, used irrigation water exorbitantly, so caused 
the problem of waterlogging and salinisation, deteriorating agricultural lands. The 
government, at that time, had not listened to what experts recommended about the extension 
service and work quality that required substantial improvements (Van den Ban, 2000 cited in 
Jongerden, 2010a). In later years, a partnership between public organisations, universities and 
private agencies came into place to solve the problem; for example, drainage systems were 
started to be set up in agricultural lands to dispose water. However, as I was told during 
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fieldwork, the problem of educating farmers about how to use water in crop cultivations is 
still continuing, despite all the efforts, in the areas where irrigation water have opened up. 
According to E. Ostrom (2011, p. 90), the governance of common pool resources must be 
designed around and embedded in certain principles. To put it differently, those who have 
rights to appropriate benefits from those resources and the resource itself must be defined 
clearly with certain boundaries. The appropriation and provision rules in relation to local 
conditions, and the rules used for modifying these rules and for providing enforcement must 
be specified well through the participation of stakeholders. Monitoring and graduated 
sanctions must be fulfilled properly by keeping accountability to the appropriators. The 
appropriators and their officials must be able to access local agencies or courts that can solve 
conflicts between stakeholders. The external agencies must respect what rules the 
appropriators have designed. 
Özerol (2013) uses Ostrom’s institutional analysis method to understand the problem having 
arisen in the case of the irrigation unions in Harran, and she first ascertains that lack of water 
rights at plot and district levels is a major problem. Both the landowners and those who rent 
those lands have a right to access irrigation water, and this creates a problem. 
In the plains of Sanliurfa which have agricultural irrigation systems, most of the large 
landholders traditionally work with sharecroppers. Under the sharecropping system, the 
provision of agricultural inputs and the decisions made about production fall under the 
responsibility of the large landholders. Sharecroppers are supposed to add their labour to the 
production process. As for the use of irrigation water in this system, most of the 
sharecroppers waste too much water (Mehmet Simsek, personal communication, July 22, 
2015). Mehmet Simsek (personal communication, July 22, 2015), a professor at Harran 
University, explains how sharecroppers think about water use: 
“[…] Citizens are responsible [for water-based problems about soil] with fifty per cent as 
well as the state with [the other] fifty per cent. […] First, the educational level of farmers 
is low. No matter how much you increase literacy rate, in order to maintain a family-type 
agricultural enterprise and employ family work force, there must be the density of 
illiterate people so you can keep them. Second, I do not have any fields today; [I think] 
today I will stay here with the person X for three years. I see this field is not 
[appropriate] so I can go to another field. Therefore, I would not care the contamination 
of this field [due to excessive water use] […]. It is because they think that I am not the 
owner of the field and that I have no expectation from here. If he somewhat has some 
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faults in his character, he says: “never mind, let it get worse and let the landholder not 
gain anything”. He would not lose [in this case], because there are many alternative 
fields for him. It is because there are a lot of needs for work force, so he has no problem 
with being unemployed. There is no situation to lose his income that year, because these 
decreases [in soil quality] expand within the long term.”   
The problem of excessive water use points to a bigger problem, that is, ‘the low degree of 
alignment between the rules at different levels also results in “inappropriate” irrigation 
practices (Özerol, 2013). For example, users who are unable to access water conveyed 
through gravity, pump water from the main or secondary channels, an action that is 
prohibited by law. Again, the tail-end users are sometimes unable to access water during the 
irrigation season, and therefore, they have to withdraw salinized water from the drainage 
system (Özerol, 2013).  
Furthermore, the participation of the farmer users in the seasonal planning of irrigation water 
procurement is limited and done by the DSI and the irrigation unions (Özerol, 2013). The 
appropriation needs of water by farmers does not match with the seasonal plan, and worse, 
monitoring, enforcing and sanctioning are frustrated by farmers and associations such that 
‘individual water use is not metered, neither aggregated to monitor the water use at the 
district level’ (Özerol, 2013). What I learned during fieldwork was that the provisional 
activities such as repairing and cleaning canals are done by the unions through the fees 
collected from users, but the problem is that these unions lack financial and administrative 
transparency and accountability. Put it bluntly, the heads of irrigation unions are not equipped 
themselves with the required information and abilities for managing an irrigation union. 
All these problems derive from the political economic terrain in the Harran Plain. Compared 
with other regions, the large landholders are key actors here who have a political tie with the 
state officials and the government thanks to being wealthy and having tribal power. In the 
Harran Plain, the majority of the population are of Arab-origin, and they have been long loyal 
to the state and the ruling party, and against the Kurdish political movement. In return, the 
large landholders controlling the tribal networks keep control of irrigation unions and the 
headship of villages, and thus, tribal nepotism plays a part in political and economic 
relationships (Özerol, 2013). It was claimed by one of my respondents that when the water is 
first released at the start of the season, it is arranged in tune with the water needs of large 
landholders, who prepare with the local administration of the DSI the seasonal irrigation 
planning related to when and how much water is required for agricultural lands (F15, 
206 
 
personal communication August 26, 2015). Timing of watering plants matters highly in 
agricultural production, any delays could thus result in less productive yields for 
smallholders. 
An official in the region (O17, personal communication, May 4, 2015) depicts the case well 
that the feudal system has disintegrated to a significant degree, but the region is now 
experiencing an interregnum between this old system and the modern one. The main source 
of this long-standing interregnum is about the conflict between the Turkish state and the 
Kurdish political movement. This political problem and the state formation help the tribal 
political power to sustain itself in the irrigation unions, blocking the democratic participation 
of the farmers in multi-layered collective action processes to improve the governance of the 
unions. E. Ostrom (2011) and Özerol (2013) never discuss how classes in the dominant 
coalition and the political economic terrain they face are determinants for collective action 
problems and the governance of common pool resources. 
7.5.3 Successful Cases of Government Interventions in the SAR 
We will look at two cases in this section to show that as long as government interventions are 
framed by approaching the polycentric governance, its likelihood of being successful will 
raise. The first case is about the use of IPARD grants to overcome the lack of capital in the 
SAR; the second case is about the support for fruit production in the SAR.  
The IPARD and the Expansion of Agro-Industries in the SAR 
Given that the total capital stock level of the region is limited – not surprising for a relatively 
less developed regional economy - the subsidisation of capital within the GAP through 
public-funded grants and economic incentive programmes created by the EU and the Turkish 
state have undeniably helped to improve the regional industrial base.  
These suppliers of grants and economic incentives do inherently not intend to obtain material 
benefits such as interest payments. However, they have encountered uncertainty that poses 
risks, that is, the demanders may waste those resources granted. As Bates (2005, p. 74) 
highlights, ‘the result is that suppliers and demanders of capital possess an incentive to 
cooperate in devising nonmarket means of providing assurances to investments’. In this 
sense, the EU and the Turkish government share the risks involved, that is, the former made a 
commitment to finance 75% of grant programmes and the latter 25%. The investors who 
receive grants for their project are liable to pay 50% of the total investment costs, but banking 
companies facilitate their financial burden offering loans with low interest rates.  
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The EU helped the Turkish government to adapt to the EU institutional framework for 
accurately conducting all the assessments required in the grant programme. The Agricultural 
and Rural Support Agency was established and its officials prepared strategy and 
implementation documents.118 As a result, the framework and strategies were adapted to local 
conditions by the local officials of the agency, preparing strategy reports in line with the GAP 
action plans that prioritise comparative advantages and consulting with local development 
agencies, the GAP-RDA, agricultural directorates and non-governmental organisations (O36, 
personal communication, May 7, 2015). When Turkey fulfilled the required tasks, 
procurement of grants were initiated in 2007 within the IPARD, which have significantly 
contributed to the solution of the problem of lack of capital in the SAR. 
The private companies applying to grants are collaborating with the private advisory firms 
that prepare the projects at the EU standards to submit the applications successfully. The 
officials of the Agricultural and Rural Support Agency are providing the required legal and 
institutional information to stakeholders, and ranking their projects based on a point-based 
system and the technical reports written by experts from universities. In doing so, they must 
comply with the institutional framework adopted from the EU, and eventually committees 
from the EU and the government are auditing all the grants provided. The Agricultural and 
Rural Support Agency has a three-layer process to evaluate and enforce the projects: the pre-
confirmation process, the implementation process, and the post-implementation process 
lasting five years. They especially check if the firm is active in the post-implementation 
process, and if it is not active or violates the agreement, they sanction the firm; for example, 
they reclaim the total amount of grant with interest payments (O36, personal communication, 
May 7, 2015).  
Looking at the practice of these grants, we can easily understand that the advisory firms that 
assume the responsibility of preparing the projects have developed their abilities over time. 
The success of receiving grants in the first invitation for bids was very low for Turkey (9.8%) 
but far higher (77.5%) in the twelfth invitation for bids (A. Koç & Giray, 2015). 
In the SAR, despite some coordination problems between local public organisations 
(TEPAV, 2013, p. 106), the grants are successfully bestowed to the establishment of new 
factories as well as the improvement of the current ones with new machineries and equipment 
                                                          
118 See  the website of Agricultural and Rural Support Institute for documents : http://www.tkdk.gov.tr/; and see 
the website of IPARD for international agreement between Turkey and the EU: 
https://ipard.tarim.gov.tr/mevzuat-tr 
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(Cihangir, Bilgiç, & Aba, 2015). The completion rate of the projects assisted is high (74%), 
and the completed ones transitioned to the evaluation of post-implementation process (S. 
Aslan, Demirhan, & Ertaş, 2016). The grants have mostly been allocated to the AEs and 
agro-industries that invest in the sub-sectors with comparative advantages. For example, in 
Mardin, investments were completed in meat and milk production and processing, 
beekeeping, halva production, corn drying, and the cultivation of ornamentals and medical 
plants (S. Aslan et al., 2016).  
Studies about how the IPARD have influenced the SAR’s economic development is limited. 
However, the study of Gülçubuk, Köksal, Ataseven, Gül, and Kan (2016) that examines the 
effect on the IPARD on Turkey’s economic development gives us some insight. The 
investments within the scope of the IPARD have not only expanded the industrial capacity 
but also helped increase sales, raise productivity by the use of novel technologies and high-
quality inputs and develop local economies by stimulating local input suppliers and local 
human resources (Gülçubuk et al., 2016). Taking these advantages, investors are carefully 
selected, so to increase their chance to survive in the market. For example, a group of the 
investors who received this grant had already obtained a certain level of experience in the 
sub-sector they invested. The others committed to hire experienced employees. In this way, 
they proved that they could create a sustainable business. The point-based system of the grant 
programme impelled them to do so, which in turn assured the development of human 
resources in localities (Gülçubuk et al., 2016). More importantly, while agro-industries in the 
SAR have developed within the GAP (see the section 7.3.2), the IPARD grants have 
significantly contributed to these efforts. These grants have increased milk production by 4% 
in Sanliurfa and meat production by 20.5% in Diyarbakir and around 12% in Sanliurfa 
(Gülçubuk et al., 2016). 
The EU authorities confirmed that 42 provinces of Turkey would be added to the IPARD 
grant programme. Sanliurfa, Mardin and Diyarbakir were three of these from the SAR. This 
impelled various stakeholders in the other provinces to put pressure on the government to 
create such a grant programme for their needs. The RDSP, therefore, came into practice in 
2006, which were updated by the same logic several years later but without the EU’s 
supervision and auditing. It is noteworthy that the programme has functioned well through 
the institutional capabilities of public organisations, developed as performing the IPARD.  
The provinces of the SAR have highly benefitted from this program. Gaziantep and Sanliurfa 
have benefited the most of all provinces from the grants for investing in agro-processing and 
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packaging; Adiyaman has been one of the seven provinces obtaining grants for fertilizer 
processing and packaging. Mardin has ranked first in making investments in agricultural 
storage facilities (Can, Sayılı, Yılmazçoban, & Bilici, 2014). 
The IPARD and the RDSP have been highly beneficial depending on the scale of capital 
owners, but the RDSP had at least helped all scales of AEs to improve their agricultural 
machinery and equipment pool until it was ended in 2016 because of the saturation AEs had 
reached in mechanisation. 
The extension of agricultural irrigation equipment into the regional agriculture (see section 
7.2.2) was the result of this programme. Apart from this, the number of agricultural 
machineries raised all over Turkey. As seen in Table 7.10, the SAR remained behind 
Turkey’s average in changes in most of the agricultural machinery and equipment between 
2000 and 2005. With the implementation of the RDSP, the SAR dramatically increased this, 
more than any other region in Turkey. It seems that the increase in the regional agricultural 
productivity we discussed earlier is related to increases in agricultural machineries and 
equipment through grants. 
 
Table 7.10 Percentage Changes in Agricultural Machineries Before and After the 
Introduction of the Rural Development Support Programme (Turkish Statistical Institute, 
2018a) 
The assistance of the EU authorities was key to improve the national and regional 
institutional and organisational capacity to execute the IPARD and the RSDP successfully. 
We should however note that the case shows that as long as the political intentions of the 
government and the content of the programmes are well matched, the programmes were 
successful. The government sought to strengthen ties with the region itself, especially with 
capitalists and the small-scale property owners who largely constitute their political base in 
the region. This was key to the plan that aimed at disintegrating the Kurds from the Kurdish 
political movement. They failed to do this, but the ruling party has remained the second most 
popular for party in the region. 
Period Tractors
Combine 
Harvesters
Tractor Disc
 Ploughs
Cultivators
Fertilizer 
Broadcasters
Milking 
Machines
Turkey 8.55% -6.10% -0.11% 7.37% 10.50% 50.91%
The SAR 4.72% -23.17% 3.95% 3.82% 18.49% 39.11%
Turkey 24.57% 37.55% 0.91% 31.12% 25.75% 129.88%
The SAR 34.13% 235.22% 20.32% 76.71% 45.04% 834.35%
2000-2005
2005-2016
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Agricultural Support for Small Agricultural Enterprises for Fruit Production: 
Strawberry Production in Lice and Sason 
Since the mid-2000s the government and regional agricultural authorities have encouraged 
SAEs in fruit and vegetable production by granting financial support, certified seedlings and 
innovative irrigation equipment in addition to countrywide agricultural subsidies. As a result 
of cooperation with international organisations, grants are being given to SAEs for 
establishing modern fruit orchards; for example, the IPARD is being used for such a purpose, 
introduced by the EU. For the Diyarbakir, Batman and Siirt Rural Development Project, 
international assistance from the UNDP and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development was obtained and has been used for SAEs which developed fruit yards with 
modern irrigation system. This support has been directed by scientific research conducted in 
the 1990s by the GAP-RDA119. Universities, regional and national research centres, and 
regional development agencies were included in this programme to increase coordination and 
enhance farmers’ adaptation to the production of new types of fruits through demonstration 
(The MOAF, 2012). Nevertheless, detailed or purposely-made scientific studies conducted by 
regional research bodies have generally benefited LAEs more than SAEs, as these have 
greatly focussed on grains, legumes, fodder plants, maize and cotton.120 However, studies 
about fruit production have gradually increased since 2005. 
To examine how state interventions have been made, and failed, for fruit production, we can 
take the case of state-supported strawberry production in Lice as an example. F2,121 a 
smallholder family in Lice, Diyarbakir who was selected as ‘a leader farmer’, and who lives 
from 25 decares of irrigated land, describes how such support failed: 
F2a: We joined in the strawberry production project two or three years before. […] But, 
strawberries dried out as a problem arose from the seedlings granted. Then, the project 
stopped. We installed here this drip irrigation system thanks to them. […] Its cost was 
covered by the provincial agricultural directorate for the strawberry production project. 
But when strawberries dried out, we started to use [to produce] pepper, aubergine and 
bean for our consumption.  
                                                          
119 For details, see website of The GAP Regional Development Administration, particularly the section of 
library and e-sources (http://yayin.gap.gov.tr/tum-yayinlar.html). 
120The publication list of the GAP Agricultural Research Institute (2016) shows that studies on fruit and 
vegetables were started in 2005 but that their number is still lower than those for other crops. The same is true 
for the GAP International Agricultural Research Institute and Diyarbakir Plant Protection Institute.  
121 The focus group of F2 includes the mother (F2b) and a daughter (F2a) of a smallholder family. The daughter 
graduated from the Department of Agriculture at Dicle University in Diyarbakir. 
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F2b: The seedlings dried out. When we planted strawberry again in the following year 
but could not gain [the desired] productivity, we removed strawberries. 
F2a: The benefit left for us is about the irrigation system. […] I went to the provincial 
agricultural directorate later. I informed them of the situation. “There is nothing we can 
do but there is a company in Mersin, so you can buy seedlings with your money”, they 
said. But if they had applied this project- this was their fault, and there was nothing 
wrong with its cultivation-, they should have covered the cost [of buying new seeds], but 
they did nothing. 
F3 (personal communication, July 14, 2015), a large landholder, explained his frustration: 
F3: […] what is to be done from now on? Farmers must be educated here; a market 
guarantee is needed; [buyers] are needed here to get farmers to do agriculture here. […] 
The provincial and town-level agricultural directorates must orchestrate all these tasks. 
At this point, qualified personnel are required. […] Our provincial agricultural 
directorate visited and looked at [the case] that farmers in Kiziltepe or Derik, Mardin 
were tremendously making strawberry production. Then, they told me “make a list 
including 14 or 15 farmers that will be able to do this well”. They provided us with a 
grant covering 100 per cent [of our cost]. The provincial and town-level directors are our 
friends. They contracted a man named as Haci A., who does not know how to do this 
business and […] strawberry production […]. That man searched on the internet and 
found a firm located in Mersin or Antalya or Adana [selling strawberry seedlings]. […] 
When time came to plant the strawberry seedlings, there were none of them here. They 
said that it had hailed and iced them, and did not give us any seedlings. The provincial 
director told me “you, tell the producers to plant tomatoes in the plots arranged for 
strawberry”. Tomatoes were planted. They gave excessive amount of water to [the 
tomato plants] because of senseless use of the drip irrigation system; the [water] channel 
dried up. The required education had not been given [to the farmers]. Then, the 
[strawberry] seedlings were brought, but tomatoes were standing tall [meanwhile]. […] 
300,000 or 400,000 Turkish liras of state fund were squandered. Now, I am the only one 
who is doing this business; the remaining part of [strawberries] all dried up. They 
brought temporary workers from the Turkish Labour Agency. We all planted them. […] 
All of the applications were made wrongly. As we had not known it, they did not get our 
opinion. […] Our climate is not favourable for strawberry. […][Still,] if farmers was 
participated [in every process] and made aware of it; if [strawberry production] was 
explained [well]; if demonstration was made; [if] soil analysis and climatic 
appropriateness were [taken into consideration], [such a project would be successful]. 
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As can be deducted from the above, AEs were helped by governmental bodies to start 
innovative strawberry production in Lice, but they failed. The regional and local officials did 
not take local agricultural conditions and the views of local farmers into consideration when 
designing the strawberry production project in Lice. Worse, they could not find a competent 
contractor to distribute seeds to farmers in Lice and failed in carrying out and enforcing this 
operation properly. Today, there is no strawberry production in Lice (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 2017b). 
The case of Sason, Batman can be taken as a counter-example to show that local and regional 
bodies, their innovation and institutional capacity, and the active participation of farmers are 
important for initiating or diffusing innovative production methods or new types of crops. 
Strawberry production was funded in Sason with grants for certified seedlings and with 
irrigation equipment by the GAP-RDA at first in 2008-2009, and later between 2011 and 
2015 within the scope of the Diyarbakir, Batman and Siirt Development Project. 
Bad previous experiences and lack of trust seemed the biggest obstacle to collective action 
among farmers. The GAP-RDA encouraged farmers to participate in a discussion to verbalise 
their problems. During this discussion, farmers discovered that they had common problems 
with marketing their crops, and that it would be difficult to solve it without collective action. 
The organisation, thus, convinced the farmers of establishing the Batman Sason Strawberry 
Producers Union and provided them with an innovative extension service, named the GAP-
TEYAP (Demir Kaya, 2016a, p. 16).122 Today the Union is executing 90% of sales operation 
strawberry in Sason by disintermediating brokers, thereby helping farmers to raise their 
income (Demir Kaya, 2016a). 
The GAP-TEYAP is still continuing to improve the strawberry cultivation in Sason. The staff 
initiated a five-year project in 2014 including grants to foster productivity and product quality 
and lay out a marketing strategy plan (Demir Kaya, 2016a). In the following years, the GAP-
TEYAP introduced low tunnel greenhouses to the farmers in Sason to improve the 
productivity of strawberry cultivation, protect crops against unfavourable weather conditions 
and extend the cultivation period, so raising income (Demir Kaya, 2016b, pp. 14-15). 
F37 (personal communication, October 17, 2016), both a manager of the union and a 
smallholder, expressed that the authorities had cut down their investment costs by 50 to 70 
                                                          
122 This system is an innovative, integrated and participatory extension system, with researchers cooperating 
with show-case farmers and subsequently farmers interacting with each other to learn how to do farming 
innovatively. The aim is to limit shortcomings of top-down extension approaches. 
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per cent by providing grants. Thanks to this well-designed project, over 300 SAEs are still 
continuing strawberry production in Sason. Although they still need some support from the 
government such as for cold storage, they were thankful that the regional and local 
agricultural bodies had provided an efficient extension and advisory service and financial 
assistance for the strawberry production.123 
The total land allocated for the strawberry production was 1.5 ha in 2008. It dramatically 
increased over time and reached 300 ha in 2017 as a result of all the effort described. The 
production raised from 45 tonnes to 3300 tonnes between 2008 and 2017 (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 2017b). Strawberry production in Sason shows that government interventions in the 
form of well-designed projects can contribute to local agricultural development. 
The Case of Kilis Organic Olive and Olive Oil Producers Union 
In Market and States in Tropical Markets, small-scale fruit producers who used to be 
squeezed out by interventionist policies were cultivating globally high-in-demand cash crops 
such as coffee, cocoa, tea, palm kernels and oil and sisal etc. (Bates, 2005, p. 11). As African 
governments offered lower prices for cash crops, producers shifted their production to food 
crops such grains with comparatively higher prices (Bates, 2005).  
The case of the SAR follows what Bates describes. The SAR producers’ way is to produce 
fruits with relatively higher prices that can be cultivated under rain-fed conditions. They also 
follow the same logic when choosing the fruit type they will cultivate.  
As we mentioned earlier, the use of modern inputs such as pesticide and fertilizer started to 
be prevalent in the region after the armed conflict. Agricultural lands in the SAR are therefore 
less contaminated by pesticides than those in the West SAR. A large area of orchards is free 
from pesticides, and many smallholders are producing high value-added organic crops in 
their orchards, such as pistachio, olive, and pomegranate, for local and national markets. 
There are however two problems with engaging in organic farming. The relative cost of 
acquiring a certificate that proves organic farming practices in production is much higher for 
SAEs and MAEs. They therefore always find it hard to meet the costs in the absence of 
subsidies (F7-F25, personal communication, July 24-July 8, 2015). Furthermore, limited 
                                                          
123 Despite this successful operation, the union still needs public financial support to advance their marketing 
capacity by investing in cold storage as smallholding members of the union are not be able to collectively cover 
these cost. For this purpose, the union applied for financial aid to the agricultural bodies, which has successfully 
operated and enabled its members to derive more profit from strawberry production. 
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interaction among the AEs involved in organic farming poses another important problem 
(Monis et al., 2012, pp. 50, 53). 
To solve these problems, the GAP-RDA instigated a programme with the technical support of 
the United Nations Development Programme (the UNDP), development agencies, research 
bodies and universities to technically and financially encourage the establishment of producer 
unions for organic farming and to enhance competitiveness, know-how and collective action 
among producers through a clustering strategy (within the GAP Organic Agriculture Cluster 
Project). The potential of organic olive farming has easily attracted such supports in Kilis in 
this way. 
After the privatisation of TEKEL, the wine factory ceased to purchase grapes from AEs of 
Kilis after 2013. The cultivated areas of wine grapes in Kilis fell by around 40% and its 
production by around 30% between 2013 and 2017 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017b). 
Merchants have harnessed their oligopolistic power to reduce prices of wine grapes (F31, 
personal communication, July 3, 2015). With few options left, some SAEs are therefore 
uprooting their grape vineyards: the cultivation of grains and pulses is likely to result in a 
drop in their income and a possible failure to sustain their agricultural activities. A more 
profitable option is to plant olive trees; however, they need money to start an olive orchard 
and the first harvest only takes place after five or six years. However, different kinds of 
interventions are required for such a switch. After the alternative crop project designed by the 
WB within the ARIP, the government got the lesson in 2008 and started paying subsidies for 
setting up orchards to cultivate the fruit types with comparative advantages and marketing 
possibilities.  
As a result of such efforts, the Kilis Organic Olive Producers’ Union has been operating 
successfully in Kilis for seven years, an area where an influx of Syrian refugees has greatly 
shocked the socio-economic stability. The Union opened an organic olive oil production plant 
with the technical support of the UNDP and the GAP-RDA and the financial support of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which was equipped with machineries 
enabling cold-pressing instead of hot-pressing, standardisation and packaging (The UNDP, 
2014, 2015b). Increasing the quality of the olive oil this way, the Union was supported and 
educated with a marketing expert, who later created their website and brands, and obtained 
the required certificates that would render them competitive in markets (The UNDP, 2015a). 
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All these efforts bear fruits. In 2011 the Union included 146 member AEs cultivating 1290 ha 
for organic olive and by 2016 the member number had risen to 345 AEs cultivating 2870 ha 
of land (Sinan Sahinalp, personal communication, February 7, 2017). The Union extended 
their farming practices to other olive producers to get higher prices for their products. That is, 
merchants used to sell the olives produced in Kilis for 4 or 5 liras per kg, paying lower prices 
to farmers than this level. The price of the olive has increased to the same level as that of the 
olive produced in the Aegean region in recent years (Çevik, 2018, p. 32). In Kilis, the total 
land allocated to olive production has consequently raised from around 18800 ha in 2008 to 
around 28040 ha in 2017 (an increase of 49%) (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017b). 
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapters addressed how neoliberal policies applied at the national level, and government 
interventions made within the scope of the GAP, assisted by national and international 
organisations, have influenced the agricultural development of the SAR. 
When the region came out of the armed conflict, the neoliberal agricultural transformation 
started, and made difficult the regional adaptation to market-oriented modern agriculture. 
This is why the neoliberal policies applied within the ARIP (e.g. the production-non-required 
DIS payment, the withdrawal of cooperatives, and the privatisation of state monopolies, etc.) 
adversely affected the SAR more than it did the relatively more developed regions, as they 
brought the dramatic withdrawal of the state from subsidising agriculture. AEs needed to be 
supported more but the neoliberal policies with the ARIP did not allow this. 
When the ARIP ended, its results were regarded as unproductive, and the government 
therefore relaxed neoliberal policies without completely abandoning it. In other words, the 
logic of neoliberal policies has been maintained across the country. The government 
specifically increased production-required subsidies, stimulating the SAR’s agricultural 
production more than in relatively more developed regions. However, the share of the 
supports in GDP continued to be reduced in line with the neoliberal agricultural 
transformation. 
The irrigation investments within the GAP and the other government interventions in the 
forms of projects and programmes achieved success to the extent that they rely on the poly-
centric governance approach. Whenever the government allows the participation of 
stakeholders (e.g. farmers, and local, regional and international organisations) in decision-
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making and implementation processes, the projects and programmes applied mostly have 
contributed to productivity gains. 
As a result, costs of production have raised since 2001, and the problem is that AEs continued 
to receive relatively low prices because of free-market dynamics. The market is free for 
brokers, merchants, supermarkets, and agro-processors (mostly large landholders) when it 
comes to appropriate the great portion of the agricultural surplus produced by AEs resulting 
from productivity gains. For this reason, a decrease in the total land under cultivation has 
continued after the post-ARIP period but at lower rate than compared with the ARIP-period. 
The neoliberal agricultural policies have not worked well, causing increasing costs and 
decreasing agricultural commodity prices. These policies benefit the members of the 
dominant coalition and squeeze the agricultural producers that cannot act collectively. It is a 
fact that the creation of non-farm jobs for rural people, transfer between family members 
living in urban and rural areas, and the informal social security network of the government 
over religious communities have cushioned the impacts of the neoliberal policies, so 
preventing the radicalisation of the rural people. 
What Bates (2005) ignores in Markets and States in Tropical Africa is that elements of the 
dominant coalition, such as large landholders and various factions in the bourgeoisie, who 
enjoyed the developmentalist policies, have also enjoyed the neoliberal economic policies 
acting at the expense of urban workers and smallholders. Government interventions in 
agriculture, in fact, aim to blunt the irreversible migration of rural people to urban areas. 
When they are added to the working class and cannot find formal jobs, but rather find lowly 
paid informal jobs driving them to severe poverty and insecurity, they are more perceptive to 
radicalisation. This possibility forced the government to carry out projects and programmes 
in the SAR. Indeed, the Kurdish movement continued to expand itself to west Turkey through 
these rural-urban migrations. Before 2001 this phenomenon happened because of the armed 
conflict but it has continued, even after the fighting ended, because of the impacts of 
neoliberal policies. The net migration rate from the SAR to other regions decreased between 
2000 and 2015 but remained negative. The rate of the East SAR is also more negative than 
the West SAR (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2015b).  
The intention of undermining the Kurdish political movement in the region brought 
government interventions to forge and strengthen ties with Turkish and Arabic-origin 
capitalist classes and alienate Kurdish capitalists and smallholders. However, the expansion 
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of agro-industries has driven AEs to engage more in market-based relationships but 
simultaneously being exploited.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction  
This research critically approached RCT from the aspects of state formation and 
development, highlighting that it has a predominately Western-centric perspective. As 
Western countries were the first to achieve security and prosperity, underpinned with well-
functioning, enduring institutions, RCT scholars therefore have focussed on them. However, 
their approach to understanding less developed countries is generally based on the same 
western-centric perspective, that is, it generally focuses on countries with which the west had 
a colonial relationship, such as Latin America and African countries. Less developed 
countries that have transitioned from an empire to a modern one, thus having a different 
political and development past, are not deeply studied using the same framework. The 
research is a step to fill this shortcoming, using Turkey as a case study. 
The research discusses two main theoretical issues with regard to state formation. The first 
one concerns Bates’s argument that regional diversity shapes the political terrain and the use 
of power; elites at the centre find coercing regional elites more effective than cooperating 
with them, thus hampering development (Bates, 2017, p. 117). We have countered this 
argument, arguing that regionalism occurs when elites at the centre restrict the participation 
of elites and people in decision-making processes. The starting point for our argument was 
the historical development of the Kurdish Question up to present day, so we traced back to 
the foundation of Turkey and the Ottomans to comprehend state formation. 
Turkey’s political-economic and institutional heritage from the Ottomans is an important 
determinant in Turkey’ state formation process and on its effect on development. Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012, pp. 120, 216) are right in observing that the Ottoman sultan created 
extractive institutions under an absolutist regime, providing privileges for the dominant 
coalition and preventing innovators to grow in power. We have showed that the military 
bureaucratic class, which never allowed the rise of any regional power in Anatolia, embedded 
itself in the modern Turkish state when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. This class was the 
product of a pre-capitalist era and maintained its power in a capitalist political economic 
setting. What is remarkable here is that it created capitalist classes that are dependent on the 
state and/or the protection of the bureaucracy. In other words, state formation and its political 
pathway have generally been shaped by the long-existing military bureaucratic class. Clearly, 
there is a symbiotic relationship between the bourgeoisie and the military-bureaucracy. The 
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outcome of this relationship is the highly centralised Turkish state that thwarts the 
participation of mass people in decision-making processes, and that subtracts systematic rents 
for the dominant coalition. 
North et al. (2009) refer to the role of the military and its control in mature natural states, but 
this is insufficient for understanding the case of Turkey, as these authors only direct their 
attention to the mature-natural-state period of France and England. So the gap in knowledge 
(which this thesis addresses) is that there is no attention to the class-based character of the 
(military) bureaucracy in non-Western countries, with its ability to keep a monopoly over 
violence.  
Violence and Social Orders by North et al. (2009) is an important study for our understanding 
as it provides a conceptual framework categorising states as limited-access orders (natural 
states) and open-access orders. This framework contributes to our understanding of how 
elites in natural states act, how the nature of intra-elite relationships make door-step 
conditions rational for them, and how a transition is realised to reach an open-access order. 
However, this study does ignore how the periphery can influence intra-elite relationships in 
the dominant coalition in a way that shapes the state. Similar to the studies of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) and (Bates, 2001, 2017) people in the periphery are considered passive 
actors. 
In our study we have addressed this issue with reference to the Kurdish Question by taking 
account of social capital and its effect on forming political collective action. The Kurdish 
political movement as an ethno-political collective action re-emerged in the 1960s as a 
grassroots movement, rather than as an elite-movement. In a similar way, a conservative 
peripheral movement emerged among elites and people as a reaction to a modernising 
Turkey. The conflicting relationship between the periphery and the centre and its effects on 
the dominant coalition and Turkey’s state formation were scrutinized in this thesis. 
After the 2001 economic crisis sparked great popular discontent, the conflicting relationship 
between centre and the periphery became more tense. The research discussed the impact of 
this relationship on the political economy and in particular the SAR’s development. 
Neoliberal policies that were initiated at the national-level as a result of the economic crisis 
were combined with development interventions in the SAR to appropriate political benefits. 
The effects of these policies on the regional agricultural development were closely examined 
in this study. 
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8.2 Findings 
The research looks at Turkey’s political economy in a wider sense but specifically focuses on 
the Kurdish Question and agricultural development of the SAR to make a series of critical 
arguments against RCT.  
In Chapter 5, the research answered the first research question: why has Turkey, since 2001, 
simultaneously implemented both neoliberal agricultural policies and governmental 
interventions for agricultural development in the SAR? Our findings showed that the 
intentional co-implementation of these policies in the same period is a derivative of the 
conflicting relationships within the dominant coalition and between the centre and the 
periphery.  
The JDP government, the political representative of the conservative bourgeoisie and 
periphery, followed the neoliberal recipe to obtain support from international financers, 
political organisations and Turkey’s secular bourgeoisie. International investors and creditors, 
satisfied with the neoliberal policy implementations of the government, provided capital to 
Turkey, which resulted in a booming economy. This neoliberal economic adaptation was also 
underpinned by an improved relationship with the West. The government improved its 
relationship with the EU and convinced it to commence with accession negotiations. It also 
developed a strategic partnership with the US for the latter’s politics and operations in the 
Middle East. These policies have strengthened the JDP government in domestic politics and 
prevented the military bureaucracy from intervening in the government. The political contest 
between the government and the Euroasianist and Kemalist wing of the military ended in a 
victory of the JDP after the 2007 general election. Judicial operations to remove that wing 
were initiated after 2007 by the JDP government and by the Gulen movement that had kept 
their members in the state since the mid-1980s. 
The Kurdish Question became a hotly debated topic in this relationship. The JDP government 
sought to initiate good relationships with Kurds in order to politically isolate the secular 
inclined people and the military in domestic politics. When the PKK resumed their attacks 
after the Iraq War, the military narrative became more dominant. In the 1990s, it had 
provided the military with the opportunity to silence different views and dominate Turkey’s 
politics. Perceiving this threat, the JDP waited for the military to start to fail in its military 
operations. Then, they created democratic openings and dramatically increased the level of 
investments in the SAR. They gained the support from most ordinary Turks and Kurds, so 
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managed to isolate the military. The increased developmental efforts in the region were thus a 
political tool for the JDP. The JDP became the second most popular party in the SAR since 
2002 thanks to these policies, and was regarded as the only political power to stop the rise of 
the Kurdish political movement. This confronted the state bureaucracy with a dilemma: “if 
we do not support the JDP against the Kurdish political movement, the PKK will achieve its 
goal, so Turkey will be divided.” The JDP benefitted from this dilemma and eliminated the 
option of the military narrative. 
The development narrative underpinned with democratic openings and peace talks with the 
pro-Kurdish parties and the authorities of the PKK all contributed in gaining support among 
many ordinary Kurds to cut their ties with the PKK. The plan of the JDP government was to 
establish a federal republic, which was to include the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, thus 
amplifying Turkey’s regional power. In line with the plan, the Kurdish political movements 
as peripheral movement were supposed to be disintegrated. Forging good relationship with 
the Kurdish bourgeoisie, as the weakest group in the dominant coalition, was considered key 
to becoming successful. To make this group more dependent on the state, the government 
substantially increased public investments and provided grants and other financial incentives 
to the Kurdish bourgeoisie. Turk-origin and Arab-origin capitalist classes in the SAR - 
elements of the conservative bourgeoisie - were also supported by the government to balance 
out the Kurds. 
As a result, the rise of two peripheral movements, those of the conservatives and the Kurds, 
has been leveraged by the conservatives and Kurdish capitalists, and the associated political 
elites, to shape the dominant coalition. This allowed for more political power and a higher 
share of rents. The Gulen movement and the Euroasianist and Kemalist wing in the military 
were removed from the dominant coalition over time. Particularly, the conservative groups 
gained some economic advantages at the expense of the secular periphery.  
In previous chapters, we argued that the highly centralised state causes regionalism and a lack 
of security and prosperity, and that the transition to open access orders is more difficult in 
countries such as Turkey because of its imperial background. This is because the (military) 
bureaucracy with its incontestable capacity of violence does not allow such a transition. 
Neither the bourgeoisie did have the intention to control them and gain political power nor 
have the peripheral movements been successful in doing this. 
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After the June 2015 election, Erdogan, facing the loss of electoral power, stopped the 
negotiations with the Kurdish political movement, and instead took military actions. But with 
the November 2015 election, he re-gained his power. However, a one-year prevalence of the 
military narrative in Turkey’s politics resulted in a coup attempt. After the failed coup 
attempt in 2016, lead by the Gulen movement, Erdogan allied with the security-obsessed 
wing of the bureaucracy to keep and raise his power. This political alliance established an 
oppressive regime. As they have blocked political participation of the periphery through 
coercion, the pro-Kurdish parties, which had introduced country-wide policies during peace 
talks, retreated and focused on regional policies again.  
In Chapter 7, we answered the second research question: how has the simultaneous 
implementation of neoliberal agricultural transformation and government interventions 
affected agricultural development of the SAR since 2001? A great part of the analysis was 
written as a response to Bates’ Markets and States in Tropical Africa, which argues against 
government interventions and prefers free-market policies and the withdrawal of subsidies. 
The 2001 economic crisis had a massive impact on the Turkish economy and society. To 
overcome the crisis, Turkey signed a standby agreement with the IMF and accepted to start a 
dramatic neoliberal agricultural transformation under the supervision of the WB. Obtaining 
debt from the IMF was contingent to carrying out the neoliberal policies at national level. The 
policies in the ARIP (e.g. the production-non-required DIS payment, the withdrawal of 
cooperatives, and the privatisation of state monopolies, etc.) negatively affected the SAR 
more than relatively better developed regions since 2009. When the ARIP ended, the 
government introduced production-based subsidies to support AEs and increased investments 
and farmer-level projects within the scope of the GAP. The result was observed to be 
positive, in that the SAR’s agricultural production has grown more than in relatively more 
developed regions. Güven (2009) defines the agricultural policies after 2008 as a hybrid 
period reflecting a partial diversion from the neoliberal reforms. We argued that these 
policies were hybrid as they included production-based subsidies and output-based subsidies. 
However, we have showed that the share of support payments in GDP kept decreasing since 
2001, which suggests a gradual removal of subsidies. Furthermore, the government has never 
reverted to subsidised purchases via cooperatives and the Turkish Grain Board, or to the 
establishment of state-funded agricultural processors competing with market actors. 
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The neoliberal agricultural policies have manifested themselves in a contraction of land under 
cultivation, with a decrease in grain and pulses predominately responsible for this. They have 
also resulted in a decline in fallow lands, which has somewhat offset the contraction of 
cultivated lands, and an increase in fruit production, in particular by SAEs. 
Production-based support and various agricultural projects and programmes after 2008 have 
stimulated the use of innovative inputs and helped raise productivity and agricultural 
surpluses as well as an increase in crop quality, which is important for agro-processors. One 
factor behind productivity increase is the public irrigation investments within the GAP. But 
despite all this, the decline in the share of total agricultural support in GDP is evident from 
the lack of subsidies. Where relative prices of inputs to outputs have increased, the lack of 
subsidies have hit AEs and caused the transfer of increasing agricultural surplus values to big 
input providers and their vendors. Neoliberal policies have forced AEs to get credits at 
market-interest rates from banking companies or at higher interest rates from informal 
creditors, such as brokers, merchants, input vendors, etc. These market actors have therefore 
seized the agricultural surplus value created by AEs 
We have shown in Chapter 6 that the agricultural crop prices dramatically decreased after 
1980. Market-oriented policies did not bring favourable prices and income levels for farmers. 
Domestic terms of trade worked also against farmers. AEs tended not to act collectively as 
they are large and dispersed group. When the government stopped supporting cooperatives, 
AEs found themselves standing alone in the market with an inability of influencing let alone 
dictating prices. Market actors such as merchants, brokers, supermarket and agro-processors 
were taking advantage of this under free market conditions at the expense of SAEs and 
MAEs. Free market conditions did not bring free competition; merchants, brokers and agro-
processors are now pre-setting crop prices and imposing these on AEs.  
Privatisation has created negative results for AEs. The privatisation of electricity providers 
required to cut electricity subsidies, which caused agricultural productivity to decrease. Those 
who could not afford to lose productivity started to illegally use electricity for agricultural 
production. This resulted in a political conflict between privatised electricity providers and a 
category of farmers. The government responded to this problem by suspending agricultural 
support payments for those farmers, making some farmers to return to cultivating low value-
added crops. 
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The privatisation of TEKEL has severely afflicted SAEs in the SAR. The government ceased 
subsidised tobacco purchases and introduced contract farming in tobacco. Big tobacco 
companies and leaf companies enjoyed decreased tobacco prices, and as they are mostly 
buying tobacco from western regions, the SAR has been affected more than other tobacco 
producing regions. Alternative crop production did not help the SAEs. Many SAEs started to 
produce and sell illicit loose tobacco to smokers. This marked a new political conflict in 
tobacco market, different from Olson’s and Bates’ argument. Neither the tobacco companies 
nor those who produce and sell illicit tobacco have solely suffered. The former obtained the 
market share of TEKEL and increased its profits; the latter is compensating their loss from 
the removal of subsidised purchases through illicit activities and the government collects 
some taxes and get votes from tobacco producers. 
Finally, we showed that governmental interventions in the form of projects and programmes 
can be successful if they are designed well and in line with the poly-centric governance 
approach, which recommends the participation of stakeholders in their design. When 
international organisations engaged in the design and implementation of a programme, it 
produced good results as they generally give importance to the participation of stakeholders. 
However, the research has argued that in the absence of international organisations the 
government favoured large landholders rather than smallholders, as was for instance in the 
case of the Harran irrigation systems. This is because large landholders in the SAR, who are 
wealthy and invest in agro-industries and other sectors, are deemed as members of the 
dominant coalition. 
It was found that a range of government interventions have generally created positive results 
in the SAR. When the government and regional bodies devise them, they generally follow a 
market-oriented logic. However, neoliberal policies naturally benefit capitalist classes at the 
expense of especially SAEs; they have absorbed a great part of the agricultural surplus 
generated by SAEs which use innovative inputs to raise productivity. The government has 
sought to cushion the adverse effects of neoliberalism by informal mechanisms alleviating the 
poverty of smallholders via religious networks and by the expansion of non-farm jobs, so 
offsetting the loss of votes. 
8.3 Suggestions for Future Academic and Practical Endeavours 
This research was designed to critically appraise RCT with regard to state formation and 
development. The main weakness of RCT is that its scholars neglect to closely look at 
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countries with an imperial background such Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Russia, China, etc. The 
political dynamics in these countries must be thoroughly understood, and in particular the 
role of the (military) bureaucratic class. 
The research assessed intra-elite relationships and the conflicting relationships between the 
centre and the periphery. Growing reactions from the periphery to the centre or the dominant 
coalition in every country is an observable phenomenon after the 2008 economic crisis. A 
recommendation is therefore that scientific investigations must not only focus on intra-elite 
relationships but also on the peripheral movements, their dynamics and effects on intra-elite 
relationships. 
Neoliberal policies and their effects are hotly debated in academia. Scientific research must 
be deepened to comprehend to what extent these policies are effective to foster development, 
especially agricultural development. Government interventions must not be considered 
necessarily harmful for economies. The question of how we can devise development 
interventions in less developed countries must be fully explored and must be done 
empirically, as we did in this study. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Qualitative Interview and Focus Group Questions 
Appendix 1a: Qualitative Interview Questions Asked Officials at Provincial 
Agricultural Directorates 
1- How do you inform small and large agricultural enterprises of innovations in 
agricultural inputs? What kinds of activities do you generally do for this purpose? Do 
you believe that public and private extension systems work? 
2- To what extent do small and large agricultural enterprises use non-certified seeds that 
have no guarantee for disinfection? What kinds of activities do you generally do for 
preventing them from using them? What do you think about the certified seed 
support? 
3- What kinds of supports do you give to agricultural enterprises about certified, 
improved seeds? To what extent do smallholders adapt themselves to the use of 
certified seeds? What kinds of problems do they have? 
4- Can the market provide seeds, seedlings and saplings to farmers appropriate for their 
ecological conditions and socio-economic circumstances? How do you help farmers? 
What kinds of activities do you carry out to prevent the market from selling such seed 
varieties? Do you carry out or inspect performance analyses of the seeds sold in the 
market? Do you inform agricultural enterprises of the results of such analyses? 
5- How do you help farmers for soil analyses? What kinds of barriers prevent 
agricultural enterprises from getting soil analysis done? What kinds of supports do 
you give to agricultural enterprises about fertilizer and diesel? What do you think 
about certified fertilizer and diesel support payments? 
6- What kinds of machineries and equipment do smallholders generally buy? Do they 
take advantage of grant programmes for machineries and equipment? What kind of 
barriers do they confront in benefiting from such grants?  
7- Do you support smallholders about the use of common machinery pool? 
8- To what extent do smallholders adapt themselves to the implementation of 
agricultural prescription in agricultural pest management? What do you think about 
their use of pesticides and their efforts for pest management control? 
9- What kind of activities do you do for organic agriculture and good agricultural 
practices? To what extent do small and large agricultural enterprises adapt themselves 
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to such activities? What do you think about support payments given for those 
activities? 
10- Have the projects for diversifying agricultural crop cultivation become successful? If 
yes, what are the factors behind your success? If no, what are the factors behind your 
failures? 
11- What kind of barriers do small and large agricultural enterprises confront, which want 
to access irrigation water or have already accessed irrigation water? Do agricultural 
enterprises in your province use modern irrigation methods and equipment? Do you 
help them learn how to irrigate? 
12- Why do some agricultural enterprises not use irrigation water though they can access 
to it? How do you help irrigation unions in conducting their activities? 
13- Do you have an understanding of integrating land consolidation and land 
improvement works? What have you done about these issues so far? 
14- To what extent do agricultural enterprises prefer to operate under a company? What 
are the problems with incorporation? 
15- What are the problems of agricultural enterprises with the market, the Turkish Grain 
Board and sales cooperatives? 
16- Are contract farming and supply value chains prevalent in your province? If no, what 
are the problems? Do you provide any extension activities to farmers about such 
marketing possibilities? What are the factors behind failed and successful projects? 
What do you think about the regional agricultural marketing system?  
17- What kind of activities do you carry out with other stakeholders in the agricultural 
system such as research bodies, universities, cooperatives, irrigation unions, etc.? 
18- How have the water dispute, dams and reservoir constructions and irrigation projects 
affected agricultural enterprises in your province? 
19- How have the Kurdish Question and the armed conflict affected agricultural 
enterprises in your province? 
20- Would like to add extra comments to what we have talked? 
Note that the similar types of questions were also asked or adapted to interviewees in other 
official and non-governmental organisation according to their tasks or activity areas. 
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Appendix 1b: Qualitative Interview and Focus Group Questions Asked Farmers 
Questions about Agricultural Production and Sale 
1- How many decares of land do you have? Could you tell me about the general qualities 
of your agricultural enterprises? 
2- Do you use certified, improved seeds? Why? What kind of problems do you generally 
face buying and using them? What do you think about the certified seed subsidy? 
3- Do you get the soil analysis done? Why? What kind of problems do you generally 
face the soil analysis? What do you think about subsidies given for the soil analysis, 
fertilizer and diesel? 
4- What are your problems with pesticide use and purchases, and pest control 
management? What do you think about the implementation of agricultural 
prescription for pesticide use? 
5- Have you ever engaged in organic agriculture and good agricultural practices? What 
do you think about the subsidies given for these activities? 
6- Do you cultivate alternative or new types of crops? What kinds of problems do you 
generally have with cultivating alternative or new types of crops? 
7- Do you receive any loan for agricultural production? What kind of problems do you 
have with getting loans? 
8- Do you benefit from grants for agricultural machineries and equipment? What do you 
think about such grants? 
9- Do you receive extension services from public organisations or private organisations? 
What do you think about the subsidy given for private extension services? 
10- Have you ever used any machinery or equipment from a common pool? 
11-  What do you think about incorporation in agriculture? 
12- What kinds of ways do you follow to access water used for agricultural activities? 
Have you ever benefitted from any grants for purchasing modern irrigation 
equipment? 
13- Do you use information technologies for your agricultural activities? 
14- How do you sell your agricultural crops? What kinds of problem do you have with 
selling your crops? Have you ever tried to sell your crops in an alternative way? How 
are your relationships with agricultural cooperatives and Turkish Grain Board? 
15- What do you think about agricultural taxation? Do you think tax on agriculture 
hampers your activities? 
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16- Would like to add extra comments to what we have talked? 
Questions about the Water Dispute and the Use of Water in Agriculture 
1- Have your agricultural activities been affected by the water dispute over the Euphrates 
and Tigris Rivers? 
2- How have dam and reservoir constructions affected your agricultural activities? 
3- Have you ever accessed the irrigation water provided in the scope of the South-eastern 
Anatolia Project? If yes, how could you benefit from the irrigation water, and what 
are your problems with accessing and using irrigation water? If no, what do you think 
about water works on agricultural irrigation? 
4- How has the use of irrigation water influenced your agricultural activities in terms of 
innovations? 
5- Could you share your experiences with irrigation unions? 
6- Would like to add extra comments to what we have talked? 
Questions about the Relationship between the Kurdish Question and Agriculture 
1- Could you tell me about how the Kurdish Question has affected your agricultural 
activities? 
2- Has the armed conflict harmed your agricultural enterprise, land, vineyard, orchards 
and agricultural facilities?  
3- Have the Kurdish Question and the armed conflict affected the use of new or modern 
agricultural inputs such as certified improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.? 
4- Have the Kurdish Question and the armed conflict affected your lending money from 
banking companies? 
5- Do you believe that you have not benefitted from public agricultural services because 
of the Kurdish Question, such as general services and extension services? 
6- Have you ever experienced any problems as purchasing agricultural inputs from the 
market during the armed conflict? 
7- How has the village guard system affected your agricultural activities? 
8- How has the Kurdish Question affected the sale of agricultural crops in the market? 
9- Did you have to leave your village because of the armed conflict? What have you 
experienced or learnt about agriculture in the cities to which you migrated? 
10- Would like to add extra comments to what we have talked? 
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Appendix 2: The Cities and the Towns Visited in the Fieldwork 
Appendix 2a: The Entire List of the Cities and the Towns Visited 
Cities Towns
Adiyaman Central District
Adiyaman Kahta
Adiyaman Samsat
Batman Central District
Batman Gercus
Batman Sason
Diyarbakir Sur
Diyarbakir Lice
Diyarbakir Silvan
Diyarbakir Yenisehir
Diyarbakir Cinar
Gaziantep Nizip
Kilis Polateli
Kilis Central District
Mardin Kiziltepe
Mardin Nusaybin
Mardin Derik
Mardin Central District
Mardin Midyat
Sanliurfa Siverek
Sanliurfa Central District
Sanliurfa Harran
Sanliurfa Hilvan  
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Appendix 2b: The List of Towns with High Conflict Rates and Those of Which Were 
Visited During the Fieldwork to Talk about the Kurdish Question (Marked in Yellow) 
Cities Towns
Sirnak Merkez
Sirnak Uludere
Diyarbakir Silvan
Sirnak Cizre
Siirt Pervari
Mardin Nusaybin
Sirnak Idil
Sirnak Silopi
Mardin Midyat
Batman Sason*
Mardin Kiziltepe
Siirt Eruh
Diyarbakir Lice
Mardin Dargecit
Batman Merkez
Diyarbakir Kulp
Diyarbakir Yenisehir
Batman Kozluk
Sirnak Beytussebab
Mardin Savur
Siirt Kurtalan
Diyarbakir Bismil
Siirt Baykan
Siirt Sirvan
Mardin Omerli
Batman Gercus
Diyarbakir Sur
Diyarbakir Ergani
Mardin Mazidagi**
Sirnak Guclukonak  
*I talked with a farmer in Sason about the Kurdish Question on the phone. 
**I went to Derik of Mardin on the recommendation of the local people, instead of Mazidagi. They 
told me that Derik had been more affected than Mazidagi during the armed conflict. According to my 
data, Derik is slightly below the average conflict rate, thus being excluded from the list above. In fact, 
the difference between the two towns in terms of conflict rates is narrow. Based on this fact, I chose to 
listen to the local people and visited Derik, around 14 miles away from Mazidagi. 
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Appendix 3: The Lists of the Interviewees 
Code Organisation Interview Date
O1 Adiyaman Agricultural Directorate 23 September 2014
O2 Adiyaman Agricultural Directorate 23 September 2014
O3 Mardin Agricultural Directorate 05 May 2015
O4 Mardin Agricultural Directorate 05 May 2015
O5 Mardin Agricultural Directorate 05 May 2015
O6 Sanliurfa Agricultural Directorate 24 April 2015
O7 Adiyaman Agricultural Directorate 22 September 2014
O8 Diyarbakir Agricultural Directorate 24 September 2014
O9 Gaziantep Agricultural Directorate 30 September 2014
O10 - O37 Mardin Agricultural Directorate 05 May 2015
O11 Sanliurfa Agricultural Directorate 28 April 2015
O12 Adiyaman Agricultural Directorate 19 April 2015
O13 Gaziantep Agricultural Directorate 30 September 2014
O14 Mardin Agricultural Directorate 04 May 2015
O15 Sanliurfa Agricultural Directorate 28 April 2014
O16 Adiyaman Agricultural Directorate 22 September 2014
O17 Mardin Agricultural Directorate 04 May 2015
O18 Mardin Agricultural Directorate 04 May 2015
O19 Sanliurfa Agricultural Directorate 29 April 2015
O20 Diyarbakir Agricultural Directorate 24 September 2014
O21 Harran Agricultural Directorate 27 August 2015
O22 Kilis Agricultural Directorate (Conversation) 20 April 2015
O23 Adiyaman State Hydraulics Works 06 July 2015
O24 Sanliurfa State Hydraulics Works 24 July 2015
O25 Adiyaman Turkish Grain Board 18 September 2014
O26 Diyarbakir Turkish Grain Board 26 September 2014
O27 Dicle Development Agency 07 May 2015
O28 The Regional Directorate of the GAP 28 July 2015
O29 The Regional Directorate of the GAP 28 July 2015
O30 Gaziantep Ipekyolu Development Agency Office 24 April 2015
O31 Ipekyolu Development Agency 24 May 2015
O32 Ipekyolu Development Agency 24 April 2015
O33 Kilis Ipekyolu Development Agency Office 21 April 2015
O34 Kilis Ipekyolu Development Agency Office 21 April 2015
O35 The Ministery of Food, Agriculture, Livestock 06 August 2014
O36 Agricultural Rural Development Support Agency - Mardin Office 07 May 2015
The Complete List of the Officials Interviewed
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Code City - Town Type of Interview Interview Date
F1 Diyarbakir - Sur Individual Interview 14 July 2015
F2 Diyarbakir - Lice Focus Group (2 people) 14 July 2015
F3 Diyarbakir – Lice Individual Interview 14 July 2015
F4 Diyarbakir-Silvan Individual Interview 14 July 2015
F5 S.urfa – Siverek Focus Group (6 people) 24 July 2015
F6 S.urfa - Siverek Individual Interview 24 July 2015
F7 Diyarbakir - Yenisehir Focus Group (3 people) 24 July 2015
F8 Mardin-  Kiziltepe Individual Interview 26 July 2015
F9 Mardin-Nusaybin Focus Group (3 people)¹ 26 July 2015
F10 Mardin - Derik Individual Interview 27 July 2015
F11 Mardin - Derik Individual Interview 27 July 2015
F12 Mardin- Central District Individual Interview 27 July 2015
F13 Batman-Gercus Individual Interview 28 July 2015
F14 Mardin - Midyat Individual Interview 28 July 2015
F15 Sanliurfa - Central District Focus Group (3 people) 26 August 2015
F16 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview 29 August 2015
F17 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview 06 September 2014
F18 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview 05 July 2015
F19 Adiyaman-Kahta Conversation 05 July 2015
F20 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview 05 July 2015
F21 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview 06 July 2015
F22 Adiyaman - Samsat Focus Group (3 people) 07 July 2015
F23
Adiyaman- The Association of Tobacco
                  Producers
Focus Group (4 people) 08 September 2014
F24 Adiyaman - Kahta Individual Interview 07 July 2015
F25 Adiyaman - Central District Focus Group (2 people) 08 July 2015
F26 Gaziantep - Nizip Focus Group (3 people) 01 July 2015
F27 Batman - Gercus Conversation 28 July 2015
F28 Batman- Central District Conversation 28 July 2015
F29 Diyarbakir - Yenisehir Conversation 13 July 2015
F30 Gaziantep - Nizip Individual Interview 01 July 2015
F31 Kilis - Polateli Individual Interview 03 July 2015
F32 Kilis - Central District Focus Group (3 people) 20 April 2015
F33 Mardin - Cenral District Conversation 26 July 2015
F34 Sanliurfa - Harran Individual Interview 27 August 2015
F35 Sanliurfa - Hilvan Conversation 22 September 2014
F36 Diyarbakir - Sur Conversation 24 June 2015
F37 Batman- Sason
Individual Interview
 via Phone
17 June 2016
F38 Diyarbakir-Cinar Conversation 26 July 2015
The List of the Farmers Interviewed
 
¹It started as an individual interview but then turned to focus group with the participation of that 
villager’s two sons, one of which is an agricultural engineer and the other is an urban dweller visiting 
his village in every summer.  
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Code Positions Interview Date
N1- Ahmet Fatih Simsek Adiyaman Agricultural Credit Cooperative 16 September 2014
N2 Cukobirlik Agricultural Cooperative 29 April 2015
N3 Diyarbakir Agricultural Credit Cooperative 25 September 2014
N4 Kilis Agricultural Credit Cooperative 20 April 2015
N5 Adiyaman Chamber of Agriculture 17 September 2014
N6 The Association of Wheat Producers, Mardin 08 May 2015
N7 The Center of Chamber of Agriculture, Ankara 07 August 2014
N8 Adiyaman Chamber of Commerce Email
N9 Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce 11 May 2015
N10 Gaziantep Chamber of Industry 22 April 2015
N11 Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce 01 October 2014
N12 Kilis Chamber of Commerce and Industry 21 April 2014
N13 Sanliurfa Commodity Exchange 30 April 2015
R1 The Research Institute for Pistachio 01 October 2014
R2 The Institute of Agricultural Pest Control 11 May 2015
R3 GAP Directorate of International Agricultural Research 29 April 2015
R4 GAP Directorate of International Agricultural Research 29 April 2015
R5 GAP Directorate of International Agricultural Research 29 April 2015
R6 GAP Directorate of International Agricultural Research 24 July 2015
R7 GAP Directorate of International Agricultural Research 24 July 2015
R9 Gaziantep Techno Park (Personal Conversation) 05 September 2014
Mehmet Simsek Harran University 22 July 2015
B1 Private Advisory Company 13 July 2015
B2 CRC Electronic 15 December 2014
B3 Tarimsalpazarlama.com 18 December 2014
The List of the Other People Interviewed that Play a Part in the Region's Agriculture
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Appendix 4: The Farmers Interviewed, Their Agricultural Enterprise Sizes and Land 
Utilisation 
 
 
Code City - Town Type of Interview Intervieews AE Size Land Utilisation
F1 Diyarbakir - Sur Individual Interview Farmer 800 da (LAE) Rain-fed Farming
F3 Diyarbakir – Lice Individual Interview Farmer 1000 da (LAE) Irrigated Farming
F4 Diyarbakir-Silvan Individual Interview
Farmer & The owner of an 
agroindustrial firm
125 (SAE) Rain-fed Farming
F5 S.urfa – Siverek Focus Group (5 people) Farmers
1st - 100 da (MAE)
2nd - 7 da (SAE)
3nd - 12 da (SAE)
4th - 9 da (SAE)
5th - 8 da (SAE)
1st - 60 da under Rain-fed 
and 40 da under Irrigated 
farming
40 da of his land is managed 
by the informal pertnership 
of all the farmers
the Others- Irrigated farming
F6 S.urfa - Siverek Individual Interview Farmer 100 da (MAE)
Partly Rain-fed +
 Partly Irrigated Farming
F7 Diyarbakir - Yenisehir Focus Group (3 people)
1st- Farmer &
Agricultural Input Seller
2nd and 3rd - Farmer
1st- 725 da (LAE)
2nd- 1000 da (lAE)
3rd- 1200 da
1st- Irrigated Farming
2nd- Irrigated Farming
3rd- 240 da under Irrigated 
Farming; the Rest under 
Rain-fed Farming 
F8 Mardin-  Kiziltepe Individual Interview Farmer 50 da (SAE) Irrigated Farming
F9 Mardin-Nusaybin Focus Group (3 people)¹
1st - Farmer
2nd - Agricultural Engineer
3rd - The Farmer's Son
60 da (SAE) Rain-fed Farming
F10 Mardin - Derik Individual Interview
Farmer + Official in the 
Township 
Agricultural Directorate
1400 (LAE)
 (Partly managed under 
tenancy)
Partly Rain-fed +
 Partly Irrigated Farming
F11 Mardin - Derik Individual Interview Farmer 660 da (LAE)
Partly Irrigated + 
Partly Rain-fedFarming
F12 Mardin- Central District Individual Interview Farmer SAE Rain-fed Farming
F13 Batman-Gercus Individual Interview Farmer 90 da (SAE)
10 da under Irrigated 
Farming
+ 80 da under Rain-fed 
Farming
F14 Mardin - Midyat Individual Interview Farmer 10 da (SAE) Irrigated Farming
F15 Sanliurfa - Central District Focus Group (3 people) Farmers
1st -30 da (SAE)
2nd - 110 da (MAE)
3rd - 150 da (MAE)
 Irrigated farming
F16 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview Farmer 150 da (MAE) Irrigated Farming
F17 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview Farmer 130 da (SAE)
Mostly Rain-fed Farming + 
Partly Irrigated Orchard
F18 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview Farmer 60 da (SAE) Rain-fed Farming
F19 Adiyaman-Kahta Conversation Farmer 180 da (MAE) Rain-fed Farming
F20 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview Farmer 200 da (MAE) Irrigated Farming
F21 Adiyaman - Central District Individual Interview Farmer 130 da (SAE)
Orchard +
Rain-fed farming land
F22 Adiyaman - Samsat Focus Group (3 people) Farmers
1st - 90da (SAE)
2st - 50 da (SAE)
3rd- 200 (MAE)
Rain-fed Farming
F23
Adiyaman- The Association 
of Tobacco Producers
Focus Group (4 people)
1st Farmer & The Head of 
the Association
the Others - Farmers
1st - 100 da (MAE)
the Others - < 50 da 
(SAE)
1st - Irrigated Farming 
25 da (SAE) Irrigated FarmingF2 Diyarbakir - Lice 
Focus Group (2 people 
from the same family)
1st- Agricultural engineer 
(daughter)
2nd- Farmer (mom)
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F24 Adiyaman - Kahta Individual Interview Farmer 60 da (SAE) Rain-fed Farming
F25 Adiyaman - Central District Focus Group (2 people)
1st - Farmer & 
Head of the Village
2nd- Farmer
350 da (MAE)
100 (SAE)
Rain-fed Farming
F26 Gaziantep - Nizip Focus Group (3 people) Farmers
1st - 10 da orchard + 
around 40 da non-
irrigated land (SAE)
2- 10 da (SAE)
3- 15 da (SAE)
Non- Irrigated 
Pistachio Orchard
F27 Batman - Gercus Conversation Farmer Around 80 da (SAE) Rain-fed Farming
F28 Batman- Central District Conversation Farmer SAE Irrigated Farming
F29 Diyarbakir - Yenisehir Conversation Farmer SAE Irrigated Farming
F30 Gaziantep - Nizip Individual Interview Farmer 120 da (MAE)
20 da Irrigated Orchard
100 da Rain-fed Farming
F31 Kilis - Polateli Individual Interview
Farmer+ the Owner of a Shop 
in the City Centre
70 da (SAE)
Orchard and Vineyard 
(Rain-fed)
F32 Kilis - Central District Focus Group (3 people)
1st - Farmer
2st Farmer
3rd- Official in an Agricultural 
Credit Cooperative
1st - 200 da (MAE)
2nd- 3000 da (LAE)
1st - Partly Rain-fed
 + Partly Irrigated Farming
2nd- Rain-fed Farming
F33 Mardin - Cenral District Individual Interview The Son of a Farmer SAE Orchard
F34 Sanliurfa - Harran Individual Interview Farmer 360 da (LAE) Irrigated Farming
F35 Sanliurfa - Hilvan Conversation Farmer SAE Irrigated Farming
F36 Diyarbakir - Sur Conversation
Farmer & Advisor 
in an Agricultural Investment 
Advisory Firm
60da (SAE) Rain-fed Farming
F37 Batman- Sason
Individual Interview
 via Phone
Farmer SAE Irrigated Farming
F38 Diyarbakir-Cinar Conversation Farmer 60 da (SAE) Irrigated Farming
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